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Abstract 
This thesis is mainly interested in the legitimation of controversial past actions and/ or 
decisions. The thesis examines the discursive means used to regain legitimacy in contexts 
of controversy. The thesis approaches Hassan Nasrallah’s argumentative discourse from an 
interdisciplinary perspective. It, therefore, proposes a model for incorporating pragma-
dialectics into the analytical toolkit of the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA). 
Moreover, insights from cognitive pragmatics, in particular research related to epistemic 
vigilance, are incorporated into the model. The main objective of the model is to investigate 
the construction of in/out-groups through carrying out argumentative analysis.  
To this end, four speeches delivered by Nasrallah at moments of heightened controversy 
are analysed based on the proposed model and the procedural steps for implementation. 
The findings are then discussed in order to evaluate the feasibility of the proposed model 
and Nasrallah’s retrospective argumentation.  
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Hizbollah: Historical and sociopolitical context 
1. Introduction  
In this chapter, I present an overview of Hizbollah’s emergence, rise to power and the 
alleged transformation in its political ideology. The chapter traces the major political 
events that are pivotal in the movement’s transformation and ascension to power. My aim 
is to pinpoint the main ideological and political tenets that played a role in the formation 
of Hizbollah as a resistance movement. This step seems crucial because it provides the 
ideological and political background against which the speeches are analysed. It is also 
important in examining how specific articulations of Hizbollah’s nationalist identity are 
promoted, by its supreme leader, Hasan Nasrallah, to appeal to multiple audiences. 
Moreover, the chapter offers a snapshot of unilateral actions and decisions taken by 
Nasrallah (or on behalf of his political party), which were severely criticised. This leads 
the discussion to the main interests of this thesis and guiding research questions. Finally, 
the chapter concludes by briefly outlining the content of the thesis.  
2. The emergence of Hizbollah 
There has never been a consensus regarding the legitimacy of Hizbollah’s (translates as: 
the Party of God) armed wing, neither internationally nor at the national or pan-Arab 
levels.1 In contrast, the acknowledgement of Hizbollah’s political power and its role as 
                                                          
1 The US and most European countries differentiate between Hizbollah’s political agenda and its military 
wing. The former is considered legitimate, while military actions, in particular those that are carried against 
Israel, are classified as acts of terror (Harb & Leenders, 2005). At the domestic level, opponents consider 
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one of the major actors in the region, especially after the 2006 Israeli war on Lebanon, is 
undisputed (Alagha, 2011; Matar & Khatib, 2014). Researchers interested in the 
‘Hizbollah phenomenon’ attribute the establishment of Hizbollah and its unprecedented 
rise to power to various sociopolitical factors. Hizbollah emerged in the context of 
continued marginalization and deprivation of Lebanese Shiites, which lasted from the 
establishment of the Lebanese Republic after gaining independence from France in 1943 
until the late eighties, when Hizbollah successfully brought them out of “political and 
social despair by directly challenging Lebanon’s longstanding internal political 
hierarchy” (Dalack, 2010, p. 4).  
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 is, undoubtedly, one of the most important 
factors in the creation of Hizbollah as an Islamist-jihadi group fighting Israeli occupation 
and repeated aggressions, as well as resisting Western/US imperialism, colonialism, and 
domination (Alagha, 2006; Bergh, 2015; Matar & Khatib, 2014). Indeed, the Israeli 
occupation of South Lebanon and the western province of the Beqaa Valley, as Saad-
Ghorayeb (2003) asserts, constitutes the very backbone of Hizbollah’s intellectual 
structure.2 
 
                                                          
Hizbollah as serving Iran’s interests with a total disregard for Lebanon’s security and stability. Recently, 
and after Hizbollah’s intervention in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, most Gulf states consider Hizbollah to be a 
terrorist organization. As a result, they have imposed sanctions on its leading officials. In contrast, 
Hizbollah’s proponents, whether at the national or pan-Arab levels, consider Hizbollah to be an exemplary 
movement of heroic and patriotic deeds, with many attributing mystical characteristics to its leader (Matar, 
2015). 
2 In contrast, Alagha (2006; 2011) argues that the emergence of Hizbollah cannot only be related to the 
influence of the Iranian Revolution and the Israeli occupation. Alagha maintains that Shiite political 
activism and liberation movements which started with Imam Sadr in the 1960s also played a role in the 
social and ideological development of Hizbollah. 
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3. Hizbollah’s ideology  
During the first decade of its establishment (1983–1992), Hizbollah adopted an 
exclusionary religious ideology that resonates well within the Lebanese Shiite 
constituency (the primary audience of Hizbollah). To this end, Hizbollah relied heavily on 
religious and symbolic references that appeal to Shiites – especially the Karbala narrative 
and the symbolic martyrdom of Imam Hussein (Alagha, 2006; Houri, 2012; Matar et al., 
2014; Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002). The objective is to instil in Lebanese Shiites a continued 
need to strive for social justice and to invigorate an unremitting resolve for defiance and 
resistance (jihad) attained only through sacrifice and martyrdom – the main themes of the 
narrative.    
Hizbollah is considered, by many political analysts and local and international news 
outlets, as well as opponents, to be one of the main offshoots of the Islamic Revolution, 
functioning as “Iran’s pawn” in the Arab world (Dalack, 2010, p. 4). Hizbollah published 
its first manifesto, The Open Letter, in 1985. In this text, Hizbollah explicitly avows its 
ideological connection to Iran and defines itself as an Islamist-jihadi movement that seeks 
to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon (Khatib, 2011; Matar & Khatib, 2014; Norton, 
2007; Wiegand, 2009). In the Open Letter, Hizbollah invokes the religious term ‘Umma’ 
(Muslim nation) to appeal to Muslims, in Lebanon and abroad, and at the same time 
underscores the Shiite/ Iranian dimension of the movement.3 The manifesto states: 
                                                          
3 The term Umma presupposes that the advocated policies or practices are done for the sake of reunifying 
and consolidating Muslims, not only at the pan-Arab level but around the world. In a nutshell, Islam is 
taken as a vehicle to unite the majority of Lebanese (Sunnis and Shiites), as well as Muslims around the 
world.    
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Each one of us (members of Hizbollah) is a combat soldier when the call of jihad 
(resistance/ struggle) demands it and each of us undertakes his task in the battle in 
accordance with the legitimate and religious responsibility of the Wilayat al-Faqih, 
the leader.4 (quoted in Alagha, 2006, p. 224)  
Working under the banner of the ‘Guardianship of Jurisprudence’ (Wilayat al-Faqih) 
means that Hizbollah must abide by the ideological tenets governing this concept and 
articulate a political and religious language that conforms with the Islamic Revolution’s 
rhetoric. Among these is the adoption of a Manichean worldview which constructs the 
West, especially the US, as the source of evil (the Great Satan) and Israel as an 
illegitimate entity that must be eradicated. Indeed, Islamic revolutionaries were, as 
KhosraviNik maintains, “the most radical in their Us vs Them categorisation, as they saw 
the Iranian Revolution as the first historical step in the struggle against the corrupt, 
colonial West” (2015, p. 26). 
In Hizbollah’s view, the US and the Zionist enemy/ Israel are the main oppressors against 
whom jihad is not only legitimate but also a divine and moral duty. As such, jihad is a 
tool to defend and empower those who are oppressed and do not have the capacity to 
defend themselves against aggression and injustice (Alagha, 2011, p. 85, 115–118; 
Dalack, 2010).5 As a consequence, anti-Zionism, anti-imperialism/anti-colonialism, pan-
                                                          
4 Adopting Imam Khomeini’s ‘Wilayat al-Faqih’ ideology entails Hizbollah regarding the Imam as the 
legitimate successor of the Prophet by virtue of his epistemic competence and leadership qualities; 
therefore, Hizbollah has a religious obligation to abide by the (religious and political) guidelines set by the 
Imam (Alagha, 2006, p. 80–98; Harb & Leenders, 2005). 
5 The term oppressed refers not only to the Shiite constituency, which has suffered political marginalization, 
but also to oppressed nations across the globe who face US/Western imperialism and domination, thereby 
adopting an inclusive perspective in the pursuit of political and social justice (Alagha, 2011; Dalack, 2010; 
Khatib et al., 2014).     
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Islamism, independence from superpowers, resistance, social justice, defiance, and 
freedom are permanent themes – or ‘master frames’ (Karagiannis, 2009) – that define 
Hizbollah’s rhetoric. This political ideology, thereof, signifies the contours based on 
which a political party is labelled as an insider/ally or outsider/enemy. At this stage, the 
‘Other’ or the enemy, against whom acts of resistance/jihad are legitimate, lies outside 
Lebanese territory, namely, Israel for its occupation of Lebanese territories and the US for 
its subversive actions in Lebanon.  
4. Hizbollah’s political transformation  
Hasan Nasrallah was appointed Hizbollah’s secretary general in 1992, three years after 
signing the Taif Accord which brought seventeen years of civil war to an end. The 
agreement redistributed power equally between Christians and Muslims and provided a 
road map for the different sects (18 religious sects comprise the Lebanese community) 
and political factions (communists, liberals, Islamists, Progressive Socialists, Arab 
nationalists etc.) to become involved in the political process. As a consequence, Hizbollah 
had to shift its status, from an armed sectarian faction fighting Israel to a mainstream 
political party working within the status quo political system (Alagha, 2006, 2011; 
Hamdar, 2013; Khatib, 2011; Wiegand, 2009).6 For example, Hizbollah’s participation in 
parliamentary and municipal elections, as well as its role in assigning ministers who are 
either active members in Hizbollah or affiliate with it, is intended, as Matar et al. (2014) 
                                                          
6 After the Taif agreement, pro- and anti-Syrian governments endorsed Hizbollah as a resistance 
organisation, i.e. as a national resistance movement, and legitimated Hizbollah’s right to use military force 
in its struggle against Israel based on international law, United Nations Security Council resolutions and the 
1989 Fourth Geneva Convention (Dalack, 2010; Wiegand, 2009).  
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argue, to strengthen its identity as a national party and to enhance its domestic position as 
a civilian political party. 
The ‘Lebanonisation’ of Hizbollah (Alagha, 2011; Hamdar, 201 3; Wiegand, 2009), i.e. 
the transformation of Hizbollah into a national political party by endorsing the existing 
political system and participating in its political institutions, necessitates the adoption of 
an all-encompassing rhetoric to address different Lebanese parties and their audiences. To 
this end, Hizbollah’s nationalist and populist discourse articulates an inclusive political 
ideology (Alagha, 2011) whereby Hizbollah’s nationalism is not only defined in terms of 
a US-dominated global context, but also encompasses other relevant dimensions that 
project the specific nature of the Lebanese context (Deeb, 2008).7 Houri (2012, p. 44–47) 
sums up the different dimensions of Hizbollah’s nationalism. These are: the inclusion of 
Shiites in the national narrative, a focus on social disparities in the country, liberating and 
defending Lebanon (anti-Zionism, anti-colonialism etc.), Arabism, and Islamism.8  
In fact, many researchers attribute the evolution of Hizbollah, from an Islamist resistance 
movement working in dissociation from the Lebanese political system to a nationalist and 
                                                          
7 Nationalism in the Levant is mainly based on two ideological strands: Arabism and anti-colonialism. In 
the Lebanese context, the former signifies that Lebanon is part of the wider Arab world; therefore, its 
political actions should be in conformity with the stipulations of the Arab League and should serve, and 
certainly not jeopardize, the interests of other Arab states. The latter means that Lebanon is part of the 
resistance block that encompasses Iran, Syria and Hamas in Palestine who resist US and Western 
domination, imperialism and intervention. Nationalism in the Orient carries different ideological 
assumptions to its Western counterpart. 
8 Pan-Islamism, as Karagiannis (2009) observes, seeks to diffuse the tensions between Sunnis and Shiites 
and to bridge the gap between Arabs and Iranians. Therefore, it is another strategy used by Nasrallah to 
address and mobilize an international audience. Karagiannis also notes that the frame of anti-globalisation, 
as well as the notion of the oppressed, aims to attract the sympathy and support of leftists and human rights 




populist party, to Nasrallah’s leadership (Matar, 2008; 2014), in particular, his nationalist 
rhetoric, charisma, and authority (see Chapter 2, section 3).  
5. Polarising the political sphere: Creating enemies  
Hizbollah’s enthusiasm to integrate the movement into the Lebanese political sphere, a 
process also known as ‘political jihad’, did not preclude military jihad. In fact, inexorable 
military acts of resistance against Israel – which lasted for almost fifteen years – resulted 
in the unconditional withdrawal of Israeli troops from most of South Lebanon on 24 May 
2000, known as ‘Liberation Day’. Most Arabs and (if not all) Lebanese read this as the 
first Arab armed group in history to defeat and compel Israel to unconditionally abandon 
occupied lands. Therefore, the liberation validated and authenticated Hizbollah’s image as 
a populist and national party that represents the interests of most Lebanese (Khatib, 2011; 
Matar et al., 2014).  
From a different perspective, Hizbollah’s opponents saw the liberation as a pretext to call 
for the disarmament of Hizbollah, since the main reason which led to Hizbollah 
possessing weapons was no longer valid (Israeli occupation). At the international level, 
Hizbollah’s opponents lobbied for the ratification of UN Resolution 1559, on 4 
September 2004, which commands Syria to withdraw its troops from Lebanon and disarm 
all Lebanese militias, including Hizbollah. The political clashes escalated, as Hizbollah 
regards the Resolution and those who support it as an existential threat. From this point 
onwards, Hizbollah started to refer explicitly to its (political) opponents as traitors and 
Israeli collaborators. Thus, Hizbollah’s opponents become enemies of national unity 
(Høigilt, 2007; Khatib, 2014). Warning opponents of the punishment awaiting them, 
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Nasrallah declared in his speech on 25 May 2005 that he would consider ‘any hand 
(internal opponents) that tries to seize our (Hizbollah) weapons an Israeli hand, and cut it 
off’.  
Hizbollah’s image as a national party suffered hugely in the wake of the 2005 Cedar 
Revolution following the assassination of former prime minister Rafic Hariri (a 
prominent Sunni figure) in February of the same year. Hariri’s proponents, supported by 
the international community (specifically, France and the US), initially accused Syria – 
Hizbollah’s ally – of orchestrating the assassination. Mass rallies were organised by 
Hizbollah’s political rivals, who formed the anti-Syrian (pro-American) group known as 
the 14th of March coalition.9 Demonstrators demanded the withdrawal of Syrian troops, 
ending Syrian interference and influence in Lebanon, and establishment of an 
international tribunal to bring culprits to justice. Public pressure and international support 
succeeded in making Syria withdraw its troops from Lebanon in April 2005 and 
establishing the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon (henceforth, STL) to investigate 
Hariri’s assassination.  
In response, pro-Syrian demonstrations were staged by Hizbollah and its allies, who 
formed the 8th of March coalition or the resistance block.10 Both parties launched political 
campaigns to justify their political stance and delegitimize the status of their opponents. 
Therefore, Hizbollah – as the major actor in the 8th of March coalition – portrayed the 
opposition (the 14th of March party) as a Western-backed group whose actions (e.g. the 
                                                          
9 The 14th of March party is an anti-Syrian/ Iranian and pro-American block composed of a Sunni majority 
and major Christian political parties, as well as Druze (a Muslim sect).     
10 The 8th of March party is a pro-Syrian/ Iranian and anti-American block. It is primarily led by Hizbollah 




STL and calling for Syria to withdraw its troops from Lebanon, among others) realize US 
plans in the region. In contrast, the 14th of March party branded Hizbollah as an Iranian 
armed wing and its actions as serving Iran’s interests in its struggle with the superpowers 
regarding its nuclear programme.  
The feud over the establishment of the STL turned into an open political confrontation, 
especially after leaked reports, from the general attorney’s office and some international 
media outlets, revealed that the STL would indict four members of Hizbollah. Hizbollah 
perceived the would-be indictment of its members in terms of a US and Israeli conspiracy 
aimed at vilifying Hizbollah’s regional and national reputation (the context of the speech 
analysed in Chapter 8). Hizbollah framed its objection to the STL by claiming that its 
members were wrongly and unfairly accused, thus Hizbollah had no alternative but to 
defend itself against injustice.  
The Israeli war in 2006 increased the cleavages between the two adversaries. The 14th of 
March party criticised Hizbollah’s unilateral action: the kidnapping of two Israeli 
soldiers. They considered the action to be an uncalculated adventure intended to take the 
Lebanese, unwillingly, into an open war with Israel (the context of the speech analysed in 
Chapter 5). Amid the turmoil, Hizbollah’s opponents (the 14th of March coalition) re-
emphasized the need to disarm Hizbollah to prevent any future escalations with Israel. 
Nasrallah saw this demand, in his speech on 14 August 2006, as ‘immoral, incorrect and 
inappropriate’, and claimed that such a call came at the ‘wrong timing on the 
psychological and the moral level, particularly before the cease-fire’.  
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The country was devastated by the brutality of the Israeli aggression, which lasted for 33 
days; however, Hizbollah’s endurance, steadfastness and exercise of restraint towards its 
opponents allowed Hizbollah to be seen as victorious. Hizbollah’s victory (Nasrallah 
declared it a ‘Divine Victory’) in the 2006 Israeli war further substantiated Hizbollah’s 
image as a pan-Arab, populist, and national party. At the domestic level, the war 
increased the polarisation between the two camps, as it failed to unify them under the 
banner of defending Lebanon against Israeli aggression.    
After the war, Nasrallah called for the establishment of a national unity government that 
would guarantee more representation for Hizbollah’s coalition (the 8th of March group), 
thereby giving the group the ability to veto decisions threatening Hizbollah or Syria (the 
context of the speech analysed in Chapter 6). Faced with rejection from the pro-American 
government, Nasrallah called for widespread demonstrations and sit-ins, which lasted for 
almost two years. The tension exacerbated with the resignation of six pro-Hizbollah 
ministers in an attempt to bring about the collapse of Fouad Siniora’s government, 
leaving the constitutional legitimacy of the Cabinet under question.11 Nasrallah stated that 
the refusal of the 14th of March coalition to form a national unity government was ‘an 
extension of Israel’s war against Lebanon […] so we (Hizbollah) will fight today, but 
with other weapons and other rules (demonstrations and resignations)’. Thus, Nasrallah 
placed his internal political opponents on the same level as Israel (Khatib, 2014), namely, 
as an internal threat to national unity, which he needed to fend off.   
                                                          
11The Lebanese constitution stipulates that for a government to gain legitimacy, every major sect should be 
fairly represented in the Cabinet so as to comply with the requirements of consensus democracy.   
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The political stalemate evolved into a violent confrontation following two decisions taken 
by the Siniora’s government, which Hizbollah considered a declaration of war (the 
context of the speech analysed in Chapter 7). This was the first time since the end of the 
civil war that Hizbollah had used weapons inside Lebanon and against other Lebanese, 
despite Nasrallah’s earlier promise that the group’s weapons would not be used inside 
Lebanon. The confrontation ended with the signing of the Doha agreement in May 2008, 
which eventually provided Hizbollah and its allies with veto power to monitor 
governments’ decisions. Nonetheless, Hizbollah’s ‘Occupation of Beirut’ demarcates a 
decisive moment in Lebanon’s present history, as violence was used against political 
rivals. Commenting on the severity of the incident, Larbi (2010) posits that Hizbollah’s 
resistance is not only against a foreign occupier (Israel) or a neo-colonial US-led world, 
but also against an anti-resistance-bloc, represented by the 14th of March party. Høigilt 
(2007) observes that Hizbollah’s discourse revolves around an axis of inclusion and 
exclusion, but that its parameters had changed since 1991, i.e. from an outside-the-border 
enemy (Israel) to an internal or domestic enemy (the 14th of March party).  
Resistance, as the most important pillar of Hizbollah’s populist identity, became, as Houri 
(2012, p. 57) maintains, the “new frontier that would […] construct a new hegemonic 
identity and a populist discourse which will articulate new frontiers of inclusion and 
exclusion”. Liberation, defiance, social justice, dignity, and pride are the other 
dimensions of Hizbollah’s populist identity, articulated via Hizbollah’s discourse as a 
means to unify a number of heterogeneous demands and audiences (ibid.). In fact, Alagha 
(2011) argues that Hizbollah’s political ideology always calls for unity on both the 
Islamic and domestic fronts. I argue, however, that Nasrallah’s discourse oscillates 
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between calling for unification and solidarity (i.e. the integrative function of discourse, 
see Chapter 2, section 2) achieved via identity-constituting rhetoric and discriminatory 
formulations that target the 14th of March party, thereby increasing the cleavages among 
political rivals (i.e. the disintegrative function). In other words, the discursive 
construction of Hizbollah’s hegemonic national identity necessitates the discursive 
destruction (Wodak et al., 2009) of a sub/intra-national identity construct, i.e. the 
ideological precepts of the 14th of March party. In the following section, I elaborate the 
main interests of this thesis by pointing out some aspects of Nasrallah’s discourse that 
motivated me to conduct this research. 
6. Guiding research interests and goals 
Inasmuch as a national identity is a unifying mechanism, it also divides nations and 
citizens of nation states (Wodak & de Cillia, 2007). Billig (1995) elucidates that to be a 
member of an in-group entails a “categorical distinction from an ‘out group’. The 
imagining of ‘our’ community involves imagining, either implicitly or explicitly, ‘them’ 
from whom ‘we’ are distinct” (p. 66). In this view, the construction of national identity is 
not only based on strategies that harmonise the in-group, but also on stereotyping and 
negative Other-presentation to villainize the out-group (see Chapter 4, section 2) in order 
to justify preferential or discriminatory practices (Wodak et al., 2009). Therefore, the 
construction of an internal enemy (the 14th of March coalition) and the discursive means 
that Nasrallah exploits in profiling this enemy is one of the interests of this thesis. In 
analysing the discourse of Nasrallah, I intend to examine how political power is exercised 
through language and how certain ideologies are replaced by others. It is in this respect 
that the Discourse-Historical Approach (henceforth, DHA) to critical discourse studies 
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(henceforth, CDS) is chosen as the overarching framework (see Chapter 3, section 2.1). 
The DHA is a useful analytical tool through which opaque representations of power, 
domination, and control, as manifested in language use, are exposed (Reisigl & Wodak, 
2001, 2009, 2016). By deconstructing Nasrallah’s discourse, the objective is to challenge 
what seems to be consensual (e.g. resistance as a binding ideology for all Lebanese) or 
indisputable.   
One of the aims of this research is to investigate the argumentative as well as the 
representation strategies that Nasrallah deploys in his attempts to defend and legitimise 
controversial past actions and decisions. To this end, pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren et 
al., 1996; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004), as an analytical template to analyse 
argumentation aimed at resolving a difference of opinion (see Chapter 3, section 3), 
provides a guiding theoretical framework. Undoubtedly, accusations are highly damaging 
to Nasrallah’s image. Therefore, the thesis aims to shed light on the retrospective 
argumentation that Nasrallah advances in his attempt to defend his image, in light of 
accusations raised by opponents, and to re-establish intersubjective agreement 
(Habermas, 1990) over problematised actions or decisions.  
Nasrallah is regarded one of the most charismatic figures in the Arab world. His charisma 
is not only related to the religious attributes vested in him, but also to the construction of 
a ‘proper image’ and ethos (see Chapter 2, section 3) via which his charisma is 
acknowledged and validated. Charisma is partially constructed, as proposed in this thesis, 
through strategies pertaining to the legitimation of assertions (Chapter 3, section 6.3.4). 
According to Hart (2011), these strategies serve to satisfy or overcome audiences’ 
epistemic defences, i.e. provide evidence of internal and external coherence. Thus, a final 
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interest of this thesis is to examine the effect of Nasrallah’s mediated charisma on 
audiences’ epistemic filters. 
7. Research objectives and questions   
The bulk of literature on Nasrallah’s discourse, and more generally Hizbollah’s discourse, 
can be classified under the following headings: (1) Nasrallah’s charismatic leadership and 
its effect on establishing an emotional bond with followers, mainly, the 8th of March 
audience (Badran, 2010; Houri, 2012; Matar, 2008, 2014, 2015; Thiel, n.d.); (2) the 
discursive construction and transformation of Hizbollah’s national identity (Alagha, 2006, 
2011; Daoud, 2012; Khatib, 2011, 2014; Saad-Ghorayeb, 2003; Wiegand, 2009); and (3) 
the effect of Hizbollah’s multi-media platforms on promoting Hizbollah’s political 
ideology (Alshaer, 2014; Hamdar, 2013; Houri, 2012). In this thesis, my main aim is to 
examine the argumentative, as well as the representation strategies, that Nasrallah 
employs in his attempts to legitimise past actions or decisions.   
To achieve this objective, I propose a framework fully incorporating pragma-dialectics 
within the DHA to CDS.12 This framework builds on the commonalities that both 
approaches share (see Chapter 3, section 4) in order to intertwine the argumentative and 
the representation functions of language. As such, the thesis is not in alignment with the 
representation versus argumentation dichotomy (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012) but 
attempts to show the representation function of some argumentative schemes as well as 
the significance of representation strategies in constructing premises for arguments (see 
                                                          
12 Although pragma-dialectics provides a theoretical backdrop to the analysis of argumentation strategies in 
the DHA, it is rarely fully or explicitly operationalised in detailed analysis (see Chapter 4, section 4.1). 
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Chapter 4, section 4.1). The framework is applied to four speeches given by Hassan 
Nasrallah in order to address the following questions:   
1) How did Nasrallah strategically manoeuvre to resolve disagreement with 
opposition audiences? 
2) How did the different justification/ legitimation strategies enact patterns of 
prejudicial attitudes towards the out-group? That is to ask: 
a) How did Nasrallah discursively promote a hegemonic identity narrative and 
how did he position partisans within this construct? Similarly, 
b) How did Nasrallah discursively construct an out-group/ intra-national enemy 
profile, and how did he position opponents? 
3) How might the construction of Nasrallah’s charisma have satisfied the epistemic 
filters of opposition audiences? 
4) How effective is the integration of cognitive approaches to legitimation within a 
model that integrates pragma-dialectics and the DHA?  
8. Outline of the thesis   
This thesis is organised in ten chapters. The next, i.e. second, chapter describes the main 
characteristics of the genre of political speeches. This focus on the genre of political 
speeches relates to the fact that this thesis is primarily interested in political speeches. 
Political speeches are, more often than not, performed publicly and delivered by 
charismatic or authoritative speakers. The chapter, then, provides a summary of the main 
approaches to the concept of charisma as it relates to political discourse. The different 
theories related to the construction of charisma pave the way to hypothesise a relation 
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between the construction of charisma and audiences’ systems of epistemic vigilance. The 
chapter also sheds light on recent research on Nasrallah’s charisma as well as the 
emotional bond that connects him with his followers. The chapter ends by outlining the 
criteria for selecting the data to be analysed.  
In the third chapter, I lay down the main theoretical frameworks and analytical tools that 
inform this study. Thus, it details the type of critique pursued in CDS, in particular, the 
DHA, and the analytical tools used to deconstruct hegemonic discourses. The study also 
adopts the pragma-dialectical perspective to argumentative discourse. Points of 
convergence between pragma-dialectics and the DHA are, therefore, discussed. This 
thesis also draws on findings from cognitive pragmatics. This chapter also outlines the 
main theoretical assumptions of two models in cognitive pragmatics: Relevance Theory 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1995) and Epistemic Vigilance (Sperber et al., 2010). Finally, the 
chapter elaborates on the possible discursive strategies for responding to accusations.  
The fourth chapter amalgamates the various analytical tools and theoretical assumptions 
into a single integrated model. This chapter presents the main reasons behind the 
appropriation of pragma-dialectics within the DHA, as well as the benefits that each 
school can gain from such an integrated approach. This chapter also shows how epistemic 
vigilance and the construction of charisma are relevant to argument analysis. Finally, this 
chapter offers a provisional structure for retrospective argumentation and concludes with 
outlining the steps for implementing the proposed model.  
The analysis of the speeches stretches across four chapters. Therefore, Chapters 5, 6, 7 
and 8 present a detailed analysis in terms of the proposed model. Four speeches given by 
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Nasrallah between 2006 and 2011 are analysed. Each chapter opens by detailing the 
context, which gives an overview of the different views, criticisms, and objections related 
to the event under scrutiny. In this way, the main points of disagreement are delineated 
and parts of the speech not related to the points at issue are excluded from the analysis 
(see Chapter 4, section 4.4). Subsequently, each speech is analysed following the 
proposed model, with a detailed reconstruction of the argument presented at the end of 
each chapter.  
Finally, in Chapter 9, I return to the research questions and consider how the analyses 
presented help to answer them. In particular, I discuss how the DHA’s representation 
strategies constitute argumentation moves and contribute to constructing argumentation 
schemes. I also discuss how legitimation is enacted via invoking different sources of 
normativity that tap into the moral values and ideological beliefs of the target audience. 
Lastly, I discuss the potential effects of the discursive construction of charisma, 
specifically, the construction of ethos and salvation narratives, on audiences’ epistemic 
assessments.  
The study concludes by showing how the integrated model may strengthen the 
explanatory level of the DHA’s critique. This chapter also discusses the limitations of the 








Charismatic leaders and performing political speeches  
1. Introduction 
This chapter starts by offering a synopsis of the main features and functions of political 
speeches. In most cases, political speeches are performed, or staged in Wodak’s (2011) 
terms, where the interaction between audience and interlocutor attests to the degree of 
receptivity of the message. However, what affects the level of receptivity is also related to 
the nature of the charismatic bond that links political leaders with their followers. 
Therefore, this chapter underscores the construction and negotiation of charisma and aims 
to clarify the link between charismatic performances and nationalist and populist 
ideologies. The aim is to prepare the ground for hypothesizing the effect of charisma on 
audiences’ epistemic vigilance (see Chapter 3, section 6.3.3). The chapter concludes by 
presenting the criteria for selecting the data to be analysed.  
2.  Characterising political speeches  
The attention that this research gives to the genre of political speeches stems from 
Reisigl’s (2010) acknowledgment of their dual functionality. On the one hand, Reisigl 
underscores the integrative function that political speeches can have in the construction of 
national identity and in promoting group solidarity. On the other hand, political speeches 
“can fulfill disintegrative and destructive functions by mobilizing addressees to social 
exclusion and, at worst, to violent attacks against those excluded and denigrated by the 
orator” (Reisigl, 2010 p. 251, emphasis added). Based on this view, this thesis focuses on 
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the strategies pursued by Nasrallah to balance the attainment of both functions. In the 
following section, I present an overview of the genre of political speeches, as examined in 
critical discourse studies, argumentation theory and classical rhetoric.     
2.1. Political speeches as a genre 
Dell Hymes (1974) defines a speech community as a group of people who share specific 
rules for speaking or at least one ‘way of speaking’ that distinguishes them from other 
groups. Speech events of a specific group, e.g. academic or medical professions, share 
certain elements that can be pinpointed in order to provide a descriptive account of the 
group’s linguistic behaviour. Hymes proposes ‘SPEAKING’ as a mnemonic device to 
analyse the ways a group communicates in specific speech situations. In this model, ‘S’ 
designates the situation, which includes the scene and the setting. ‘P’ refers to the 
participants in the communicative activity. ‘E’ refers to the ends or goals of 
communicating. ‘A’ designates the speech acts performed. ‘K’ refers to the key or the 
tone of the speech. ‘I’ refers to instrumentality or the channel of communication used. ‘N’ 
refers to the set of rules or norms guiding the speech. And finally, ‘G’ refers to cultural 
and/or clearly demarcated types of utterances, such as poems, sermons, and editorials. 
Hymes argues that “genres often coincide with speech events, but must be treated as 
analytically independent of them” (1974:61). 
Genres are ritualized types of utterances that can be used either in conventional speech 
situations or outside the usual settings. Swales (1990) perceives genre as referring to a 
“distinctive category of discourse” (p. 33) involving spoken and written communication. 
He maintains that a genre is a class of communicative events characterised by discourse 
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or register, participants, the function of discourse and the environment of its production 
and reception. According to Swales, what turns this class of communicative events into a 
genre is “some shared set of communicative purposes” (p. 46). Therefore, genre 
membership is designated by the extent to which these events share similar 
communicative goals. For example, what unites party political speeches are the shared 
goals of presenting party policies, countering opposition policies, and mobilizing 
audiences to vote (ibid.).  
From a critical discourse studies (CDS) perspective, Fairclough argues that genre can be 
characterized as “a socially ratified way of using language in connection with a particular 
type of social activity” (Fairclough, 1995, p. 14).13 In his view, “genres are the 
specifically discoursal aspect of ways of acting and interacting in the course of social 
events” (2003, p.65). In other words, the analysis of a text as an instantiation of genre is 
closely related to how this text contributes to and influences social practices and action. 
According to Fairclough, the various aspects of text organization and features, such as the 
overall generic structure of a text, text semantics, and the mode of intertextuality, are 
shaped by genre.  
Fairclough (2003) proposes a framework through which genre is analysed in terms of 
activity (what people are doing), social relations (the type of relations between people), 
and communication technology (what kind of technological means are used). Wodak 
(2008) summarises the development of the concept of genre as one that has moved from 
                                                          
13 In pragma-dialectics, the conceptualization of genre (see Chapter 3, section 3.3), as van Eemeren (2013) 




textual characteristics to a more functional approach, and finally, to an approach that 
focuses on social practices, norms and conventions of use. Reisigl and Wodak (2016) 
define genre as a “socially conventionalized pattern of communication that fulfils a 
specific social purpose in a specific social context” (p. 27). Their typology links the 
multi-varied subgenres of political communication to ‘fields of political action’. In their 
view, the political field is divided into eight different fields of action, such as lawmaking 
procedures, the formation of public opinion and will, political advertising, political 
control etc., where each of these fields is associated with a set of sub-genres. For 
example, election speeches, commemorative speeches, speeches by an MP and so on, 
delivered with the aim of advertising one’s political position, belong to the field of 
political advertisement.  
In classical rhetoric, political speeches are classified based on three classes of rhetorical 
genre: judicial, deliberative and epideictic. Judicial oratory is oriented to the past, 
thematically focuses on issues related to justice or injustice, right or wrong, and its 
function is to accuse or defend. Deliberative rhetoric is future-oriented, thematically deals 
with expediency and harmfulness, and its function is to exhort or dissuade. Finally, the 
epideictic genre is associated with the present, thematically with honour or disgrace, and 
its function is to praise or blame. However, in actual discursive practices, these classes do 
not occur in pure forms as is theoretically suggested, for the “diversity of topics and 
temporal references usually results in the simultaneous presence of elements from all 
three rhetorical categories within one and the same speech” (Wodak et al., 2009, p. 70). 
Richardson (2007) and Reisigl (2008), similarly, maintain that political speeches exhibit a 
combination of two or more classes of rhetorical oratory.  
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From a pragma-dialectical point of view, the field of political communication belongs to 
the deliberative genre, i.e. it is future-oriented.14 However, van Eemeren has recently 
asserted that “political theorists recognize that the argumentation put forward in political 
discourse is also often about past performances and requires a retrospective account” 
(2013, p. 28). It follows that identifying the type of rhetorical genre that characterises 
Nasrallah’s argumentation should precede the analysis. This amounts to identifying 
whether the speeches primarily follow a judicial, epideictic or deliberative genre, or a 
combination of two or more of these divisions (Richardson, 2007). Nasrallah’s speeches, 
as I claim, (see Chapter 1, section 6) are attempts to legitimise past actions and decisions 
in order to regain legitimacy in contexts of controversy. Therefore, it might be reasonable 
to deduce that the speeches selected for this thesis mainly belong to the judicial genre. 
 In light of Wodak, Reisigl and Richardson’s argument (as aforementioned), Nasrallah’s 
speeches also exhibit traces of the epideictic genre, i.e. they assign blame (onto 
opponents) or praise (partisans). The persuasive and/or manipulative power of political 
speeches is not limited to specific rhetorical devices or genre-specific characteristics. In 
my view, what makes political speeches persuasive is the fact that these are performed, 
more often than not, by charismatic leaders. This is specifically the case in the Lebanese 
context. In the following section, I outline theoretical frameworks that are relevant to pin 
down the different characteristics and dimensions of a charismatic personality. 
 
                                                          
14 In pragma-dialectics, the deliberative genre is one among several argumentative genres. Adjudication, 
negotiation, communication-seeking, and disputation are other argumentative genres (van Eemeren et al., 
2014).   
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3.  Charismatic leadership  
Many theories have been put forward to account for the nature and presumed (affective or 
cognitive) influence that charismatic leaders have on audiences. In his attempt to 
understand the sociology of domination, political obligation and obedience, Weber (1978) 
suggests that for domination to be stable, power must be converted into legitimate 
authority. He distinguishes between three types of legitimate authority: legal or rational 
authority (e.g. bureaucracy, democracy), traditional authority (e.g. customs, monarchies) 
and charismatic authority (special characteristics of an individual). The latter relates to 
the individualistic personalities of leaders who are “bearers of specific gifts of body and 
mind” (ibid., p. 1111–1112). In Weber’s view, charisma is a “certain quality of an 
individual personality by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary”. Consequently, 
he is treated as one who is “endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or exceptional 
powers or qualities” (Schweitzer, 1974, p. 151).  
These extraordinary qualities, according to Weber (1987), are of divine origin and the 
authority of a charismatic leader stems from his/her ability to put them into practice 
through tangible heroic deeds, exemplary actions or miracles as an attestation of his/her 
“divine mission” (ibid., p. 1114). Once these are recognized and perceived as such, it 
means that leaders have “proved their charisma in the eyes of their adherents” (ibid. p. 
1112). This highlights the relational dimension of charisma or the ‘charismatic bond’ that 
is established between charismatic leaders and their supporters. It follows that charismatic 
authority is based on being recognized as such by others, and its perpetuation is a function 
of the continued validation of “personal strength proven time and again” (ibid., p. 1114). 
Charismatic authority, as a form of legitimate domination, is “the accepted power to lead 
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and command others stemming from the recognition” of the specific qualities that are 
attributed to a leader (Hofmann & Dawson, 2014, p. 349). From a Weberian point of 
view, charisma is a specific quality of an individual personality and its recognition by 
those “subject to authority, which is decisive” for the validation of charisma (Weber, 
1978, p. 242).  
In Weber’s view, obedience to a charismatic authority is a duty predicated on divine 
qualities and the virtue of the mission. This recognition entails, as Weber concludes, that 
followers show unconditional devotion and trust. Moreover, Weber argues that charisma 
is unstable and subject to erosion, specifically in cases where the leader fails to deliver 
promises or achieve the goals aspired to. Consequently, adherents might withdraw their 
recognition as the leader is no longer recognized as the “god-sent master” (Weber, 1978, 
p. 1114). It can, thus, be deduced that Weberian charisma is a quality that is attributed to 
leaders, and not only a quality that they inherently possess. 
Weber’s conceptualization of charisma has been criticized for its emphasis on the 
psychological dimension of charisma (Eatwell, 2007). In fact, Weber (ibid.) 
acknowledges the effects of social factors on shaping charismatic personalities, such as 
the effects of a troubled childhood, schooling and the cultural environment. In this view, 
Eatwell (2007) criticises reducing the study of charismatic authority to examining the 
influence of social factors on a leadership personality, as it limits the analysis of political 
action and decisions to personality development. Despite Weber’s emphasis on the 
psychological dimension of charisma, and to a lesser degree on social factors, he sees the 
socio-political/ economic dimension as a prerequisite for the emergence of charismatic 
leadership. Weber (1978), thus, highlights the importance of social, political and 
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economic crises in catalysing the emergence of charismatic leaders and in facilitating 
identification with a leader.  
Based on this view, Weber observes that charismatic leaders, such as Vladimir Lenin, 
Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, among others, emerged at times of economic, 
ethical and/or political distress or disorder. Crises, in Weber’s view, form the social 
situations necessary to encourage the attribution of charisma, as the leader comes to 
embody the promise of salvation. Therefore, crises are would-be opportunities that can be 
exploited by leaders, and through these they can construct charisma by performing heroic 
or miraculous deeds. Following Weber, Bass (1985) asserts that charisma “carries with it 
a challenge to the old order, a break with continuity, a risky adventure, continual 
movement, ferment, and change” (p. 36). 
3.1. Narrative dimension: Charismatic leaders as salvationists   
In distressful situations, as Tucker (1977) expounds, a charismatic leader presents to 
sufferers a “formula for salvation [which] may arouse their intense loyalty and 
enthusiastic willingness to take the path the leader is pointing out” (p. 388). Tucker 
continues to explain that in moments of crisis a charismatic leader becomes a saviour who 
embodies hope for salvation. Consequently, followers “tend to revere him and surround 
him with that spontaneous cult of personality which appears to be one of the symptomatic 
marks of the charismatic leader-follower relationship” (1968, p. 746-747). The notion of 
receptivity to the leader’s message depends on the strategic exploitation of crises, 
inasmuch as a charismatic leader is capable of articulating and imposing a vision for 
salvation (Hofmann & Dawson, 2014).   
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A culturalist view of charisma (Smith, 2000 & Willner, 1984) conceptualizes charisma as 
a cultural phenomenon, the construction of which compels the leader to draw on myths, 
common symbols, cultural frames and shared meanings. From a culturalist perspective, 
the presence of social anomie, as a precondition for the emergence of charismatic leaders, 
is not a sufficient condition because charisma is the product of social and cultural 
contexts (Willner, 1984). Smith defines charisma as “a moral bond of duty linking 
followers to leaders” and argues that this bond should be understood in terms of symbolic 
structures (2000, p.103). Smith asserts that charismatic authority is “underpinned by 
binary cultural codes which elaborate and oppose sacred and evil grammars of 
motivations […] along with narratives which employ events within a salvation 
framework” (ibid., p. 103).  In this respect, salvation narratives – based on a binary code 
of good versus evil – are the main facets of charismatic authority through which events 
and actions acquire new meaning and come to have moral significance (ibid.). It follows 
that the role of a charismatic leader is to create and identify an ‘evil’ entity, the 
destruction of which forms the basis of the salvation narrative. Therefore, charisma is 
constructed via salvation narratives that exploit cultural-specific symbols and myths. 
To put it differently, the moral bond between charismatic leaders and their followers 
seems to be predicated on a shared hatred and fear of an identified evil against which they 
have to fight. From a culturalist perspective, the presence of an enemy or evil adversary is 
pivotal for the construction of charismatic authority, which will therefore “attain its 
greatest force when images of evil are at their most threatening” (ibid., p. 105). The 
constructed evil is, thus, a unifying mechanism that consolidates and unites a community 
around a common desire to fight the threat. In this respect, the moral dimension of 
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charismatic discourses is given prominence as the battle is essentially between good/right 
versus evil/wrong. In his attempt to understand how (fascist) charismatic leaders prepare 
the scene for ethnic cleansing and genocide, e.g. the holocaust and ethnic cleansing in 
Serbia, Eatwell (2006a, 2006b) proposes a social-constructivist approach in which he 
outlines four traits that define the nature of a charismatic personality.  
First, charismatic leaders are visionary and driven by a mission (e.g. national unification), 
which is often linked to foundation myths and the construction of a national identity. 
Therefore, leaders embody a special mission that is characterised by quasi-religious 
language and images that employ the semantic field of salvation, such as redemption, 
rescue and rebirth. Second, charismatic leaders portray themselves as ordinary men or 
women who obey the wishes of the people, and they explicitly express what the common 
people think in private to foster the leader-follower bond or ‘symbiotic hierarchy’. 
According to Eatwell, the charismatic bond links fascist leaders and followers via the 
construction of a broad ‘ideological matrix’, i.e. the creation of a new man, a holistic 
nation and state. Third, enemies and scapegoats are discursively constructed and 
identified – ‘Manichean demonization’. The Other is portrayed as an imminent threat, 
whereby salvation is sought via the path (salvation narrative) outlined by the charismatic 
leader. Finally, there is the leader’s personal presence or magnetism, which includes not 
only physical traits but, more importantly, the ability of the leader to portray the ‘correct 
image’ of himself (ibid., p. 144–148). In this view, the charismatic bond is no longer 
defined in terms of emotions, an affectional relation, but is proactively negotiated 
between leader and followers.  
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It seems possible to conclude that charismatic leadership depends on successful attempts 
to articulate and impose a hegemonic national identity via the construction of salvation 
narratives in which various ideologies, e.g. populist, nationalist, fascist etc., are exploited 
to bind a community of followers or a nation. In this respect, charisma is not only a 
relational (socio-emotional) product, it is also built around moral values and ideological 
constructs such as nationalism, fascism, populism etc. (Breuilly, 2011; Eatwell, 2006b; 
Hofmann & Dowson, 2014; Kallis, 2006; Musiedlak, 2009). For example, Breuilly (2011) 
examines the relation between charisma and an anti-colonial nationalist ideology. Taking 
Gandhi as an example, he emphasizes that charismatic domination develops when “strong 
existing nationalist sentiments” are faced with a “massive crisis [that] has undermined the 
modern institutions of power. It is on the basis of that nationalist ideology itself […] that 
a charismatic leader can emerge” (p. 492).  
This thesis aligns itself with this strand of thought. Nasrallah’s salvation/ rescue narrative, 
in which the identity of Nasrallah as a saviour and the villainized image of the ‘Other’ are 
constructed, is articulated based on aspects of Hizbollah’s national identity and political 
ideology.15 Eatwell (2006a; 2006b) also emphasizes the effect of charismatic 
performances and the way leaders present themselves to the public, i.e. how leaders 
become charismatic. Therefore, the next section outlines the effects of projecting the 
‘correct image’ on the recognition of charisma.  
 
                                                          




3.2. Performative dimension: Constructing image   
The recognition of charismatic authority as well as the creation and fostering of the 
charismatic bond are generated and actively negotiated via charismatic performances 
which are tailored to meet the social and cultural conventions in which they are 
embedded. Based on this view, Wodak (2011) examines how politicians, specifically 
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), stage or perform politics and assesses the 
impact of the personalities of individual politicians on their performances. This means 
that how politicians perceive, and eventually construct their identities, such as active/ 
passive or proactive/ reactive, affects how they do and perform politics. The need to 
analyse strategies of performing politics (frontstage performances), as Wodak (2011) 
expounds, reveal the influence that these performances have on gaining, controlling and 
retaining political power and authority.16 In her view, the analysis of political 
performances has to integrate three theoretical concepts: habitus, community of practice 
and identity (ibid., p.11–14).  
According to Wodak, for a successful frontstage performance, the politician must abide 
by the cultural practices pertaining to a certain society, group or nation – habitus. Next, 
the performer has to comply with the rules and conventions related to a specific 
community of practice, i.e. practices related to a professional setting, e.g. the European 
Parliament. Finally, how politicians display their individuality, the self, influences their 
performances. In other words, the construction of a politician’s (individual and collective) 
                                                          
16 Wodak (2011) distinguishes between backstage and frontstage performances and examines in detail the 
strategies pertaining to each and the impact of both on public perception. However, I will limit the 




identity is directly linked to the presentation of the self, which in turn affects the 
performance and validation of charisma.  
The discursive construction and performance of identities, as Wodak (ibid., p.78–79) 
suggests, is established via two linguistic processes: footing and narrating. Footing 
reflects the different roles (e.g. giving an opinion, telling a story) taken on by the speaker 
in a discursive event and signals the speaker’s discursive identities through the way they 
position themselves in discourse, e.g. as active agents or victims. Narratives (personal 
examples or anecdotes) reveal footing, which in turn reveals the speaker’s orientation to a 
specific identity or self. The results of Wodak’s analysis show that some MEPs position 
themselves as individuals actively pushing for specific agendas, while others reflect 
multiple identities (oriented towards both a specific national identity and a supranational 
European identity). To put it differently, the discursive positioning of a politician’s 
identity realized through certain linguistic cues reveals how politicians perform politics 
and, more importantly, feeds into how aspects of their constructed identities are perceived 
and recognized by the public, i.e. how they construct their charisma.  
A more pronounced view of the relation between the discursive positioning of identity 
and habitus and their relation to the construction of charisma is offered in Wodak’s recent 
publication (2105). Following Eatwell’s typology for the construction of charisma, 
Wodak (2015, p. 126-127) observes that the success of right-wing populist parties in 
Europe can be credited to a successful double positioning strategy. On the one hand, 
right-wing populist politicians position themselves as saviours who are entitled to save 
people from perceived threats or social/political predicaments (i.e. they construct 
salvation narratives), and as being one of the people, on the other. Authenticity entails 
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that politicians portray themselves as performing the daily activities and duties that 
ordinary people do (ibid.). The effect of such a portrayal, to use Eatwell’s terminology, 
fosters the symbiotic/ charismatic bond between a leader and his followers via the 
construction of a proper image. Both strategies indicate that populist and nationalist 
discourses are one feature of charismatic leadership (Houri, 2012).  
In her multimodal analysis (analysis of posture and dress code) of the election campaign 
of HC Strache during the 2012 Vienna elections, Wodak hints at the multiple identities 
invoked by Strache on his Facebook page in order to address different audiences. Strache 
positions himself as a saviour, a sportsman, a youthful Viennese to establish a symbiotic 
bond with audiences. A similar approach is followed by Matar (2008, 2015) in her 
analysis of the strategies used by Nasrallah to construct his proper image. Matar observes 
that Nasrallah oscillates between creating and maintaining two identities: an ordinary 
man, one of the masses, and an elite individual, i.e. a religious and political leader. 
According to Matar, this is established through a mode of address that alternates between 
using vernacular language to establish solidarity with his fellow Lebanese and classical 
Arabic when he uses Quranic and prophetic verses (ibid.)  
I will not elaborate any further on the strategies of constructing image or presence since 
this research limits itself to specific instances of Nasrallah’s linguistic behaviour, rather 
than taking into account dress code, style, demeanour and physical appearance, among 
others, as parameters for constructing charisma. Suffice it for now to recognise that the 
correct image is constructed through a series of linguistic and non-linguistic means which 
all feed into strengthening the bond between leaders and their audiences.   
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4.  Nasrallah as a charismatic leader 
Matar (2005, 2008), who has extensively researched Nasrallah’s charisma, observes that 
Nasrallah’s public persona is constructed based on his religious attributes and oratorical 
skills. These two dimensions allow Nasrallah to adapt his public image and rhetoric to 
specific political contexts. In her view, Nasrallah’s discourse integrates contemporary 
events with historical and cultural signifiers that resonate with a broad spectrum of the 
Lebanese audience. Matar (2015) argues that Nasrallah mixes frames of suffering and 
redemption with resistance, struggle and promises for divine rewards. According to 
Matar, Nasrallah mixes two basic frames. The first is a religious frame that appeals to the 
wider Muslim community, invoked through the use of religious terms, such as jihad, 
martyrdom and the divine promise. The second is an Arab nationalist frame, invoked 
through terms like ‘muqawama’(resistance) and ‘oppressed’ (see Chapter 1, section 3) in 
order to appeal to a pan-Arab community.  
The different approaches to the notion of charisma outlined above can enrich the analysis 
of Nasrallah’s charisma. For example, Nasrallah can be shown to fit Weber’s notion of 
charisma in at least the following ways.  First, where Weber emphasises the divine origin 
of a charismatic personality, Nasrallah is a highly regarded religious scholar who is 
believed to be a descendant of the Prophet. Such a view might partially explain the 
ensuing obligations and duties imputed on followers (the 8th of March audience). 
Consequently, Nasrallah’s words and commands are taken, by followers, as undisputable, 
unnegotiable and beyond any doubt, thus his followers tend to be less vigilant (see 
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Chapter 3, section 6.3.3).17 Second, where Weber focuses on the influence of social 
factors on a charismatic personality, few studies have examined the effects of Nasrallah’s 
upbringing, social class and schooling etc. on shaping and refining his charismatic 
personality (see Matar, 2008, 2014, 2015; Thiel, n.d.). Such an analysis might explain 
Nasrallah’s constant endeavour to portray himself as an ordinary man who has passed 
through hardships and is thus able to articulate people’s grievances. This suggests that 
Nasrallah’s charisma fits the different personality traits proposed by Eatwell (see section 
3.1).     
Nasrallah’s charisma can also be shown to fit the culturalist approach. Nasrallah’s 
salvation narratives are constructed around a moral argument (Houri, 2012), the 
components of which revolve around the values of resistance, pride, justice and liberty, 
i.e. the components of Hizbollah’s national identity (see Chapter 1, sections 3, 4). Indeed, 
Nasrallah’s charisma is predicated on the “manufactured fear and hatred of a purportedly 
evil adversary, the state of Israel, and Nasrallah’s associated narrative frame of salvation” 
(Thiel, n.d., p. 1).18 The above discussion, related to the different characteristics and 
dimensions of a charismatic personality, points to an important implication, i.e. audiences 
seem to be persuaded by charismatic leaders.  
                                                          
17 This might explain, at least partially, how violent actions taken against Nasrallah’s opponents and their 
supporters are accepted by Nasrallah’s followers and sympathisers. Due to the fact that they take his words 
on trust, they tend to be less vigilant. However, this research is interested in the relation between charisma 
and its effects on opponent audiences’ epistemic defences (see Chapter 3, section 6.3.3).  
18 Many researchers identify the evil ‘Other’ in Nasrallah’s discourse as the Israeli enemy. However, recent 
studies hint at a change in the identity of Nasrallah’s enemy (Høigilt, 2007; Khatib, 2014) (see Chapter 1, 





It is pertinent at this stage to elaborate on the data, as these form the basis for testing the 
thesis hypotheses and via which I further investigate the link between charisma and the 
promotion of nationalist or populist identities. Thus, the following section outlines the 
steps for data selection.  
5. Data  
Nasrallah’s speeches, from 2000 onwards, are all available on Hezbollah’s official 
website: www.mediarelations-lb.org. The speeches are classified based on the occasion 
on which they were delivered. For example, there are speeches to commemorate 
‘Martyrs’ Day’, ‘Jerusalem International Day’, ‘2000 Liberation’, ‘August 2006 Victory’ 
and the commemoration of ‘Hezbollah leaders’. There are also speeches given primarily 
on religious occasions like Ashura. The speeches analysed in this thesis are retrieved from 
the sections that are labelled ‘General Speeches’ and ‘July 2006 War Speeches’. Within 
these two categories, the data are further downsized to those which are delivered at times 
of heightened political controversy between 2006 and 2014.  
More specifically, the data are collected from speeches delivered by Nasrallah as an 
attempt to restore the legitimacy of controversial past actions and decisions. In total, there 
are six speeches in which Nasrallah attempts to justify already taken political actions or 
decisions.19 Four of these are selected for detailed, qualitative analysis. These four are 
selected because Nasrallah’s speeches are relatively long. The topics of the four speeches 
and the word count of the original Arabic versions are presented in Table 2.1, below: 
                                                          
19 The speeches are conveyed via video-conferencing to ensure interaction with the audience who gather in 
advance in designated areas to watch Nasrallah. Moreover, the speeches are broadcasted on all Lebanese 





Date Topic of Speech/Occasion Word Count 
25/7/2006 Israeli war 1,982 
7/12/2006 Protests against Siniora’s government 4,904 
15/5/2009 Invasion of Beirut  5,444 
16/1/2011 Resignation of pro-Hizbollah ministers  6,022 
                                                                                                             Total: 18,352 
    
   
The transcripts of the Arabic versions are available on Hizbollah’s official website 
(mentioned above) and can be easily retrieved. The English versions of the speeches, with 
the exception of the first speech which can be downloaded from 
http://www.musicman.com/00pic/nasrallaha.html, are available on Hizbollah’s English 
official website: www.english.alahednews.com.lb. However, the translations are of poor 
quality. This is because English, in Hizbollah’s view, is the language of the imperialist 
enemy, i.e. the US. Therefore, I have made some changes to the original translations, such 
as making scrambled sentences comprehensible, adding missing verbs, nouns or phrases 
and so on.  
I am quite aware that the critical stance I am taking in approaching Nasrallah’s speeches 
might influence my interpretation and translation. However, I have tried to minimize this 
risk by providing literal translation as much as possible and consulting online newspapers 
that affiliate with different sides of the struggle. Consulting an archive for online 
newspapers provided the political context specific to each speech, and based on which the 
analysis is conducted. The online newspapers consulted are: Almustaqbal (affiliates with 
Table 2.1. Date, occasion and length of speeches analysed  
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the 14th of March party), Alakhbar (affiliates with the 8th of March party) and Alanwar 
(an independent one).  
6.  Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have presented the main theoretical frameworks relevant to the analysis 
of charisma. I have discussed Weber’s view of charisma, in particular, his emphasis on 
the divine origin of a charismatic personality. I have also discussed the culturalist view, 
which emphasises the presence of an ‘evil’ Other as a precondition for a charismatic 
personality to emerge. From a culturalist point of view, this evil becomes a focal point 
around which salvation narratives are constructed, and based on which a charismatic bond 
is predicated. Finally, I have discussed the social-constructivist approach proposed by 
Eatwell (2006a, 2006b). In light of these different perspectives on charisma, I have 
discussed how these can elaborate aspects of Nasrallah’s charisma. The aim is to find a 
link that can bridge research on charisma with epistemic vigilance. This is further 










CDS and Argumentation  
1. Introduction  
In this chapter, I aim to present the different theoretical conceptualizations and analytical 
tools that inform the framework proposed in this thesis. It begins by sketching out the 
main aims of adopting a critical perspective to discourse analysis. This leads me to 
present the different theoretical frameworks that inform my study, namely, the discourse 
historical approach (DHA) to CDS and pragma-dialectics. The chapter presents points of 
convergence as well as the contradictions between these two paradigms. Other theoretical 
assumptions and analytical categories sourced from Relevance theory and Epistemic 
vigilance are also introduced. The main aim in this chapter is to lay down the basis for a 
plausible integration of these different approaches to analysing discourse production and 
consumption. The chapter ends by highlighting the pragmatics of the speech act of 
accusation and its perlocutionary effects. This is important because Nasrallah’s speeches 
are (indirect) attempts to respond to the opposition’s accusations; therefore, a detailed 
discussion related to denial and legitimation strategies is conducted.   
2. Critical discourse studies (CDS): overarching aims and concepts     
Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) as a ‘school’ perceives language in use or discourse as a 
form of social action (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). It, thus, postulates a dialectical 
relation between the micro-level or structure of language and the macro-social structures 
that shape discursive events. That is:  
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Discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned – it constitutes 
situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships 
between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it 
helps to sustain and reproduce the status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to 
transforming it.  (ibid. p. 258)  
To account for these multifarious functions of discourse, different theoretical frameworks 
and analytical techniques that are oriented towards different types of data and social 
settings are formulated. Despite this heterogeneity, Wodak and Meyer (2016) assert that 
all critical approaches to discourse are problem-oriented and share an interest in 
deconstructing ideologies and power.20 Discursive events are envisioned to play a role in 
the construction and perpetuation of a social status quo and/or in transforming and/or 
dismantling the existing social order (Wodak et at., 2009). These multifarious functions 
of discourse are realized via the ways in which political actors, actions and policies are 
represented and positioned, and inasmuch as this created representation is discursively 
legitimated and accepted as true by the intended audience (see Section 6.3.4). 
Criticality means that this discursively created or mediated social reality – most often by 
powerful elites who exploit resources and control access to the public sphere (van Dijk, 
2006b) – should be challenged and evaluated. The notion of critique in CDS draws on 
Literary Criticism, traditional Marxist conceptualizations (Fairclough’s dialectical 
approach) and the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School (Wodak’s DHA), among 
                                                          
20 Different typologies have been proposed to account for the heterogeneity of CDS. The first of these is 
presented by Wodak and Meyer (2009). However, in an attempt to compensate for the limitations of this 
typology, Hart and Cap (2014) and Unger (2016) present their own classifications of the different CDS 
approaches and their respective theoretical attractors.       
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others, and aims at an informed understanding of societal problems (Fairclough et al., 
2011; Reisigl & Wodak, 2009).21 Being critical entails a perspective and an attitude 
towards the investigated social problems (Reisigl & Wodak, 2016; van Dijk, 2009), 
which are manifestations of struggles for power and control (Weiss & Wodak, 2003).  
The concept of critique is linked to the notions of power and ideology as they appear in 
almost all variants of CDS. According to Weiss and Wodak (2003, p.14), ideology is a 
“means of establishing and maintaining unequal power relations”. CDS is interested in 
deconstructing the latent ideologies that permeate political discourse (Wodak & Meyer, 
2009, 2016). To be critical, then, means to “unpack the ideological underpinnings of 
discourse that have been naturalized over time that we begin to treat them as common, 
accepted and natural features of discourse” (Fairclough, 1989, p. 20). Ideologies, as van 
Dijk (1998) states, form “the basis of specific arguments for, and explanations of, specific 
social arrangements, or indeed influence a specific understanding of the world in general” 
(p.19). It is this interest in demystifying the discursive function of latent and manifest 
ideologies (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001), which have become consensual or naturalised, that 
makes CDS an appropriate framework for examining the way Nasrallah uses Resistance, 
as a political ideology, to perpetuate and maintain his political power. 
In the next sections, I outline the main theoretical assumptions of the DHA and pragma-
dialectics, followed by giving reasons for choosing each one as an analytical tool in this 
study.  
                                                          
21 A detailed discussion of the normative standards that form the basis of critique in the DHA is presented 
in Section 4.1, below.  
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2.1. The discourse-historical approach (DHA) to CDS  
The DHA was initially developed, in 1986, to examine anti-Semitic stereotypes and 
prejudiced attitudes that permeated Austrian public discourse and was gradually modified 
to analyse structures of discrimination, control, and domination promulgated in European 
institutional discourse. The DHA seeks to make explicit these structural relations of 
power abuse, a direct manifestation of which is the discursive construction of a binary 
opposition between in-groups and out-groups. To this end, the DHA attempts to identify 
the discursive strategies and the linguistic means through which the dichotomous ‘Us’ vs 
‘Them’ is realized. To demystify discriminatory practices, the DHA integrates “available 
knowledge about the historical sources and the background of the social and political 
fields in which discursive ‘events’ are embedded” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 35).   
The DHA adheres to a complex concept of social critique, the socio-philosophical 
orientation of Critical Theory (discussed below), and integrates three interrelated aspects: 
a) text-immanent critique, aims to discover inconsistencies or paradoxes in text-internal 
structure; b) socio-diagnostic critique, aims to demystify the latent persuasive or 
manipulative character of discursive practices; c) prospective critique, aims to contribute 
to the improvement of communication or, simply put, it is the practical or applied 
dimension of the DHA (|ibid., p. 32–34). In the DHA, the principle of triangulation seems 
a priori to account for the multifarious functions of discourse, where discourse is defined 
as (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, 89): 
a) A cluster of context-dependent semiotic practices that are situated within 
specific fields of social action; 
b) Socially constituted and socially constitutive; 
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c) Related to a macro-topic; 
d) Linked to argumentation about validity claims, such as truth and normative 
validity.  
The topic-relatedness of discourse entails that discourse is not a closed unit but rather a 
fluid, dynamic, and semiotic entity that incorporates and is linked to other discourses. 
This topic-relatedness or interdiscursivity accentuates the historicity of discourses 
whereby temporal and spatial connections among discourses are accounted for. For 
example, in the speeches analysed, Nasrallah’s anti-Zionist discourse incorporates 
elements of discourses on occupied Palestine, social justice, and national unity. From a 
DHA perspective, a text is a product of linguistic action, a part of discourse and assigned 
to a specific genre. Reisigl and Wodak (2016) define genre as a “socially 
conventionalized pattern of communication that fulfils a specific social purpose in a 
specific social context” (p. 27). Texts are either directly or indirectly linked to other texts 
(i.e. intertextuality) via, for example, references, allusions to a topic, event or social actor, 
or the transfer of an argument from one text to another. The latter is the process of 
recontextualization whereby elements of previous texts are transferred or taken out of 
specific contexts (de-contextualization) and inserted into a new context to serve political 
goals.22   
The interconnectedness of texts, discourses and genres underscores the role of 
‘historicity’ in the production and interpretation of discourse and provides a means to 
                                                          
22 In pragma-dialectical terms, the straw man fallacy is an example of recontextualization, whereby 




explore the ways in which genres or discourses are subject to diachronic change. This 
complex bundle of relations would be impossible to pin down without a multi-
dimensional approach to context, such as the one adopted by the DHA. According to 
Reisigl and Wodak (2016, p. 30–31), four levels of context are integrated to account for 
the mediation between discursive practices and sociopolitical structures. These are: 
1) The immediate language or text internal co-text; 
2) The intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between utterances, texts, 
genres and discourses; 
3) The social variables and institutional frames of a specific ‘context of 
situation’; 
4) The broader sociopolitical and historical context in which discursive practices 
are embedded.  
This study adopts the four-level model of context developed by the DHA. As such, it 
takes into account: the historical development of Hizbollah as a Resistance movement 
(sociopolitical/ historical context), specific political events which gave rise to the 
speeches as well as related criticisms and debates (situational context), selected speeches 
(text-internal or co-texts) and, finally, other texts, discourses, events, arguments and 
counter-arguments that (might) have influenced the speeches (intertextual and 
interdiscursive relations). Such an in-depth analysis that takes into account situational 
frames and knowledge about the historical and sociopolitical background of political 
agents/ institutions makes it possible to identify and trace the discursive mechanisms that 
Nasrallah exploits to defend, justify, and promote his (and his political party’s) 
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hegemonic practices. This is the main reason for selecting the DHA as one of the 
analytical tools in this study.  
In the DHA, five discursive strategies are involved in the construction and perpetuation of 
hegemonic discourses. These strategies are: nomination, predication, argumentation, 
perspectivization, and intensification or mitigation (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 44–84). 
What unites these strategies and dictates their linguistic realization is the overall unifying 
macro-strategy of positive Self-presentation and negative Other-presentation, or what van 
Dijk calls the Ideological Square (van Dijk, 1998).23 Nomination (or referential) 
strategies represent and construct social actors (in-/out-groups) via references to 
biological, naturalizing and/or other personal/ group characteristics. Referential strategies 
are enacted via, for example, depersonalising metaphors, metonymies and synecdoches. 
The main function of these rhetorical and linguistic means is to assign membership 
categorizations. Predication strategies assign (positive or negative) evaluations and 
attributions to the constructed groups, actors, events or actions. Predication strategies can 
be realized linguistically via, for example, stereotypes and evaluative adjectives.  
Argumentation strategies encompass a fund of topoi and fallacies, the aim of which is to 
justify and legitimise the adoption of exclusionary actions or policies directed towards the 
out-group. DHA scholars (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 75–80; Wodak, 2011, p. 44) present 
a list of the most common topoi used in justifying discriminatory actions. Some of these 
                                                          
23 Van Dijk (1998, p. 267) proposes four parameters that constitute the Ideological Square: emphasize the 
positive information about Us and the negative about ‘Them’, at the same time, de-emphasize the negative 
information about ‘Us’ and the positive information about Them. Typically, in such a polarized discourse 
the negative information about the behaviours, actions or policies related to the out-group are topicalized 




are: topos of burdening, topos of reality, topos of history, topos of numbers, topos of the 
people, topos of authority, topos of threat or danger, topos of definition, topos of justice, 
topos of urgency, topos of advantage or disadvantage, topos of humanitarianism, topos of 
culture, topos of abuse.   
Perspectivization strategies (framing or discourse representation) reveal speakers’ 
involvement and the way they position their points of view, e.g. through narrating, 
describing, reporting etc. Finally, intensification or mitigation strategies are strategies via 
which actors modify and qualify the epistemic status of a proposition. These strategies 
serve either to capitalize on and magnify the negative attributions and actions of an out-
group or downplay and trivialize the negative actions of an in-group. These strategies can 
be linguistically realized through adjectives, quantifiers, modals, euphemisms, vague 
expressions etc. (see Chapter 4, section 2). In the following section, I elaborate on the 
reasons for choosing pragma-dialectics as an overarching analytical tool to examine 
Nasrallah’s speeches.  
3. Pragma-dialectics 
Argumentation is a verbal activity that aims to question, justify, or defend a particular 
point of view.24 At the same time, it is a social activity addressed to an audience or a 
second party. Moreover, argumentation is a process of reasoning whereby reasons given 
in support of claims convey the presumption that a rational account is conferred on the 
position advocated. Finally, argumentation arises, from a pragma-dialectical perspective, 
                                                          
24 In a recent publication, van Eemeren et al. (2014) prefer to define argumentation as a communicative act 
complex rather than as a verbal or a linguistic act complex to account for argumentation that is conveyed by 
nonverbal means.  
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in contexts of opposition, disagreement, or doubt (as a minimum requirement to initiate 
argumentation) where discussants presume that their standpoints are not immediately 
accepted or are met with doubt; thus, they need to be supported with reasons to favour 
their acceptability (van Eemeren et al., 1996, p. 2–4).  
In a nutshell, argumentation, from a pragma-dialectical perspective, is “a verbal, social 
and rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of the acceptability of a 
standpoint by putting forward a constellation of propositions for justifying or refuting the 
proposition expressed in the standpoint” (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 1). 
Based on this view, Nasrallah’s responses to accusations as a means to refute opponents’ 
standpoints as well as his justification of past controversial actions and decisions are part 
of an argumentative dialogue that seeks to convince the audience of the acceptability of 
his standpoints.25 Therefore, pragma-dialectics provides an appropriate framework to 
deconstruct Nasrallah’s argumentative discourse.  
Four meta-theoretical starting points represent the methodological framework of pragma-
dialectics (van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 523–527). These starting points highlight how the 
descriptive dimension (e.g. speech act theory) and normative insights (the ideal model of 
critical discussion) are integrated into pragma-dialectics. First, the principle of 
functionalization amounts to making explicit the functions of speech acts performed, i.e. 
the communicative function (as illocutionary acts) and the interactional function (as acts 
aimed at eliciting a response from the audience). This means that, in analysing 
                                                          
25 In pragma-dialectics, the primary criterion for characterizing a discourse as having an argumentative 
function is whether it aims, directly or indirectly, to remove or overcome genuine or supposed doubts (van 
Eemeren et al., 2014; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004). 
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Nasrallah’s argumentation, various speech acts that communicate the standpoints, the 
arguments advanced and the argumentative moves involved in defending and justifying 
his position have to be made explicit.  
Second, the principle of socialization means that argumentation is viewed as a dialogue 
between a protagonist and an antagonist (whether real or projected) who are involved in a 
methodological exchange (the ideal model of critical discussion) to resolve a difference of 
opinion, with the protagonist defending his standpoint against (real or projected) 
criticisms, doubts or objections raised by an antagonist. The principle of socialization is 
pertinent to this research as it allows Nasrallah’s speeches to be contextualised as a 
dialogic exchange through which he attempts to respond to criticisms and accusations 
raised by his opponents. Based on the roles that participants in a dialogic exchange play 
(protagonist vs antagonist), and from what they express in their discourse, it is then 
possible to identify the commitments of each party for which they can be held 
accountable, i.e. the principle of externalization.  
Finally, the principle of dialectification points to the normative standards that govern the 
critical testing of standpoints. In pragma-dialectics, a non-fallacious argumentative 
exchange has to follow the dialectical procedures and rules stipulated by the ideal model 
of critical discussion, whereby standards of reasonableness are observed to ensure a 
reasonable exchange of speech acts that will eventually lead to a resolution of the 
disagreement.26 In actual argumentative practice, however, discussants often deviate from 
                                                          
26 From a pragma-dialectical perspective, the ideal model of critical discussion is not an unattainable ideal 
or utopia (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004). On the contrary, various qualitative (e.g. van Eemeren et 
al.’s (2007) research on the clues that arguers use to indicate the functions of the various moves they make) 
and quantitative research has examined the extent to which the norms of the ideal model correspond to 
argumentative reality. In an empirical study carried out by van Eemeren, Garssen and Meuffels (2009), the 
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these normative standards. A critical approach to analysing argumentation involves 
identifying such sites of deviation or ‘unreasonableness’. The principle of dialectification 
is, therefore, fundamental to this study, as the dialectical norms stipulated by the ideal 
model of critical discussion (stages and rules) form the basis for reconstructing, 
analysing, and evaluating Nasrallah’s argumentation. 
3.1. The ideal model of critical discussion  
The ideal model of critical discussion specifies the different stages that arguers have to 
pass through and the ensuing dialectical obligations of the parties involved in the 
argumentative exchange to arrive at the resolution of a difference of opinion.27 Moreover, 
the model identifies the different speech acts constituting the argumentative moves 
specific to each of the four stages outlined below and the rules that have to be observed to 
check whether the standpoints are indeed tenable vis-à-vis criticism or doubt.  
The ideal model of critical discussion comprises the following four stages. In the 
confrontation stage, the difference of opinion or standpoints to be defended or refuted 
(realized, for example, by assertives) and the respective criticisms or doubts are 
externalized (communicated through, for example, commissives). In the opening stage, 
the material (e.g. eliciting concessions) and procedural (distribution of roles, protagonist 
vs antagonist) starting points relevant to the initiation of the discussion are established. In 
                                                          
aim was to show the extent to which ordinary arguers judge the reasonableness or fallaciousness of moves 
to be in accordance with the norms stipulated by the rules of the ideal model. The results of these 
experiments indicate that the dialectical norms of the ideal model are intersubjectively valid among 
language users.  
27 From a pragma-dialectical perspective, resolution means that agreement has been reached regarding the 
acceptability of the standpoint, i.e. either the antagonist has been convinced of or the protagonist has 




the argumentation stage, arguments in support of standpoints are advanced and tested. 
Finally, in the concluding stage, the outcome of the discussion is formulated. This means 
that either the antagonist retracts his criticism, or the protagonist withdraws her 
standpoints as they fail to withstand the critical responses put forward by the antagonist. 
Thus, the ideal model of critical discussion serves as a heuristic and analytic tool based on 
which an argumentative activity is reconstructed, analysed, and evaluated. As an 
evaluative tool, the model of critical discussion provides a platform against which reasons 
given in support of claims can be assessed as reasonable or fallacious. Assessment is the 
result of checking the extent to which argumentative moves and arguments adduced 
conform with the rules of critical discussion. The ideal model of critical discussion 
encompasses ten rules that form a code of conduct (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, 
p. 135–157), whereby arguers’ adherence to these rules leads to a reasonable resolution of 
a disagreement. The ten rules of the code of conduct are:  
 
• Rule 1 (Freedom Rule): Discussants may not prevent each other from advancing 
standpoints or from calling standpoints into question. 
• Rule 2 (Obligation to Defend Rule): Discussants who advance a standpoint may 
not refuse to defend this standpoint when requested to do so. 
• Rule 3 (Standpoint Rule): Attacks on standpoints may not bear on a standpoint 
that has not actually been put forward by the other party. 
• Rule 4 (Relevance Rule): Standpoints may not be defended by non-argumentation 
or argumentation that is not relevant to the standpoint. 
• Rule 5 (Unexpressed Premise Rule): Discussants may not falsely attribute 




• Rule 6 (Starting Point Rule): Discussants may not falsely present something as an 
accepted starting point or falsely deny that something is an accepted starting point. 
• Rule 7 (Validity Rule): Reasoning that is in an argumentation explicitly and fully 
expressed may not be invalid in a logical sense. 
• Rule 8 (Argument Scheme Rule): Standpoints defended by argumentation that is 
not explicitly and fully expressed may not be regarded as conclusively defended 
by such argumentation unless the defence takes place by means of appropriate 
argument schemes that are applied correctly. 
• Rule 9 (Concluding Rule): Inconclusive defences of standpoints may not lead to 
maintaining these standpoints and conclusive defences of standpoints may not 
lead to maintaining expressions of doubt concerning these standpoints. 
• Rule 10 (Language Use Rule): Discussants may not use any formulations that are 
insufficiently clear or confusingly ambiguous, and they may not deliberately 
misinterpret the other party’s formulations. (van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 542–544) 
 
The ideal model of critical discussion will form the descriptive and normative framework 
for the reconstruction, analysis, and evaluation of Nasrallah’s argumentative discourse. 
Based on this model, in some cases, Nasrallah’s argumentative moves can be judged as 
reasonable if they adhere to the rules of critical discussion and, thus, allow the critical 
testing of standpoints. In other instances, Nasrallah’s moves may hinder the critical 
testing of standpoints, e.g. by silencing opponents through casting doubt on their 
expertise or threatening them (ad hominem and ad baculum, respectively). These moves 
are said to be fallacious because they represent a violation of the first rule of the ideal 
model of critical discussion – the Freedom Rule; hence, they obstruct the critical testing 
of standpoints.28 During an argumentative exchange, as van Eemeren and Houtlosser 
                                                          
28 A list of the different fallacies that violate the ten rules of critical discussion is provided in Appendix A  
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(2000) elucidate, participants are committed to simultaneously achieving dialectical 
(reasonable) aims by complying with the rules of critical discussion to resolve 
disagreements and rhetorical aims, i.e. to have their standpoints accepted, and the 
perlocutionary effects of their speech acts serve their own strategic interests. To balance 
the attainment of both goals is an instance of strategic manoeuvring.  
3.2. Winning an argument through strategic manoeuvring  
Parties involved in an argumentative exchange will attempt “to exploit the opportunities 
afforded by the dialectical situation” in order to steer the discussion rhetorically to their 
advantage (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 1999, p. 482). Conceived in this manner, strategic 
manoeuvring serves as a mechanism for balancing the attainment of rhetorical aims 
against the backdrop of complying with the standards of reasonableness.29 Van Eemeren 
and Houtlosser (2003) maintain that the simultaneous pursuit of both aims creates 
tension. Therefore, strategic manoeuvring is a reconciliatory mechanism “directed at 
diminishing the potential tension between pursuing at the same time a dialectical as well 
as a rhetorical aim” (p. 392).   
Each discussion stage has both a dialectical aim and a rhetorical counterpart. For 
example, in the confrontation stage, the dialectical aim is to formulate a reasonable 
definition of the difference of opinion. Once formulated, this opens up a set of 
possibilities related to presenting the confrontation in the most effective way, i.e. a 
rhetorical aim (van Eemeren, 2013). While dialectical aims are grounded in the normative 
                                                          
29 Pragma-dialecticians prefer the term effectiveness rather than persuasiveness, because the latter only 
pertains to the rhetorical effectiveness of argumentative moves advanced in the argumentation stage, while 




standards (rules) of critical discussion, rhetorical aims are realized by making expedient 
choices concerning the three aspects of strategic manoeuvring: topical potential, 
adaptation to audience, and presentational devices. As such, the analysis of strategic 
manoeuvring reveals how the opportunities available at a certain dialectical stage are 
exploited to favour the protagonists’ interests (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999).  
Topical potential represents the repertoire of options (topoi or loci) that are available at a 
certain discussion stage and which form the basis for selecting moves (van Eemeren, 
2010).30 Topical potential reflects the perspective, angle, or viewpoint that the arguer 
takes regarding the content of her discourse (ibid.). In the confrontation stage, topical 
potential amounts to making the most effective choices among the potential issues for 
discussion, i.e. exploiting and restricting the ‘disagreement space’ (ibid.). This means that 
the confrontation is defined in terms of the arguer’s preferences which are attained, for 
example, by choosing a topic that she finds it easier to handle or by evading the burden of 
giving an explicit definition of the disagreement.  
In the opening stage, the arguer aims to create a broad ‘zone of agreement’ that represents 
the most advantageous material and procedural starting points for the discussion. To this 
end, the arguer aims to elicit helpful concessions or to secure agreement through 
reference to implicitly assumed endoxa.31 In the argumentation stage, the arguer selects 
the appropriate argument schemes (causal, symptomatic, comparison schemes) that best 
suit her line of defence or attack. Finally, in the concluding stage, topical potential 
                                                          
30 A more detailed discussion of the relation between topoi, loci and topical potential is presented in Section 
4.2, below. 




amounts to determining the ‘scope of conclusiveness’ related to the outcome of the 
discussion by showing, for example, the implications of the positive consequences of 
accepting her line of argument, or capitalising on it (van Eemeren, 2010, Ch. 4). 
The second aspect of strategic manoeuvring is adapting the arguer’s moves to meet 
audience preferences and frames of reference. Adaptation to the audience requires that 
moves connect with the views and perspectives that are most agreeable to the audience, 
so that these moves attain the widest agreement. In the confrontation stage, the arguer 
aims to avoid mentioning contradictions or to limit disagreement to a non-mixed 
difference in order to secure communion.32 One strategy is to present conflict over values 
as being conflict over facts, because facts are easier to handle. In the opening stage, 
adaptation to the audience entails referring to widely-shared values and value hierarchies 
that pertain to the respective audience. The objective is to establish material and 
procedural starting points that the audience is willing to accept or to appeal to those that 
are already part of the audience’s value systems and beliefs, i.e. exploiting endoxa. 
Reference to shared background knowledge and values, as well as adopting the other 
party’s arguments (conciliatio) to support one’s position, creates empathy with the 
audience since the stated premises are already part of the audience’s or the other party’s 
commitments and hence need no justification. Similarly, in the argumentation stage, the 
arguer may refer to arguments that conform with the audience’s interests or appeal to 
sources that the audience respect and trust. In the conclusion stage, the arguer may 
                                                          
32 A non-mixed difference of opinion is an argumentative confrontation in which one party advances a 
standpoint and the same party has the obligation to defend it. In contrast, in a mixed difference of opinion, 
two parties advance contradictory standpoints and both have the obligation to defend their standpoints (van 
Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992).   
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emphasize the joint responsibility of accepting her standpoints and/or avoid mentioning 
consequences that the audience do not favour (van Eemeren, 2010, Ch. 4).  
For optimal rhetorical effect, arguments that are reframed to meet audience preferences 
must be presented in such a way as to induce acceptance. This involves exploiting a range 
of presentational devices. Presentational devices, such as rhetorical questions, 
metonymies and metaphors, serve “the purpose of framing the argumentative move that is 
made in such a way that it introduces a particular perspective” (ibid., p.126). The three 
aspects of strategic manoeuvring are realized in every stage of critical discussion, where 
the outcome of maintaining a balance between dialectical and rhetorical (effectiveness) 
aims leads to winning the discussion in a reasonable way. 
However, in certain instances of actual argumentative practice, this tension is not resolved 
and the rhetorical aim is achieved at the expense of abiding by the rules of critical 
discussion. In such cases, as van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2003) state, the “commitment 
to the critical ideal may be neglected due to assiduity to win the other party over to one’s 
own side” (p. 394). Due to this imbalance, strategic manoeuvring can derail when an 
argumentative move is characterised as fallacious.  
3.3. A pragma-dialectical view of fallacies  
In pragma-dialectics, fallacies are derailments of strategic manoeuvring because they not 
only constitute violations of the ten rules of critical discussion, but they also indicate 
discussants’ failure to balance the attainment of rhetorical effectiveness with that of 
reasonableness, with the balance tipping towards the former. Based on this view, the 
evaluation of Nasrallah’s responses to accusations and criticisms can be considered 
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reasonable if his choice, for example, in selecting a favourable definition of a difference 
of opinion, in the confrontation stage, does not hinder critical testing; otherwise, it is a 
fallacious move. In other words, Nasrallah needs to convince the audience of the 
untenability of his opponents’ standpoints without forcing the acceptability of his 
arguments through, for example, silencing or threatening opponents (i.e. obstruct critical 
testing). 
However, strategic manoeuvring, as van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2003) observe, takes 
place in multifarious communicative practices that have become, more or less, formally 
conventionalized. In their view, many communicative practices, such as the legal domain, 
are formally conventionalized. Communicative practices in the political domain, 
however, are less likely to be so formalized. Communicative activity types are 
“conventionalized communicative practices whose conventionalization serves to meet the 
institutional exigencies of the communicative domain in response to which they have 
developed” (van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 557). It is through the implementation of the 
appropriate genre of a communicative activity (e.g. the genre of deliberation is related to 
the political domain) that a communicative activity type, such as Prime Minister’s 
question time, can realize its ‘institutional point’ (van Eemeren, 2013). The different 
communicative activity types related to the political domain share the institutional 
objective of preserving democracy through deliberation (van Eemeren, 2013).33 The 
effect of institutional macro-contexts lies in creating preconditions and imposing 
constraints on arguers’ strategic manoeuvring. This means that the rules and conventions 
                                                          
33 Pragma-dialecticians adopt a Habermasian view to deliberation in which formal and informal contexts, 




of an argumentative activity type constrain arguers’ choice of topics, adaptation to 
audience, and presentational devices. At the same time, institutional constraints help the 
analyst to have a better account of the resources that arguers can exploit at a given point 
in discourse.34 van Eemeren and his co-authors (2014) note that in cases where the 
argumentative characteristics of a particular speech event are the main focus of the 
analysis, then, institutional constraints on arguers’ manoeuvring are excluded from the 
analysis.   
This is the view that I adopt in this thesis. Consequently, the analysis of Nasrallah’s 
speeches will not take into consideration the institutional constraints imposed by the 
macro-context on the way he strategically manoeuvres.35 In the following section, I 
outline points of interest that pragma-dialectics and the DHA share. 
4. Pragma-dialectics and the DHA: Commonalities and shared vision 
Ihnen and Richardson (2011) posit that the DHA and pragma-dialectics converge in their 
interest in argumentative discourse, not only in the critical view of political discourse they 
each take, but also on pragmatic and evaluative levels. In addition to the emphasis that 
both approaches put on context and the conceptualization of discourse as a goal-oriented 
activity, I believe that problem- solution and practical applications are further aspects of 
the pragmatic orientation of both approaches. As for the context, both approaches link the 
meaning of an utterance to various levels of context. In the DHA, texts are analysed in 
                                                          
34 Recently, three studies have examined the effect of institutional constraints on arguers’ strategic 
maneuvering in specific macro-contexts (Andone, 2010; Lewinski, 2010; Mohammed 2009). In these 
studies, the analyses focus on arguers’ choices in terms of being either suitable/permissible or inappropriate 
in light of the rules and conventions of the argumentative activity type under scrutiny. 
35 This is also because the analysed speeches belong to a variety of political (sub)genres, such as 
commemorative speeches, election speeches, war speeches and so on.   
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relation to four levels of context (see Section 2.1): immediate co-text, intertextual and 
interdiscursive relations, social variables and institutional frames and, finally, the broader 
sociopolitical and historical context. A pragma-dialectical analysis of discourse also 
relates the meaning of argumentative moves to the linguistic micro-context, the 
situational meso-context, the institutional macro-context and the intertextual context in 
which these moves are made (van Eemeren, 2010, p. 16-19). Moreover, both approaches 
acknowledge the strategic functions of language, i.e. language as a goal-oriented activity. 
Speakers are, thus, expected to mobilise linguistic and non-linguistic resources in order to 
get their messages accepted and achieve political goals. In pragma-dialectics, 
unreasonable persuasion occurs when the pursuit of dialectical aims is overridden by 
rhetorical aims. Resultant fallacies, seen as obstructions to the resolution of a difference 
of opinion, lead to a “false resolution” (van Eemeren et al., 1993, p.14). From a DHA 
perspective, discursive strategies are analytical categories that help the analyst to identify 
the ideological dimensions of strategic discourse. More importantly, these strategies are 
vehicles for persuasion. That is, they are exploited by speakers in persuading audiences of 
a standpoint, policy, or action (e.g. immigration should be reduced).  
A primary aim on the DHA’s critical agenda is highlighting the social effects of 
discursively perpetuating hegemonic ideologies. To this end, the DHA examines texts 
that contribute to the creation of specific social problems. The DHA focuses on 
examining discursive forms of representations that are partly or directly responsible for 
the creation of discriminatory and prejudicial attitudes towards minorities. Crucial to the 
DHA is its commitment to emancipation and empowering those who are oppressed and 
marginalized. By siding with those who are suffering and making explicit the discursive 
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means by which they are subdued, the DHA, thus, contributes to the transformation of 
existing social structures that have given rise to undesired social inequalities (Wodak, 
2001). Similarly, Van Eemeren et al. (1993) assert that practical research in 
argumentation aims to “empower ordinary discussants to engage in argumentation that 
more closely approximates ideal standards” (p.24), as a means to foster and enhance 
(deliberative) democratic practices. Therefore, arguers can, in principle, select 
argumentative moves that are persuasive and reasonable at the same time.   
According to pragma-dialecticians, the normative reconstruction of argumentative 
discourse is not an end in itself. In other words, proposing a normative and a procedural 
model – the ideal model of critical discussion – based on which an argumentative 
behaviour is assessed, is not the end result of pragma-dialectical analysis. Pragma-
dialectics has a practical agenda that is directly associated with the normative standards of 
the ideal model, namely, improving argumentative practice (ibid.). From a pragma-
dialectical perspective, improving argumentative practice can be achieved on both 
individual and social levels. Improving individual competencies can be attained through 
the “development of a discussion-minded attitude” (van Eemeren et al., 1993 p.25), 
whereas at the social level, this can take the form of examining and evaluating 
institutional or social structures that “can constrain an argumentative practice for good or 
ill” (ibid.).  
A more pronounced commitment to the “improvement of communication within public 
institutions” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 34) is voiced by the DHA founders. Wodak 
(2001) calls for the application of results to communication problems in schools and 
hospitals, in setting guidelines for avoiding sexist, discriminatory and prejudiced 
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language behaviour, e.g. in writing schoolbooks (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001). In this respect, 
pragma-dialectics’ commitment to improving a discussion-minded attitude echoes the 
DHA’s goal of raising critical language awareness. That is, being aware of unreasonable 
arguments empowers the public to apply greater scrutiny to discourses to which they are 
exposed. It might be safe to conclude that improving communication and empowering 
citizens to be more involved in the discursive public sphere are shared interests of the two 
approaches.  
The DHA and pragma-dialectics share a further interest in evaluating or critiquing 
argumentative discourse. In pragma-dialectics, the reconstruction and evaluation of the 
reasonableness, or fallaciousness, of argumentative moves are carried out in accordance 
with the stages and rules specified by the ideal model of critical discussion, which also 
form the basis for normative critique. Following pragma-dialectics, argumentative 
strategies (topoi and fallacies) in the DHA are also evaluated in terms of the ten rules of 
rational arguing, since these, as Reisigl and Wodak state, “form the basis of a discourse 
ethics on which a political model of discursive, deliberative democracy can be grounded” 
(2001, p. 71). However, from the DHA’s perspective, the evaluation of whether an 
argument scheme/ topos is reasonable or fallacious is not overtly related to specifying 
violations of the ten rules of critical discussion. This is because the DHA is primarily 
interested in evaluating the extent to which a specific representation justifies and 
legitimizes domination, repression, marginalization etc., instead of focusing on specifying 
violations of rational means of arguing.  
Forchtner and Tominc (2011) claim that the DHA’s use of pragma-dialectics as a point of 
reference for its normative critique is the main point of divergence, which results in 
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contradictory positions. In Forchtner and Tominc’s view, in pragma-dialectics, a 
discriminatory practice or policy is justified if it is supported by reasonable arguments 
(ibid.). This does not fit with the DHA’s emancipatory agenda, which, in addition to the 
ideal model of critical discussion, adopts a Habermasian view to critique (ibid.). In my 
view, the alleged contradiction at the level of evaluation might, in principle, be valid. 
However, argumentative reality provides evidence that attests to the contrary. Critical 
studies of discriminatory discourse have, more often than not, revealed the fallaciousness 
of the arguments deployed in the justification of preferential treatment of minorities.  
This suggests that a deeper understanding of the normative and epistemological positions 
of both approaches could build a bridge between them. Therefore, in the following 
section, I elaborate on the theoretical conceptualizations specific to each approach.   
4.1. Epistemological and normative positions  
The DHA subscribes to the socio-philosophical orientation of the Frankfurt school and to 
Habermas’s conception of deliberative democracy (Reisigl, 2014; Reisigl & Wodak, 
2001, 2009), whereas pragma-dialectics subscribes to Popper’s critical rationalism (van 
Eemeren et al., 1993; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004). From a critical rationalist 
point of view, knowledge and the approximation of objective truth can be reached 
through methodological scepticism, i.e. through critical examination, testing or 
falsification. Therefore, a rational approach based on procedural testing and the 
elimination of mistakes will eventually improve knowledge and approximate truth. This 
entails the continuous testing of hypotheses through critical discussion or debate. Based 
on this view, the dialectical nature of pragma-dialectics calls for the resolution of 
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contested issues through the “methodological exchange of discussion moves” (van 
Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 22), i.e. the procedures formulated for the critical 
testing of standpoints. It is through following the ideal model of critical discussion that 
points of view are critically tested, and based on this, a conclusion as to whether these are 
“defendable in light of critical doubt and objections” is reached (ibid., p. 52). Therefore, a 
good argument, from a pragma-dialectical perspective, is one that withstands critical 
testing.  
 Forchtner and Tominc’s (2012) contention relates to the integration of critical 
rationalism, the main theoretical tenet of pragma-dialectics, into the DHA’s theoretical 
framework. In their view, this integration leads to inconsistencies not only on the 
epistemological level but also in the normative grounds informing the DHA’s critique. 
According to Forchtner and Tominc, Popper’s justification of a rational attitude through 
which knowledge is advanced relies, epistemologically, on “a subjective choice based on 
an irrational faith in reason, a subjective preference” (p. 34). This contrasts with 
Habermas’ Discourse Ethics, which is grounded on rational consensus attained through 
moral argumentation.    
To redeem or ground validity claims, according to Habermas (1990), means to be 
engaged in an argumentative exchange with the aim of reaching rationally motivated 
agreement. This communicative activity takes place against the backdrop of the 
counterfactual presuppositions that form the Ideal Speech Situation: inclusivity, absence 
of external constraints, freedom to agree or disagree and truthfulness (ibid.). It is a form 
of communication that “rules out all external or internal coercion other than the force of 
the better argument and thereby also neutralizes all motives other than that of the 
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cooperative search for truth” (ibid., p. 89). According to Forchtner and Tominc (2012), 
this speech situation should not be considered an unrealizable ideal but rather the 
“counterfactually anticipated presupposition of every meaningful debate” (p.36). The 
importance of arriving at rational consensus by all those affected is because it sets out a 
platform for opening up the public sphere and promotes dialogue which, according to 
Habermas, forms the essence of deliberative democracy.   
Based on this view, Forchtner and Tominc (2012) suggest that overtly relating critique to 
Habermas’ deliberative democracy rather than to pragma-dialectics’ critical rationalist 
view would provide the DHA with a stronger basis for its emancipatory agenda. To reach 
rational consensus grounded in Habermas’ Discourse Ethics means that the discussion 
should not be restricted only to those who are involved in the act of arguing (protagonist 
vs antagonist).  Rational consensus is attained when the views of all those who are 
affected by the consequences of normative claims (e.g. we ought to do X) are taken into 
consideration, i.e. orientation to difference. This is the main criticism levelled at pragma-
dialectics, where the act of arguing is limited to the standpoints advanced by the 
protagonist and the objections raised by the antagonist, without acknowledging the views 
of other parties that might be affected by resolution of the disagreement (ibid.).  
Reisigl (2014) has recently asserted that while the ten rules of critical discussion are good 
normative standards, they are not sufficient to ground the DHA’s critique. In relation to 
the epistemological divergence – between critical rationalism and Habermas’ deliberative 
democracy – Reisigl emphasizes that the ten rules of critical discussion are not that far 
removed from Habermas’ Ideal Speech Situation. In fact, Reisigl (ibid.) expounds that 
some rules of the ideal model of critical discussion implicitly refer to Habermas’ 
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Discourse Ethics and can, thus, be taken to promote rational consensus. For example, the 
first rule of critical discussion, which refers to the freedom of arguers to put forward 
arguments and cast doubts, could be expanded, as Reisigl suggests (ibid.), to include the 
freedom of non-present third parties who may either advance or question standpoints. 
What is important here is an acknowledgment, coming from one of the founders of the 
DHA, that the normative standards of the ideal model of critical discussion are good 
normative standards to assess the persuasive or manipulative character of argumentative 
discourse.  
This does not mean that the analysis of Nasrallah’s speeches will not examine how 
Nasrallah attempts to ignore and silence alternative discourses or weaken his opponents’ 
positions. In fact, the analysis remains faithful to one of the main objectives of the DHA’s 
project, i.e. demystifying ideologies that have become naturalised or consensual (see 
Section 2). Therefore, the analysis examines how Nasrallah trivialises and/or silences 
opponents’ propositions (e.g. through negative Other-presentation) to sustain his 
hegemony. Indeed, silencing alternatives and reducing social reality to a limited range of 
cause-effect relations and solutions are characteristic of hegemonic discourses.  
The above discussion shows that the DHA and pragma-dialectics are epistemologically 
and normatively more closely connected – though often implicitly – than is sometimes 
supposed. The notion of topoi is another point of convergence, although in each approach 
they are related to different domains of enquiry. Therefore, the following section briefly 




4.2. The concept of topoi  
It is worth noting that the concept of topoi is a controversial topic, where consensus 
among argumentation and rhetoric scholars, from antiquity onwards, as to the nature of 
the concept seems to be beyond reach. This is clearly reflected in a remark by Leff (2006) 
who, after spending 40 years examining rhetorical and dialectical traditions, concluded 
that topoi are ambiguous and multi-faceted. Leff attributes this ambiguity to the many 
referents that topoi are associated with. In his view, topoi are taken to refer to: modes of 
inference, aspects of the subject, attitudes of the audience or types of issues or topics, 
among others. He further explicates that this complication stems from adopting either a 
rhetorical (arguments on specific topics for a specific audience) or a dialectical (abstract 
argument schemes or context-independent patterns) perspective to the study of topoi. 
From a DHA perspective, topoi are “parts of argumentation which belong to the required 
premises. They are the formal or content-related warrants or ‘conclusion rules’ which 
connect the argument with the conclusion, the claim” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, p. 110). 
Wodak et al. (2009) reiterate that they consider “topoi’ or ‘loci’ to be highly 
conventionalised parts of argumentation which belong to the obligatory elements of 
argumentation and take the form either of explicit or inferable premises” (p. 34–35).  
According to Zagar (2009, 2010), the DHA's characterisation of topoi as both formal and 
content-related warrants is problematic, as it treats formal rules/ topoi as identical to 
content-related rules/ warrants. Therefore, he proposes that the DHA should restrict the 
use of the term topoi to formal schemes (rules) of argumentation. He further notes that the 
DHA's definition of topoi presupposes that topoi are ready-made arguments that are 
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widely used, and that the role of the analyst is limited to identifying the arguments of a 
given text against the backdrop of clearly delineated lists of topoi (Zagar, 2010). 
This alleged inconsistency stems from Kienpointner’s conceptualization of topoi, which 
is, in Zagar’s view, a hybrid product influenced by Toulmin’s (1969) work. In 
Kienpointner’s opinion, “topoi are search formulas which tell you how and where to look 
for arguments. At the same time, topoi are warrants which guarantee the transition from 
argument to conclusion” (1997, p. 226). According to Kienpointner (2001), topoi have a 
selective function (to search for arguments) and a probative function (as an inferential 
rule or warrant). Zagar (2009, 2010) argues that Kienpointner’s view of topoi does not 
conform with that of Aristotle. This is because an Aristotelian view of topoi entails topoi 
being of two kinds: (i) context-independent or abstract/ common topoi that can be applied 
to an unlimited number of arguments (dialectical topoi); (ii) and more specific topoi 
(rhetorical topoi) that are related to three genres of rhetoric (see Chapter 2, section 2.1): 
judicial, deliberative, and epideictic (Boukala, 2016; Rubinelli, 2009; Zagar, 2009, 2010).  
Rubinelli observes that Aristotle, in The Topics, considers topoi to be “argument schemes 
of universal acceptability” (2009, p. 145). In this view, Aristotelian topoi are “general 
instructions allowing a conclusion of a certain form (not content), to be derived from 
premises of a certain form (not content)” (Zagar, 2009, p. 57). Similarly, Stump (1978) 
notes that Aristotle’s topos has to be seen, primarily, as an abstract argument that allows 
the construction of a number of specific arguments and, secondarily, as a rule or a 
principle that supports a variety of arguments (van Eemeren, 2010). Zagar (2010) claims 
that an Aristotelian topos, seen as a general or abstract scheme, enables the arguer to 
construct an argument for a certain conclusion. This process is possible, Zagar (ibid.) 
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suggests, because a topos consists of an instruction based on which a rule is formulated. 
This means that the instruction guides the arguer to frame the argument based on the 
relation (e.g. definition, genus, property, accident) that exists between the subject and the 
predicate of a proposition, from which a rule is formulated that functions as a general 
premise in an enthymeme (Zagar, 2009).36  
Using one of Zagar’s examples, the topos of opposition is first used as a general or an 
abstract formula that has the following structure: If action Y is desirable in relation to 
object X, then, the contrary action Y´ should be disapproved of in relation to the same 
object X (i.e. instruction function). The application of this topos to a specific subject 
provides the rule that serves as a general premise in an enthymeme: If it is desirable to act 
in favour of one’s friends, it should be disapproved of to act against one’s friends (2010, 
p. 17–18). As such, a topos, in Zagar’s view, is a “general argumentative form or pattern, 
and concrete arguments are instantiations of this general form” (ibid., p. 17). Following 
Zagar’s suggestion, Boukala (2016) shows how particular content-related warrants that 
are identified in the DHA lists of topoi are better accounted for based on Aristotle’s view 
of topoi. For example, Boukala elucidates that the topos of threat (a recurring topos in 
most of the DHA lists) and the more specific topos of internal threat are instantiations or 
applications of Aristotle’s abstract scheme, the topos of the consequential.  
In my view, Zagar’s criticisms of the DHA’s notion of topoi, as well as his suggestions, 
have clear implications for recent work by the DHA’s founders. This can be seen in the 
attention that DHA’s scholars have recently given to argument reconstruction, although 
                                                          
36 An enthymeme is a syllogism (a deductive argument formed of a major and a minor premise, as well as a 
conclusion) in which one of its premises or the conclusion is omitted. 
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such reconstruction is limited to specific argument schemes (Reisigl & Wodak, 2016, p. 
50–53; Wodak, 2015, p. 52). More important is the recent distinction between topoi that 
are labelled as formal schemes (e.g. topos of opposites, topos of definition, topos of the 
consequential etc.) and those that are labelled as content-related (e.g. topos of people, 
topos of reality, topos of nature etc.) (Reisigl & Wodak, 2016, p. 35; Wodak, 2015, p. 51–
53).37  
The discussion so far has focused on the Aristotelian conception of topoi; however, the 
DHA also relates topoi to Cicero’s loci. According to Rubinelli (2009), Cicero, in De 
Inventione, is interested in specifying the steps that orators have to follow in order to 
construct a persuasive speech. These parts are the: exordium (the introduction, which 
announces the subject and the purpose of the discourse); narrative (an account of what 
has happened or what is the case); partition (a presentation of the issues that will be 
discussed); confirmation (putting forward arguments in support of a claim); refutation 
(answering the counterarguments of opponents); and finally, peroration (conclusion). 
Moreover, in De Inventione, as Rubinelli notes, Cicero uses the term ‘locus’ to refer to 
different things: topic or theme, subject-matter indicator, argument scheme (or warrant) 
and ready-made arguments known as locus communis (2009, p. 101–107).  
                                                          
37 From a different perspective, Charteris-Black (2014, p. 135–136) considers the DHA’s formal topoi to be 
equivalent to Toulmin’s treatment of warrants, while the more specific content-related topoi pertain to the 
content of an argument. In his view, formal abstract formulations or warrants allow arguments to be 
evaluated based on their underlying structure, while content-related topoi are descriptive and do not identify 
logical structures. It seems that his treatment of the DHA’s content-related topoi echoes Zagar’s (2009; 
2010) criticism, i.e. the DHA’s content-related topoi are simply themes or topics, thus, they do not have an 
argumentative function. In Charteris-Black’s view, the topos of finance, the topos of uselessness and the 
topos of burden provide the contents of arguments; however, the aggregate of these cause-effect relations 





Rubinelli argues that Cicero’s locus communis should not be equated with Aristotle’s 
topoi, for the latter has universal applicability while the former is mainly effective in 
judicial, deliberative and epideictic contexts. Rubinelli maintains that locus communis 
does not have an argumentative function as it does not add information. Instead, it is 
“used to put the audience in a favourable frame of mind by presenting evaluations and 
interpretations of the facts at issue” (ibid., p. 107). Similarly, van Eemeren (2010) 
maintains that Cicero’s loci do not always have an argumentative function as they are 
used to identify the contents of different parts of a persuasive speech (mentioned above). 
In pragma-dialectics, the three aspects of strategic manoeuvring (see Section 3.2) are the 
counterparts of three concepts in classical rhetoric: topical selection relates to topoi or loci, 
adaptation to audience relates to the notion of endoxa, and presentational means refer to 
stylistic devices. Topical potential or system, according to van Eemeren et al. (2009), refers 
to the range of topical choices that are available at a given point in discourse where its 
function is “similar to that of the topoi or loci in the classical rhetoric of inventio” (van 
Eemeren, 2010, p. 96). Following Cicero’s classification of parts of a speech and his 
concept of loci, van Eemeren asserts that topoi or loci are not limited to the argumentation 
stage because there are:38 
Topoi pertaining specifically to the exordium (e.g. to underline the importance of 
the subject of the speech), the narratio (e.g. to establish a certain perception of the 
                                                          
38 Cicero identifies five tasks which an orator has to fulfil in preparing a speech (officia oratoris). These are: 
invention (inventio), arrangement (dispositio), style (elocution), memory (memoria) and delivery 
(pronuntiatio) (Reynolds,1993). The different parts of a persuasive speech mentioned in van Eemeren’s 





course of events), and the peroratio (e.g. to incite pity with the accused in the jury 
of a law case), so too in argumentative discourse there are specific topical options 
to choose from for every single stage of the process of resolving a difference of 
opinion on the merits. (2010, p. 98)   
Based on this view, van Eemeren concludes that the scope of the rhetorical topical system 
in pragma-dialectics is “by no means limited to the argumentatio [argumentation] but 
covers also other parts of the oratio [oration] that have different aims, such as the exordium 
[introduction] and (especially) the peroration [conclusion]” (ibid., p. 107). Boukala (2016) 
claims that the DHA’s inconsistent treatment of topoi stems, on the one hand, from the 
DHA’s identification of topoi as warrants, and in considering Aristotle’s topoi as equivalent 
to Cicero’s loci, on the other. Consequently, she proposes that the DHA’s characterization 
of topoi has to be confined to Aristotle’s view of topoi, thus suggesting, erroneously, that 
pragma-dialectics only follows the Aristotelian tradition.  
The aim of this thesis is certainly not to get involved in this highly controversial issue. 
However, the various points of view surveyed above have specific implications for my 
treatment of topoi in this research. First, since pragma-dialectics is taken as the main 
analytical framework for the reconstruction and evaluation of Nasrallah’s speeches, it is, 
thus, reasonable to align with pragma-dialectics’ notion of topical potential, which 
comprises Aristotelian and Ciceronian conceptualizations of topoi, among others. Second, 
where the DHA provides the other overarching analytical approach, I propose that the 
DHA’s topoi that have clear counterparts in pragma-dialectics, or those that can be shown 
to fall under Aristotle’s abstract schemes, should be identified as such. For example, what 
the DHA identifies as the topos of people (Wodak, 2015) – if it has an argumentative 
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function, it can be reconstructed as an argument – can be regarded as an instance of 
argumentum ad populum. Similarly, following Zagar’s and Boukala’s suggestions, the 
DHA’s topos of threat or topos of danger are instantiations of Aristotle’s abstract scheme 
of the consequential (Boukala, 2016), or causal argumentation in pragma-dialectical 
terms. I also suggest that the DHA’s topos of illustrative example(s) echoes the argument 
scheme from example (van Eemeren et al., 2002), which falls under symptomatic 
argumentation in pragma-dialectics.39  
Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) in their proposed model for integrating argumentation 
theory and CDS choose not to work with the concept of topoi, despite favouring an 
Aristotelian treatment of the concept. In the following section, I will summarise the main 
theoretical assumptions of Fairclough and Fairclough’s practical argument model and 
mention reasons for the inefficacy of their model for the purposes of this research.   
5.  The practical argument approach 
Fairclough and Fairclough (2011, 2012) advocate an analytical framework for the 
analysis of argumentative discourse, which represents a shift from CDS’s prime focus on 
the analysis of representation to the analysis of political action and decision-making. In 
their view, political discourse is fundamentally argumentative in nature and primarily 
involves “practical argumentation, argumentation for or against particular ways of acting, 
argumentation that can ground decision” (2012, p. 1). To reach a decision on ‘what ought 
                                                          
39 Three main categories of argument schemes are distinguished in pragma-dialectics. These are: 
symptomatic (or of the token type) argumentation, comparison (or of the similarity type) argumentation 
and, finally, causal (or of the consequence type) argumentation (van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 547–548). All 
the argument sub-types identified in the argumentation literature, according to pragma-dialecticians, belong 




to be done’ (a normative claim), political agents present reasons for or against following a 
specific course of action, as well as for considering alternatives (ibid.). In so doing, they 
are involved in practical argumentation, the main objective of which is to propose 
solutions capable of transforming the current political or economic malaise into an 
imagined future state of affairs (ibid.).  
A practical argument scheme is made up of the following premises: a circumstantial 
premise, which presents the problem or the current context of action; a goal premise, 
which articulates a future state of affairs; a means-goal premise, which articulates a 
proposed action that will presumably lead to the goals aspired to; and a value premise, 
which invokes the values, concerns or desires that inform the action. The outcome 
(conclusion) of this chain of reasoning leads either to favouring or disapproving of the 
adoption of the proposed action or policy. The integration of argumentation theory – 
Walton’s practical reasoning scheme as well as aspects from pragma-dialectics – within 
Fairclough’s dialectical approach to CDS aims, on the one hand, to introduce 
argumentation analysis and evaluation into the analytical toolkit of CDS, and to 
strengthen CDS’s explanatory and normative critique, on the other (ibid.).  
On the explanatory level, as the authors explain, the selection of a certain representation 
of the context of action – the political or economic problem tackled – is tied to a 
particular ideology. Similarly, the values and political commitments invoked to legitimize 
the goals and actions are related to naturalising a specific ideology that serves the 
interests of dominant social groups (ibid.). In other words, the analysis of practical 
arguments reflects the way ideologies, beliefs and values are configured as premises for 
action. In this view, the analysis of practical arguments, according to Fairclough and 
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Fairclough (2012), feeds into the critique of ideology, and as such it gives CDS greater 
explanatory power in terms of critiquing the social structures and causes that perpetuate 
and maintain hegemonic ideologies (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2013).  
From a normative perspective, the critical evaluation of arguments might explain how 
biased and one-sided argumentation influences specific audiences. The normative 
evaluation of arguments, attained through a set of critical questions designed to evaluate 
practical arguments, cannot “help but naturally connect with the social explanatory 
critique” (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2013, p. 341). A normative critique attempts to 
clarify why arguments that “draw on dominant discourses and ideologies”, i.e. are 
“grounded in unreasonable and rationally indefensible values and goals” (ibid., p. 81), go 
unchallenged and are accepted by respective audiences. For example, the evaluation of 
practical arguments questions the validity of a proposed action or policy in light of 
alternative means of action that have been backgrounded or ignored. The evaluation also 
brings to the fore the negative consequences of the proposed action or policy that have 
been ignored or subject to silencing. Such an evaluation, according to Fairclough and 
Fairclough (2012), explains how dominant ideologies shape practical arguments and how 
agents drawing on dominant discourses maintain and (re)produce unequal power relations 
through impartial representations and biased argumentation.  
This thesis calls for a systematic integration of pragma-dialectics into the theoretical and 
methodological toolkit of the DHA, and as such it also holds that pragma-dialectics can 
strengthen the DHA’s explanatory and normative critique. In this respect, the evaluation 
of Nasrallah’s argumentation stretches beyond evaluating the fallaciousness or 
reasonableness of the adduced arguments to showing how the different tenets of the 
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resistance ideology are configured as premises that feed into perpetuating Nasrallah’s 
hegemony.  
The above discussion might give the impression that Fairclough and Fairclough’s model 
is a plausible one to follow. However, due to the nature of the data and the set objectives 
of this thesis (see Chapter 1, section 6,7), the practical argument model, despite its 
obvious advantages, is unable to account for retrospective argumentation (i.e. justifying 
already taken courses of action). This is mainly due to the deliberative nature of the 
political sphere that the authors are interested in evaluating (e.g. UK public debates over 
the global financial crisis), which favours deliberating over issues of public concern. This 
is, unfortunately, not the case in Lebanon where ‘consensus democracy’ (i.e. agreement is 
secured among different political factions and religious sects prior to action) is the main 
vehicle for political action. Moreover, the speeches analysed are primarily concerned with 
defending and justifying controversial past actions or decisions. Nasrallah’s speeches, as I 
claim, are attempts to (re)establish the legitimacy of problematized actions or decisions. 
As such, a model that is predominantly built on weighing the reasons for future-oriented 
actions does not align with the purposes of this study.    
The above discussion only hints at the persuasive nature of fallacious arguments. The 
proceeding section discusses the persuasive and/or manipulative character of 
argumentative discourse in more detail.  
6. Manipulation versus persuasion 
There is consensus among scholars interested in the perlocutionary effects of discursive 
messages that one of the main features that distinguishes persuasion from manipulation is 
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the degree of control exerted over recipients’ mental states. Persuasion is legitimate 
because “interlocutors are free to believe or act as they please, depending on whether or 
not they accept the arguments” (van Dijk, 2006a, p. 361). Similarly, O’Keefe (2002) 
perceives persuasion as “a successful intentional effort at influencing another’s mental 
state through communication in a circumstance in which the persuadee has some measure 
of freedom” (p. 5). This means that recipients of persuasive messages enjoy some degree 
of cognitive flexibility, which allows them to arrive at an epistemic evaluation by 
questioning the veracity of representations and assessing the rationality of the arguments 
advanced (van Dijk, 2006a; Jowett & O’Donnell, 2006; O’Keefe, 2002; Reardon, 1991), 
thereby making resistance possible and acceptable (Perloff, 2010).  
In contrast, manipulation has a negative connotation, as it limits recipient’s choices 
“through deceptive tactics” (Reardon, 1991, p. 2) aiming to “mislead the recipient by 
delivering an overt message that belies its true intent” (Perloff, 2010, p.24). In contrast to 
persuasion, a manipulative attempt seeks to constrain recipients’ cognitive processes and 
induce them to arrive at the manipulator’s preferred interpretation (van Dijk, 2006a; 
Maillat & Oswald, 2009, 2011; Oswald, 2014). The process of inducing addressees to 
entertain a certain belief is achieved, as Galasinski elucidates, through controlling access 
to other relevant information. For Galasinski, “withholding information, controlling it, is 
the essence of deception in general” (2000, p. 22).  
However, scholarly interest has recently shifted from studying manipulation as a speaker-
oriented phenomenon to examining how manipulation succeeds in constraining and 
controlling the cognitive processes underpinning message comprehension. In the 
following sections, I outline how manipulation and persuasion are conceptualized in 
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pragma-dialectics, the DHA and cognitive pragmatics, as these fields of enquiry are 
directly related to the theoretical assumptions adhered to in this thesis. 
6.1. Manipulation and persuasion in pragma-dialectics 
There is significant variation among argumentation scholars regarding the place of 
persuasion in argumentation theory. The controversy stems from whether argumentation 
can be defined in terms of its perlocutionary effect or in terms of the communicative 
means employed (Nettel & Roque, 2012), i.e. ends versus means. Argumentation 
scholars, such as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), Walton (2007, 2009) and van 
Eemeren and his co-authors (2009, 2014), consider persuasion to be a fundamental 
dimension of argumentative discourse.  
In pragma-dialectics, argumentation is perceived as a communicative and an interactional 
complex act. This means that the speech acts performed in argumentative discourse have 
a dual function. The communicative function aims to bring about the illocutionary effect 
of understanding, whereas the interactional function attempts to bring about the 
perlocutionary effect of acceptance (van Eemeren, 2013). In van Eemeren’s view, 
convincing is the associated perlocution of arguing, by which he means using 
argumentation to get an addressee to accept a standpoint based on a constellation of 
reasons advanced in support of claims. In other words, participants who engage in an 
argumentative activity uphold the presumption of reasonableness, and consequently 




In actual argumentative practice, however, arguers will not only try to sustain the 
impression that they are playing within dialectical permeates (reasonableness), but they 
will also seek to “stretch the use of these means so much that the fallacious manoeuvring 
concerned is also covered” (van Eemeren, 2013, p. 149). Thus, committing a fallacy does 
not only mean that one or more rules of critical discussion have been violated, it also 
indicates that the commitment to rhetorical aims is at the expense of maintaining 
reasonableness or dialectical aims. To put it differently, the presumption of 
reasonableness that is “conferred in every discussion move will also be operative when a 
particular strategic manoeuvre is in fact fallacious” (ibid., p.149).40 Therefore, the 
deceitful character of fallacies, according to van Eemeren (ibid.), can be attributed to 
exploiting the presumption of reasonableness where addressees, unwittingly, assume that 
the communicator is convincing them within the domain of reason which is, apparently, 
not the case. Fallacies, as van Eemeren asserts, “often manifest themselves as strategic 
manoeuvres that seem to comply with the critical discussion rules although in fact they do 
not” (ibid., p. 149).  
To conclude, van Eemeren maintains that manipulation seeks to “intentionally deceive 
one’s addressees by persuading them of something that is foremost in one’s own interest 
through the covert use of communicative devices that are not in agreement with generally 
acknowledged critical standards of reasonableness” (2005, p. xii). As mentioned earlier 
                                                          
40 From a different perspective, Habermas (1984) argues that whenever we say something meaningful we 
raise or commit ourselves to claims of truth, normative rightness and truthfulness. That is, recipients 
counterfactually presuppose that what is being communicated to them is true, right and truthful. Thus, 






(see Section 4.1), DHA scholars (Reisigl, 2014; Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, 2009, 2016) 
adhere to pragma-dialectics’ conception of fallacies as violations of the ten rules of 
rational discussion. However, the DHA’s analysis of the persuasive or manipulative 
character of discourse is embedded within a more ideological framework. In the 
following section, I summarise the notion of ideological manipulation as perceived in the 
DHA.    
6.2. Manipulation and persuasion from the DHA’s perspective 
Persuasive or manipulative discourses in the DHA are examined in terms of the 
ideological and the social effects that these discourses have in (re)producing and 
sustaining social power relations (Wodak, 2011; Reisigl,& Wodak, 2001; Wodak & 
Meyer, 2009). In the DHA, manipulation or persuasion is enacted through the five 
discursive strategies involved in the creation of in/out-groups, guided by the ideological 
macro-strategy of positive Self-presentation and negative Other-presentation. However, 
Reisigl and Wodak (2001, pp. 70–71) distinguish between discursive attempts that aim to 
convince through rational means, i.e. rational persuasion or convincing argumentation, 
and manipulative attempts to persuade or suggestive procedures of persuasion (i.e. 
irrational persuasion).41 Under conditions of suspended rationality, achieved via non-
argumentative means, such as emotionalization, propaganda, threatening and so on, 
acceptability is attained by “repressing the ability of rational and logical judgement” 
(ibid., p. 70).   
                                                          
41 It seems that Reisigl and Wodak’s distinction between the two types of persuasion echoes the conviction-
persuasion dichotomy that permeates classical argumentation scholarship. In this tradition, conviction seeks 
to influence understanding through rational means, while persuasion seeks to influence the will through 




Rational persuasion refers, as Reisigl and Wodak (ibid.) explicate, to securing 
intersubjective consensus or reaching rationally motivated agreement, which takes place 
against the backdrop of the counterfactual presuppositions forming the ‘Ideal Speech 
Situation’ (see Section 4.1) (Habermas, 1990). Therefore, Habermas’ Discourse Ethics 
and his theory of Deliberative Democracy are further sources of normativity that inform 
the DHA’s critique, i.e. the normative standards based on which manifest or latent 
persuasive or manipulative attempts are evaluated (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 263–266). 
In light of this view, Reisigl (2014) has recently called for stronger theoretical links to be 
made with Habermas’ theories as well as a more systematic adherence to principles of 
justice and equality. As such, the delineation of the persuasive and/or the manipulative 
character of discursive practices is more theoretically justified.   
From a cognitive point of view, manipulation is a form of mind control that involves the 
formation, activation and modification of recipients’ personal mental models and social 
representations (van Dijk, 2006a). In van Dijk’s view, manipulation restricts recipients’ 
freedom in such a way as to lead them to activate the mental models that the manipulator 
wishes them to activate. In this sense, manipulation is characterised as the “illegitimate 
hindering or biasing of the process of discourse comprehension” (ibid., p.366). The actual 
comprehension processes involved in such cognitive control are not explicitly described 
by van Dijk. One recent model that seeks to explain such cognitive control is based on 





6.3. Manipulation in cognitive pragmatics 
From a cognitive perspective, manipulation is possible because it exploits the same 
cognitive processes and inferential mechanisms used in interpreting the non-strategic use 
of language (Maillat & Oswald, 2009). In cognitive pragmatics, the study of manipulation 
focuses on how a speaker attempts to intentionally constrain addressees’ cognitive 
mechanisms so as to “attain a perlocutionary effect the speaker is covertly pursuing” 
(Oswald, 2014, p. 99). Research in cognitive pragmatics partially draws on relevance-
theoretic assumptions. Thus, it is necessary to outline the main tenets of this theory. 
6.3.1. Relevance Theory  
Relevance Theory (henceforth, RT) stipulates that the human mind tends to be geared to 
the maximisation of relevance, where relevance is a “property of inputs to cognitive 
processes which makes them worth processing” (Wilson & Sperber, 2012, p. 62). RT 
assumes that the presumption of optimal relevance is conferred on every ostensive 
stimulus. Optimal relevance is defined in terms of the best ratio between the effort 
required to process an utterance and the expected cognitive effects, i.e. the optimal 
cost/benefit ratio (Sperber & Wilson, 1995). A stimulus is relevant, according to Wilson 
and Sperber (2002), when it connects with an addressee’s available background 
knowledge or existing contextual assumptions to yield positive cognitive effects. Positive 
cognitive effects take several forms, including: (i) accepting new beliefs that are 
deducible from the input and context together (contextual implications); (ii) modifying 
the strength of contextually activated beliefs; or (iii) revising contextually activated 
beliefs in cases where the new information contradicts those beliefs (2000, p. 251–252). 
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In a relevance-theoretic framework, two dimensions determine the relevance of an input: 
the greater the positive cognitive effects achieved in processing an input, the greater is its 
relevance; and the greater the effort required for processing an input, the less relevant it 
is.42 In RT, comprehension is regarded as an inferential process, which starts by decoding 
linguistic stimuli and gradually enriching the context with relevant assumptions to arrive 
at the speaker’s intended meaning.43  
RT claims that inferential meaning involves the performance of subtasks, each of which is 
guided by the principle of optimal relevance (the optimal effect/effort ratio). Therefore, to 
arrive at the speaker’s intended meaning, recipients have to: (i) construct an appropriate 
hypothesis about the explicit content (explicatures) – achieved through decoding, 
disambiguation, reference resolution and so on; (ii) construct an appropriate hypothesis 
about the intended contextual assumptions (implicated premises); and (iii), construct an 
appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual implications (implicated 
conclusions). Consequently, interpretation is a multi-layered process through which the 
derivation of explicit and implicit meaning follows a path of least effort (maximise 
cognitive effects for the least cognitive effort), until the resulting interpretation meets the 
addressee’s expectation of relevance, which in turn is taken to be compatible with the 
speaker’s intended meaning (Wilson and Sperber, 2002).    
                                                          
42 These constitute the extent conditions of relevance. Extent condition 1: an assumption is relevant in a 
context to the extent that its contextual effects in this context are large. Extent condition 2: an assumption is 
relevant in a context to the extent that the effort required to process it in this context is small (Sperber & 
Wilson, 1995, p. 125).   
43 In RT, understanding is achieved when the speaker’s communicative intention (the intention to inform 
the audience of one’s own informative intention) is fulfilled, which means that the audience has recognized 
her informative intention. The informative intention is the intention to produce a certain response in an 




The Relevance-guided comprehension heuristic (Sperber & Wilson, 1995; Wilson & 
Sperber, 2012) assumes that the derivation of the speaker’s meaning is achieved through 
following a path of least effort in calculating cognitive effects. This means that the 
representation which is most easily accessible (in terms of effort) or yields more cognitive 
effects (by being reliable and epistemically strong) will be part of the contextual 
assumptions against which an utterance is interpreted. The interpretation of the speaker’s 
meaning is, thus, a function of achieving the best effort/effect ratio. According to Wilson 
and Sperber (2000, p. 254–255), a manipulative attempt involves the speaker’s covert 
intention to guide addressees to select the first interpretation that satisfies their 
expectations of relevance or the optimal effort/effect ratio. 
Following this line of thought, Maillat and Oswald (2011) perceive manipulation as a 
form of communication that exploits “the inherently fallible and heuristic-based ways in 
which the human mind processes information” (p. 66). Due to constant pressures seeking 
efficiency, the human cognitive system has evolved with an automatic tendency to select 
the most relevant stimuli, activate relevant assumptions and process them in the most 
productive way (Wilson & Sperber, 2002). Among the tasks that recipients have to 
perform (explained above) to arrive at the speaker’s meaning is the process of 
constructing the appropriate context – contextualization – against which an utterance is 
processed and interpreted (Sperber & Wilson, 1995).44  
 
                                                          
44 From a cognitive perspective, context refers to the set of relevant assumptions that recipients select while 
processing information (Maillat & Oswald, 2011).  
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6.3.2. The contextual selection constraint model  
Context selection is a gradual process that permits the inclusion of different sets of 
contextual assumptions, provided that the level of optimal relevance is not reached 
(Maillat & Oswald, 2009). Certain contextual assumptions, as Maillat and Oswald (2009, 
2011) argue, will be selected if these are made more accessible, i.e. they are less effortful 
to activate. Accessibility is one dimension that ensures the inclusion of certain 
assumptions in the addressee’s cognitive environment.45 The second criterion which 
might guarantee the inclusion of contextual assumptions is related to the epistemic 
strength of a representation (Oswald, 2014; Oswald & Hart, 2013). Epistemic strength 
indicates that the stronger the assumption or representation, the more chances it has to be 
selected, and hence it becomes part of the addressee’s cognitive environment. Therefore, 
accessibility and epistemic strength define the dimensions according to which the 
dynamics of the Contextual Selection Constraint (henceforth, CSC) model are described.  
The function of these inclusion rules is to ensure that an utterance is interpreted within a 
limited subset of contextual assumptions. Therefore, a manipulative move tends to be 
successful if:  
On the one hand, it tries to make sure that every information set that is 
mobilised in the process is compatible and coherent with the target deceptive 
utterance, while on the other it strives to keep critical information sets that 
would defeat the deceptive attempt concealed (i.e. so as to leave them 
                                                          
45 The cognitive environment is the set of assumptions that are manifest to an individual at a given time. 
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unprocessed or to get the cognitive system of the addressee to dismiss them). 
(Oswald et al., 2016, p. 523) 
In this view, successful attempts at manipulation or deception, as Oswald (2014) 
elaborates, necessitate that critical or contradictory information that would lead the 
addressee to question the veracity of the message or the speaker’s motives and intentions 
must not be accessed during processing.46 This is because mobilisation of these critical 
information sets would yield a different cognitive effect or a different modification to the 
hearer’s cognitive environment (Ozols et al., 2015).  
From a different perspective, constraining information selection is influenced by 
cognitive shortcuts or heuristics that affect judgement and therefore lead to biased 
processing (Maillat & Oswald, 2009, 2011; Oswald & Hart, 2013; Hart 2013). Cognitive 
heuristics are rules of thumb that help us take decisions and make judgements in a cost-
effective way (Hart, 2013; Oswald & Lewinski, 2104). Fallibility is a core feature of 
cognitive heuristics, due to the fast and frugal way in which information is processed, i.e. 
yielding results with the minimal allocation of cognitive resources (Oswald & Lewinski, 
2014). Building on findings from evolutionary psychology, which claims that under the 
constraints of efficiency some cognitive processes involved in thinking, memory, 
perception, decision-making and judgement are subject to errors, Maillat and Oswald 
(2009, 2011) suggest that the activation of shortcuts and heuristics during processing 
                                                          
46 More recently, the term deception has replaced manipulation (Oswald, 2014; Ozols et al., 2015) for fear 
that the latter could be taken for its literal meaning – operating or using an object (Oswald, 2014). However, 
for the sake of being consistent with the terminology used by the main theoretical frameworks adopted in 
this research, the DHA and pragma-dialectics, I prefer to retain the term manipulation when analysing and 




deviates addressees’ attention from selecting relevant and critical information and thus 
leads to judgemental errors. Cognitive shortcuts and heuristics, as Oswald and Hart 
(2013) argue, lead to errors at the level of epistemic judgement.  
Cognitive biases play a pivotal role in making certain contextual assumptions more 
salient than others; and by virtue of the dynamics of optimal relevance, they eventually 
become part of the limited subset against which an argument is interpreted and evaluated 
(Maillat & Oswald, 2009, 2011; Oswald & Hart, 2013). Fallacies, as Oswald and 
Lewinski (2014) maintain, “block access to critical resources” (p. 326) because of their 
ability to trigger cognitive biases and heuristics, making some representations cognitively 
inescapable from being selected. The information contained in these representations is 
devoid of any critical and relevant information to evaluate the argument (Maillat & 
Oswald, 2011). Consequently, the fallaciousness of the argument is unnoticed. For 
example, the ad populum fallacy exploits the strategy of strengthening-by-repetition 
(Maillat, 2013) or the validity effect.47 This cognitive bias means that validity and 
epistemic strength are a function of repetition. The more a representation is repeated, the 
more valid it becomes, which in turn increases its cognitive strength. Therefore, it 
becomes more salient, gets selected during processing and eventually prevents the 
addressee from questioning the validity of the assertions attributed to the majority 
(Maillat & Oswald, 2011). In this sense, the ad populum fallacy exploits two forms of 
cognitive bias: the validity effect which correlates validity with frequency, and the 
                                                          
47 The ad populum fallacy, as suggested by Oswald and Hart (2013), operates in relation to a conformity 




mechanism of optimal relevance which tends to select the most salient representations 
(ibid.).  
The Contextual Selection Constraint (CSC) is one mechanism that manipulative 
communicators can exploit, namely, the dynamics of the comprehension module, which is 
geared to maximise relevance. Moving from comprehension to believability, i.e. how 
addressees accept incoming representations as true, is a process governed by another 
cognitive mechanism: epistemic vigilance (or the logico-rhetorical module).  
6.3.3. Epistemic vigilance  
Communication, according to Grice (1989), is essentially cooperative. However, 
cooperation, as Origgi and Sperber assert, is “vulnerable to free-riding, which, in the case 
of communication, takes the form of manipulation and deception” (2000, p. 161). 
Therefore, for communication to remain advantageous, as Sperber et al. argue, humans 
have developed a “suite of cognitive mechanisms for epistemic vigilance, targeted at the 
risk of being misinformed by others” (2010, p. 359), i.e. a defence mechanism against the 
risk of deception. Epistemic vigilance is a cognitive mechanism that caters for the 
calibration of trust towards the source and filters incoming content. Epistemic vigilance, 
as Cruz (2012) states, denotes a “captious alertness to the believability and reliability” (p. 
368) of the communicated message and to the one who dispenses it. Epistemic vigilance 
directed at the source checks for evidence related to the trustworthiness of the speaker in 
terms of competence, benevolence, credibility, and reliability. As for the content, 
epistemic filters monitor the logical consistency of the message and the degree of its 
coherence with addresses’ background knowledge and beliefs (Sperber et al., 2010).  
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The believability of the newly communicated message, as Sperber et al. (2010) iterate, 
relies on a subset of background knowledge and beliefs that are activated during 
comprehension. The authors maintain that the “same background information which is 
used in the pursuit of relevance can also yield an imperfect but cost-effective epistemic 
assessment” (p. 374). In this respect, the accessed subset of contextual information 
(selected through the mechanisms of the CSC), which is devoid of any critical or 
contradictory information, forms the basis for meaning derivation and evaluation 
processes (Oswald & Lewinski, 2014, p. 323–325).48 Recall that for an utterance to be 
relevant in a context of existing beliefs, it has to yield one of the following contextual 
effects: acceptance of contextually implied beliefs, modification of the strength of beliefs 
or revision of existing beliefs. The assessment of this inferential output leads to various 
judgements depending on whether or not the recipient trusts the communicator. 
Assessment can lead to one of these possibilities: (i) rejection of new beliefs, if the source 
is not trusted; (ii) correction of existing beliefs, if these are not held with much 
conviction, given that the addressee acknowledges the communicator’s competence and 
authority; and (iii) revision of background beliefs or reducing confidence in the source if 
the addressee has strong convictions in both (Sperber et al., 2010).  
Following this line of thought, Oswald and Hart (2013) argue that addressees’ failure to 
spot and assess the fallaciousness of ‘source-related fallacies’, such as ad populum, ad 
verecundiam and ad hominem, can, on the one hand, be attributed to the type of cognitive 
                                                          
48 This view is based on the mechanisms of the argumentative module, proposed by Mercier & Sperber 
(2009, 2011), which plays a role in the production and evaluation of arguments. At the production level, the 
module allows communicators to construct arguments so as to satisfy or exploit addressees’ epistemic 
filters. At the evaluation level, it is responsible for evaluating the validity of the arguments adduced, i.e. 
identifying the type of relation between premises and conclusion (Oswald & Hart, 2013). 
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constraints that these fallacies exert on argument processing, which prevent addressees 
from accessing critical content and hence increase acceptability. On the other hand, these 
fallacies manage to circumvent addressees’ epistemic vigilance by providing apparently 
satisfactory evidence, therefore preventing addressees from questioning the credibility 
and/or reliability of the source to whom the information is attributed (ibid.).  In ad 
populum and ad verecundiam, as Oswald and Hart (ibid.) elucidate, the epistemic strength 
of the conclusion is derived from the perceived trustworthiness of the source and from the 
widespread endorsement of the belief, respectively. In contrast, ad hominem works by 
inducing addressees to reject the conclusion by casting doubt on the legitimacy and 
credibility of the source. Source-related fallacies manage to satisfy addressees’ epistemic 
filters by presenting supporting evidence for the claims advanced, such that the cognitive 
system is not alerted to invest the more complex processing mechanisms that could point 
to their fallaciousness. 
These fallacies are examples of accepting claims based on the perceived trustworthiness 
and credibility of a third party. A revision of beliefs is triggered when new information is 
inconsistent or incoherent with contextually activated beliefs or existing background 
knowledge. This is because, when these “inconsistencies and incoherencies occur, they 
trigger a procedure wholly dedicated to such assessment” (Sperber et al., 2010, p. 376). It 
follows that in cases where the communicator suspects that her addressee will not accept 
her words out of confidence and trust but will, as Sperber et al. (ibid.) elucidate, exercise 
some vigilance to check whether her representation coheres with his own beliefs, she then 




When an addressee is reluctant to accept a representation that is incoherent with his 
background beliefs, the communicator has to induce him to access less highly activated 
beliefs that weigh in favour of the representation if these are taken into account (ibid.). To 
put it differently, the communicator will induce the addressee to expand his activated set 
of contextual assumptions or background knowledge so as to include a set of beliefs that 
cohere with her claims. To this end, as Sperber et al. (ibid.) argue, the communicator can 
remind the addressee of these background beliefs or provide other information that the 
addressee will accept out of trust. 
Perceiving a source as trustworthy means that addressees regard what this source is 
telling them as epistemically strong (Oswald & Lewinski, 2014). It might be safe, then, to 
deduce a reciprocal relation between the degree of trust ascribed to the communicator and 
the believability of claims: the more an addressee trusts the speaker, the less vigilant he 
tends to be, and the less trustworthy is a speaker, the more vigilant her addressee tends to 
be. One implication of this line of thought for my thesis is related to the nature of the 
audience that Nasrallah addresses. Nasrallah is primarily interested in convincing the 14th 
of March audience, who are expected to be reluctant towards accepting his claims out of 
trust – presumably, due to the actions and decisions that Nasrallah has taken against them 
and their leadership, and which have negatively affected them.49 Therefore, their 
epistemic defences are expected to check whether his justifications and claims are 
consistent and cohere with their existing beliefs and convictions. To get past these 
                                                          
49 In pragma-dialectical terms, Nasrallah is addressing primary and secondary audiences. The secondary 
audience encompasses those who directly affiliate with Hizbollah as well as supporters and sympathisers 
from different political groups. However, due to the nature of the charismatic bond that relates this audience 
to Nasrallah, they tend to take his words on trust (see Chapter, section 3.1). Meanwhile, much discursive 
work is needed to convince the opposition’s audience, Nasrallah’s primary audience, that the actions and 
decisions taken against them are acts of heroism and patriotism (as the analysis will show). 
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defences, as I claim, Nasrallah attempts to induce the audience to expand the activated set 
of contextual assumptions in order to make them access a less highly activated set, which 
consists of undisputable and generally accepted background knowledge and beliefs that 
cohere with his justifications.  
At this point, I believe, it is possible to suggest a relation between the construction of 
charisma and epistemic vigilance. More specifically, salvation/ rescue narratives (see 
Chapter 2, section 3.1), which are part and parcel of charismatic discourses and via which 
actions or decisions already taken are reframed in terms of rescuing and saving a 
community, might provide the link. In other words, in his attempt to justify past 
controversial actions or decisions, Nasrallah reframes them via salvation or rescue 
narratives in order to make them cohere with generally accepted moral values and 
nationalist views, despite the opposition audience’s beliefs to the contrary.     
The above discussion is related to vigilance towards content. In what follows, I elaborate 
on the mechanisms of vigilance directed at the source. Epistemic trust directed at the 
source can be driven by general impressions of trustworthiness, such as the 
communicator’s reputation, or by context-specific considerations (Sperber et al., 2010). 
The latter means that the allocation of trust, as Sperber et al. (ibid., p. 369–370) explicate, 
depends on the topic, the nature of the audience and the circumstances. A communicator 
is deemed reliable and trustworthy if she meets two conditions: competence and 
benevolence. This means that the calibration of trust is a function of the communicator’s 
character (ibid.), inasmuch as epistemic filters do not provide evidence that points to the 
contrary. Sperber et al. (ibid.) also note that granting trust to the source of information can 
be the result of a successful attempt to “project an image of trustworthiness” (ibid., p. 
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370) that is discursively mediated. The assessment of trust is, therefore, a function of the 
discursive construction of ethos. 
Aristotle (1959) considers ethos to be one of the influential means of persuasion – along 
with logos and pathos – and defines it in terms of the moral character of the speaker. In 
the Aristotelian tradition, the moral character of the speaker is primarily constructed 
through speech, while reputation and authority are considered ‘extrinsic’ to the art of 
persuasion (Zmavc, 2012). It follows that ethos is discursively constructed, whereby a 
trustworthy image of the speaker as benevolent, virtuous and competent is reflected in 
discourse. It is through discourse that a speaker constructs a “kind of a mask which is 
socially acceptable and even desirable” (Danler, 2013, p. 40), even if it does not represent 
the speaker’s actual personality (Zmavc, 2012). It seems that the concept of ‘image’ is the 
modern equivalent of Aristotle’s ethos (Szczepanska-Wloch, 2013).  
From a different perspective, Cockcroft and Cockcroft (2005) argue that the construction 
of ethos is not only contingent on the creation of the speaker’s image, but also dependent 
on the speaker’s stance and her level of engagement with the audience. Ethos, then, is not 
a “fixed set of traits” (Danler, 2013, p. 41) but is, rather, a matter of how these can be 
differentiated to best suit the topic and audience demands (Szczepanska-Wloch, 2013). 
According to Danler (2013), ethos is the result of linguistic-discursive construction, 
whereby ideology, religion, culture and philosophical trends, among others, form the 
content of discursive texts that eventually convey the facts, truths, values and assumptions 
of the respective culture.  
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Two implications can be derived from this view. First, the construction of ethos is 
inherently linked to the discursive construction of charisma (see Chapter 2, section 3.1, 
3.2). This is because the construction of a proper image (personal presence or magnetism) 
is considered one of the traits that define a charismatic personality (Eatwell, 2006a). The 
validation of charisma partially relies on projecting an appropriate image of the self, 
which, according to Wodak (2011), is realized through footing and narrating (see Chapter 
2, section 3.2). Through the construction of charisma, Nasrallah aims to provide the 
audience with palpable evidence that attests to his trustworthiness and competence (see 
below) in order to satisfy audiences’ epistemic defences directed towards the source. 
Another aim is to provide the audience with evidence that satisfies their vigilance directed 
towards the message. Both aims are realised through the construction of charisma. The 
first objective is achieved via the construction of a proper image, whereas the second is 
achieved via rescue or salvation narratives.50   
The second implication is related to the linguistic means via which the construction of 
ethos is mediated in discursive texts, i.e. the type of linguistic evidence that constructs the 
image of the source as trustworthy, competent, and benevolent. Therefore, the next 
section outlines the linguistic means that speakers employ to influence addressees’ 
epistemic stance.  
 
                                                          
50 This is not to say that coherence is the only criterion for acceptability. The members of the 14th of March 
audience are also expected to check the logical consistency of his claims and arguments. However, I assume 
that coherence will most likely be the overriding criterion for believability, as Nasrallah’s speeches are 
attempts to respond to opponents’ criticisms, counter-claims and arguments which underscore the 
inappropriateness and undesirability of Nasrallah’s actions and decisions because they destabilize and 
jeopardize Lebanon’s security.      
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6.3.4. Legitimation of assertions  
Epistemic vigilance, as Sperber (2001) maintains, is a cognitive mechanism that checks 
the internal and external coherence of the message. It is designed to “help audiences 
decide what messages to accept, and to help communicators produce messages that will 
be accepted” (Sperber 2001). For this constructed account of reality to be taken as true, it 
has to be supported with “evidence, authority and truth” (Chilton, 2004 p. 23). Strategies 
underpinning the legitimation of assertions, as Chilton (2004) and Hart (2011) point out, 
are means through which speaker’s guard against the epistemic vigilance of recipients by 
offering them evidence regarding the truthfulness, rightness and authority of their claims. 
These strategies, then, tend to satisfy addressees’ epistemic filters through displaying 
aspects of internal and external coherence that they expect addressees to check for (Hart, 
2010, 2011). In other words, it is through the stance that speakers take towards the 
validity of their assertions that aspects of their competence, reliability, and credibility are 
communicated. Epistemic stance expressions index the way speakers position themselves 
with regard to the validity of their assertions, as well as their level of engagement with 
addressees (Marin-Arrese, 2013). Epistemic positioning counts as an attempt by the 
speaker to influence addressees’ epistemic stance towards their assertions through 
satisfying addressees’ epistemic filters, thereby inducing acceptance (Hart, 2011).  
Epistemic stance resources include modal auxiliaries and evidentials, which serve the 
function of displaying external coherence. Through evidential expressions, speakers 
display external coherence by providing evidence regarding the source of their 
information. This can be achieved either by providing evidence about the basis of their 
own knowledge or by attributing this knowledge to experts, specialists etc. through 
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source-tagging. In Hart’s (2011, p. 759–760) analysis of anti-immigration media reports, 
he demonstrates that speakers may invoke sources belonging to different domains of 
evidence. Perception offers directly attested sensory forms of evidence. Proof and 
Obviousness are indirectly derived inferences based on results and reasoning. Public 
Knowledge is evidence sourced from indirectly reported folklore, and Expert Knowledge 
from reported hearsay. Finally, Epistemic Commitment indicates evidence that is based 
on the speaker as a source of authority on the topic.  
A second way of providing evidence is through the attribution of assertions to a third 
party. This is realized linguistically through source-tagging in the form of indirectly 
reported Hearsay or Mindsay (Hart, 2010), i.e. by reference to what someone else has 
said, felt or knows. Source-tagging, then, can meta-represent previous public speeches 
(Hearsay) or meta-represent other mental representations (ibid.). Therefore, source-
tagging provides assessments regarding the reliability and credibility of the sources 
invoked, which in turn convey the degree of the speaker’s attitude towards the validity of 
her assertions. Evidentiality is, as Hart (2010, 2011) suggests, a legitimising strategy of 
objectification because it offers addressees the possibility to check the reliability, 
credibility, and authority of the assigned source. Epistemic modality is a second strategy 
involved in the legitimation of assertions (ibid.). 
Epistemic modality offers a subjective form of legitimation that depends on the degree of 
certainty the speaker attributes to events (Hart, 2010), i.e. a strategy of subjectification. 
Epistemic resources include modals conveying various degrees of certainty, such as must, 
will and can, as well as zero-marked modality. High certainty indicates a strong epistemic 
commitment to the truth of a proposition. Therefore, epistemic modality can be 
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conceptualized as a form of epistemic scale that shows varying degrees of commitment, 
ranging from certain through probable to possible (ibid.). Marin-Arrese (2011) holds a 
similar view to the function of epistemic modality and its linguistic resources. In contrast, 
she classifies evidential markers into experiential (e.g. it is evident, obvious, clear), 
cognitive (e.g. I know, that means) and communicative evidentiality (e.g. I say to you, 
that suggests). The reliability of these evidential markers varies from high to low. Despite 
categorical differences, both authors consider the function that epistemic positioning 
strategies have on addressees’ exercise of vigilance and in the construction of the 
speaker’s image. In this study, the legitimation of assertions is embedded within the 
macro-functions that Nasrallah’s speeches are expected to serve, i.e. responding to 
accusations and legitimating past controversial actions. In this respect, the legitimation of 
assertions is seen as a preliminary step leading to the acceptance, or otherwise, of 
Nasrallah’s claims and arguments or, as Hart (2011) puts it, “[t]he successful justification 
of action, […] requires that the hearer accept the justifying assertion as true in the first 
place” (757).  
7. The pragmatics of accusations  
Accusations are, undoubtedly, face-threatening acts, as they can have a destructive impact 
on the accused’s perceived image, reputation, credibility etc. Typically, an accusation is 
an assertion in which the accuser claims that someone (X) has performed a certain action 
(A). The act of accusing entails that: (X) is deemed responsible for doing (A) and that (A) 
is wrong as it is seen as an infringement of some norms, values or principles of action. 
The speech act of accusing serves the communicative purpose of making a charge or an 
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accusation (illocutionary effect) and the interactional function of eliciting a response from 
the accused related to the charge raised (perlocutionary effect) (Searle, 1969).  
For an accusation act to be successful in achieving both functions, Kauffeld has 
formulated felicity conditions. The accuser has to: (i) state her charges that some party 
(A) did (X); (ii) demand that the accused answer the charges through denials, admissions 
of guilt, excuses, justifications etc.; and (iii) act as if she intends that the charge and her 
demand provide the accuser with reasons to respond to the accusation (1986 p. 252). In 
Kauffeld’s view, accusations are designed to impose on the accused the obligation to 
respond to allegations (Kauffeld, 2003). Responses to accusations can take several forms, 
such as denials, justifications, excuses, admissions of guilt or apologies. It is also possible 
for the accused to simply ignore the need to respond to charges, i.e. evade the burden of 
proof.    
Responding to accusations, as Austin (1956) notes, involves either defending one’s 
conduct by showing that (A) was a good thing and that it was carried out for good 
purposes, i.e. admit responsibility, or admitting that (A) was wrong but it is not fair to be 
accused of doing (A), i.e. deny responsibility. In the former, the objective is to legitimise 
the action by giving reasons that support the claim: (A) was right. In this case, the speaker 
attempts to exploit legitimation strategies (see below) to justify the rightness of the action. 
In the latter, the agent admits that the action was wrong but denies partial or full 
responsibility (ibid.). In this case, the speaker resorts to denial strategies (see below) to 
support the claim: (X) did not do (A). 
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As mentioned above, the accused has an obligation to explain why he acted as alleged. 
That is, there is a burden of proof conferred on the accused by the performance of the 
speech act of accusing (Kauffeld 1989, 2003). This is the view taken in this study. The 
fact that the opposition accuses Nasrallah of doing wrongful actions or taking incorrect 
decisions is highly damaging to his image. Therefore, Nasrallah is expected to employ 
strategies related to image repair, such as denying accusations, shifting blame and 
legitimising actions or decisions, among others. Therefore, the following sections discuss 
the various legitimation and denying strategies that have been identified by CDS scholars. 
7.1 Responding to accusations through denials  
 Within CDS, van Dijk (1992, p. 92) considers strategies of denying racist or prejudiced 
attitudes towards minorities to be part of constructing a positive image of the in-group. 
These strategies are:  
• Act-denial (‘I did not do/say that at all’) 
• Control-denial (‘I did not do/say that on purpose’, ‘It was an accident’)  
• Intention-denial (‘I did not mean that’, ‘You got me wrong’)  
• Goal-denial (‘I did not do/say that, in order to ---’) 
Disclaimers, such as ‘we are tolerant, but’, as van Dijk maintains, are forms of denial 
strategies that aim to promote a positive image of the in-group whilst articulating at the 
same time negative attributes to those discriminated against. Moreover, offering 
justifications, excuses, blaming the victim and victim-perpetrator reversal are other forms 
of denial. In denying racism, the last two strategies are considered the strongest forms 
because they are used to identify the group that should receive the blame (ibid.). In 
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contrast, van Dijk notes that mitigation strategies, such as downtoning and euphemisms, 
are used to trivialize one’s negative actions and hence evade blame.  
In her analysis of Austrian politicians’ attempts to deny anti-Semitic rhetoric and 
prejudices, Wodak (2105) observes that most of these denial strategies are used. In the 
context of denying anti-Semitism and constructing blame-takers, Angouri and Wodak 
(2014) assert that blaming and denying employ various justification strategies. These 
strategies include: denying direct responsibility, redefining and reformulating actions in 
terms of accepted moral values, providing fallacious generalizations and false analogies, 
providing causal explanations, narrating, drawing on collective memories, claiming 
victimhood, constructing scapegoats, shifting the blame onto others and blaming the 
victim, etc. The cumulative function of these strategies is to turn blame into credit 
(Wodak 2006, 2015). Moreover, various argumentation strategies are used to justify and 
legitimise negative actions taken by the in-group, as well as to delegitimise the actions 
and policies advocated by the out-group. For example, ad verecundiam, ad populum and 
false analogies are used to justify and maintain a positive representation of the Self, 
whereas tu quoque, ad baculum, ad hominem, ad misericordiam and the straw man 
fallacies are used to construct a negative image of the Other. The latter set is most likely 
employed in creating scapegoats onto whom responsibility is shifted, i.e. victim-
perpetrator reversal (tarjectio in alium, Reisigl & Wodak, 2001). 
Wodak (2015) posits that the construction of a conspiracy is another discursive strategy 
involved in denying and avoiding blame. In her view, the construction of a conspiracy 
serves the creation of scapegoats, who are identified as the original culprits, thus shifting 
the blame onto them, whereas the accused is portrayed as the victim of these 
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conspiratorial scenarios. In his innovative typology – which synthesizes the different 
strategies identified for blaming and denying in discourse analysis, politeness research 
and argumentation theory – Hansson (2015) maintains that ways of framing events 
through narratives constitute one of the main strategies for creating scapegoats, thereby 
legitimising shifting blame onto others.  
Following Lakoff (2008), Hansson asserts that, through narratives, in particular Rescue 
narratives, speakers attempt to avoid blame by portraying themselves as performing good 
and praiseworthy deeds, i.e. construct themselves as saviours, while simultaneously 
constructing villains/ scapegoats to whom blame is attributed.51 Rescue narratives, 
according to Lakoff (2008), have specific semantic roles, such as Hero, Villain, Victim 
and Helpers. The actions that structure a Rescue narrative are as follows: the Villain 
harms the Victim, the Hero struggles against the Villain, the Helpers together with the 
Hero defeat the Villain, the Victim is rescued, the Hero is rewarded and the Villain is 
punished. Lakoff (ibid.) considers Self-defence narratives to be a variant of the Rescue 
narrative in which the Hero is the Victim, i.e. the Hero rescues himself. Victimisation or 
claiming victimhood and defence, then, are the basic elements of Rescue narratives.  
To escape blame, accused parties can attempt to reframe events in terms of rescue 
narratives via which blameworthy deeds are turned into heroic acts. It is through these 
narratives that the Other/ Villain is constructed as posing an imminent threat, signalling 
                                                          
51 Hansson also emphasizes the function of the Bad Apple narrative in finding a target to be blamed. 
According to Lakoff (2008), the Bad Apple narrative is based on the proverb: ‘one bad apple spoils the 





that an action of some kind should be taken to alleviate the danger. The evil in these 
narratives catalyzes the binding of a community or nation around a common desire to 
fight the threat, provided that the path proclaimed by the leader is followed (see Chapter 
2, section 3.1).  
In this study, I propose that rescue narratives play a role in legitimating   
actions, inasmuch as these narratives appear as premises in arguments, such as argument 
from fear appeal and argument from negative consequences (see Chapter 4, section 4.2). 
The justification of practices and policies is not limited to strategies involved in denying 
and avoiding blame. Justification also employs the full range of legitimation strategies 
(Hansson, 2015). Responding to criticisms and accusations through legitimation strategies 
is the subject of the next section.   
7.2  Responding to accusations through legitimation strategies  
The aforementioned strategies serve the macro-strategy of denying full or partial 
responsibility. In other instances, however, political actors choose to accept 
responsibility, but simultaneously use a variety of legitimation strategies to provide 
answers to the following question: ‘Why should (or did) we do this in this way?’ (van 
Leeuwen, 2007). Legitimation, a major objective of political discourse (Cap, 2008), is a 
complex process that involves “providing good reasons, grounds or acceptable 
motivations for past or present action that has been or could be criticized by others” (van 
Dijk, 1998, p.263). Two things can be deduced from this definition. First, it presupposes 
disagreement, opposition and doubt, which are necessary to initiate self-defence 
responses (van Dijk, 1998; van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999). Second, it presupposes moral 
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and normative grounds based on which the action is legitimated, i.e. to gain normative 
approval (Rojo & van Dijk, 1997). The performance of a legitimation act, as Cap asserts, 
has to be “grounded in an implicit claim, on the part of the speaker, to inhabit a particular 
social or political role, and to possess a particular authority” (2008, p. 22).52   
Discursive legitimation, as Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999) state, offers explanations, 
justifications and reasons as to why social practices are or are expected to be conducted in 
the manner proclaimed by the communicator. To this end, the authors identify four types 
of strategies involved in the legitimation of practices (van Leeuwen, 2008; van Leeuwen 
& Wodak 1999). Authorization is legitimation achieved via reference to the authority of 
tradition, custom, law and persons in whom institutional authority is vested. The latter can 
take the form of referring to experts, opinion leaders, role models or specific people who 
enjoy a defined social status or role. Moral evaluation is legitimation realized by 
reference to value systems. Abstractions, analogies and evaluations (evaluative 
adjectives) are some forms of moral legitimation. The objective is to associate ‘Our’ good 
practices with publicly shared values or common sense cultural knowledge, thereby 
transferring the positive values to the proclaimed action or policy. Rationalization is 
legitimation achieved by reference to the goals, uses and effects of social practices 
(instrumental rationality), or to the knowledge that a given society has constructed 
regarding the natural order of doing things (theoretical rationality). Finally, mythopoesis 
is legitimation achieved via reference to moral narratives (e.g. protagonists are rewarded 
                                                          
52 This clearly relates to the construction of the speaker’s ethos or image, which is part of the construction 
of charisma and can be partially realised linguistically through strategies pertaining to epistemic positioning 




for their good deeds while villains are punished) or cautionary tales that highlight the 
negative consequences of actions or their inconformity with social norms (ibid.).  
Reyes (2011) has recently proposed another typology in which emotions, hypothetical 
future scenarios, rationality and voices of expertise and altruism (the common good) are 
identified as strategies serving the legitimation of social practices. As can be seen, there 
are some commonalities between the two frameworks, such as reference to expertise, 
theoretical rationalization and moral evaluation. However, this thesis is interested in 
legitimation achieved through hypothetical future scenarios via which a potential threat or 
danger is constructed. Typically, this is achieved, as Reyes (ibid.) explicates, via the use 
of conditional sentences, whereby a sense of urgency and fear is projected onto the 
actions of the ‘Other’.   
The different legitimation and justification strategies outlined above overlap with some of 
the argument schemes and fallacies that are part of the DHA’s argumentation strategies. 
As Fairclough and Fairclough (2012, p. 109–110) observe, some of the legitimation 
strategies that are identified in the DHA seem to offer explanations and clarifications 
rather than reasons that appear in premises for arguments. Hence, the terms ‘legitimation’ 
and ‘justification’ are used interchangeably. In Fairclough and Fairclough’s view, a 
justification that attempts to legitimize an action has to invoke “publicly shared and 
publicly justifiable, and sometimes even highly formalized, codified, institutional systems 
of beliefs, values, and norms, in virtue of which the action proposed is considered 
legitimate” (ibid., p. 109). As such, an action gains legitimacy if it conforms to widely 
shared values, beliefs, norms, customs and traditions that are themselves publicly 
recognised and justified. 
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This thesis aligns itself with this line of thought. To this end, I adopt a definition of 
legitimation that is consistent with Fairclough and Fairclough’s observation.53 
Legitimation, as Suchman (1995, p. 574) argues, is: “a generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”. Moreover, holding 
the perception that judgements of legitimacy are based on shared value systems and 
beliefs conforms with my earlier claim: reframing events via salvation or rescue 
narratives necessarily entails drawing on nationalist and populist ideologies or widely 
held moral values and ideological beliefs (see Chapter 2, section 3.1). In the Lebanese 
case, this means tapping into the ideological constructs of the Resistance (see Chapter 1, 
section 4,5).  
From a different perspective, CDS scholars interested in the study of legitimation have 
repeatedly emphasised that legitimation is inherently linked to argumentation (Fairclough 
& Fairclough, 2012; Hart, 2010; Reyes, 2011). Indeed, it is only through argumentation 
that reasons are given in support of claims that need justification (Fairclough & 
Fairclough, 2012). However, some of the legitimation strategies outlined above include 
narratives (mythopoesis), explanations and moral evaluations that do not act as arguments 
and hence they attempt to justify rather than legitimise actions (Fairclough & Fairclough, 
2012). As such, these strategies are not part of the analytical framework followed in this 
thesis. However, rescue narratives are an exception because, as I propose, they have an 
                                                          
53 In fact, Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) follow a politically oriented view of legitimation. In political 
theory, as the authors expound, legitimation is an argumentative process that involves the public exchange 
of reasons where a decision concerning ‘what ought to be done’ is the result of public deliberation, i.e. the 




argumentative function, i.e. they appear as premises in arguments. Legitimation strategies 
that act as arguments, such as argument from authority (and its fallacious variants), 
argument from negative consequences, argument from moral values and ad populum, are 
also included in the analysis since these are part of the analytical toolkit of pragma-
dialectics.  
8. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have presented the overarching theoretical frameworks that inform this 
study, in particular, the DHA and pragma-dialectics. I have shown that although there are 
some divergences between these two paradigms, which should not be ignored, there are 
also commonalities which make their combination a fruitful and felicitous endeavour. I 
have elaborated on other frameworks based in cognitive pragmatics, including relevance 
theory and epistemic vigilance. I have also attempted to outline the relationship between 
epistemic vigilance and the construction of charisma. I claim that salvation or rescue 
narratives, as a salient feature in the discourse of charismatic leaders, are a means of 
reframing events in such a way so as to make them cohere with or satisfy audiences’ 
epistemic filters. Moreover, I have suggested that the strategies which speakers exploit to 
legitimise their assertions feed into the construction of charisma, i.e. by constructing a 
trustworthy image of the speaker. The next chapter will attempt to synthesize these 








Proposal for integrating pragma-dialectics and the DHA, methodology and 
analytical frameworks 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I presented the main theoretical frameworks and analytical tools 
that inform this study. This chapter further elaborates on how these frameworks will be 
applied in the present study. It explains the mechanisms of implementation and the 
particular analytical tools sourced from each discipline. It continues to develop the 
argument for the need to incorporate pragma-dialectics into the analytical framework of 
the DHA. It also explains in detail how this integrated model is to be applied, including 
the procedural steps followed, in my analysis of Nasrallah’s speeches.  
2. The DHA and its implementation 
One of the main aims of the DHA is to deconstruct the hegemonic character of dominant 
discourses that tend to establish and perpetuate asymmetrical power relations (Reisigl & 
Wodak, 2001, 2009). To reveal the ideological underpinnings of hegemonic discourses, 
DHA scholars propose a multi-dimensional analytical framework that constitutes textual 
meanings and structures. The analytical categories are the topics, discursive strategies 
and linguistic means of realizations. Following this model, the analysis of Nasrallah’s 
speeches starts by identifying the main topics or contents of selected speeches; then, 
discursive strategies are investigated; and finally, the linguistic means of realization are 
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examined (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, 2009, 2016).54 In chapter 3, section 2.1, I discussed 
the five discursive strategies involved in the production and perpetuation of 
discriminatory practices and their means of realization. Figure 4.1, below, gives a more 
detailed view of the functions of these strategies and possible linguistic means of 
realization.   
                                                          
54 A typical DHA analysis of a given discourse specifies the various topics as well as their interrelatedness. 
However, this is not the procedure followed in this study. This is because, in pragma-dialectics, topics that 
are not directly related to resolving a difference of opinion are excluded from the analysis.  
 
Strategy Objectives Devices 
REFERENTIAL/ 
NOMINATION 
discursive construction of 
social actors, objects, 
phenomena, events, 
processes and actions 
• membership categorization devices,                    
  deictics, anthroponyms, religionyms, 
ideologonyms etc.  
• tropes such as metaphors, 
metonymies     
  and synecdoche (pars pro toto, totum  
  pro parte)  
• verbs and nouns used to denote  
  processes and actions etc. 
 
PREDICATION discursive qualification of 
social actors, objects, 
phenomena, events, 
processes and actions 
(positively or negatively) 
• (stereotypical) evaluative attributions  
  of negative or positive traits (e.g. in  
  the form of adjectives, appositions,   
  prepositional phrases, relative clauses,  
  conjunctional clauses, infinitive 
clauses and participial clauses or 
groups)  
• explicit predicates or predicative 
nouns/ adjectives/ pronouns  
• collocations  
• comparisons, similes, metaphors 
  and other rhetorical figures (including  
  metonymies, hyperboles, litotes,  
  euphemisms)  
• allusions, evocations, presuppositions/  
  implicatures etc. 
 
ARGUMENTATION justification and 
questioning of claims of 
truth and normative 
rightness 
• topoi (formal or more content-related) 
• fallacies 
PERSPECTIVIZATION positioning speaker’s or 
writer’s point of view and 
expressing involvement or 
distance 
• deictics  
• direct, indirect or free indirect speech  
• quotation marks, discourse markers/ 







Through these strategies, the identities of social actors are constructed and the categorical 
distinction between in- and out-groups is maintained. More important, however, is the 
justification and legitimation of discriminatory and exclusionary policies achieved 
through the DHA’s argumentation strategies.55 This thesis adheres to the DHA’s 
principles and aims, and as a consequence, it adopts the DHA’s discursive strategies and 
their respective means of realization as an analytical apparatus to examine the means by 
which Nasrallah manages to simultaneously construct a solidified in-group (the 8th of 
March coalition) and a disintegrated/ traumatized out-group (the 14th of March coalition).  
The construction of in-/out-groups is also enacted via the construction of national 
identities. Thus, the contours of who belongs to ‘Us’ (i.e. share similar ideologies, moral 
values and beliefs) versus who are outsiders (i.e. have different values and beliefs) are 
marked by the discursive formation of identities. Wodak and her co-authors (2009, p. 33–
                                                          
55 Although the DHA conceptualisation of argumentation strategies draws, partially, on pragma-dialectics, 
pragma-dialectics provides a more regimented analytical apparatus for the analysis of argument schemes 
and fallacies. In this study, topoi that correspond to specific argument schemes, as identified in pragma-
dialectics, are included in the thesis’s analytical framework (see Chapter 3, section 4.2). 
  
• metaphors  
• animating prosody etc. 
INTENSIFICATION 
OR MITIGATION 
modifying (intensifying or 
mitigating) the 
illocutionary force and thus 
the epistemic or deontic 
status of utterances 
 
• diminutives or augmentatives  
• (modal) particles, tag questions,    
  subjunctive, hesitations, vague  
  expressions etc.  
• hyperbole, litotes,  
• indirect speech acts (e.g. question  
  instead of assertion)  
• verbs of saying, feeling, thinking etc. 
 




42) propose four macro-strategies that are employed in the discursive formation of 
national identities. These are: constructive strategies, strategies of perpetuation, 
transformation and dismantling or destructive strategies. Each of these macro-strategies, 
as Wodak et al. (ibid.) observe, incorporates a set of sub-strategies, topoi and fallacies, as 
well as respective means of realization.56 
Constructive strategies attempt to construct and establish a certain national identity by 
promoting unification and solidarity, as well as differentiation between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’. 
This macro-strategy might be realized through sub-strategies, such as assimilation/ 
inclusion strategies (emphasis on sameness and similarity), singularisation strategies 
(emphasis on national uniqueness), autonomisation strategies (emphasis on national 
autonomy and independence) and a strategy of avoidance. Moreover, strategies of 
unification, cohesivation and heteronomisation serve the macrofunction of constructing 
national identities. The strategies of unification and cohesivation place emphasis on 
unifying common features and worries, as well as on the need to unite and cooperate 
against an external threat. Heteronomisation strategies emphasize the dangers of extra-
national dependence and thus aim to warn against the loss of national autonomy 
Strategies of perpetuation attempt to maintain a threatened national identity and are 
attained through the sub-strategies of positive Self-presentation, continuation (emphasis 
on positive political continuity) and defence strategies (emphasis on an imminent threat 
and negative consequences of certain actions). Transformation strategies attempt to 
transform an established identity into another identity, the contours of which the speaker 
                                                          
56 At this point, I need to clarify that I will only mention the macro- and sub-strategies that occur in the 
data; Wodak’s typology offers a more detailed account. 
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has previously defined. Several sub-strategies can be deployed, including autonomisation, 
heteronomisation and dissimilation/ exclusion.57 Finally, dismantling or destructive 
strategies aim to dismantle parts of an existing national identity without providing a new 
model to replace the old one. Strategies of assimilation, heteronomisation and 
dissimilation, among others, can serve the social macrofunction of dismantling a national 
identity construct (Wodak et al., 2009, p. 33–42). 
The macro-strategies involved in the discursive formation of national identity also serve 
as a guide to examine the strategies that Nasrallah deploys in the construction and 
promotion of Resistance as a national identity, i.e. as a means to unify the Lebanese. This 
identity-constituting rhetoric is clearly seen in rescue narratives, via which controversial 
actions or decisions are reframed in order to comply with Resistance ideology tenets. In 
the proposed model, these strategies are incorporated within the analytical toolkit of 
pragma-dialectics. 
3. Pragma-dialectics and its implementation 
In pragma-dialectics, the ideal model of critical discussion is a template that guides the 
reconstruction, analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse (see Chapter 3, section 
3). Applying the ideal model of critical discussion means that the discourse is 
reconstructed and interpreted in terms of argumentative moves that are relevant to the 
resolution of a difference of opinion (van Eemeren et al., 2014). To resolve a difference 
of opinion, arguers must pass through four discussion stages (see Chapter 3, section 3.1) 
                                                          
57 The authors explicate that the same sub-strategy can serve different functions based on the social 




and perform speech acts that are relevant to each move. Based on this view, Nasrallah’s 
responses to the accusations and criticisms raised by opponents are reconstructed as part 
of an argumentative confrontation. 
From a pragma-dialectical perspective, the result of this reconstruction process is an 
analytic overview that takes on board only those parts of the discourse that are relevant to 
resolving a difference of opinion and excludes those that are not pertinent to this goal. 
This means that speech acts that are irrelevant to the resolution of a difference of opinion 
are not part of the analysis, whereas implicit premises and indirect speech acts that play a 
role in the resolution of the disagreement are identified and therefore included in the 
analysis (cf. van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004).    
Argumentative reality, as Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) observe, does not 
correspond to the ideal model of critically resolving a difference of opinion in either 
content or structure. As far as the content is concerned, this can be attributed to the 
complicated nature of actual argumentative activities during which some parts that are 
relevant to the goal of resolving a difference of opinion are absent, left unexpressed or 
presupposed, and they are, therefore, not fully represented in discourse (ibid.). For 
example, as the authors illustrate, the definition of a difference of opinion, the distribution 
of discussants’ roles and/or the starting points for discussion are most often not stated or 
expressed explicitly in discourse. On the level of structure, the beginning of a new 
discussion stage, the relation between different arguments advanced in support of a 
standpoint, is often left unexpressed (van Eemeren et al., 2014). In other instances, some 




Argumentative reality, moreover, does not follow a linear progression. That is, it does not 
strictly and explicitly follow the order of the four stages of the ideal model that 
discussants have to pass through to ensure a reasonable resolution to a difference of 
opinion.58 It is, therefore, the analyst’s task to recover these elements through the process 
of reconstructing argumentative discourse, taking the ideal model as a template (van 
Eemeren et al., 2007).59 In carrying out such a reconstruction, four types of analytic 
operations, known as reconstruction transformations, are used to identify the parts of 
discourse that are relevant to the resolution of a difference of opinion (van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst, 2004, p. 103–104). The first type involves the deletion of all the elements 
of the discourse that are not relevant to resolving the difference of opinion, such as 
discussion related to other topics or repetition.60 The second transformation requires the 
addition of relevant elements that are implicit, indirectly expressed or presupposed. The 
third type is substitution, which consists of reformulating, unequivocally, relevant parts of 
the discourse that are ambiguous or vague. Finally, permutation involves rearranging 
parts of the discourse and argumentative moves in a way that shows their relevance to 
resolving the difference of opinion, i.e. rearranging them to conform to the four stages of 
the ideal model.  
                                                          
58 According to van Eemeren (2010), the fact that in argumentative reality some stages are absent or are left 
implicit does not mean that the ideal model can be characterised as unrealistic because the dialectical 
insights concerning the requirements for resolving a difference of opinion contradict such a conclusion (see 
Eemeren et al., 1993, Ch. 3). 
59 According to van Eemeren et at., the demarcating criteria based on which a discourse is expected to have 
an argumentative function or not is whether the discourse, directly or indirectly, aims at overcoming doubt 
(2014, p. 534).  
60 As I mentioned earlier, the analysis of Nasrallah’s speeches will only include the topics that are relevant 




A faithful reconstruction of argumentative practice should lead to an analytic overview 
that encompasses all the elements of discourse that are relevant to the resolution of a 
difference of opinion. Therefore, the analytic overview must address the following points:  
1. The standpoints at issue in the difference of opinion; 
2. The positions adopted by the parties and the procedural and material starting points;  
3. The arguments that have been explicitly or implicitly advanced by the parties for each 
standpoint;  
4. The argumentation structure for the whole argument advanced in defence of a 
standpoint; 
5. The argument schemes used to justify a standpoint in each of the individual arguments 
that together constitute the argumentation;  
6. The outcome of the discussion claimed by the parties. 
(van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 536)  
The ideal model of critical discussion – comprising the four stages involved in critically 
testing standpoints and the associated rules of the code of conduct (see Chapter 3, section 
3.1), as well as the different transformation operations involved in the reconstruction 
process, will form the basis on which Nasrallah’s speeches are reconstructed, (partially) 
analysed and evaluated.61 However, before I elaborate on the procedure for conducting 
the analysis, I have to lay out the reasons and underlying assumptions based on which the 
                                                          
61 In pragma-dialectics, the ten rules constituting the code of conduct provide the dialectical norms that are 





proposed model for incorporating pragma-dialectics into the analytical framework of the 
DHA is founded. This model forms, as I claim, a main contribution of this research. 
4. Research proposal 
4.1. Proposal for integrating pragma-dialectics and the DHA 
The main starting points for the integration of pragma-dialectics within the analytical 
framework of the DHA are as follows: 
First, this research adheres to Fairclough and Fairclough’s (2012) conceptualization of 
political discourse as fundamentally argumentative in nature. Such a view also conforms 
with the DHA’s view of discourse (see Chapter 3, section 2.1), where discourse is linked 
to argumentation about validity claims, such as truth and normative rightness, and 
involves social actors with different perspectives (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009: 89). Despite 
the DHA interest in the argumentative dimension of discourse, it remains limited to 
identifying argumentative strategies, in terms of topoi and fallacies, with no attention paid 
to the rules of rational discussion that these fallacies violate. Moreover, a typical DHA 
analysis does not require the reconstruction of arguments (Zagar, 2009, 2010), neither is 
there a clear procedure that describes how such a reconstruction can be operationalised 
within the DHA’s analytical toolkit.62 For example, Reisigl and Wodak (2001) in their 
analysis do not spell out the various premises, explicit or implicit, involved in 
                                                          
62 One of the main criticisms levelled at the DHA is the absence of argument reconstruction that forms the 
basis for analysing and evaluating argumentative texts (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012; Zagar, 2009, 2010). 
In response, recent works by DHA scholars (Reisigl, 2014; Reisigl & Wodak 2016; Wodak, 2015) exhibit 
attempts to reconstruct argument schemes; however, the reconstruction remains confined to single argument 





constructing arguments, with no reference to pragma-dialectics or to other forms of 
argument reconstruction, such as Walton et al. (2008). 
In the DHA, the argumentative function of a discursive event, e.g. defending, justifying, 
criticizing or refuting (as macrofunctions) a political position, proposal or policy etc., are 
not taken as playing a role in (re)producing, maintaining or transforming social conditions 
and realities. In the DHA, the emphasis is on ways of representing and how these function 
in establishing the domination of powerful groups and perpetuating prejudices. However, 
dominant and hegemonic ideologies do not only constitute representations. It is also in the 
ways of arguing, i.e. in the ways political actors choose to defend, justify and/or refute 
their political positions and proposals, that these ideologies are disseminated and, more 
importantly, gain legitimacy. Indeed, ideologies, van Dijk iterates, form “the basis of 
specific arguments for, and explanations of, specific social arrangements” (1998, p.19). 
Thus, I propose pragma-dialectics as a theoretical construct to compensate for these 
shortcomings. This is because pragma-dialectics offers a theoretical apparatus that 
accounts for the different moves, stages and elements (implicit premises, arguers’ 
commitments etc.) that constitute argumentative discourse (Ihnen & Richardson, 2011).  
Second, taking pragma-dialectics as the overarching framework for the reconstruction of 
Nasrallah’s speeches presumes that resolving disagreement is the primary function of 
Nasrallah’s argumentative discourse. Through the social activity of justifying and 
criticising claims, other functions, I argue, are also realized, e.g. the representation 
function. In this respect, I claim that the representation and legitimation functions of 
discursive events are linked. This research does not agree with the representation versus 
argumentation dichotomy and attempts to show the representation function of (some) 
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argumentative schemes and moves as well as the significance of the DHA’s 
representation strategies in constructing premises for arguments. In Fairclough and 
Fairclough’s (2012) view, representation strategies are subordinate to argumentation 
designed to deliberate over possible courses of action. However, I do not adhere to this 
position. In my view, representation and argumentation are linked for the following 
reasons: 
a) Some argument schemes and fallacies, such as arguments from positive and 
negative consequences, arguments from positive and negative values (Walton & 
Macagno, 2010), argument from character to action or from action to character, 
argument from fear appeal (Walton et al., 2008), the three variants of ad hominem 
attacks (abusive, tu quoque, circumstantial), slippery slope, straw man fallacy, 
post hoc ergo propter hoc, ad populum, among others, have concomitantly an 
argumentative and representation function. In fact, it is hard to envision these as 
only providing reasons in support of claims and ignore that these also serve 
positive Self-presentation and negative Other-presentation.  
 
b) Argumentation consists of a constellation of propositions advanced in defence of a 
standpoint. These propositions are composed of subjects and predicates which 
assign qualities or properties to subjects (van Eemeren et al., 2014). In other 
words, these can be referred to as nomination/ referential and predication 
strategies that construct arguments and standpoints. Therefore, I propose that the 
DHA’s representation strategies – nomination/ referential, predication, 
intensification and mitigation – and perspectivisation strategies (see Section 2) 
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play a pivotal role in constructing arguments and argumentative moves. In his 
analysis of anti-immigration discourse, Hart (2010) illustrates that predications 
tend to operate as premises in topoi. Reisigl and Wodak (2001) suggest that 
predications appear as the first part of conclusion rules. More recently, DHA 
scholars have shown that nomination/ referential and predication strategies 
construct premises for arguments (Reisigl 214; Reisigl & Wodak, 2016; Wodak, 
2015). However, I extend this view to incorporate perspectivization, 
intensification and mitigation strategies, suggesting that these too play a role in 
constructing premises for arguments. Therefore, I consider the four discursive 
strategies involved in the representation of social actors and actions necessary for 
a discourse to attain its argumentative function.  
As far as the legitimation function of discourse is concerned, I reiterate that I follow the 
position that considers legitimation (see Chapter 3, section 7.2) to be enacted through 
argumentation (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012; Hart, 2010; Reyes, 2011). A further 
fruitful suggestion that this research aligns with is the “potential of strategic manoeuvring 
for enriching the strategic analysis of DHA” (Ihnen & Richardson, 2011, p. 237). For 
Ihnen and Richardson, such an analysis should go beyond the analysis of strategic 
manoeuvring at the argumentation stage (arguments given in support of claims) to include 
strategies pertaining to strategic manoeuvring in the confrontation, opening and 
concluding stages. Such an analysis might reveal how particular issues related to the 
disagreement are highlighted, while others are ignored via defining the difference of 
opinion in an advantageous way (confrontation stage). It might also show how, in the 
opening stage, presuppositions and starting points are falsely presented as accepted points 
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for the discussion (ibid.), all of which feeds into demystifying and deconstructing 
hegemonic ideologies. 
Ietcu-Fairclough (2007, 2008) argues that the analysis of the three aspects of strategic 
manoeuvring – topical potential, orientation to audience and presentational devices, 
which manifest themselves in every stage of critical discussion – brings additional 
insights to the processes of legitimation and recontextualization. In other words, the ways 
in which arguers strategically manoeuvre to steer the result of argumentation to their 
advantage underscore what aspects of the disagreement, as well as which arguments 
resonate well with the audience or are already accepted by the audience, are 
recontextualized in the argumentation. This research fully endorses this view and further 
proposes that the three aspects of strategic manoeuvring are also realized through 
referential, predication, intensification, mitigation and perspectivization strategies. What I 
am suggesting is that the resolution of a difference of opinion, achieved through the wise 
management of strategic manoeuvring, depends on the strategic use of representation 
strategies. Representation strategies, thus, contribute to realizing the macro-legitimation 
function that strategic manoeuvring is expected to serve. Figure 4.2, below, summarizes 








4.2. Integrating charisma and epistemic vigilance into the model 
The integration of cognitive insights into the theoretical framework of this study builds on 
a body of research that has already established a relation between cognitive pragmatics 
and argumentation theory. This type of research is interested in explaining the cognitive 
mechanisms involved in interpreting and evaluating fallacies (Maillat & Oswald, 2009, 
2011, 2013; Oswald & Hart, 2013; Maillat, 2013). Other fruitful insights are taken from 
research conducted by Hart (2010, 2011). Based on the former, the rhetorical 
effectiveness of ‘source-related fallacies’ (see Chapter 3, section 6.3.3) is interpreted in 
terms of addressees’ failure to spot their fallacious character due to the type of cognitive 
constraint that these fallacies exert over argument processing, typically, by satisfying 







































Figure 4.2: Legitimation enacted via strategic Manoeuvring and representation strategies  
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towards a source is achieved via the evidence that communicators provide to attest to 
their trustworthiness, benevolence and credibility (see Chapter 3, section 6.3.4).  
These strategies, as I claim, are part and parcel of the successful construction of charisma 
(see Chapter 3, sections 3.1, 3.2). Thus, the construction of charisma, as it pertains to this 
study, plays a role in satisfying addressees’ epistemic filters through: (i) the construction 
of a proper image or ethos via strategies that underscore the credibility and 
trustworthiness of the source (i.e. legitimation of assertions); and (ii) the construction of 
rescue narratives via which representations that do not cohere with addressees’ 
background knowledge are reframed so as to make them compatible with their nationalist 
beliefs and values. In other words, this thesis claims that through the construction of 
charisma, Nasrallah attempts to induce addressees to expand their activated set of 
contextual assumptions in order to make them access undisputable and generally accepted 
background knowledge, beliefs and values (i.e. access a less highly activated set). This is, 
therefore, one type of legitimation that clearly exploits moral values and culture-specific 
beliefs. In the following section, I elaborate on Nasrallah’s retrospective argumentation 
strategy.  
4.3. Retrospective argumentation  
Political communication, within the field of argumentation, belongs to the deliberative 
genre, i.e. it is future-oriented. However, van Eemeren has recently asserted that “political 
theorists recognize that the argumentation put forward in political discourse is also often 
about past performances and requires a retrospective account” (2013, p. 28). 
Retrospective critique in the DHA tradition aims at an informed understanding of the 
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discursive reconstruction of the past and its influence on the present (Reisigl & Wodak, 
2001). Therefore, some studies focus on the narration of success stories (Heer et al., 2008; 
Wodak et al., 2009) and the effects of these in promoting unification. Other studies 
examine apologetic narratives and the effects that these have on the discursive 
construction of a more inclusive ‘We’ (Forchtner, 2014).  
This study is mainly interested in legitimating controversial past actions and decisions. 
Past events in this study are not historical events, as in the aforementioned studies, that 
have become part of the collective memory of a nation. Instead, the past actions and 
decisions of concern to this study are those that belong to the immediate past and whose 
social and political effects are still in the making. The data analysed in this study refer to 
unilateral past actions and decisions taken by Nasrallah (or on behalf of his political 
party) and that were met with controversy, criticism and discontent. More specifically, 
this thesis analyses Nasrallah’s strategic use of retrospective argumentation, not only as a 
means to legitimise past actions and decisions but also as a defence strategy to rebut 
opponents claims. His speeches are, thus, attempts to redeem a problematized validity 
claim to rightness in order to restore the legitimacy (Habermas, 1990) of already taken 
actions or decisions. 
Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) note that argumentation advanced to justify past actions 
develops “in relation to a counter-argument, whose claim was that the action should not 
be performed, because it would lead to negative effects” (p.134). Accordingly, the arguer 
has to show that negative effects, predicated by opponents, have not materialized and that 
the intended goals behind the action have been achieved. Consequently, the claim that the 
action was right is empirically verified (ibid.). Fairclough and Fairclough’s proposal for 
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justifying past actions entails criticisms, in terms of negative consequences, were put 
forward prior to the doing of the action (deliberation over possible courses of action). The 
arguer, then, embarks on justifying the criticized past action by showing that the cited 
negative consequences have not materialized, and in case they have, they have not 
undermined the intended goal.63     
Hassan Nasrallah’s retrospective argumentation takes a different path. First, Nasrallah’s 
criticized actions or decisions were taken unexpectedly and unilaterally. There has been 
no prior deliberation concerning the nature of the action or decision, the reasons and 
motivations underlying them, nor the goals that these actions or decisions are expected to 
achieve. Second, opponents’ arguments and claims are advanced only after concrete, 
rather than anticipated, negative consequences have emerged and have, in many respects, 
undermined the goal. Nasrallah’s strategy for legitimating a past action or decision can be 
seen to have the following dimensions: (i) downplaying and trivializing the impact of 
negative consequences of the action, i.e. showing that the goal is more important than the 
materialized negative consequences; (ii) capitalizing on emerging positive consequences 
to show that these outweigh the negative ones cited; and, (iii) magnifying the negative 
consequences of failing to act via the construction of a hypothetical future scenario.  
This set of positive and negative consequences is embedded within an overall legitimating 
strategy of referring to publicly shared moral values and beliefs, on the one hand, and 
                                                          
63 From a different perspective, Walton (1990, 2003) maintains that retrospective reasoning is often used in 
legal and ethical argumentation. In the legal domain, the retrospective use of practical reasoning starts from 
the agent’s actions and reasons backwards to determine what might have been the agent’s real intentions 
and commitments that led to the action. Similarly, retrospective ethical reasoning aims to judge whether a 
past action can be justified as being right or wrong, taking from the facts or known circumstances a starting 
point to arrive at a moral/ ethical evaluation (Walton, 2003).   
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group-specific (Hezbollah’s immediate audience) religious duties and commitments that 
motivated the action/ decision, on the other. This is, in my view, one of the main 
functions of Nasrallah’s charismatic discourses, via which rescue narratives are exploited 
to unify a disintegrated nation around a threat to national unity. Based on this moral 
legitimation, the negative consequences of doing an action or taking a decision are 
provisionally accepted, given the moral and religious values that motivate the criticised 
actions or decisions. The conclusion of this chain of reasoning is: doing or deciding (A) 
was right. This, in turn, allows Nasrallah to rebut the oppositions’ claim – that doing or 
deciding (A) was wrong. The overall structure of Nasrallah’s retrospective argumentation 











Before concluding this section, I have to elaborate on the nature of arguments from 
positive and negative consequences advanced by Nasrallah, since these are predominantly 
used in his retrospective argumentation. The figure above shows that Nasrallah defends a 
descriptive standpoint (action A was right) using a normative or evaluative argument, i.e. 
Rebut Counterclaim: Doing (A) was right 
Positive 
Consequences  
of Doing (A) 
Negative 
Consequences of 






of Doing (A) 





of Doing (A) 
Figure 4.3: Provisional structure of Nasrallah’s retrospective argumentation  
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premises that point to the (un)desirable consequences of carrying out an action or 
adopting a policy or a plan. The combination of a descriptive standpoint and a normative 
argument, as van Eemeren et al. (2009) explicate, leads to an inappropriate use of the 
scheme of causality. In this case, Nasrallah is using ad consequentiam. van Eemeren et al. 
(2009) identify two variants of this fallacious scheme. The first mimics the argument 
scheme from positive and negative consequences, while the other mimics the argument 
scheme reductio ad absurdum.64 This means that Nasrallah’s arguments from positive and 
negative consequences amount to the first variant of ad consequentiam. The negative 
consequences that Nasrallah enumerates as being a result of failing to act amounts to the 
second variant of ad consequentiam (the argument points to the negative consequences of 
the contrary to of the standpoint).  
In this section, I present my model for integrating pragma-dialectics within the DHA’s 
analytical framework. In the next section, I outline the procedure followed in 
implementing the proposed model.  
4.4. Procedure for implementing the model 
This research embraces Reisigl’s (2014) recent comments in which he acknowledges that 
the DHA’s analytical framework should include more explicit and detailed reconstruction 
of arguments. Following Reisigl, the thesis offers a detailed reconstruction and analysis of 
Nasrallah’s argumentative discourse based on the critical discussion model proposed by 
pragma-dialectics. Such a detailed and rigours reconstruction of argumentative texts can 
                                                          
64 In pragmatic argumentation (argument scheme from positive and negative consequences), a normative 
standpoint is defended by stating the negative or positive consequences of adopting a certain plan, policy or 
action. In reductio ad absurdum, a standpoint is defended by pointing out that a consequence of the 
contrary to the standpoint is an undisputable falsity (van Eemeren et al., 2009, p. 172–174). 
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enrich and strengthen CDS’s explanatory critique by adding another source of 
normativity. That is, it supplements the DHA with further evidence regarding the 
manipulative character of hegemonic discourses. The analysis of speeches adheres to the 
following procedure: 
• At the level of contextualising argumentative discourse: The criticisms, objections 
and accusations forwarded by Nasrallah’s opponents, i.e. the immediate context 
which gave rise to the confrontation, are presented in the first section of each of 
the analysis chapters (i.e. speech context). Thus, the speech context section 
outlines the speech occasion and the related claims and arguments associated with 
differences of opinion.  
 
• At the level of locating arguments: This research follows argumentation scholars’ 
differentiation among argumentation, explanation and narration (Fairclough and 
Fairclough, 2012; Reisigl, 2014; Walton, 2006). In their view, argumentation is 
related to justifying and defending controversial claims with the aim of convincing 
or persuading. Explanation aims to make something more comprehensible for the 
objective of clarifying or specifying things, i.e. the starting point of an explanation 
is accepted and not contested. Finally, narration can overlap with argumentation 
when narrative episodes are employed to back up a claim, e.g. illustrative 
argumentation schemes (Reisigl, 2014). This distinction is important because 
Nasrallah’s speeches have many instances of narration and explanation tied to 
argumentation. In this case, the parts of speeches that are not related to the 
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resolution of disagreements are excluded from the analysis. This is presented in 
the preparatory section of each of the analysis chapters. 
  
• At the level of identifying and recovering argumentative content: The four 
reconstruction transformation operations (see Section 3) are applied to ensure a 
faithful reconstruction of Nasrallah’s argumentation. 
 
• At the level of reconstruction: The ideal model of critical discussion is the guiding 
framework for the reconstruction of Nasrallah’s argumentation, based on which 
the different stages of confrontation are reconstructed (confrontation, opening, 
argumentation and concluding stages). A further guide is the set of 
(argumentative) linguistic indicators (van Eemeren et al., 2007) that signal the 
beginning, the various argumentative moves and the ending of each stage. 
 
• At the level of reconstructing argument schemes: In pragma-dialectics, 
symptomatic, causal and comparison argumentation are the three generic types of 
which all other argument schemes are sub-types. The analysis also refers to some 
argument schemes that are identified by Walton et al. (2008), such as argument 
from values, argument from sacrifice, argument from fear appeal, argument from 
character to action and from action to character, which all fall under pragma-
dialectics generic types. Reference to the aforementioned schemes intends to 
facilitate the reconstruction of arguments. 
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•  At the level of evaluating arguments: The evaluation proceeds in the following 
manner. First, following pragma-dialectics, the different argumentative schemes 
are evaluated based on whether, or not, they conform to the ten rules of critical 
discussion. Therefore, the evaluation specifies the types of violations involved and 
their effects in derailing the critical testing of standpoints. Second, the rhetorical 
effectiveness of some of these fallacies is assessed based on insights from 
cognitive pragmatics. The objective is to show whether the acceptability of a 
given representation depends on satisfying, or otherwise, audiences’ epistemic 
vigilance. Third, the evaluation takes into account the effects of strategies 
underpinning the legitimation of assertions regarding audiences’ epistemic 
assessments (Hart, 2010, 2011), which, as I claim, are part of the discursive 
construction of charisma. Figure 4.4, below, summarises the steps followed in the 



















In this chapter, I have presented the main premises for incorporating pragma-dialectics 
into the DHA’s analytical framework. The model perceives the representation and 
argumentative functions of discourse as linked, rather than dichotomous. I propose that 
the DHA’s representation strategies are involved in the construction of argument schemes 
and in formulating the three aspects of strategic manoeuvring. I also propose that strategic 
Preparatory step: Follows the reconstruction transformation operations  
 
Reconstruction: a) Follows the ideal model of critical discussion and linguistic indicators  







Analysis:  a) Shows how representation strategies enact the three aspects of strategic 
manoeuvring and argument schemes    
b) Identifies fallacies 
c) Shows how rescue narratives appear in premises for arguments   





Evaluation:  a) Evaluates fallacies as violations of the code of conduct 
  c) Evaluates effectiveness of fallacies based on cognitive pragmatics 
   d) Evaluates charisma and its effects on audiences’ epistemic vigilance:  
1. The construction of ethos (legitimation of assertions) and epistemic 
vigilance  
2. Rescue narrative as a tool to overcome audiences’ epistemic defences 
 
Figure: 4.4 Steps for implementing the proposed model  
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manoeuvring has a macro-function that goes hand in hand with resolving a difference of 
opinion to one’s own advantage, i.e. a legitimation function. Moreover, I suggest that 
rescue narratives have an argumentative function, inasmuch as elements of these 
narratives are configured in premises for arguments. The chapter also provides a detailed 
description of the steps followed in implementing the proposed model. My next 
endeavour is to show the applicability of this model to the selected data and its efficacy in 
offering appropriate answers to the thesis’s research questions. Therefore, the following 




















July 2006 Speech: The Israeli war on Lebanon 
1. Speech context  
On 12 July 2006, and after a few hours of Hizbollah’s sudden military operation – ‘the 
sincere promise’ – during which Hizbollah kidnapped two Israeli soldiers, Nasrallah held 
a press conference. In it, Nasrallah declared that 12 July marked ‘loyalty day’ for three 
Lebanese prisoners who had been held captive in Israel for several years (one of them had 
been imprisoned for more than 25 years) and for ‘all Arab brothers who are captives and 
prisoners in the occupation prisons (Israel)’.65 Nasrallah declared that this operation was 
the ‘only available means’, which was ‘not only capable of releasing the three Lebanese 
prisoners, but also shed light, at the international level, on the enormous suffering, 
humiliation and tragedy that thousands of Arab, Palestinian and Lebanese prisoners and 
their families had endured for years’. That is, he emphasised the nobility of the goal 
(freeing prisoners) and the moral values that motivated the action (kidnapping Israeli 
soldiers).   
Warning his opponents against voicing their objections at such a critical time, he 
announced that ‘any debate concerning the rightness or wrongness of the action’ would 
have to be postponed since ‘now is the time for solidarity and cooperation (due to the 
expected Israeli retaliation)’. Moreover, Nasrallah confirmed that any countermeasures 
                                                          
65 These direct quotes are taken from Nasrallah’s press conference, which can be retrieved from Hizbollah’s 





taken by Israel would not succeed in freeing the Israeli soldiers and the only possible way 
to release them was through ‘indirect bilateral negotiations to swap prisoners’.  
Within a few hours of Nasrallah’s press conference, Israel waged war on Lebanon. The 
main objectives of this military assault, according to an Israeli press release, were to free 
the Israeli prisoners and dismantle Hizbollah’s military power. Within the first few days 
of the Israeli aggression, hundreds of Lebanese civilians were killed, some were buried 
under rubble, thousands were injured, hundreds of thousands were displaced, the national 
airport was attacked, some bridges and power plants were destroyed. As the Israeli 
aggression increased in its severity and brutality, opponents’ (the 14th of March party) 
criticisms and objections to the kidnapping of the Israeli soldiers dramatically intensified. 
The opponents’ main claim (counterclaim) – kidnapping Israeli soldiers was not the right 
action – is substantiated by the following reasons: 66 
• The action instigated open war with Israel;  
• Nasrallah’s monopoly on the decision to wage war (informing neither the cabinet 
nor parliament) gives him the political and moral responsibility for the decision 
and ensuing repercussions (death toll, injuries, destruction etc.);  
• The cost of freeing three prisoners was extremely high compared with the 
treacherous consequences;   
• Nasrallah ignored alternative actions that could have been taken, such as seeking 
international diplomatic efforts to swap prisoners – as had been successfully done 
before.  
                                                          
66 These arguments are taken from newspaper editorials and news reports concerning the progress of the 
war, and the political statements of opposition leaders (see Chapter 2, section 5).  
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On 25 July 2006, after two weeks of Israeli aggression and the controversy that the 
kidnapping of the Israeli soldiers spurred was exacerbating, Nasrallah gave a speech to 
respond to those criticisms and to clarify the reasons that motivated him to take action.67 
2. Speech analysis 
2.1. Preparatory step   
The analysis will only focus on the political aspects of the speech that are directly related 
to differences of opinion (see Chapter 4, section 4.4). The parts related to diplomatic 
efforts to bring about ceasefire (lines 104–125), the latest developments on the battlefield 
(lines 126–154), such as the types of weaponry used, the names of cities under siege or 
attack, the types of military fighting taking place on either side of the conflict, and the 
effects of the psychological war launched by Israel (lines 155–177) are not included in the 
analysis as they are not relevant to the resolution of disagreements.  
This speech is an attempt, by Nasrallah, to restore the legitimacy of a controversial past 
action, the consequences of which, whether positive or negative, are still in the making. It 
is an attempt, on the one hand, to rebut the opposition’s counter-claim (kidnapping Israeli 
soldiers was not the right action) by formulating arguments that endow the action with 
normative legitimacy, and to defend himself against the accusations raised by his 
opponents, on the other. Given the nature of the charismatic bond that relates Nasrallah to 
his followers, i.e. they are more likely to be inclined to accept his claims out of trust (see 
Chapter 3, section 6.3.3), it seems reasonable to suggest that Nasrallah’s focus is on the 
                                                          
67 The translated English version of the speech can be found in Appendix B and the original Arabic version 




14th of March audience, who are swayed by their leaders’ untenable arguments and unfair 
criticisms (lines 6–10). He is, thus, addressing his opponents’ audience at a time when the 
sovereignty of the state is under direct attack.  
2.2. Reconstruction and analysis  
 Confrontation Stage 
The speech is divided into two parts. The first is an indirect response to the opposition’s 
accusations and criticisms (lines 1–58), while the second part aims to legitimise and 
defend the rightness of kidnapping Israeli soldiers (lines 59–103, 178–189). The objective 
of the quasi-juridical part is to deny Nasrallah’s direct responsibility for instigating war 
with Israel, to absolve himself of moral responsibility for the ensuing human suffering, 
and to shift the blame onto others, i.e. to show that Nasrallah is not to be blamed. The 
second part is an attempt to justify the rightness of his action through a series of 
argumentum ad consequentiam. As for the quasi-juridical part, Nasrallah strategically 
manoeuvres by leaving implicit the main accusations he aims to defend, as these are 
highly damaging to his image. In this respect, Nasrallah selects from the ‘disagreement 
space’ an issue which is easy to handle (topical potential). Thus, he presents the 
disagreement as if it were a conflict over facts and the appropriate interpretation of them. 
The 14th of March audience expected Nasrallah to explicitly address the accusations 
raised against him, especially the cost of freeing three Lebanese prisoners, i.e. the 
morality of the action. However, he shifts the discussion to the factual basis of his 
opponents’ position and manages to cast doubt on their credibility. Nasrallah formulates 
his arguments and argumentative moves utilizing the DHA’s representation strategies (see 
142 
 
Chapter 4, section 4.1). I will refer to examples of referential, predication, 
perspectivisation and mitigation strategies in the analyses. However, the main discussion 
of intensification strategies is presented in Chapter 9, section 5. Where possible, 
representation strategies are identified using the key presented in Table 5.1, below. 
Referential strategies  Single lines 
Predication strategies  Double lines  
Perspectivization strategies Dashed lines 
Important phrases or clauses  Bold lines  
  
 
We have to know and understand the true reality of this war and the background to the 
aggression. After two weeks, things are clearer now, with the availability of 
information, from political speeches, public statements either from officials in the 
American administration or the Zionist enemy, or from those who rotate within their 
orbit, and from political analysis and from facts which will all lead to the one obvious 
conclusion. If we know which war we are now fighting, we can know how to continue 
the march. (lines 6–12) 
 
Nasrallah presents the purpose of addressing the audience in a highly abstract form: ‘there 
are things that I need to comment on’ (line 3–4), ‘things are much clearer now’ (line 7), 
‘facts which will all lead to the one obvious conclusion’ (line 10), ‘If we know which war we are 
now fighting, we can know how to continue the march’ (line 12). This high level of abstraction 
permits Nasrallah to implicitly refer to accusations and to portray members of the 
audience as sensible and rational allies who are entitled to know the ‘true reality of this 
war’ (line 6). As for the former, Nasrallah is referring to the accusation of instigating an 
open war with Israel and suggests that there are facts and information that can verify 
Israel’s responsibility. This new information that Nasrallah is about to disclose, which 
contradicts the 14th of March audience’s background knowledge, will lead the audience to 
Table 5.1: Key for identifying representation strategies  
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arrive at the ‘one obvious conclusion’; i.e. Israel is responsible for instigating war. This 
means that the 14th of March audience’s knowledge about the war, which mainly derives 
from the 14th of March leaders’ statements, speeches, and associated media, is distorted 
and impaired. As for the latter, Nasrallah suggests that once members of the 14th of March 
audience have access to the real facts, they will abandon the position of their leaders and 
adopt Nasrallah’s more ‘logical and moral’ standpoint.  
Nasrallah manages, on the one hand, to dissociate the audience from his opponents, and 
as such, he presents the mixed dispute as being a non-mixed one, i.e. Nasrallah is trying 
to resolve a disagreement with his political opponents and not the audience. On the other 
hand, through argumentum ad hominem, he indirectly attacks the 14th of March leaders, 
who do not know the facts, and even if they did they would be unable to arrive at ‘the one 
obvious conclusion’ (line 11).68 This ad hominem supports the claim that the arguments 
and accusations put forward by the 14th of March leaders should not be accepted. This 
claim is premised on the inability of the 14th of March leaders to have access to the ‘real 
facts’ and to arrive at an appropriate interpretation and assessment of these facts, hence 
they are non-credible sources of information and their claims should be questioned (X is 
of a bad character; therefore, X is not credible and hence his arguments should not be 
accepted).   
The conclusion that should be derived from the facts – sourced from, for example, the 
political statements of the Zionist enemy and the US administration (lines 8–11) – is not 
                                                          
68 This fallacy is a violation of Rule 1, the Freedom Rule, which aims to restrict the other party’s freedom of 
action and eliminate them as rational discussants by doubting their expertise and intelligence (the first 




revealed at this stage. It is only declared at the argumentation stage: ‘it (the war) was an 
American decision’ (line 58). There is another instance of argumentum ad hominem 
(circumstantial) in: ‘those who rotate within their orbit’ (line 9–10). By ‘those’, Nasrallah 
refers to the leaders of the 14th of March party (Nasrallah’s opponents), who are 
metaphorically presented as those who succumb to American and Israeli will and control. 
Because of their overt and harsh criticisms of kidnapping Israeli soldiers and their pro-
American affiliations, they become suspects of serving the enemy’s interests, i.e. he is 
doubting their motives. Through this ad hominem, Nasrallah undermines the credibility 
and trustworthiness of his opponents claiming that their actions are motivated by serving 
the interests of the enemy, hence their claims and accusations should not be accepted. 
Therefore, the negative representation of his opponents is accentuated through ad 
hominem attacks and metaphorical expressions. Moreover, ad hominem attacks serve to 
alert the (14th of March) audiences’ epistemic vigilance towards the untrustworthiness of 
their leaders and their lack of credibility, thereby weakening the acceptability of their 
claims (see Chapter 3, section, 6.3.3).    
Adaptation to the audience is achieved not only through defining the differences as a non-
mixed dispute, but also via referential strategies (see Chapter 4, section 2), such as the use 
of the pronouns ‘we’, ‘you’ and the possessive determiner ‘our’, which serve as a 
collectivisation strategy (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001). To establish communion and empathy 
with the (opponents’) audience, Nasrallah addresses them using the pronoun ‘you’: ‘I 
want to talk to you’ (line 3).69 Nasrallah presents them as allies who are ready to continue 
the battle under his leadership: ‘If we (Lebanese) know which war we are now fighting, 
                                                          
69 In Arabic, you (antoum) indicates familiarity and is a sign of a conversational style. 
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we can know how to continue the march’ (line 11–12). With these assimilation strategies 
(see Chapter 4, section 2), he positions the 14th of March audience as being part of his 
defence strategy against the Israeli aggression, rather than being on the other side, i.e. 
tipping the balance of the audience in his favour. He is thus appealing to the duties and 
responsibilities that the audience should accept once they are confronted with the facts. 
Nasrallah praises and flatters the Lebanese, who are qualified as a ‘proud and dignified 
people’ (line 2), and their endurance is ‘miraculous’ (line 1).  
In contrast, ideological anthroponyms (ideologonyms, see Chapter 4, section 2) used as 
referential strategies (Reisigl & Wodak 2009), such as the ‘Zionist enemy’ (line 9) and 
‘barbaric Zionist aggression’ (line 1), indicate the ideological position and perspective 
that Nasrallah adopts. A noteworthy presentation device is the level of ambiguity and 
abstraction conferred on the main issues to be tackled: ‘things to comment on’, ‘attitudes 
that should be taken, ‘things are clearer’, ‘one obvious conclusion’.70 This strategic 
ambiguity, which serves as a mitigation strategy, conforms with Nasrallah’s evasion 
strategy, namely, avoid mentioning points of disagreement. After casting doubt on the 
14th of March party’s position and credibility, Nasrallah embarks on revealing the sources 
of his knowledge/ facts. 
Opening Stage 
At the opening stage, the starting points of the discussion are stated, the roles of the 
participants in the dispute are delineated, and concessions derived from exploiting 
                                                          
70 Ambiguity fallacy is a violation of Language Use Rule, Rule 10 of critical discussion, and is caused by 
referential, semantic or syntactic ambiguity.  
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common background knowledge and beliefs (endoxa) are established. With respect to 
participants’ roles, Nasrallah is the antagonist of his opponents’ counterclaim (the 
kidnapping was a wrong action) and the protagonist of his own claim (the kidnapping was 
the right action) at the same time. This stage opens with Nasrallah revealing the sources 
of facts which lend themselves to the ‘true reality of this war’ (line 6). Ironically, the 
source of his factual basis is a statement from the US Foreign Secretary of State, 
Condoleezza Rice, in which she declared the birth of the ‘New Middle East’ (the 
statement was made a few days after the Israeli assault on Lebanon): 
After the US Foreign Secretary of State’s statement about the new Middle East, by 
which she means the American-Israeli new Middle East, can anyone believe that this 
huge enormous project (the new Middle East) was born a few days after the Resistance 
captured the two Israeli soldiers?  (lines 13–16) 
 
Nasrallah strategically manoeuvres by (implicitly) eliciting concessions derived from a 
rhetorical question. The proposition conveyed in the rhetorical question (the new Middle 
East is a pre-planned project) is, thus, taken as a common starting point for the discussion, 
instead of being defended. By appealing to the audience’s common sense – no one 
believes that this huge project could have been born within a few days – he presents his 
claim as if it is self-evident and does not need proof. Thus, he commits the fallacy of 
evading the burden of proof.71 Nasrallah further substantiates this assumption through an 
explicit assertion: ‘All the evidence confirms that the preparation to launch this project 
(the new Middle East) started at least one year ago’ (lines 17–18). This means that the 
14th of March party advanced a false proposition; i.e. kidnapping the soldiers gave Israel a 
                                                          
71 Presenting a standpoint as self-evident, immunising it from criticism and giving a personal guarantee as 
to its rightness are argumentative attempts by which the protagonist violates the Obligation to Defend Rule, 
Rule 2 (see Appendix A).  
147 
 
pretext to wage war against Lebanon is wrong. However, Nasrallah asserts that there are 
obstacles that impede the implementation of the ‘new Middle East’ project. 
 In the new Middle East, there is no place for any Resistance Movement, so work is 
needed to remove these obstacles exemplified by the Resistance Movements in 
Lebanon, Palestine, Syria and Iran. (lines 21–23) 
 
Nasrallah’s evidence for the presence of obstacles facing the project is based on 
American estimations. He states: ‘According to American estimations there are obstacles 
facing the new Middle East’ (line 18–19). Nasrallah’s strategic ambiguity (estimations, 
obstacles) makes it hard for the audience to question and evaluate the nature of the 
evidence and the source of the information. In Nasrallah’s view, what Rice means by the 
‘new Middle East’ is an area that will be directly controlled by the US administration and 
Israel in order to manage and exploit the region’s ‘resources and wealth’ (line 20). 
Nasrallah finally reveals that the Resistance movements in Lebanon, Syria and Iran are 
‘the obstacles’ that prevent the US and Israel from implementing the project. Though 
Nasrallah attributes the sources of his information to Rice and American estimations (the 
supposed enemy), he provides his own interpretation of what the ‘new Middle East’ 
project amounts to. 
The question that presents itself here is whether Nasrallah misrepresents, distorts or 
exaggerates the views of the group that his opponents affiliate with (the US), i.e. commits 
the straw man fallacy.72 Despite the fact that Rice declared the birth of the new Middle 
                                                          
72 Misrepresenting, distorting or attributing a fictitious standpoint to (fictitious or real) an opponent or 





East, there is no official document or statement from the US administration that clearly 
defines or clarifies what is meant by it. Nasrallah’s reference to statements attributed to 
American officials aims to satisfy the 14th of March audiences’ epistemic filters, due to 
the latter’s overt affiliation to the US, thereby enhancing the acceptability of his 
propositions. This is because by referring to an expert opinion (Rice), the likelihood of 
accepting statements attributed to the source is enhanced (source X is an expert in a 
specific domain that contains proposition A and X asserts that A is true; therefore, A may 
plausibly be taken to be true). Another instance of adapting to the audience can be seen in 
paving the way for a hypothetical future scenario presented in terms of obstacles that 
should be removed (lines 22–23). By defining these obstacles as inherently linked to the 
Resistance movements in Lebanon, Syria and Iran, he is appealing to common 
background knowledge and beliefs, in particular, the shared ideology that Lebanon is a 
Resistance country (Resistance as a binding ideology).  
As for presentational devices, the ‘new Middle East’ is referred to as the ‘huge enormous 
project’ (line 15) and it is negatively qualified as being under American and Israeli 
control (line 19–20) and the place in which there is ‘no place for any Resistance 
Movement’ (lines 21–22). Resistance movements are metaphorically portrayed as 
‘obstacles facing the new Middle East’ (line 18–19), which the Americans must remove. 
The metaphor is purposefully used to propagate fear, which will be further accentuated in 
the hypothetical future scenario. Referential and predication strategies serve to construct a 
negative representation of the ‘new Middle East’. 
Finally, in this stage, Nasrallah manages to establish his credibility and objectivity by 
emphasising his reliance on facts and attributing propositions to authorities whom the 
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respective audiences trust (see Chapter 3, section 6.3.3). To enhance his ethical status, 
Nasrallah constructs himself as helping and saving the Lebanese people through a rescue 
narrative, which he exploits in the argumentation stage.  
Argumentation Stage 
The line of defence that is related to the quasi-juridical part of the speech depends mainly 
on arguments from authority (Rice’s statement) and arguments from example. Nasrallah’s 
use of arguments from authority in the form of attributing propositions to Condoleezza 
Rice (line 13) makes the starting point unquestionable, because the members of the 14th of 
March audience consider her a credible source. The rhetorical effectiveness of this ad 
verecundiam is achieved by attributing propositions to an external source whom members 
of the opposition audience are expected to trust, thus satisfying their epistemic filters 
(Oswald & Hart, 2013) and enhancing Nasrallah’s credibility at the same time.73 As 
mentioned earlier, Nasrallah claims that the main objective of the pre-planned new 
Middle East is to eliminate resistance movements in the region (in Syria, Lebanon, Iran 
and Palestine) (lines 21–23). Therefore, he tries to back up a general claim by illustrating 
how this is the case in Palestine (lines 24–30), using an argument from analogy.74 
However, drawing such a general conclusion based on evidence derived from one 
example is an instance of hasty generalization or secundum quid.75 To make the 
                                                          
73 This fallacy is a violation of Rule 8, the Argument Scheme Rule. It presents the standpoint as right 
because an authority says it is right (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, p. 213).  
74 The argument from example (Garssen, 2017; van Eemeren et al., 2007) echoes the topos of illustrative 
examples identified by Wodak et al. (2009). For the difference between argument from example and 
argument from analogy see (Garssen, 2017 p. 35). 
75 This fallacy is a violation of the Argument Scheme Rule, Rule 8. Its fallaciousness is attributed to the 
incorrect application of the argument scheme of concomitance by making generalisations based upon 
observations that are not representative or sufficient.  
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illustrative example more convincing, it is formulated using cause-effect relations in 
which one event is, supposedly, the cause of the following event.  
The project started in Palestine. What was required was the termination of the 
Resistance Movement in Palestine. [---] They (Israelis) killed Palestinian people, 
starved them, deprived them of humanitarian aid, and they were pushing things to the 
verge of internal strife. Then, the operation to capture the Israeli soldier in Gaza took 
place. The importance of this operation is that it pushed away the danger of internal 
strife, and returned Palestinians to their true and original battle. (lines 24–30)  
 
According to Nasrallah, because the resistance movement (Hamas) won the parliamentary 
elections, the Palestinians were punished (killed, subject to starvation, put under siege) 
and pushed to the verge of civil strife. Then, Hamas’s operation to capture an Israeli 
soldier changed the scene, prevented civil strife and redirected the Palestinians back to 
their original battle. This example shows the pressure that the Palestinian resistance was 
subject to, despite winning the elections, and seeks to draw a lesson from Palestinians’ 
response to the kidnapping operation. This means that just as capturing an Israeli soldier 
in Gaza united Palestinians and redirected them back to their original battle (fighting 
Israel), this should have been the case in Lebanon or how the 14th of March leaders 
should have reacted to Hizbollah’s operation (kidnapping Israeli soldiers). This could also 
be taken as an indirect ad hominem attack on his opponents, who failed to meet the 
expected measures.  
With respect to the Lebanese context, Nasrallah uses the same strategy of enumerating 
events in the form of cause-effect relations (lines 31–51), which pertain to the efforts 
made by the US administration and Israel to find a domestic party that will terminate 
Hizbollah. The objective is to deny his direct responsibility for instigating war and to find 
a blame-taker, i.e. an entity that Nasrallah can blame for instigating war. For example: 
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‘They (Americans and Israelis) bet, but their bets failed at the local level, for they did not 
find anyone capable of terminating the Resistance Movement and ending its existence in 
Lebanon’ (lines 33–34). This is because, as Nasrallah states, the Americans ‘were 
surprised by the public support that the Resistance Movement enjoys’ (line 35–36). 
Therefore, they had to bet on the national army to eliminate Hizbollah (lines 36–43), but 
this also failed due to the patriotism of the Army and its leaders.  
Three points are worth mentioning here. First, by presenting the case as if the resistance 
(Hizbollah) is facing an imminent threat, by virtue of a pre-planned project, he is 
appealing to the audiences’ compassion and empathy through propagating fear. Thus, he 
is defending his position using ad misericordiam.76 Second, by flattering the audience, 
other political factions and the army for their patriotic and nationalist views (refusing to 
take part in terminating Hizbollah), he is appealing to people’s emotions by stirring 
symbols of national pride, i.e. ad populum fallacy or pathetical fallacy.77 Nasrallah plays 
on the audience’ sentiments by using emotively laden language to arose emotions in 
support of his position (i.e. emotions such as enthusiasm, pride, anger, or disgust are used 
to express evidence for statement A; therefore, statement A is true). Third, by referring to 
a set of (internal) political actors who refused to take part in terminating Hizbollah, he is 
evoking elements of a conspiracy plot prepared by the Americans.78 Therefore, through 
the construction of a conspiracy, Nasrallah manages to deny direct responsibility, claim 
                                                          
76 This fallacy violates Rule 1, the Freedom Rule, by playing on the other party’s feelings of compassion.  
77 This ad populum violates Rule 4, the Relevance Rule, of critical discussion by exploiting emotions and 
sentiments, i.e. using non-argumentative means of persuasion. 
78 Recently, Oswald and Herman (2016) assert the argumentative function of conspiracy theories. The 
authors propose a rhetorical-pragmatic model to analyse the argumentative elements embedded in 
conspiracy theories.  
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victimhood (victim-perpetrator reversal strategy in the DHA’s terms) and create culprits 
to blame. 
This series of failed attempts led the Americans to conclude that: ‘there is no local way 
they can bet on to terminate the Resistance Movement and wipe out its existence’ (lines 
52–56). The same is equally true for Hizbollah’s regional allies – Syria and Iran – who 
refused to terminate Hizbollah (lines 48–51). Therefore, ‘It was an American decision to 
wage an Israeli war on Lebanon’ (line 58) which, according to Nasrallah, was supposed to 
take place in ‘late September or the beginning of October’ (lines 61–62). As a 
consequence, Nasrallah manages to shift the blame onto the Americans, who hold the 
responsibility for instigating the war.  
Nasrallah’s narration of this succession of events in the form of one event following 
another is highly effective. This is because a cause-effect relation “suggests only a 
minimum of disputable connections” (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999, p. 491). 
However, causal argumentation does not seem to offer a conclusive support to the claim – 
the war was an American decision. To judge the fallaciousness of causal argument 
schemes, van Eemeren et al. (2007) propose a set of critical questions to evaluate whether 
the proposed cause does indeed lead to the mentioned (un)desirable result, or whether the 
proposed effects can be caused by another cause or achieved by other means. Answering 
this set of critical questions reveals the following. First, presenting the idea of punishing 
the Palestinian people – which is indeed a fact – due to Hamas’s victory in the election, is 
a biased representation, if not erroneous. There are other causes, such as Hamas’s desire 
for autonomy after taking over Gaza and Hamas’s continuous shelling of some Israeli 
villages. Secondly, Hamas’s kidnapping of the Israeli soldier was welcomed by Hamas’s 
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supporters and followers, whereas other Palestinian factions criticised the action and 
considered it an unwarranted escalation with Israel.  
These fallacious cause-effect arguments are based on Nasrallah’s own personal 
observations and understanding of events. These fallacious attempts are instances of the 
post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy.79 However, the primary function of these causal 
relations is to deny his direct responsibility for instigating the war (implicitly responding 
to the opposition’s accusation) and to justify the attribution of blame to another party – 
the Americans are to blame.  
It is at this stage that the speech shifts from an indirect response to accusations to an 
attempt to legitimate the action of kidnapping Israeli soldiers, i.e. to show that the action 
of kidnapping Israeli soldiers was a right action. On finally reaching ‘the one obvious 
conclusion’ (line 11), that he is not to blame because the Americans had pre-planned and 
prepared the war, he narrates a fictitious scenario of a presumed pre-planned war.  
The plan (hypothetical scenario) entails that all of a sudden, with or without a pretext 
(kidnapping the soldiers), the enemy (Israel) [---] launches a wide ground offensive to 
take full control of the south of Litani region in order to prevent launching missiles. 
At the same time, the Israeli Air Force strikes the homes of senior Hizbollah officials, 
Hizbollah’s headquarters and institutions, and the infrastructure to cripple the 
Resistance and the whole country [-----]. This (the plan) was intended to be a harsh 
blow from which it is difficult to recover. This is the scenario that would have been 
implemented had we not captured the Israeli soldiers. (lines 65–73) 
 
The causal-relations of this narrative are of the means-goal type. For example, part of the 
pre-planned war scenario, according to Nasrallah, is a wide ground military invasion to 
                                                          
79 This fallacy is a violation of Rule 8, the Argument Scheme Rule. It amounts to an incorrect use of the 
scheme of causality, which leads to inferring a cause-effect relation from the mere observation that two 




the south of the Litani region (a Hizbollah stronghold) with the goal of preventing 
Hizbollah from launching missiles. Air strikes are expected to hit the homes of senior 
Hizbollah officials and headquarters with the goal of paralysing Hizbollah’s military 
power, and hence paralysing Hizbollah. According to Nasrallah, the kidnapping of the 
Israeli soldiers ‘prevented the most dangerous plan and the worst war scenario for 
Lebanon and the Resistance, and the Lebanese people’ (lines 75–77). 
Through this hypothetical dreadful scenario, Nasrallah constructs the elements of a self-
defence rescue narrative (see Chapter 3, section 7.1): the villains are the Americans and 
the Israelis, the victims are Hizbollah and the Lebanese people, the hero/ victim is 
Hizbollah who acts to defend himself and the Lebanese nation. The hypothetical scenario 
invokes fear and a sense of urgency to deal with the looming danger; therefore, it leads 
the audience to the conclusion that something should be done to eliminate the foreseen 
threat. The sense of fear that is propagated through the construction of a hypothetical 
scenario has a dual function. On the one hand, it warns the audience against loss of 
national autonomy, independence, freedom, and sovereignty. In this case he is warning 
the public against heteronomy, i.e. exploiting a strategy of heteronomisation (see Chapter 
4, section 2). On the other, it unites different sections of the audience in a quest to oppose 
an imminent threat, i.e. using a unification strategy (see Chapter 4, section 2). From a 
different point of view, the elements of the rescue narrative seem to configure as premises 
in the argument from fear appeal. Adopting Walton’s et al. (2008, p. 333) scheme, the 
argument from fear appeal can be reconstructed as follows: 
Premise 1: If Hizbollah did not kidnap the soldiers, then the worst war scenario will  
take place 
Premise 2:  The war scenario is very bad for the resistance and for Lebanon  
Premise 3:  Therefore, the scenario ought to be prevented if possible 
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Premise 4: But the only way to prevent the worst war scenario is to take Israel by 
surprise through kidnapping soldiers 
Conclusion:  Therefore, Hizbollah had to kidnap the soldiers  
 
The rescue narrative allows Nasrallah to construct himself as a saviour or as the one 
whose actions will bring salvation to the Lebanese people, i.e. the action should be 
praised and not criticised. It also frames the action as serving Lebanon’s national interest, 
which is in stark contradiction to opponents’ claims. Moreover, the negative effects of the 
hypothetical future scenario also appear as premises for argumentum ad consequentiam. 
These negative consequences highlight what would be the case had Nasrallah not taken 
the action, i.e. the worst war scenario would have been implemented.80  
In a single moment, the south of Litani is invaded. Homes, centres, and institutions are 
raided. We (Hizbollah) would thus lose control, the ability to communicate together 
and the ability to manoeuvre, as a result the Resistance is terminated. (lines 82–85) 
 
This chain of events that the war scenario is expected to trigger takes the form of the 
slippery-slope fallacy.81 At the same time, Nasrallah defends his descriptive standpoint 
(kidnapping of Israeli soldiers was right) ) by highlighting the positive consequences of 
kidnapping the Israeli soldiers, i.e. argumentum ad consequentiam.82 One of the most 
important positive consequences of capturing the soldiers is that the ‘Zionist enemy found 
himself in a humiliating position’ (lines 78–79), which caused the Israelis to rush to war 
instead of continuing their preparations until the ‘end of September or the beginning of 
                                                          
80 This variant of ad consequentiam is the fallacious counterpart of the argument scheme reductio ad 
absurdum. The fallacy is a violation of the Argument Scheme Rule, Rule 8. It consists of pointing to the 
consequences of the contrary to the standpoint (see Chapter 4, section 4.3).   
81 This fallacy is a violation of Rule 8, the Argument Scheme Rule, it uses the scheme of causality 
incorrectly by erroneously suggesting that by taking a course of action one will be moving from a bad 
situation to a worse one.  
82 This variant of ad consequentiam is a violation of the Argument Scheme Rule, Rule 8. It consists of 
defending a factual or descriptive standpoint by pointing to the positive consequences, i.e. confusing facts 
with value judgements (see Chapter 4, section 4.3).   
156 
 
October’ (line 62). By going to war earlier than planned, Hizbollah prevented ‘the enemy 
(Israel) from taking us (Hizbollah/Lebanon) by surprise’ (line 81). These positive 
consequences will probably lead the audience to evaluate the action as desirable, since 
they confirm to the anti-Zionist ideology that most Lebanese subscribe to. Similarly, 
preventing Israel from implementing the pre-planned war scenario and saving the 
Lebanese from its horrendous effects might also lead to a positive evaluation of the 
action.     
The second level of legitimation emphasises the moral values that informed the goal, and 
based on which the action is in turn justified. In this case, Nasrallah is advancing an 
argument from moral values to justify the goal (Macagno & Walton, 2010; Macagno, 
2013), followed by an argument from the nobility of a goal scheme (van Eemeren et al., 
2007, van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992), to justify the means via which the goal is 
realised.83 In an argument from moral values, the goal (saving and protecting Lebanon 
from the worst war scenario) is justified based on the moral values (Lebanon’s freedom, 
sovereignty, and independence) that motivate the goal (i.e. a value is a reason to retain 
commitment to a goal), whereas in an argument from the nobility of a goal, the action 
(kidnapping the Israeli soldiers) is justified based on the nobility of the goal (i.e. 
contributing to a noble goal is a reason for doing an action). Therefore, the action that was 
classified by Nasrallah’s opponents as falling within the category of actions that ruin and 
devastate the country is redefined and reframed, through a rescue narrative, as an action 
that saved and rescued Lebanon and the Lebanese from the worst war scenario. It is at 
                                                          
83 According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992), the argument scheme from the nobility of a goal is a 
subtype of causal argumentation. The scheme emphasises the nobility of the goal that the action is expected 
to realise, thereby justifying the action/ means.   
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this stage that the relation between salvation/ rescue narratives (part of the construction of 
charisma) can be related to audience epistemic vigilance (see Chapter 4, section 4.2) 
Members of the14th of March audience are most likely against the action, by virtue of the 
criticisms advanced by their leaders and the materialised negative consequences of the 
action. Thus, they are expected to exercise vigilance towards a representation that 
contradicts or is incoherent with their background information related to the action. 
Therefore, to make his justification coheres with their background knowledge and beliefs, 
Nasrallah induces them to access a less highly activated set of indisputable beliefs that 
weigh in favour of the action (see Chapter 3, section 6.3.3). This is achieved, as I propose, 
through a rescue or salvation narrative. The salvation/ rescue narrative, which invokes 
nationalist and anti-Zionist ideologies, might trigger members of the audience to revise 
their previous assumptions or provisionally entertain the new representation.  
Based on this view, the action of kidnapping Israeli soldiers, which brought war, has to be 
regarded as an act of resistance and as serving the goal of saving and rescuing Lebanon 
from the worst war scenario (line 102). According to Nasrallah, if the project was 
implemented it would ‘bring Lebanon back under American-Israeli domination and 
control’ (lines 94–95). Classifying the action as falling within the category of the praised 
and honourable actions of the Resistance movement entails the action of kidnapping the 
Israeli soldiers being honourable and praiseworthy. In this case, Nasrallah is advancing an 
argument from classification (Macagno, 2013; Walton et al., 2008, p. 68). Nasrallah 
explicitly states the conclusion of the confrontation, which is presented in value-laden 
lexes that invoke national sentiments.  
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Our destiny is to fight, together with the noble patriots, this horrific project and to 
prevent this war from achieving its goals and to engage in the battle of liberating the 
rest of our land and prisoners and to engage in the battle of true sovereignty and true 
independence [---] nor are we going to accept any formula (ceasefire) that is against 
national sovereignty, interests and independence, especially after all these sacrifices 
and no matter how long this confrontation lasts and no matter how huge the sacrifices 
will be. Our true and basic slogan is dignity first. (lines 99–102, 113–117) 
 
However, the second type of argumentum ad consequentiam is concerned with the 
negative consequences of capturing the soldiers (lines 117–118).84 It is, therefore, an 
indirect response to the opponents’ accusation related to the number of casualties and the 
level of destruction. Thus, he speaks about huge sacrifices, destroyed infrastructure and 
homes. Interestingly, Nasrallah refers euphemistically to the deaths of thousands of 
Lebanese. Given the set of moral values which underlie the goal, these negative 
consequences have to be seen as sacrifices in the battle for sovereignty and independence. 
Accordingly, the negative consequences of capturing the soldiers become premises in an 
argument from sacrifice (Walton et al., 2008, p. 322).  Adopting Walton’s et al. argument 
scheme, Nasrallah’s argument from sacrifice can be reconstructed as follows: 
Premise 1: For the thing X (saving and rescuing Lebanon) sacrifice S (human  
losses, destruction etc.) is made 
Premise 2: If a great sacrifice S has been made for X, then the value V of X will 
be greater  
Premise 3: A great sacrifice S has been made 
Conclusion: X (saving and protecting Lebanon) is of a great value V 
 
In other words, saving and protecting Lebanon, as well as preserving Lebanon’s dignity, 
sovereignty, and independence, is worthy of these sacrifices. Nasrallah’s line of defence 
for legitimating the action of kidnapping the Israeli soldiers can be reconstructed as 
shown in Figure 5.2, below. 
                                                          
84 This variant of ad consequentiam is a violation of the Argument Scheme Rule, Rule 8. It consists of 
defending a factual or descriptive standpoint by pointing to the negative consequences, i.e. confusing facts 



















The aforementioned arguments are formulated to suit the audience’s preferences. In the 
part related to denying direct responsibility and shifting the blame, Nasrallah exploits 
anti-Zionist and anti-American sentiments. Through narrating past events that took place 
in Palestine and Lebanon, Nasrallah constructs a regional in-group (Lebanon, Palestine, 
Syria and Iran) that is in a constant struggle to defeat American and Israeli plots. At the 
national level, what caused the defeat of these plots is the unity, solidarity, nationalism, 
and patriotism of the ‘dear Lebanese people’ (line 90). Similarly, in the part related to 
legitimation of the action, Nasrallah constructs a horrifying and frightening scene of what 
the situation would be had the action not taken place. This is also emphasised by the 
negative attributions with which the plan/ project is predicated, ‘most dangerous plan’, 
‘the worst war scenario’. 
Opponents’ Counterclaim: Kidnapping the 
Israeli soldiers was wrong 
Negative 
Consequences of 
Doing the Action: 












are worthy  
Negative 
Consequences Had 
the Action not Taken 
Place 
-Worst war scenario 
would have been 
implemented 
-Resistance movement 





of Doing the Action: 
-Israel was humiliated   
- Israel was unable to 
take us by surprise  
-Israel was unable to 
continue its war 
preparations 
-Prevented the worst 
war scenario  
 
Figure 5.2: Positive and negative consequences of kidnapping the Israeli soldiers  
160 
 
In his presentation of the arguments, Nasrallah manages to construct two contrasting 
scenes. The first relates to the calamities of the would-be-scenario contrasted with the 
advantages gained by capturing the soldiers. Had Hizbollah not captured the soldiers and 
the pre-planned scenario been implemented, a ‘wide ground offensives’ and air strikes 
(line 67) would have ‘crippled’ (line 70) the resistance and made it ‘lose control’. At the 
national level, the objectives of the scenario are to ‘bring Lebanon back under American-
Israeli domination’ (line 95) and to dissociate Lebanon from its ‘history, commitment, 
culture and real identity’ (lines 96–97). This is immediately contrasted with humiliating 
Israel, thus forcing it to start the war. Given all these invaluable gains of the action, what 
the ‘Resistance did is guided by Divine mercy’ (line 93). At this level, Nasrallah alludes 
to religious convictions that not only guide this action but also provide a third level of 
normative legitimacy.  
Concluding Stage  
Nasrallah explicitly states the conclusion of the discussion, ‘We (Hizbollah) are 
determined to continue fighting and to stand up to protect our dignity and our sovereignty 
and our freedom’ (lines 179–181). In this assertion, Nasrallah presumes that he has 
successfully refuted the accusations raised against him and presented conclusive evidence 
that weighs in favour of the action. To put it differently, Nasrallah’s statement implicitly 
asserts the righteousness of the action. Thus, the practical conclusion that can be drawn is 
to continue along the same lines. In this case, Nasrallah commits the fallacy of making an 
absolute of the success of the defence.85 Nasrallah concludes the confrontation by 
                                                          
85 This fallacy violates the Concluding Rule, Rule 9, by concluding that a standpoint is true merely because 
it has been successfully defended.    
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selecting lexical terms that convey religious convictions. On the one hand, this gives 
legitimacy (fighting Israel is a religious duty) to the action, and on the other it emphasises 
the need for more sacrifices to attain the noble goal of saving and protecting Lebanon. 
Interestingly, at the level of religious legitimation, the register shifts from the more 
inclusive ‘we’, which encompasses all Lebanese irrespective of their political affiliations, 
to the use of pronominals and determiners that refer only to Hizbollah fighters and their 
direct community. This can be deduced from Nasrallah’s reference to ‘martyrdom’ (line 
179) and the ‘promised victory’ (line 182), which alludes to the ‘Divine Promise’ 
(religionyms, Reisigl & Wodak 2001). In this view, martyrdom ‘creates victory’ (line 
179) and ‘all this blessed blood must win over the sword’ (line 187–188). This means that 
the Almighty has promised Hizbollah, being God’s party, victory, which is only 
attainable through sacrifice, steadfastness, and patience. This is an effective way of 
adapting to Hizbollah’s immediate audience. After all, it is Hizbollah’s fighters who are 
on the battlefield and Hizbollah’s audience who are paying the highest price and whose 
blood ‘will win over the sword’ (line 187–188).  
3. Conclusion 
The analysis of this speech illustrates the mechanisms that Nasrallah deploys to take 
advantage of the rhetorical opportunities afforded by the dialectical situation in each 
stage. Nasrallah’s strategic manoeuvring is evident through the careful selection of topical 
potential, adaptation to the audience and presentational devices that he exploits in his 
attempt to attain two interrelated goals: responding to accusations and restoring 
intersubjective recognition of a controversial past action. 
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In the confrontation stage, Nasrallah manages to manipulate the ‘zone of disagreement’ 
by implicitly responding to accusations and presenting differences of opinion in terms of 
conflicts over facts instead of moral values. In this respect, he chooses to defend himself 
against blame for instigating war with Israel, while ignoring the issue of his moral 
responsibility for human losses. In dealing in an indirect way with some accusations, he is 
thus using an evasion strategy that permits him to avoid contradictions with respective 
audiences. In fact, flattering the audience and presenting them as rational allies who are 
ready to adopt his standpoints once they are confronted with the ‘reality of things’ were 
the dominant strategies in the opening stage.  
Manipulating the audience’s emotions, such as fear, was fully exploited in the 
argumentation stage. The construction of a hypothetical future scenario and presenting 
himself (and Hizbollah) as the saviour of the Lebanese people allows Nasrallah to deny 
responsibility for instigating war, and to construct blame-takers. This portrayal feeds into 
a favourable evaluation of the action. In addition, the positive consequences of 
kidnapping the Israeli soldiers seem to indicate that these outweigh the negative 
consequences that have already materialised. Moral values, in the form of indisputable 
political ideology as well as group-specific religious convictions, were also deployed to 
legitimise the action. The speech concludes by reminding the audience of their duty to 
defend the country and by an overwhelming assertion of victory.   
However, what is omitted or subject to silencing is of equal importance from a DHA 
perspective. Although the text is, in essence, a response to opponents’ criticisms, there is 
no direct reference to them. Opponents are only implicitly criticised due to their lack of 
facts and misreading. Nasrallah only implicitly deals with the accusations levelled against 
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him, i.e. opponents as social actors and their criticisms are backgrounded. Similarly, 
opponents’ claim that there is another way in which Lebanese prisoners can be released 
(diplomatic efforts to swap prisoners) is absent from the discussion. Therefore, 
Nasrallah’s presentation of the disagreement amounts to creating a false dilemma through 
which alternative means of action are ruled out of the discussion (either A or B is true and 
A is not true; therefore, B is true). Nasrallah reduces the range of options to deal with the 
anticipated Israeli war to either wait for Israel to continue its preparations to wage war on 
Lebanon in September/ October or take Israel by surprise and drag it into war. According 
to Nasrallah, granting Israel time to continue its war preparations is not the Resistance 
preferred option. Therefore, forcing Israel to start the war and preventing it from taking 
the Lebanese by surprise is the right choice. This strategy feeds into justifying the 
rightness of the action of kidnapping the Israeli soldiers. 
The analysis shows the significance of the DHA’s representation strategies in 
constructing premises for arguments as well as argumentation stages. Referential 
strategies (e.g. Zionist enemy, martyrs, inclusive we etc.), predication strategies (e.g. the 
orbit metaphor, evaluative adjectives and allusions) and intensification and mitigation 
strategies (vague expressions and presuppositions), as well as perspectivisation strategies 
(e.g. deictics, indirect speech, and intensifying adverbs), were exploited by Nasrallah 
throughout his argumentation. However, a more detailed discussion of the relation 
between representation strategies and their role in argumentation is presented in Chapter 9 





Reconstruction of the argument  
- Quasi-juridical defence to avoid blame:  
(1.) (I/Nasrallah should not be blamed for instigating war)  
1.1 We should know the facts and the true reality of war 
1.1.1 Condoleezza Rice announced the birth of the new Middle East  
1.1.1.1a The new Middle East project was not born within few days  
of kidnapping the Israeli soldiers 
1.1.1.1a.1 It was a pre-planned project 
(1.1.1.1a.2) (Those who believe that the Israeli war was a response  
to the kidnapping of the soldiers are wrong) 
   1.1.1.1a.3 The war was intended to start later this year  
   1.1.1.1a.4 Israel was continuing its preparations 
1.1.2 The project aims to terminate Resistance movements in the region  
1.1.2.1a. The project started in Palestine  
1.1.2.1a.1 Hamas’s kidnapping of the Israeli soldier reunited  
Palestinians 
(1.1.2.1a.2) (The opposition should have embraced the action  
instead of criticising it) 
1.1.3 In Lebanon, the bets to find someone to terminate Hizbollah failed 
 1.1.3.1a No internal party is capable of terminating Hizbollah 
 1.1.3.1a.1 The army refused to have a confrontation with Hizbollah   





-Legitimation of action:  
(2.) (The action of kidnapping the Israeli soldiers was right)    
(2.1) (The worst war scenario should be avoided)  
2.1.1 It is the worst war scenario 
2.1.1.1a Hizbollah would be terminated   
2.1.1.1b Lebanon would be under Israeli domination  
2.1.1.1c This would jeopardise Lebanon’s safety, unity, freedom  
and independence 
 (2.2.)  (Avoiding the worst war scenario is the right thing to do) 
2.2.1 We have to protect Lebanon’s freedom, independence, and  
sovereignty 
2.2.2 Our goal is to save and rescue Lebanon from the worst  
war scenario  
   2.2.2.1a. (Kidnapping the soldiers is a means to achieve the goal) 
 (2.2.2.1a.1) (Hizbollah had to kidnap the soldiers to save Lebanon  
from the worst war scenario) 
 2.3 The kidnapping of the Israeli soldiers is an act of resistance  
  2.3.1 It is against US and Israeli ploys in Lebanon  
   (2.3.1.1a) (Acts of resistance are honourable and praised)  
   (2.3.1.1a.1) (The kidnapping is an honourable and praiseworthy  
act)  
   (2.3.1.1a.2) (The kidnapping should be positively evaluated) 




2.4.1 The kidnapping prevented Israel from continuing its war  
preparations 
2.4.2 Israel was humiliated 
2.4.3 Israel was deprived of taking us by surprise  
2.4.4 Israel was unable to continue with its war preparations  
2.4.5 (The action should be positively evaluated) 
2.5 Our true and basic slogan is dignity first, no matter what the sacrifices are 
 2.5.1 Homes and infrastructure were destroyed  
 (2.5.2) (Hundreds of innocent civilians were killed) 
 2.5.3 Martyrs from different groups paid with their lives   
 2.5.4 Lebanon’s dignity, freedom and independence are worthy of these  
sacrifices 
2.6 We are determined to continue fighting and to stand up to protect our dignity,  
sovereignty and freedom 
 2.6.1 We have been promised victory 
  2.6.1.1a (The Almighty has promised us victory) 










December 2006 speech: The formation of a new government  
1. Speech context  
The Israeli war on Lebanon (analysed in Chapter 5) ended on the14 August 2006 with the 
ratification of United Nations resolution ‘1707’. The resolution calls for the: (1) 
immediate cessation of hostilities by both sides; (2) withdrawal of Israeli troops from 
newly occupied territories; (3) withdrawal of Hizbollah’s fighters from the Litani zone; 
(4) disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon; (5) deployment of new UN troops 
(UNIFIL) to monitor violations. On the 14 August 2006, Nasrallah gave a speech – 
known as the ‘Victory Speech’ – in which he praised the Lebanese people for the unity, 
solidarity, warmth, and empathy that they had shown to their fellow displaced citizens. In 
the same speech, Nasrallah called for the formation of a new national unity government, 
with the power of veto, with the 8th of March party (Hizbollah coalition), i.e. securing a 
third of the quorum. The objective was to veto decisions that could be threatening to 
Hizbollah or its regional allies.  
The 14th of March party (holds a majority in Cabinet and parliament) rejected Nasrallah’s 
call for the formation of a new national unity government, claiming that the current one 
was the result of the 2005 democratic elections and in which all parties, including 
Hizbollah, were represented based on the number of parliamentary seats gained. 
Nasrallah responded by threatening the 14th of March coalition with sweeping 
demonstrations and sit-ins in the centre of Beirut to topple the (pro-American, anti-
Syrian/Iranian) government or force the Prime Minister, a prominent Sunni figure, to 
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resign. This was seen by the 14th of March party as an unexpected political escalation and 
a clear indication of Nasrallah’s desire to profit from Hizbollah’s victory at the domestic 
level. The 14th of March party criticised Nasrallah’s call for the formation of a new unity 
government and considered it a coup that aimed at:  
• Changing the current political distribution of power as stipulated by the Taif 
Accord to  
tripartite rule;  
• Disrupting the work of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL); 
• Targeting the political gains that the Taif Accord had granted to Sunnis. 
Amid this turmoil, the Speaker in Parliament (part of the 8th of March coalition) called 
upon all parties to participate in a ‘National Dialogue’ and reach a reconciliation. After 10 
days of negotiations, the dialogue reached a deadlock and ended with the resignation of 
six pro-Hizbollah ministers from the Cabinet. From this point, the 8th of March coalition 
officially became the anti-government party or the Opposition Front. According to 
Nasrallah, the Cabinet was unconstitutional and illegitimate because a major political 
party (the 8th of March party) and a major religious sect (Shiites) were not represented. 
On 1 December 2006, the 8th of March party led demonstrations and sit-ins to besiege the 
Prime Minister’s headquarters.  
Counter-demonstrations organised by the 14th of March coalition (the pro-government 
party) were staged to support the Prime Minister, Fouad Siniora (see Chapter 1, section 
5). Due to the obscene and derogatory chants and slogans raised in the Hizbollah-backed 
demonstrations, riots and acts of violence spread through the streets of Beirut, which 
resulted in the death of one Hizbollah follower as well as many injured on both sides. 
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With the increase in violence between Shiites and Sunnis, the 14th of March party accused 
Nasrallah of exploiting demonstrations to enflame intra-sectarian strife.86 As a 
consequence, Nasrallah gave a speech on 7 December 2006 to respond to the 14th of 
March party’s accusations and defend his decision to form a new national government 
with veto power over the 14th of March party’s decisions.87 
2. Speech Analysis 
2.1. Preparatory step   
In this speech, Nasrallah is addressing his immediate audience (the 8th of March 
audience) as well as the 14th of March audience.88 The need to address both audiences can 
be attributed to the gravity of the situation and the looming threat of intra-sectarian strife, 
which must be controlled because ‘all Lebanese will lose in civil war or in sectarian 
sedition’ (line 160). Thus, this speech is an opportunity to examine how Nasrallah 
manoeuvres to meet the frame of reference of multiple audiences and achieve multiple 
goals. However, to remain faithful to the aims set for this thesis (see Chapter 1, section 7), 
the primary focus will be on the strategies that Nasrallah deploys in his attempt to 
persuade the 14th of March audience. This means that the focus will be on how Nasrallah 
attempts to convince members of the 14th of March audience of the rightness of his 
decisions and actions taken against their leaders.  
                                                          
86 For the process of contextualisation, identifying events and associated debates, I consulted newspapers 
that affiliate with both sides of the struggle (see Chapter 2, section 5).   
87 The translated English version of the speech can be found in Appendix B and the original Arabic version 
in Appendix C. 
88 In this speech, Nasrallah also addresses an Arab and a wider Islamic audience (lines 237–240, 249–251) 
where the majority follow the Sunni tradition. However, the analysis will only focus on the Lebanese 
audience, since Nasrallah attempts to resolve a difference of opinion with them.     
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In this speech, Nasrallah attempts, on the one hand, to shift the blame onto his opponents 
and hold them responsible for the current dilemma, at the same time appealing to the 14th 
of March audience’s (Sunni majority) emotions and moral values. On the other hand, he 
attempts to mobilize his followers (Shiite majority) and galvanize support for the rallies 
while denying accusations of fuelling intra-sectarian conflict. Identifying the main points 
of disagreement (the decision to form a new unity government and the intra-sectarian 
conflict propagated by the demonstrations) makes it possible to exclude parts of the 
speech not related to the disagreement (see Chapter 4, section 4.4). This means that the 
religious address at the beginning of the speech (lines 1–4) and Nasrallah’s declaration of 
a fatwa, a religious order concerning Friday prayers, towards the end of the speech (lines 
418–428) are not included in the analysis. Similarly, Nasrallah’s criticism of his 
followers’ behaviour, such as firing guns as an expression of exaltation while giving his 
speeches (lines 11–20), is also excluded.  
As mentioned earlier, Nasrallah’s speech is an attempt to legitimise his decision to form a 
new unity government by rebutting the pro-government party’s counterclaim (the 
decision to form a new unity government was wrong). The speech is also an attempt to 
respond to the 14th of March party’s accusations, in particular, that Nasrallah’s decision to 
form a new unity government was a coup against the Taif Accord and his responsibility 






2.2. Reconstruction and analysis 
Confrontation Stage 
This speech is divided into two parts. The first is a quasi-judicial defence against the 14th 
of March party’s accusations, while the second attempts to legitimise the decision to form 
a new unity government. In the first part, Nasrallah chooses to address two accusations: 
the decision to form a new unity government represents a coup against the Taif Accord 
and his responsibility for enflaming intra-sectarian struggle exacerbated by 
demonstrations and sit-ins. Nasrallah attempts to refute the latter by: (1) showing that he 
has made every effort to avoid resorting to the streets (demonstrations or sit-ins); (2) 
shifting the blame onto his opponents; (3) redefining the act of demonstrating to conform 
with Resistance ideology and nationalist views.  
With respect to the first point, Nasrallah’s attempts to bring about reconciliation met with 
‘monopoly and authoritarianism’ from the 14th of March party (lines 124). Nasrallah 
manages to shift the blame by holding the ruling party responsible for the death of one of 
his supporters and propagating riot: ‘They (the 14th of March party) resorted to riot, they 
sent their gangs’ (line 212). Finally, Nasrallah reframes the act of demonstrating in order 
to comply with the Resistance ideology and present demonstrations as the ‘only solution 
that can save and rescue Lebanon’ (line 112). Concerning the second part, Nasrallah 
attempts to legitimise his decision to form a new government with the right to veto by 
highlighting: the political, moral and religious values that motivated the decision; the 
positive consequences of forming a new government; and finally, the negative 
consequences of falling to comply with Nasrallah’s demands.   
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Due to the sensitivity of the intra-sectarian topic, it seems reasonable to anticipate that 
Nasrallah would refrain from explicitly mentioning points of disagreement at this initial 
stage. In fact, Nasrallah manages to present the confrontation in terms of a conflict 
between the political and moral values that motivate Hizbollah and those of the 14th of 
March party (topical potential). Therefore, it is the 14th of March party’s monopoly, 
authoritarianism and exclusivity versus the participation, cooperation, reconciliation, and 
solidarity that Hizbollah calls for (lines 34–36). This direct ad hominem attack on the 14th 
of March leaders aims to construct them as unreliable politicians who cannot be trusted to 
lead the country.89 The negative Other presentation conveyed through the ad hominem 
attack alerts the audience to the unreliability of the 14th of March leadership, thereby 
weakening the acceptability of this group’s claims by the audience.   
In the opening lines of his defence, Nasrallah greets the protestors and emphasizes the 
nobility of the goals that these demonstrations are expected to serve.  
Dear brothers and sisters, dear demonstrators picketing for the sake of Lebanon, for 
the sake of Lebanon’s sovereignty, Lebanon’s independence, Lebanon’s dignity and 
Lebanon’s freedom [---] what you (demonstrators) are doing is a great and honourable 
thing because it (demonstrations) serves a noble, honourable and national goal, which 
is rescuing Lebanon. (lines 5–7, 32–33) 
 
Framing demonstrations in that way stands in direct contrast to the 14th of March party’s 
accusations of fuelling intra-sectarian conflict. Moreover, Nasrallah states that 
demonstrations and sit-ins are taking place ‘in one of the squares of honour and in one of 
the squares of steadfastness and resistance’ (lines 7–8). Therefore, Nasrallah presents the 
                                                          
89 This fallacy is a violation of Rule 1, the Freedom Rule, which aims to eliminate opponents as rational 
discussants by doubting their expertise, intelligence and good faith.  
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act of demonstrating against the ‘illegitimate government’ (line 74) as an act of 
resistance, the aim of which is to save and rescue Lebanon from the ruling party. Based 
on this view, the victim, Ahmad Mahmoud, who died in a demonstrations-related riot, is 
considered a martyr.   
Martyr of the Resistance par excellence. He is not a martyr who gave his life in a street 
fight, he is a martyr who died for the sake of defending Lebanon’s independence, 
Lebanon’s sovereignty, a martyr of the public movement to rescue Lebanon.
 (lines 24–27) 
 
Presenting the death of one of the demonstrators as a price paid to rescue Lebanon, 
Nasrallah is appealing to the 14th of March audience’s feelings of compassion through 
argumentum ad misericordiam to win their sympathy.90 In fact, rescuing and saving 
Lebanon (rescue narrative) is the perspective that Nasrallah exploits in the argumentation 
stage.  
In terms of adapting to the audience, Nasrallah addresses his immediate audience as ‘Dear 
brothers and sisters, dear demonstrators’ (line 5). Thus, he positions his immediate 
audience (the 8th of March audience) as members of his big family in order to establish 
communion and empathy. Forms of address are perspectivisation strategies because they 
indicate the degree of the speaker’s involvement or detachment from the addressees. 
Demonstrators are portrayed as social actors with the highest virtuous qualities, people 
who only participate in honourable and highly valued actions: ‘You (demonstrators) are 
the most honourable people, the most pure people, the most lovable, and the dearest of 
                                                          
90 This fallacy is a violation of the Freedom Rule, Rule 1, and aims to put pressure on the audience by 
playing on their feelings of compassion.  
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all’ (lines 28–29). Moreover, members of Hizbollah’s audience are denied any physical 
traits that have negative qualities and are attributed with qualities indicative of the 
group’s perseverance, determination and unbeatable strength (predication strategy): ‘Fear 
has no place in your (Hizbollah’s audience) hearts’, ‘You (Hizbollah’s audience) are a 
diligent and inexorable nation’ (lines 40–42), ‘We (Hizbollah audience) don’t know 
weariness’, ‘we defeat hunger and boredom’, ‘we are stronger than rockets, ‘we are 
stronger than war’ (lines 56–58).  
References to members of the 14th of March party audience are restricted to their positive 
role in supporting the displaced during the Israeli war: ‘You (Hizbollah’s audience) were 
embraced by your fellow Lebanese from all the Lebanese districts, areas and from all 
sects’ (lines 47–48). This acknowledgment aims to dissociate the 14th of March audience 
from their political leadership, who are negatively portrayed and whose actions jeopardize 
the national interest. 
They (14th of March party) have tried during the past few days, through provocations, 
riot and attacking protestors, which resulted in killing the martyr Ahmad Mahmoud, 
to instil fear into your (demonstrators’) hearts, to prevent you from picketing in the 
squares. (lines 37–39)  
 
The above examples show Nasrallah’s reliance on loaded adjectives, superlatives and 
quantifiers, which are used as perspectivisation strategies to reveal the degree of 
Nasrallah’s involvement in his discourse. The use of the ‘yes-but’ structure intensifies the 
division between Nasrallah’s party and the pro-government party: ‘Yes, from the first 
day, they (the 14th of March party) asked us (Hizbollah party) to surrender, but we 
(Hizbollah party) refused to surrender. They bet on our defeat but we were not defeated’  
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(lines 49–50). Other presentational devices are metaphors and personifications, which 
also serve to widen the disparity between the two adversaries. For example, Nasrallah’s 
‘honourable goal’, i.e. rescuing Lebanon, entails the restoration of Lebanon’s dignity, 
pride, and freedom. Similarly, demonstrations are taking place in the squares of honour 
and steadfastness (lines 7–8). There is a set of presuppositions exploited at this stage that 
falsely presume agreement. For example, the proposition that demonstrations aim to save 
and rescue Lebanon presupposes that Lebanon is indeed in crisis and that demonstrations 
are the solution. In fact, the demonstrations and sit-ins caused the crisis. Therefore, 
Nasrallah escapes the burden of proof by presenting his claim as enjoying agreement. In 
the opening stage, presuppositions are also used as common starting points for the 
discussion instead of being defended.   
Opening Stage 
In the confrontation stage, Nasrallah uses representation strategies as well as ad hominem 
attacks to construct an out-group (the 14th of March party) that is worthy of blame. 
Casting doubt on opponents, scapegoating, shifting blame onto opponents and claiming 
victimhood are the strategies utilised in this stage. From a pragma-dialectical perspective, 
this stage is, dialectically speaking, oriented towards eliciting concessions, establishing 
common starting points for the discussion and identifying participants’ roles. In this 
speech, Nasrallah explicitly states the starting points of the discussion. In Nasrallah’s 
view, gaining knowledge about ‘the political realities’ and ‘facts on the ground’ (lines 72) 
are key factors in assessing the extent to which his decision to form a new government 
fuelled intra-sectarian strife.  
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Nasrallah reaffirms his role of providing the Lebanese (particularly, the 14th of March 
audience) with the facts by stating: ‘I (Nasrallah) will tell the Lebanese [---] who are the 
ones pushing things to the verge of civil war’ (lines 157–158). Thus, he positions himself 
as a credible source of information and implicitly suggests that the audience is ready to 
reassess their position once confronted with the facts. These facts are sourced from 
Nasrallah’s personal knowledge and from statements attributed to Israeli ministers.  
The aim is to cast doubt on the motives and credibility of the 14th of March leaders before 
Nasrallah explicitly accuses them of instigating intra-sectarian conflict. Concerning the 
first point, Nasrallah claims that the ruling party is receiving direct support from the US 
administration: ‘Your (ruling party) reliance on American and Western support will do 
you no good’ (lines 74–75). This claim is falsely taken as a starting point for the 
discussion. This is because a section of the audience (the 14th of March audience) does 
not accept the ensuing implication: the 14th of March leaders favour American/ Western 
interests at the expense of the Lebanese. Even though the 14th of March party is a pro-
American/ Western group, it does not follow that this group favours and realises 
American interests in Lebanon – Nasrallah’s unexpressed premise.  
This government [--] received support and is still receiving support from the US and 
the West, which no other government in Lebanon’s history has ever received. Doesn’t 
this raise doubts and evoke suspicions? Why is this American passion with this 
government and its prime minister? (lines 85–88) 
 
Nasrallah formulates his claim in a non-falsifiable way to make it immune to criticism, 
i.e. no one can falsify the fact that the 14th of March party affiliates with the US and the 
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West.91 However, the problem lies in the unexpressed premise, which is emphasized in 
subsequent rhetorical questions. The second type of fact relies on attributing statements to 
Israeli ministers in their endeavour to find means to assist the ruling party.  
How can we (Israeli government) help this failing government in Lebanon. Some of 
them (Israeli ministers) said that we can help them (Lebanese government) by 
withdrawing from the southern part of occupied Ghajar town. Others (Israeli ministers) 
said that we can withdraw from Shebaa farms to present them as a gift and as a sign of 
political and psychological support for the ruling party in Lebanon. [--] Doesn’t this 
American, Western and Israeli support call for contemplation?   (lines 94–100) 
 
Nasrallah presents this evidence in the form of statements attributed to Israeli ministers 
during their Cabinet meetings. However, there is no evidence in the form of official 
statements, press releases or news reports that confirm Nasrallah’s allegations. Falsely 
attributing statements to a source amounts to committing the straw man fallacy.92 The 
function of these statements is to scapegoat the ruling party, even if accusing them of 
treason has significant life-threatening effects.93 As aforementioned, no one can deny the 
fact that the 14th of March party is a pro-American group, but this does not necessarily 
mean working against the national interest.  
In this stage, Nasrallah manages to dissociate the 14th of March audience from its 
leadership. In so doing, he portrays the members of this audience as potential allies who 
are ready to change their positions once confronted with the facts. These facts are also 
formulated to meet the frame of reference of the audience. The accusation that Israel 
                                                          
91 This fallacy is a violation of the Standpoint Rule, Rule 2, by which the protagonist evades the burden of 
proof through immunising the standpoint against criticism.   
92 Misrepresenting, distorting or attributing a fictitious standpoint to (fictitious or real) opponents or 
referring to the views of the group to which the opponent belongs are violations of Rule 3, the Standpoint 
Rule. 
93 Accusing someone of having direct or indirect contact or relation with Israel, the supposed enemy, is 
punishable by the Lebanese constitution. 
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supports the 14th of March leaders aims to invoke nationalist and anti-Zionist sentiments. 
This might alert the 14th of March audience to the risks of sympathising with a group 
backed by Israel. It is within this anti-resistance and nationalist view that the act of 
demonstrating is reframed as an act of resistance in the argumentation stage.  
The use of rhetorical questions in this stage is highly effective (presentational devices). 
The presuppositions conveyed in these questions help Nasrallah to falsely assume 
agreement that is not in place. This covert representation of claims serves as a mitigation 
strategy, the effect of which is to overcome the epistemic filters of the 14th of March 
audience. If the claim (14th of March leaders serve American and Israeli interests) was 
stated explicitly, this would have alerted the 14th of March audience to the falsity of the 
proposition. Referential strategies encoding distance, e.g. ‘your’ (the ruling party), are 
used to emphasize the binary opposition between the two groups. Moreover, predication 
strategies are used to demonise the 14th of March party leaders: ‘Your reliance on 
American and Western support will do you no good’ (lines 74–75). The objective is to 
provide the audience with conclusive evidence that points to the need to change the 
government and form a new one, which complies with Nasrallah’s terms.   
Argumentation Stage 
In the quasi-judicial part of the speech, the primary accusation that Nasrallah aims to 
defend is Hizbollah’s (and the 8th of March party’s) role in inciting intra-sectarian 
conflict, propagated through demonstrations. To this end, Nasrallah selects four lines of 
defence to falsify this claim. The first shows that Nasrallah has exhausted all possible 
efforts to arrive at a resolution, but his attempts were frustrated by the 14th of March 
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party’s monopoly and authoritarianism: ‘When the doors of dialogue were shut, and 
negotiations were stopped, and we (Hizbollah’s party) were faced with monopoly and 
authoritarianism (of the ruling party), our only solution was going into the streets’ (lines 
123–125). This means that Nasrallah (and his political party) should not be blamed 
because he was forced to do so. Moreover, Nasrallah assigns the identity of the blame-
taker, i.e. the 14th of March leaders should be blamed.  
The second line of defence consists of revealing facts only accessible to Nasrallah. As 
mentioned above, the first type of facts depends on Nasrallah’s personal knowledge and 
expertise as a major political actor. Nasrallah claims that the pro-American government is 
receiving support from the US administration: ‘Your (government’s/ ruling party’s) 
reliance on American and Western support will do you no good’ (lines 74–75). Instead of 
providing evidence to support his claim, Nasrallah exploits his own qualities as an 
authoritative and political expert: ‘This government [--] received support and is still 
receiving support from the US and the West, which no other government in Lebanon’s 
history has ever received’ (lines 85–86). Therefore, Nasrallah is advancing a fallacious 
ethotic argument, a variant of argumentum ad verecundiam, where the authority that he 
has in the eyes of the audience – his acknowledged credibility and reverence – enhances 
the acceptability of his claims.94 Nasrallah continues to warn the 14th of March leaders of 
the consequences of depending on Western support, taking Iraq as an example. According 
to Nasrallah, ‘failure, disintegration, sectarian war with no horizon’ (lines 81–82) are the 
results of American support in Iraq. The lesson (American support will do you no good), 
                                                          
94 This fallacy violates the Relevance Rule, Rule 4, because the standpoint is defended by non-
argumentative means through parading one’s own qualities. 
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which is emphasised through the Iraq example, is presented via an argument from 
analogy combined with an argumentum ad consequentiam.95 
Nasrallah’s claim is further asserted through rhetorical questions: ‘Doesn’t this raise 
doubts and evoke suspicions? (line 87–88), ‘Doesn’t this American, Western and Israeli 
support call for contemplation? (lines 100). These questions presume that this government 
is serving US and Israeli interests in Lebanon. According to Nasrallah, this is the main 
reason behind the government’s refusal to comply with his demand to form a new unity 
government. Nasrallah is falsely presenting the issue of serving American and Israeli 
interests (the claim) as a starting point for the discussion instead of proving it. By 
concealing the claim in rhetorical questions, he treats matters under debate as already 
established, i.e. he commits the many questions fallacy.96  
Nasrallah defends his claim/standpoint (your reliance on American and Israeli support 
will do you no good) by offering premises that repeat or paraphrase the claim: ‘This 
government [--] received support and is still receiving support from the US and the West, 
which no other government in Lebanon’s history has ever received’ (lines 85–86). In this 
case, Nasrallah presents premises that amount to the same thing as the standpoint, i.e. he 
is committing the circular reasoning fallacy or petitio principii (premise A has the same 
meaning as the conclusion/claim. Thus, what is to be proved has already been assumed in 
the premise).97   The claim that the 14th of March party serves Western and Israeli 
                                                          
95 This fallacy is a violation of the Argument Scheme Rule, Rule 8. It consists of casting light on the 
(un)desirable consequences of a factual or descriptive claim.  
96 This fallacy violates the Starting Point Rule, Rule 6, by making unfair use of presuppositions through 
asking questions.   
97 This fallacy violates the Starting Point Rule, Rule 6. It consists of presenting arguments that amount to 
the same thing as the standpoint.  
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interests is reiterated in the second type of evidence, which Nasrallah presents in the form 
of statements attributed to Israeli ministers during their cabinet meetings.  
How can we (the Israeli government) help this failing government in Lebanon? Some 
of them (Israeli ministers) said that we (Israeli ministers) can help them (Lebanese 
government) by withdrawing from the southern part of occupied Ghajar town. Others 
(Israeli ministers) said that we (Israeli ministers) can withdraw from Shebaa farms to 
present them as a gift and as a sign of political and psychological support for the ruling 
party in Lebanon.  (lines 94–98) 
 
By attributing statements to a source, Nasrallah is advancing a fallacious variant of the 
argument from authority – argumentum ad verecundiam.98 Nasrallah claims that Israeli 
ministers are discussing ways in which Israel can support the ruling party. Nasrallah’s 
claim is re-emphasized through the following rhetorical question: ‘Is there something 
behind this (Israeli) praise that we (Lebanese) are not aware of?’ (lines 90–91). Nasrallah 
exploits the opportunity to supply the Lebanese with facts to cast doubt on the credibility 
and trustworthiness of the ruling party (14th of March party). This seems to be a 
preliminary step, leading to the reversal of blame (or victim-perpetrator reversal in 
Wodak’s terms), i.e. the 14th of March leaders are responsible for inciting intra-sectarian 
struggle. This is the main objective of the third line of defence.  
In his attempt to assert the peaceful nature of Hizbollah-led demonstrations and sit-ins, 
Nasrallah implicitly admits that obscene language and insults were indeed factors inciting 
violence.    
No insults. Some fervid demonstrators use derogatory slogans when talking about 
some ministers, and we (Hizbollah party) refuse any personal insult to anyone. Any 
insult, any obscene or unethical expression should not come from your sit-ins. We 
(Hizbollah party) reassert the civilized and peaceful nature of our sit-ins.   
(lines 143–146) 
                                                          
98 This fallacy violates the Argument Scheme Rule 8. The fallacy entails using an argument scheme 




He immediately dismisses this admission of responsibility (obscene language and insults 
incited violence) by shifting the blame onto his opponents and making them responsible 
for instigating riot. In this case, Nasrallah commits the fallacy of denying an unexpressed 
premise.99 This means that Nasrallah retreats from holding his group responsible for 
inciting violence – the unexpressed premise – which was implicitly invoked when he was 
reprimanding his followers for the use of insults and obscene language.   
 Your movement (demonstrations and sit-ins) is a civilized one, as acknowledged by 
the whole world. [---] What did they (the ruling party) do? How did they react? They 
resorted to riot, they sent their gangs [---] They sent their gangs to attack you during 
your return journey and kill the martyr Ahmad Mahmoud and injure others.          
 (lines 209–210, 212, 216–217)    
 
Nasrallah claims that by killing one of Hizbollah’s supporters the ruling party aimed to 
drag Hizbollah into civil war. Nasrallah repeatedly affirms that the 8th of March party 
(Hizbollah group) refuses to be dragged into war. 
We (Hizbollah party) will not be dragged into any conflict, even after you (ruling 
party) have killed Ahmad Mahmoud, even if you killed thousands like Ahmad 
Mahmoud. We will not raise our weapons in the face of anyone. (lines 164–167)   
 
Nasrallah supports his claim by citing evidence from past actions presented in the form of 
argument from analogy. He reminds the ruling party of Hizbollah’s nonviolent reaction to 
the killing of Hizbollah’s supporters in the 1993 demonstrations (lines 168–170). This 
means that just as Hizbollah did not react violently to the killing of its members in the 
1993 demonstrations, this will also apply to the current incident of killing Ahmad 
                                                          
99 This fallacy violates the Unexpressed Premise Rule, Rule 5, by refusing to accept a commitment to an 
unexpressed premise.  
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Mahmoud. In this case, Nasrallah is supporting a general claim (we will not be dragged 
into any conflict) by evidence derived from one example. This is an instance of hasty 
generalisation fallacy (or secundum quid).100 Nasrallah takes the killing of one of his 
supporters (Ahmad Mahmoud) as evidence to point out the discrepancies between the 14th 
of March party’s words and deeds: ‘They (ruling party) were not able to withstand the 
democracy (right to demonstrate) that they claim to protect’ (line 217-218), ‘Is this 
(killing and riot) democracy? Is this freedom?’ (line 220–221).  
Nasrallah is referring to the set of moral values that guides the actions of the 14th of 
March party. Democracy, freedom of speech and liberty are among the prophesied values 
of the 14th of March party. It follows that preserving the right to demonstrate and 
protecting protestors are the direct manifestations of the commitment to these values. In 
showing an inherent inconsistency between the guiding values of the 14th of March 
leaders and their current actions, Nasrallah is undermining their credibility, and hence 
decreasing the acceptability of their claims (X advocates argument Q, which has 
proposition A as its conclusion. X is committed to the opposite of A as shown in his 
actions. Therefore, X’s credibility is put into question, and hence the plausibility of X’s 
arguments is decreased). Nasrallah, thus, launches an ad hominem attack of the tu quoque 
type, which is contrasted with the consistency of the 8th of March party’s previous and 
current actions.  
                                                          
100 This fallacy is a violation of Rule 8, the Argument Scheme Rule. Its fallaciousness is attributed to the 
incorrect application of the argument scheme of concomitance by making generalisations based upon 
observations that are not representative or sufficient. 
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Assuring the audience that Hizbollah will not use its weapons at the domestic level, 
Nasrallah asserts the power of the people and their sacrifices in bringing about victory: 
‘With our voices we (demonstrators, Hizbollah party) defeat you (the ruling party). With 
the blood of Ahmad Mahmoud we defeat you’ (lines 172–173). Therefore, through 
argumentum ad populum, Nasrallah is appealing to the masses to win their support.101 A 
series of hypotheses attributed to the 14th of March leaders, followed by ad populum 
fallacies, are used to mobilize demonstrators for the forthcoming rallies, on the one hand, 
and to discredit opponents by showing the inappropriateness of their assumptions and 
assessments, on the other.  
They (ruling party) bet that with time you (demonstrators) would be weary and bored, 
but they don’t know that you are a diligent and inexorable nation. [---] they said that 
they are expecting screams of surrender to come out from your squares due to the cold 
and rainy weather. [---] However, they have forgotten how you, in the near past (Israeli 
war), endured the most violent and brutal air strikes ever seen in recent decades during 
the 33-day war (Israeli war). [---] Tell them (the ruling party) that we (demonstrators, 
Hizbollah) don’t know weariness and that we defeat hunger and boredom. We are 
stronger than rockets, so how about words? We are stronger than war, so how about 
intimidation? (lines 40–58) 
 
Nasrallah claims that the 14th of March leaders bet that with time exhaustion, weariness 
and boredom will discourage demonstrators. Nasrallah responds by praising the audience 
and appealing to their emotions: ‘They don’t know that you are a diligent and inexorable 
nation, we don’t know weariness and that we defeat hunger and boredom, we are stronger 
than rockets’. By exploiting emotively laden language to arose emotions in support of his 
position, Nasrallah is using an ad populum (i.e. emotions such as enthusiasm, pride, 
                                                          
101 This fallacy is a violation of the Relevance Rule, Rule 4. It consists of appealing to the masses and 




anger, or disgust are used to express evidence for statement A; therefore, statement A is 
true).  Through references to the Israeli war in 2006, Nasrallah flatters his (immediate) 
audience and commends their steadfastness and valour during that war. Thus, Nasrallah is 
advancing an argument from analogy in order to show the group’s exemplary deeds 
during the Israeli war. This means that what Hizbollah’s members and audience expect to 
face while demonstrating is nothing compared to defeating the strongest army in the 
region. Nasrallah’s emphasis on the demonstrators’ endurance and inexorable strength 
when facing hardships seems to prepare them for the conclusion: ‘We (demonstrators and 
Nasrallah as one of the group) will remain in the streets’, ‘we will not vacate the streets 
before we achieve the goal (a new unity government) that rescues Lebanon’ (lines 140–
141). Despite this announcement, Nasrallah reassures the 14th of March audience of the 
peaceful nature of the demonstrations. In fact, Nasrallah vows to protect them from any 
harm.   
The blood of every Lebanese is like ours, the honour of every Lebanese is like ours, 
the money of every Lebanese is like ours, the house of every Lebanese is like ours. 
This is the red line that we protect with our blood, even if you kill us, [---] and if you 
want to drag us into war, we will not fall into this trap. (lines 190–195) 
 
Through this assimilation strategy (see Chapter 4, section 2), Nasrallah aims to 
promote unification and solidarity with the 14th of March audience. Nasrallah 
reasserts his call for unification and solidarity with the leaders of the 14th of March 
party, even though he directly accuses them of killing demonstrators: ‘They (the 
ruling party) are killing us (Hizbollah party) and yet we say to them, we want to be 
with you and we want you to be with us, to be together’ (lines 175–177). Having 
emphasised the peaceful nature of the demonstrations, Nasrallah moves on to 
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redefine the act of demonstrating to make it comply with the resistance ideology 
and nationalist views. This is the fourth line of defence that Nasrallah puts forward.  
Interestingly, Nasrallah begins his speech by announcing that demonstrations are 
acts of resistance that take place in one of the sites of resistance and steadfastness. 
In this case, Nasrallah is advancing an argument from classification (Walton & 
Macagno, 2010), which confers on demonstrations all the positive attributes related 
to acts of resistance. It follows that demonstrations that were defined by opponents 
as acts of resistance should be honoured and admired. 
Dear demonstrators, picketing for the sake of Lebanon, for the sake of Lebanon’s 
sovereignty, Lebanon’s independence, Lebanon’s dignity and Lebanon’s freedom. I 
wish I were among you (demonstrators) in one of the squares of honour and in one of 
the squares of steadfastness and resistance. [---] What you (demonstrators) are doing 
is a great and honourable thing because it (demonstrations) serves a noble, honourable 
and national goal, which is rescuing Lebanon by ending the state of monopoly, 
authoritarianism and exclusivity, and this will pave the way for establishing a national 
unity government to ensure participation and cooperation and achieve reconciliation 
and solidarity.   (lines 5–7, 32–36) 
 
According to Nasrallah, these demonstrations are legitimate because the 14th of March-
led government is ‘the government of the American ambassador’ (line 287). In this view, 
the act of demonstrating against the ‘illegitimate government’ (line 74), which is seen by 
opponents as a threat to Lebanon’s stability (by inciting intra-sectarian conflict), is 
reframed to conform with the overarching Resistance ideology and nationalist views that 
bind the Lebanese together. Nasrallah highlights the moral values that motivate the act of 
demonstrating as well as the noble goals that these demonstrations are expected to 
achieve. In this case, Nasrallah is advancing an argument from moral values (Macagno & 
Walton, 2010; Macagno, 2013) to justify the pursued goal (rescuing and saving Lebanon), 
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combined with an argument from the nobility of a goal scheme to justify the action or 
means (demonstrations) used to realise the goal (form a new government).  
As for the former, the goal is justified by virtue of the moral values (preserving 
Lebanon’s dignity, freedom, independence etc.) that underlie the goal (a value is a reason 
to retain commitment to the goal). As for the latter, the argument from the nobility of a 
goal scheme justifies the means via which the goal is realised. Demonstrations are, thus, 
desirable because they contribute to the achievement of a noble goal (Hitchcock & 
Wagemans, 2011; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; van Eemeren et al., 2007). In this 
case, Nasrallah falsely presents demonstrations as a solution to the problem. In fact, 
demonstrations are the cause of the current problem which Nasrallah is addressing in his 
speech. By presenting demonstrations as actions that save and rescue Lebanon, Nasrallah 
constructs the elements of a rescue narrative.  
In this narrative, the villains are the 14th of March leaders (ruling party) who rejected 
Nasrallah’s demand to form a new government. The victims are not only the Hizbollah 
party, but the whole country. The hero/ victim is Nasrallah (and his political party) who 
takes courageous action (demonstrations) to rescue Lebanon from a ‘state of monopoly, 
authoritarianism and exclusivity’. Through this narrative, Nasrallah manages to present 
the audience of the 14th of March party as victims who need to be saved from the self-
centredness of their political leadership. As a consequence, members of the 14th of March 
audience, who were originally against demonstrations, are encouraged to review their 
position. Members of the 14th of March audience are expected to exercise vigilance 
towards a representation that is incoherent with their background information, especially 
information related to the events that preceded and followed the demonstrations. 
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Therefore, to make his justification coheres with their background knowledge and beliefs, 
Nasrallah leads members of this audience to access a less highly activated set of 
indisputable beliefs that weigh in favour of action (see Chapter 3, section 6.3.3). This is 
achieved through reframing the demonstrations to conform with the Resistance ideology. 
At this point, Nasrallah’s argumentation shifts from responding to accusations to 
legitimating the call for the formation of a new national unity government with the power 
of veto over the Hizbollah party.    
In the second part of the argumentation stage, Nasrallah attempts to legitimise his 
decision to form a new unity government by showing that it was a right decision. He thus 
embarks on providing reasons that attest to the rightness of this decision. These reasons 
are presented in the form of argumentum ad consequentiam.102 The first set of reasons 
relates to the negative consequences of failing to form a new unity government (the 
fallacious counterpart of reductio ad absurdum): ‘a single-party government and the 
domination of one political party had always led Lebanon to a deadlock’ (lines 103–105). 
However, the main negative consequence of failing to form a new unity government is 
presented in the form of a hypothetical situation, based on which the ruling party is 
accused of having made commitments to Israel and the US: ‘if we (Hizbollah party) were 
the majority, we would give with confidence any opposition a third of the quorum 
because [---] we don’t have any international or regional commitments’ (lines 119–121). 
                                                          
102 The first variant mimics the argument scheme of reductio ad absurdum. The second variant of the ad 
consequentiam mimics the argument scheme from negative and positive consequences. Both cases are 
violations of the Argument Scheme Rule, Rule 8. In the first, a factual standpoint is defended by pointing to 
the negative or positive consequences of the contrary to the standpoint. In the second, a descriptive 
standpoint is defended by an evaluative argument that highlights its positive or negative consequences, i.e. 
confusing facts with a value judgement (see Chapter 4, section 4.3). 
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This implicitly suggests that the 14th of March leaders’ refusal to form a new unity 
government is due to their commitments to the US and Israel. This also suggests that a 
new government with the power to veto decisions has to be formed, otherwise, the 
‘government of the American ambassador’ (line 287), or the government that has made 
commitments to the US and Israel, will continue to rule. In Nasrallah’s view, this is the 
main reason that explains the ruling party’s preference for single-party rule. This 
accusation is an implicit ad hominem attack on opponents. According to Nasrallah, ‘who 
officially asked America, [--] to wage war on Lebanon’ are some leaders of the 14th of 
March party (lines 202– 303). The evidence that Nasrallah provides to support his claim 
(14th of March leaders’ collaboration with Israel) is taken from statements allegedly made 
by the Israeli Prime Minister during the Israeli war. 
Some parties in the Lebanese government contacted us (Israeli officials) and asked 
us to continue our fight against Hezbollah. Olmert spoke the truth and we (Nasrallah) 
know who they are (some leaders of the 14th of March party), and I hope the day 
when I (Nasrallah) will be forced to disclose these names in front of the world won’t 
come. (lines 344–347) 
 
There is no record, however, of such statements being made, neither by Olmert (Israeli 
prime minister) nor by any other Israeli official. Nasrallah enhances the acceptability of 
his claim (14th of March leaders collaborated with Israel) by attributing statements to an 
authoritative and expert source (source X is an expert or authority in subject domain S 
containing proposition A. X asserts that proposition A is true; therefore, A may plausibly 
be taken to be true). Through argumentum ad verecundiam, Nasrallah attributes a 
fictitious standpoint to an authority, i.e. committing the straw man fallacy. The 
cumulative effect of these statements is to hold the 14th of March leaders responsible for 
the Israeli war and depict them as those who totally disregard the national interest. 
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Therefore, a new unity government, with the third of the quorum to the Hizbollah party, is 
needed to monitor decisions of the would-be government. Based on this view, Nasrallah 
asserts that the new unity government is the only way to prevent foreign tutelage.  
We (Hizbollah party) want a national unity government because it is the only way to 
prevent any foreign tutelage. Let the whole world know that we want a Lebanese 
government to be led by Lebanese leaders and to take decisions based on Lebanon’s 
interests. This is what we are looking for and this government will be the guarantee 
that secures Lebanon’s safety, future, security, stability, prosperity and unity.
 (lines 106–111) 
  
The proposition that Lebanon will be under foreign tutelage aims to propagate fear in all 
sections of the audience. Via this assertion, Nasrallah alludes to the French mandate in 
Lebanon which ended in 1943. On the one hand, it reminds the audience of the atrocities, 
sorrows and oppression that the French occupation caused. On the other hand, it evokes 
nationalist sentiments related to the fear of losing national autonomy and jeopardising 
Lebanon’s stability. In this case, Nasrallah is utilising a strategy of heteronomisation (see 
Chapter 4, section 2), by which he warns the audience of the dangers of foreign 
domination. The threat of losing national autonomy also serves to unify different sections 
of the audience around the desire to elevate the danger, i.e. a unification and cohesivation 
strategy (see Chapter 4, section 2). Indeed, the construction of a threat and the 
propagation of fear are means that charismatic leaders employ to unify a community 
around their rescue missions (see chapter 2, section 3.1). As mentioned earlier, Nasrallah 
presents the decision to form a new unity government as the ‘only way to prevent any 
foreign tutelage’. To put it differently, a new government with the right to veto decisions 
will rescue Lebanon from foreign domination. This new government will, in turn, secure 
Lebanon’s safety, stability and unity. 
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Nasrallah is, therefore, constructing the elements of a second rescue narrative. The 
villains are some leaders of the 14th of March party, because they participate in realising 
foreign domination and interests. The victims are the Lebanese, whose national autonomy 
is threatened. The hero is Nasrallah (and his party) who will save the country through 
veto power in the would-be government, which will in turn safeguard Lebanon’s interests. 
Moreover, elements of the rescue narrative configure as premises in an argument from 
fear appeal (Walton et al., 2008, p. 333). Nasrallah’s argument can be reconstructed as 
follows:  
Premise 1: If a new government is not formed, then Lebanon will be under foreign tutelage  
Premise 2:  Foreign tutelage is very bad for Lebanon  
Premise 3:  Therefore, foreign tutelage ought to be prevented if possible 
Premise 4: But the only way to prevent it is to form a new government with veto power over 
government’s decisions   
Conclusion:  Therefore, a new government has to be formed 
 
Through a rescue narrative, Nasrallah induces the audience to reinterpret the decision to 
form a new government within nationalist views. Therefore, members of the 14th of 
March audience, who are against forming a new government because it represents a coup 
against Taif (threatens the Sunni leadership of the country) are encouraged to envision 
this proposal as a guarantee of Lebanon’s security and stability. Preventing foreign 
tutelage is one of the positive consequences of forming a new government. Securing 
Lebanon’s safety, security, stability and unity are the other positive consequences cited 
(line 111). Finally, Nasrallah claims that the new government will ‘ensure participation, 
cooperation [---] reconciliation and solidarity’ (lines 35–36), thereby ending monopoly, 
authoritarianism and exclusivity (line 34). In this case, Nasrallah is defending his decision 
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through argumentum ad consequentiam (a variant that mimics the argument from positive 
consequences). 
As aforementioned, the decision to form a new unity government, with a third of the 
quorum to the Hizbollah party, was criticised because it was a coup against the Taif 
Agreement (it threatens the Sunni leadership of the country). Nasrallah refutes this claim 
by saying that it is a ‘slur and a lie’ (line 245). In other words, it is not true that a third of 
the quorum is a coup because it is a lie. Nasrallah’s refutation is also a direct ad hominem 
attack on opponents (portraying them as liars), which is immediately followed by ad 
baculum.103 Nasrallah threatens the 14th of March leaders with taking more coercive 
measures if they do not comply with his demands. That is, either the government 
immediately agrees to form a unity government with a third of the quorum going to the 
Hizbollah party, or Nasrallah’s party will topple the government, call for early elections 
and assign a pro-Hizbollah Sunni figure to lead the new government (lines 401–407). 
Nasrallah’s threat amounts to creating a false dilemma, because his representation reduces 
the range of possibilities that can be taken to reach a resolution to only two options: 
acceptance or sanctions.  
One of the most significant strategies in this speech is Nasrallah’s oscillation between 
threatening opponents and showing clemency. Towards the end of the speech, Nasrallah 
states that the 14th of March leaders are ‘traitors who have to be taken to trial’ (line 380). 
Despite the dire consequences of this accusation (death sentence), Nasrallah uses 
                                                          
103 This fallacy is a violation of the Freedom Rule, Rule 1. It amounts to putting pressure on opponents by 
threatening them with sanctions.  
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unification and cohesivation strategies to soothe their worries. To this end, appeals to 
cooperation, pulling together and solidarity are used. 
 
Work with us (Hizbollah party) to change this government to a national unity 
government, we (the 8th of March party) want to be with you (ruling party) and we 
want you to be with us [---], we will continue to ask them (the ruling party) to cooperate 
with us to form a national unity government (lines 175–176, 297–298).  
 
 
This emphasis on the will to unify is due to the moral and religious values to which the 
group subscribes: ‘the world will be surprised, we (the Hizbollah party) are the offspring 
of these values and this culture (Shiite Islam), a culture that calls for unity, forgiveness 
and love’ (lines 381–382). Nasrallah is appealing to group-specific values, emotions and 
beliefs. This ad populum is combined with the argument scheme from action to character 
(Walton, 2006 p. 194).104 According to Nasrallah, the group’s actions can be described as 
forgiving, loving and unifying; therefore, they are forgiving, caring and aim at 
unification. Nasrallah concludes his argumentation by restating the moral values that 
motivate the decision to form a new government as well as the noble goal that this 
decision is expected to achieve.  
We (Hizbollah party) will remain in the squares until we form a national unity 
government, which represents a guarantee for Lebanon, for all Lebanese, which will 
rescue Lebanon, [---] We will make them hear that we insist on our goal, and we will 
continue no matter what the sacrifices are.  (lines 437–443) 
 
In Nasrallah’s view, rescuing Lebanon is a morally virtuous act and the price (loss of 
human lives) of realising it can be religiously justified. Therefore, the Hezbollah party is 
                                                          
104 According to Walton, the scheme for the argument from action to character is as follows: (1) agent A did 




ready to pay what is deemed necessary to rescue Lebanon from domination and 
monopoly by the ruling party: ‘we (Hizbollah) remain faithful to our cause (a new 
government with a third of the quorum), to our nation and to our people, and for whom 
we sacrifice our blood, our souls and our children’ (lines 271–272). In this respect, 
Nasrallah is advancing an argument from sacrifice that can be reconstructed as follows: 
Premise 1:  For X (rescuing Lebanon) sacrifices S (human losses) are made  
Premise 2:  If a great sacrifice S has been made for X, then the value V of X will be 
greater  
Premise 3:  A great sacrifice (human losses) has been made 
Conclusion:  Rescuing Lebanon is of a great value V 
 
The argumentation that Nasrallah puts forward to legitimise the decision to form a new 
government with the power to veto decisions can be reconstructed as shown in Figure 6.1, 
below. 
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In his attempt to adapt to members of the 14th of March audience, Nasrallah dissociates 
them from their unreliable and untrustworthy leadership. Nasrallah gives them every 
assurance that his decisions and actions do not target them. Nasrallah implicitly flatters 
them when he acknowledges their role in embracing the displaced during the Israeli war. 
Nasrallah even vows to protect them from harm: The blood of every Lebanese is like 
ours, the honour of every Lebanese is like ours [---] This is the red line that we protect 
with our blood’ (lines 190–192). This sense of solidarity is reiterated through unification 
and cohesivation strategies, the aim of which is to unify the Lebanese against the threat of 
a foreign mandate. This is achieved via a rescue narrative that Nasrallah exploits. 
Through this strategy, Nasrallah manages, on the one hand, to portray members of the 
14th of March audience as victims of their own leadership. On the other hand, Nasrallah 
presents his rescue mission (a new government with veto power) as serving the common 
good and the welfare of the Lebanese nation, instead of serving group-specific goals. To 
this end, Nasrallah frames his responses to accusations, and the arguments via which he 
legitimises his decision to form a new government, so as to be in conformity with 
resistance principles and nationalist views.  
In his presentation of the arguments, Nasrallah manages to construct a profile of his 
enemies to whom acts of resistance (demonstrations) are directed, and which is contrasted 
with positive Self-presentation. This is achieved through referential, predication, 
perspectivisation and intensification/ mitigation strategies. The 14th of March camp are 
portrayed as those who always make wrong choices and decisions and rely on false 
assumptions. In contrast, the Hizbollah party is portrayed as those who have a noble cause 
and whose actions are governed by moral and religious principles. Nasrallah relays on 
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personal pronouns, demonstratives and possessive pronouns, which serve as referential 
strategies as well as value-laden words, and also superlatives which serve as predication 
strategies. The 14th of March party is predicated with negative attributes and the 8th of 
March party with positive qualities. For example, ‘they (14th of March leaders) resorted to 
riot’, ‘they sent their gangs’, ‘you (14th of March party) have killed Ahmad Mahmoud’, 
‘traitors who have to be taken to trial’, ‘those who sat down with the Americans and 
requested Israel to wage war on us (Hizbollah party)’. Nasrallah mentions that the 14th of 
March leaders are traitors, but refrains from giving specific names. This strategic 
vagueness aims to cast doubt on each leader in the 14th of March party. 
In contrast, Nasrallah’s group holds the most admired qualities: ‘you (Hizbollah audience/ 
party) are a diligent and inexorable nation’, ‘we (Hizbollah party) are stronger than 
rockets’, ‘we are stronger than war’, ‘you endured the most violent and brutal air strikes 
ever seen in recent decades’. Moreover, through pronouns, Nasrallah distances himself 
from the out-group and at the same time creates communion and empathy with the in-
group. In this case, pronouns serve as a perspectivisation strategy. The exaggeration in 
attributing positive qualities to Nasrallah’s group also serves to underpin intensification 
strategies. Rhetorical questions, allusions, referential vagueness and indirect speech are 
also presentational devices used in this stage. These devices also serve as mitigation 
strategies, inasmuch as they are forms of covert representation. Finally, Nasrallah ends 
this stage by invoking group-specific religious and moral values that are accentuated in 





Nasrallah concludes his defence by emphasising the moral values that underlie his 
decision and the goal that it is expected to serve: ‘we (Hizbollah party) will not surrender, 
we will remain in the squares until we form a national unity government that represents a 
guarantee to Lebanon, to all the Lebanese, which will rescue Lebanon, which will defend 
Lebanon’ (lines 437–440). This assertion has a dual function. On the one hand, it 
implicitly suggests that the decision (forming a new government with veto power) was 
right. On the other hand, it states the practical conclusion that should be derived from 
Nasrallah’s defence, namely, that demonstrations will continue until the goal is achieved. 
This statement also suggests that Nasrallah has conclusively rebutted his opponents’ 
claims and accusations. Therefore, Nasrallah is making an absolute of the success of his 
defence. He is thus committing the fallacy of concluding that a standpoint is true because 
it has been defended successfully.105 
The moral argumentation that Nasrallah advances in the previous stage made it clear that 
the decision to form a new government is morally virtuous and that the price paid to 
achieve it is religiously justified. In this respect, Nasrallah confers a higher-order level of 
legitimacy on his decision. It is sacrifices that will bring victory: ‘by Allah’s (the 
Almighty’s) will you (demonstrators) will be victorious. And as I used to promise you 
victory before, I again promise you victory’ (lines 444–445). In this stage, Nasrallah 
addresses his direct community, thus he selects lexical terms that convey group-specific 
religious convictions, such as ‘martyrdom’, ‘promised victory’ and ‘sacrifice’ 
                                                          
105 This is a violation of the Concluding Rule, Rule (9). It amounts to meddling with the conclusion by 
emphasising that a standpoint is true because it has been defended successfully. 
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(religionyms, see Chapter 4, section 2). This victory is the result of a battle which is 
metaphorically presented as a ‘battle of defending Lebanon’s identity, unity and safety’ 
(line 446).  
3. Conclusion  
In this speech, Nasrallah attempts to achieve multiple goals: deny the accusation of 
inciting intra-sectarian conflict, shift the blame onto opponents, mobilise supporters for 
future rallies, and appeal to the 14th of March audience’s emotions and convictions. These 
goals are achieved within the macro-strategies of responding to accusations and 
legitimating the decision to form a new government with veto power over the 14th of 
March party’s decisions. Nasrallah takes advantage of the rhetorical opportunities 
afforded in each argumentation stage. In the confrontation stage, Nasrallah chooses to 
limit the ‘zone of disagreement’ by presenting the conflict in terms of conflicting moral 
values, i.e. rescuing and defending Lebanon, vis authoritarianism and monopoly. As such, 
Nasrallah evades mentioning the main points of disagreement to avoid evoking 
unwarranted contradictions with the 14th of March audience. In the opening stage, 
Nasrallah indirectly flatters the 14th of March audience and manages to dissociate them 
from their untrustworthy leadership. In both stages, Nasrallah relies on representation 
strategies and ad hominem attacks to disparage and vilify the 14th of March leaders.  
In the argumentation stage, Nasrallah attempts to shift the blame onto his opponents and 
defend the rightness of his decision. With respect to the latter, a rescue perspective is 
exploited via which Nasrallah manages to: deny accusations, construct himself (and his 
group), as well as the 14th of March audience, as victims, and create scapegoats. His 
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defence of the decision rests on identifying the positive consequences of forming a new 
government as well as the negative consequences of falling to do so. This represents the 
first source of normativity against which the decision is legitimated. Moreover, moral 
values, nationalist views and religious convictions are other sources of normativity. With 
respect to the former, a set of arguments from authority and arguments from analogy, via 
which facts are presented, are utilised to construct a negative representation of 
Nasrallah’s opponents. The concluding stage presents an image of the ‘promised victory’ 
that aims to dispel any doubts regarding the rightness of the decision. During the analysis, 
I have identified some of the referential, predication, perspectivisation, intensification/ 
mitigation strategies that play a role in constructing arguments and argumentation stages. 
A more detailed discussion regarding the role of the DHA’s representation strategies in 















Reconstruction of the argument  
- Quasi-juridical defence to avoid blame:  
(1) (Nasrallah and his party should not be blamed) 
(1.1) (Nasrallah and his party should not be blamed for enflaming intra-sectarian struggle) 
 1.1.1 All efforts were made to avoid going into the streets 
 1.1.1.1a These were faced by the monopoly and authoritarianism of the  
ruling party   
1.1.2 Lebanese should be acquainted with the political realities and the facts on  
the ground 
1.1.2.1a I will tell Lebanese who is pushing things to the verge of civil war 
1.1.2.1a.1 The government’s reliance on American and Western  
support will do it no good 
1.1.2.1a.2 No government in Lebanon’s history has  
received this amount of support  
1.1.2.1a.2.1a This support raises suspicions and doubts  
(1.1.2.1a.2.2a) (The government is serving US and  
Israeli interests in Lebanon) 
   1.1.2.1b. Take Iraq as an example     
1.1.2.1b.1 Failure, disintegration and civil war are  
the outcomes of Bush’s support in Iraq  
1.1.2.1b.2 This is the fate of any country that bets on  
American support. 
(1.1.2.1b.3) (The US support for the 14th of March party  
will lead to similar outcomes)  
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1.1.2.1c Israeli ministers are discussing ways to support the  
government during their cabinet meetings 
1.1.2.1c.1 Some ministers propose withdrawing from  
Shebaa or Ghajar Farms 
    1.1.2.1c.2 There is something behind the Israeli praise for  
this government  
    (1.1.2.1c.3) (The government is serving Israel’s interests)  
 1.1.3 Our demonstrations and sit-ins are peaceful and civilised  
1.1.3.1a They resorted to riot, sent their gangs and killed the martyr  
Ahmad Mahmoud 
1.1.3.1a.1 We forgive them and ask them to cooperate with us and 
form a new government with us 
1.1.3.1a.2 We are the offspring of this culture 
 (1.1.3.1a.2.1a) (We are a forgiving and caring group)  
1.1.3.1b They wanted to drag us into civil war  
   1.1.3.1b.1 We refuse to be dragged into war just as we did in the  
1993 demonstrations 
1.1.3.1b.2. We will protect Lebanese with our blood    
  1.1.3.1c We insist on remaining in the streets despite their bets  
   1.1.3.1c.1 They bet on our weariness and being tired 
   1.1.3.1c.2 The Israeli war is an example of our endurance and  
steadfastness  
    (1.1.3.1c.2.1a) Demonstrations are nothing compared to  
rockets   
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1.1.4 (Demonstrations are honourable and admirable) 
 (1.1.4.1a) Demonstrations are acts of resistance 
 (1.1.4.1a.1) (Acts of Resistance are honourable and praiseworthy) 
1.1.4.1b Demonstrations serve an honourable and national goal  
1.1.4.1b.1 Our goal is to rescue Lebanon from the ruling party’s monopoly 
               and authoritarianism  
1.1.4.1b.1.1a We have to defend Lebanon’s dignity, pride and  
freedom 
1.1.4.1b.1.2a Demonstrations are a means to achieve the goal 
1.1.4.1b.1.3a Demonstrations will continue until the goal is  
achieved 
1.2 A new government with veto power over government’s decisions is not a coup against 
the Taif Agreement 
1.2.1 This is a lie and a slur   
-Legitimation of Decision:  
(2) (The decision to form a new government with veto power over government’s 
decisions was right)    
2.1 Depriving Hizbollah from the power to veto decisions is not desirable  
2.1.1 A single-party role will lead Lebanon into a deadlock 
2.1.2 This is the government of the American ambassador  
 2.1.2.1a The government has made commitments to the US and Israel  
2.1.2.1a.1 Olmert’s statements during the Israeli war prove this 
(2.1.2.1a.2) (The government should not continue to rule) 
2.1.3 Lebanon will be under foreign tutelage 
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 (2.1.3.1a) (Foreign tutelage is very bad for the Lebanese) 
  (2.1.3.1a.1) (The French mandate was horrible)  
  (2.1.3.1a.2) (Foreign tutelage in the future should not be allowed)  
  2.1.3.1a.3 A new government is the only way to prevent such  
tutelage  
  (2.1.3.1a.4) (The decision to form a new government should be  
positively evaluated)  
2.2 The formation of a new government will save Lebanon    
2.2.1 It will prevent foreign tutelage 
2.2.2 It will secure Lebanon’s security, safety, unity and stability 
(2.2.3) (The decision to form a new government should be positively evaluated) 
2.3 The formation of a new government is not a coup against the Taif Agreement 
 2.3.1 We insist on achieving the goal despite the sacrifices  
 2.3.2 Ahmad Mahmoud paid his life 
 2.3.3 We are ready to make more sacrifices   
 (2.3.4) (Lebanon’s stability, security, safety and unity are worthy of these  
sacrifices) 
2.4 We will continue the battle to defend Lebanon’s safety and unity  
2.4.1 I promise you victory 






May 2009 speech: The invasion of Beirut  
1. Speech context  
Demonstrations and sit-ins in the centre of Beirut’s financial and business centre (see 
chapter 6, section 1) lasted from 1/12/2006 until the ratification of the Doha Agreement 
on 21/5/2008. What gave rise to this agreement was a series of systematic assaults, the 
most significant of which was the ‘Invasion of Beirut’. This operation was carried out by 
Hizbollah against highly populated Sunni areas in Beirut (Shiites are a minority in Beirut) 
and other co-inhabited cities. The ‘Invasion of Beirut’ was Hizbollah’s response to two 
decisions taken by the (pro-American) government on the 5 May 2008. The first decision 
was the expulsion of the Director of Airport Security Apparatus (affiliated to Hizbollah) 
after reports accusing Hizbollah of monitoring the airport with private cameras, i.e. 
Hizbollah was tightening its security control over the national airport. The second 
decision is related to dismantling Hizbollah’s illegal telecommunications network. These 
decisions were seen by Hizbollah as a declaration of war. Nasrallah gave a speech, on 6 
May 2008, in which he gave the government two options: reverse these decisions or war 
(known as the ‘Invasion of Beirut’).  
In Nasrallah’s view, the government’s decision to sack the Director of Airport Security 
Apparatus was an attempt to ‘target the Shiite community’ and, more importantly, ‘to 
facilitate the government’s plan in making the airport a base for American and Israeli 
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intelligence services’.106 Similarly, the dismantling of Hizbollah’s telecommunications 
network exposed Hizbollah’s officials and military leaders to being tracked by Israel, and 
hence their assassination. Nasrallah warned the government that if the two decisions were 
not reversed, ‘arms would be used to defend arms’. The government did not comply with 
Nasrallah’s request. As a result, Nasrallah declared the start of war (the ‘Invasion of 
Beirut’) on 7 May 2008. This miniature civil war resulted in besieging the capital and 
attacking financial and media institutions and residential areas of prominent figures of the 
14th of March party. Street fighting broke out between highly populated Sunni districts 
and Shiite ones and lasted for almost two weeks, leaving 71 dead and hundreds injured. 
The devastating nature of this war led the Arab League to propose a political initiative in 
order to arrive at a peaceful resolution to the conflict. This initiative resulted in the 
signing of the Doha Agreement on 21 May 2008 by both parties. Based on this 
agreement, the two decisions taken by the government were reversed, the siege over the 
capital and other facilities was lifted, demonstrations and sit-ins were brought to an end, a 
president of the republic was elected, a new law for June 2009 elections was adopted, the 
use of Hizbollah’s armoury at the domestic level was prohibited, and a new government 
with veto power over the 8th of March party was formed. From the moment of signing the 
Doha Agreement, both parties were involved in a blame-game relating to the 
responsibility of each in causing the escalation (Invasion of Beirut). The 14th of March 
party considered the ‘Invasion of Beirut’ a coup that aimed at:  
• Seizing power; 
                                                          
106 For the purposes of contextualisation, identifying events and associated debates, I consulted newspapers 
that affiliate with both sides of the struggle (see chapter 2, section 5).    
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• Undermining state sovereignty;  
• Changing the current power sharing formula to tripartite rule;  
• Promoting intra-sectarian cleansing; 
• Serving the interests of the Resistance axis, Syria and Iran. 
The ‘invasion of Beirut’ and its aftermath became the foci of electoral campaigns and 
speeches of both parties. Each party presented its election campaign based on the 
conviction that the ‘Other’ was part of a foreign project, thereby unworthy of holding 
office or gaining control. During the 14th of March party campaign that coincided with the 
first commemoration of the ‘Invasion of Beirut’ (7 May 2009), the leader of this coalition 
declared that Hizbollah’s ‘Invasion of Beirut’ was a ‘trap to lead Lebanon to civil war’ 
and a preamble leading to ‘recalibration of the Taif Accord’. In other words, the ‘Invasion 
of Beirut’ aimed to change the power-sharing formula from Muslim-Christian parity, as 
the Taif Accord stipulates, to a tripartite (Sunni-Shiite-Christian) division of power. On 
15 May 2009, Nasrallah gave a speech to respond to the accusations raised by the 14th of 
March party and to announce his party’s electoral programme.107  
2. Speech analysis 
2.1. Preparatory step   
Nasrallah gave this speech during the graduation ceremony of 2,883 university graduates 
who were members of Hizbollah. In the speech, Nasrallah exploits the ceremonial nature 
                                                          
107 A translated English version of the speech can be found in Appendix B, and the original Arabic version 




of the event to achieve the following interrelated goals: mobilize voters for forthcoming 
elections, publicize his party’s electoral programme, respond to the 14th of March leaders’ 
accusations, and legitimise the ‘Invasion of Beirut’. The speech is divided into three 
overlapping parts. In the ceremonial part, Nasrallah greets the graduates and applauds 
their academic success (lines 1–79). In the part related to elections, Nasrallah announces 
his party’s political programme (lines 111–351); thus, he addresses the Lebanese public at 
large. Finally, the third part relates to responding to accusations and defending the 
rightness of the ‘Invasion of Beirut’ (lines 80–110, 356–525). The first and second parts 
of the speech are not included in the analysis as these are not directly linked to the main 
point of disagreement. This means that neither part plays a role in resolving the difference 
of opinion related to the ‘Invasion of Beirut’. However, I will briefly mention the main 
topics of these two parts.   
Nasrallah’s electoral manifesto highlights his futuristic outlook of the would-be state with 
a detailed description of the different political measures that should be taken to ‘build a 
strong and a fair state’ (line 113). Nasrallah’s political agenda consists of a set of 
measures that would eventually guarantee the establishment of a strong and capable state. 
These measures are: the adoption of a new election law based on proportionality to ensure 
fair representation (line 214), the formation of a new government with veto power over 
the 14th of March party (lines 272–289), and reformation of the juridical system (lines 
233–247). In the part related to greeting the graduates and praising their academic 
achievement, Nasrallah extends his gratitude to the graduates’ families due to the 
financial, social and psychological burdens they had had to endure (lines 32–41). 
Moreover, Nasrallah’s praise of academic achievement is presented within the 
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perspective of religious duties and obligations. Thus, educational achievement amounts to 
‘jihad in the path of the Almighty’ (line 29–30).108  
In the third part, Nasrallah attempts to rebut the 14th of March party’s accusations and 
defend the rightness of the ‘Invasion of Beirut’. This part is in turn divided into two 
sections. The first section is an indirect response to accusations and an attempt to shift the 
blame onto opponents. According to Nasrallah, the 14th of March party should be blamed 
for the causes which led to the ‘Invasion of Beirut’ – the two decisions taken by the 
government. The second section relates to justifying the rightness of the action that was 
severely criticized, i.e. an attempt to restore intersubjective agreement regarding 
Hizbollah’s ‘Invasion of Beirut’.   
2.2. Reconstruction and analysis 
Confrontation Stage 
As aforementioned, the argumentative (i.e. third) part of the speech is divided into two 
sections. In a quasi-judicial section, Nasrallah chooses to respond to two accusations: 
enflaming intra-sectarian conflict that spread with the ‘Invasion of Beirut’, and changing 
the power-sharing formula to tripartite rule. As for the former, Nasrallah indirectly refutes 
it through creating and promoting a correct image of Hizbollah and shifting the blame 
onto opponents. To this end, Nasrallah highlights the moral values that govern the actions 
of Hizbollah, as well as the noble goals that these actions realize (lines 82–91). As for the 
latter, Nasrallah falsifies it (changing the power-sharing formula) by denying full 
                                                          
108 Jihad in the Islamic view is the constant striving of the self for improvement at all levels, while military 
jihad against invasion or enemies has only one form. 
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responsibility using act-denial (see Chapter 3, section 7.i). In the second section of the 
argumentation part, Nasrallah chooses to defend the rightness of the ‘Invasion of Beirut’ 
through a set of argumentum ad consequentiam. 
The main standpoint that Nasrallah attempts to defend in this section is not explicitly 
announced in the confrontation stage. It is, however, implicitly stated towards the end of 
the argumentation stage, where Nasrallah declares that the ‘7th of May (Invasion of 
Beirut) was a glorious day’ (line 486–487). This statement implicitly suggests that the 
‘Invasion of Beirut’ was the right action. As for the first section, the standpoint that 
Nasrallah aims to refute remains largely implicit throughout his argumentation. This 
evasion strategy permits Nasrallah to present the confrontation as if it were a conflict over 
two contrasting visions and images (topical potential), i.e. Hizbollah’s (and his party’s) 
views, aims and actions versus the 14th of March party’s views, anticipation and actions. 
Taking advantage of the occasion (a graduation ceremony), Nasrallah claims that the 
graduation of Hizbollah’s members is a faithful and genuine representation of Hizbollah’s 
true image, i.e. as educated and well-informed citizens whose actions are guided by moral 
values. This image stands in direct contrast to the image that Hizbollah’s opponents are 
promoting – killing other Lebanese. As such, it is an indirect response to the accusation of 
enflaming intra-sectarian strife.  
This large number of male and female graduates from the heart of this faithful 
procession of Jihad presents to Lebanon and to all the world one of the true faces of 
this procession and one of the shining faces that reflects the Resistance march in 
Lebanon, and its faith, humanitarianism and patriotism, its sincerity and dedication, its 




To support his claim (Hizbollah and its members are humane, civilised, moral and well-
informed), Nasrallah compares the actions of Hizbollah with those of other resistance 
movements. To this end, Nasrallah brings to mind the actions of the French resistance 
after its success in ending the Nazi occupation of France and compares them to those of 
Hizbollah after the latter’s success in liberating most of Lebanese occupied territories in 
2000.   
We did not do what other Resistance movements did. All Resistance movements in 
history held trials and punished collaborators and traitors, nationals of their own 
homeland except the Resistance in Lebanon. [---] I said to the French ambassador that 
the Resistance in Lebanon is much more civilized, humane and moral than the French 
resistance because yours back then held field trials, executed thousands of French 
nationals without trial, those who were charged with collaborating with the Nazi army, 
while we (Hizbollah) in Lebanon did not even kill a chicken from Antoine Lahad's 
Army (a brigade that split from the national army and collaborated with Israel during 
the civil war).  (lines 248–260).  
 
Through this analogy, Nasrallah depicts Hizbollah as a peaceful, tolerant and 
benevolent group that does not seek vengeance. This is an indirect response to the 
accusation of killing other Lebanese during the ‘Invasion of Beirut’ (intra-sectarian 
conflict). This constructed image of Hizbollah is juxtaposed with the image of 
the14th of March leaders. They are portrayed as those who rely on false assumptions 
and arrive at inaccurate assessments. For example, Nasrallah claims that his 
opponents are doubtful about Hizbollah’s ability to rule Lebanon, should Hizbollah 
(and its party) win the forthcoming elections. Nasrallah asserts that the graduation 
ceremony is the best response to these doubts. Thus, this is another instance of 
exploiting the occasion. 
You (graduates) also present a strong scene and send a clear message to all those (14th 
of March party) who doubted the power of the opposition party (Hizbollah’s party) to 
manage Lebanon’s affairs in all fields and disciplines, [---] If you (14th of March party) 
211 
 
are betting on the failure of the opposition (Hizbollah’s party), the only answer is this 
(graduation ceremony), and this is one out of many ceremonies and one stage out of 
many stages, with 2,883 graduates in all fields of specialization. (lines 91–94, 99–101)
  
Academic achievement, as exemplified by the graduation ceremony, attests to Hezbollah 
having the necessary competence, knowledge and expertise to rule the country. 
Nasrallah’s response also implies that the 14th of March party’s wrong expectations stem 
from their failure to arrive at a proper assessment of Hizbollah’s points of strength and 
capabilities; i.e. doubting the intelligence and expertise of his opponents. Nasrallah 
supports his claim (Hizbollah is capable of ruling the country alone) with evidence from 
the last Israeli war.  
The hearts, minds, souls, willpower and determination (of Hizbollah), which 
defeated the strongest army (Israel) and the strongest country (Israel) in the region [--
-], are more than capable of managing a country a hundred times larger than Lebanon 
[---] and as we (Hizbollah) were able with our Lebanese minds and hearts, with our 
Lebanese willpower and sacrifices to liberate our land and prisoners and protect our 
country, we are able yet  the most able [---] to build our country and nation and 
promote development.  (lines 101–110)  
 
The reference to the Israeli war, on the one hand, insinuates that lessons should be 
derived from this experience. The call to learn lessons from history promotes a negative 
representation of Nasrallah’s opponents, as it portrays them as incapable of arriving at the 
right conclusions. As such, it is another instance of ad hominem attack on opponents. On 
the other hand, reference to Hizbollah’s victory over Israel is further evidence that 
supports the image that Nasrallah is constructing.    
The religious perspective that Nasrallah begins his speech with also extends to the 
confrontation stage. This perspective aims to meet Hizbollah’s audience frame of 
reference. To this end, Nasrallah selects lexical terms that refer to Islamic convictions. 
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These religious anthroponyms serve as referential strategies (religionyms, see chapter 4, 
section 2), e.g. ‘sacrifices’ (line 108), ‘by Allah’s (the Almighty’s) will’ (line 109), 
‘asceticism and modesty’ (line 96). The last set refers to religious values that are only 
reached through a high level of unblemished commitment to Islamic ideals. The negative 
representation of the 14th of March coalition is emphasized through predications that 
attribute negative qualities to them: ‘those (14th of March party) who doubted the power 
of the opposition’ (lines 92–93) and ‘they (14th of March party) bet on the opposition’s 
(Hizbollah party’s) failure’ (line 94). Furthermore, Nasrallah refers to his opponents using 
the demonstrative ‘those’ and the pronoun ‘they’. These indicate spatial distance, and as 
such serve to realize a perspectivisation strategy. In contrast, Nasrallah’s party and his 
immediate audience (the 8th of March party) are predicated as those who ‘defeated the 
strongest army and the strongest country (Israel) in the region’ (lines 101–103) and who 
are ‘more than capable of managing a country a hundred times larger than Lebanon’ 
(lines 103–104).  
Nasrallah manages to establish communion with his immediate audience through 
pronouns, such as ‘you’ and ‘we’, to indicate proximity; thus, they serve referential as 
well as perspectivisation strategies: ‘Today you (Hizbollah audience) also present a 
strong scene’ (line 92), ‘we were able with our Lebanese minds and hearts’ (line 107). In 
contrast, (in)direct references to the 14th of March audience are completely absent in this 
stage. However, there are ample references to the 14th of March audience, especially to 
citizens of Beirut, where the dramatic actions took place, in the argumentation stage. This 
is because, in this stage, Nasrallah aims to convince them of the rightness of the violent 
actions taken against them (‘Invasion of Beirut’).     
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One of the salient presentational devices in this stage is the use of quantifiers that indicate 
exaggeration, such as ‘more’ and ‘most’. Exaggeration is also realized through the use of 
comparative and superlative adjectives: ‘the strongest country’, ‘the strongest tyrant in 
this world’ (lines 102–103), ‘a country a hundred times larger than Lebanon’ (lines 103–
104).  Moreover, exaggeration is also achieved through the use of personification, e.g. 
‘willpower and determination which defeated the strongest army’ (line 102), ‘Lebanese 
willpower’ (line 108). Exaggerations realised through adjectives and personifications 
realise both intensification and perspectivisation strategies.  Nasrallah’s reference to the 
Israeli war is used to elicit concessions (due to the widespread belief that Hizbollah 
defeated Israel in the 2006 war). In the opening stage, more concessions and common 
starting points of the discussion are laid out.  
Opening Stage 
In the opening stage, Nasrallah intensifies the binary opposition between the in-group 
(Hizbollah party) and the out-group (14th of March party) through evidence derived from 
past events. Nasrallah constructs a denunciatory image of the 14th of March party by 
calling to mind the historical event of signing the 17th of May Treaty with Israel in 1983. 
He reminds the Lebanese people of the political leaders who signed the Treaty ‘from a 
weakened, defeated and servile position’ (line 360). This image is contrasted with those 
who stood against the Treaty. This historical event is presented in the form of rhetorical 
questions.  
Who signed the treaty, who wanted to attach Lebanon to Israel through the May 17th 
treaty? Who are the leaders and political parties involved in crowning Lebanon 




Nasrallah does not explicitly name the leaders who signed the Treaty. The leaders whom 
Nasrallah is leading the public to identify are, primarily, Christian politicians and some 
Sunni leaders. Those leaders are prominent figures in the 14th of March coalition. On the 
one hand, the presuppositions conveyed in rhetorical questions serve as common starting 
points for the discussion. On the other, they remind the audience of the disgraceful past of 
some of the 14th of March leaders. It is, therefore, used to point out an inherent 
inconsistency between the convictions and actions of some of the 14th of March leaders. 
Nasrallah confirms this conclusion with an assertion: ‘those (some of the 14th of March 
leaders) who wanted to subjugate Lebanon forever to Israel are now themselves symbols 
of independence, sovereignty and freedom (the 14th of March party’s slogan)’ (lines 371–
372). This is an ad hominem attack of the tu quoque type, which aims to discredit some of 
the14th of March figures by shedding light on their dishonourable past; i.e. their past 
relation to and collaboration with Israel versus their current yearning for liberty, freedom 
and independence (X advocates argument Q, which has proposition A as its conclusion. X 
is committed to the opposite of A as shown in his actions. Therefore, X’s credibility is put 
into question, and hence the plausibility of X’s arguments is decreased). Through 
reference to a past event, Nasrallah constructs the 14th of March party as a blameworthy 
group in order to shift the blame onto them and, eventually, to hold them responsible for 
the 7th of May 2008 events (‘Invasion of Beirut’). Similarly, a positive representation of 
Nasrallah’s group is achieved through rhetorical questions that pertain to the same event, 
signing the 17th of May Treaty.  
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Who opposed the 17th of May Treaty, whose blood was shed to announce Lebanese 
people's rejection of the 17th of May treaty, who were the clergy, the men and women? 
(lines 364–365)  
 
The expected answer, which also serves as a common starting point, is the Shiites of 
Lebanon. This conclusion is emphasized by Nasrallah’s direct reference to the insurgency 
that started in ‘Bir al-Abed’ (line 366), as well as to the ‘martyr Mohamed Najdeh’ (lines 
367–368), who died in the clashes that took place with the army in the aftermath of 
signing the Treaty. In both cases, the presuppositions contained in rhetorical questions are 
presented as common starting points of the discussion, and as such Nasrallah falsely 
presumes that agreement is established.109 Thus, Nasrallah escapes the burden of proof by 
presenting his claim as enjoying agreement, i.e. fallacy of evading the burden of proof.110 
Moreover, this Treaty is evidence of the 8th of March party’s nationalist and patriotic 
deeds.  
It is a pity and very unfortunate [---] that those who stood against May 17th Treaty 
(Shiites), those (Hizbollah) who sacrificed their blessed blood for the liberation of 
Lebanon are now the titles of subordination, treason and foreign dependence (Syria 
and Iran). Isn’t this historical injustice?  (lines 357–358, 372-374)  
 
Nasrallah sees the impertinent charge of the 14th of March party – the ‘Invasion of Beirut’ 
serves the interests of Iran and Syria – as an unjust accusation. Through argumentum ad 
                                                          
109 In fact, the Treaty was signed by ministers and parliamentarians belonging to different religious sects 
and not exclusively Christians or Sunni leaders. Ironically, two Shiite MPs who signed the Treaty are now 
members of the Hizbollah coalition. The question that presents itself is why the public might have picked 
up the referents that Nasrallah favoured. Relevance Theory might provide a plausible answer. It has been a 
repeated practice in the media that belong to or affiliate to Hizbollah to emphasize the role of Christians 
and, to a lesser degree, Sunni figures, while ignoring the role of Shiites in approving the Treaty. Similarly, 
the role of Shiites in resisting the Treaty was overemphasized while the role of other sects was subject to 
silencing. Therefore, this repeated one-sided interpretation of a historical event increases the strength and 
validity of these propositions in the cognitive environment of the audience. Consequently, Nasrallah’s 
favoured interpretation is selected (see Chapter 3, section 6.3.1). 
110 The attempt to present standpoints as self-evident amounts to the fallacy of evading the burden of proof. 
This fallacy is a violation of the Obligation to Defend Rule, Rule 2.  
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misericordiam, Nasrallah appeals to the 14th of March audience’s feelings of compassion 
to win their sympathy. To put it differently, Hizbollah is seen by the 14th of March party 
and its audience as a perpetrator because of Hizbollah’s use of weapons against other 
Lebanese. Thus, Nasrallah’s appeal for empathy and the call to do his party justice are 
examples of victim-perpetrator reversal (Reisigl &Wodak, 2001).  
Nasrallah adapts to the Hizbollah audience by underscoring the patriotism and 
nationalism of the 8th of March party leaders. A clear example is their rejection of the 17th 
of May Treaty with Israel. In contrast, Nasrallah’s opponents (the 14th of March party) are 
depicted as those who collaborated with Israel to ‘subjugate Lebanon forever to Israel’ 
(line 341). The positive representation of Nasrallah’s party is emphasised through 
predications and value-laden words, e.g. ‘stood against the Agreement’ (line 359), ‘whose 
blood was shed to announce Lebanese people's rejection of the 17th of May treaty’ (lines 
366–367), ‘sacrificed their blessed blood for the liberation of Lebanon’ (lines 372–373). 
In juxtaposition, the 14th of March camp is negatively predicated: ‘signed the agreement 
from a weakened, defeated and servile position’ (line 360), ‘involved in crowning 
Lebanon forever as a country that belongs to the Zionist project’ (line 363–364).  
These negative and positive attributions serve a predication strategy. Rhetorical questions 
are the main presentational devices exploited in this stage. Nasrallah manipulates a 
historical event by relying on presuppositions (the 14th of March party’s collaboration 
with Israel and signing the 17th of May Treaty) conveyed in rhetorical questions. These 
presuppositions act not only as common starting points but also indirectly assert the 
culpability of some leaders of the 14th of March party. Interestingly, Nasrallah resorts to 
rhetorical questions in order to make his claim (the Treaty was signed by Christians and 
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some Sunni leaders) go unnoticed by the 14th of March audience. Had Nasrallah stated 
this claim overtly, it would have alerted their epistemic filters to the falsity of the 
proposition, because it contradicts their background knowledge and beliefs. This covert 
representation of claims serves as a mitigation strategy.   
Argumentation Stage 
As mentioned above, the argumentation stage is divided into two sections. In the first one, 
Nasrallah attempts to refute his opponents’ criticisms, shifts the blame onto opponents 
and holds them responsible for the causes of the invasion of Beirut, i.e. the two decisions 
taken by the government. As for the former, Nasrallah indirectly refutes accusations 
through creating and promoting the correct image of Hizbollah. The latter is also achieved 
through constructing a disgraceful image of opponents and by supplying the audience 
with facts about the ‘Invasion of Beirut’. In both cases, Nasrallah relies on arguments 
from example, arguments from analogy and arguments from authority.  
Nasrallah starts his defence by exploiting the ceremonial nature of the graduation event. 
According to Nasrallah, the ceremony is a true and faithful representation of Hizbollah’s 
(members and audience) actions and goals: ‘This large number of male and female 
graduates [---] presents to Lebanon [---] one of the true faces of this procession [---] and 
one of the shining faces that reflects the Resistance march in Lebanon’ (lines 80–83). 
Nasrallah provides further evidence that weighs in favour of the image of Hizbollah 
constructed. It is presented in terms of an argument from analogy, through which the 
actions of the French resistance are compared to Hizbollah’s actions. According to 
Nasrallah, the French resistance convicted and executed those who collaborated with the 
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Nazis. In contrast, Hizbollah handed over those who collaborated with Israel to Lebanese 
judiciary authorities in order to receive fair trials. 
Resistance in Lebanon is much more civilized, humane and moral than the French 
resistance because yours back then held field trials, executed thousands of French 
nationals without trial, those who were charged with collaborating with the Nazi army, 
while we (Hizbollah) in Lebanon did not even kill a chicken from Antoine Lahad's 
Army. (lines 256–260). 
 
In this case, Nasrallah is supporting a general claim: Hizbollah is peaceful, tolerant and 
does not seek vengeance, through evidence derived from one example. This is an instance 
of the hasty generalisation fallacy or secundum quid. Nasrallah contrasts the image 
constructed of Hizbollah with that of his opponents. To this end, Nasrallah depicts them 
(14th of March leaders) as those who rely on false assumptions and arrive at the wrong 
conclusions. Nasrallah claims that the 14th of March party anticipates the failure of 
Hizbollah’s party in ruling the country should they win the forthcoming elections: ‘those 
(14th of March party) who doubted the power of the opposition party (Hizbollah party) to 
manage Lebanon’s affairs’ (lines 92–93). Nasrallah is attributing a fictitious standpoint to 
a source; thus, he is committing the straw man fallacy. Nasrallah responds to this 
hypothetical scenario through an argument from analogy in order to assert Hizbollah’s 
capabilities and its readiness to handle such a task. 
The hearts, minds, souls, willpower and determination (of Hizbollah), which 
defeated the strongest army (Israel) and the strongest country (Israel) in the region [--
-], are more than capable of managing a country a times larger than Lebanon’ [---] 
and as we (Hizbollah) were able with our Lebanese minds and hearts, with our 
Lebanese willpower and sacrifices to liberate our land and prisoners and protect our 
country, we are the most able [---], to build our country and nation and promote 
development.  (lines 101–110) 
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In this example, Nasrallah is referring to Hizbollah and its audience’s heroic deeds during 
the Israeli war on Lebanon in 2006. These patriotic and heroic acts are taken as evidence 
to show Hizbollah’s capabilities and level of preparedness. Nasrallah reasserts his party’s 
nationalism and patriotism versus the 14th of March party’s subjugation to and 
collaboration with Israel by referring to the 17th of May Treaty, which was endorsed by 
some leaders who are prominent figures in the 14th of March party. In this case, Nasrallah 
is using an argument from example combined with hasty generalisation in order to 
support his claim (14th of March leaders collaborate with Israel). Using rhetorical 
questions (explained above), Nasrallah manages to: cast doubt on the 14th of March party 
and exempt his party from any wrongful actions. Nasrallah exploits the previous 
collaboration of some of the 14th of March party’s leaders to discredit and disparage that 
party. Thus, Nasrallah is transferring the negative attributes of a part to the whole. In this 
case, Nasrallah is committing the fallacy of composition.111 Similarly, due to the 
patriotism and nationalism of some Shiite leaders, who rejected the Treaty, these qualities 
are transferred to the 8th of March party as a whole (both cases are fallacious 
representations, as explained above).  
Two points can be deduced from Nasrallah’s reference to the 17th of May Treaty. First, 
Hizbollah and its party have an honourable past; thus, they cannot be accused of serving 
foreign countries (Iran and Syria) through the ‘Invasion of Beirut’. In this respect, 
Nasrallah is simultaneously advancing two argument schemes where the conclusion of 
the first becomes a premise in the second. The first is an argument scheme from action to 
                                                          
111 This fallacy is a violation of Rule 7, the Validity Rule. It amounts to confusing properties of parts and 
wholes by ascribing a relative or structure-dependent property of a part of the whole to the whole (van 
Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1993, p. 213). 
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character, while the second is an argument scheme from character to action (Walton, 
2006, p. 194–195).112 That is, Hizbollah and its political party rejected the shameful 
Treaty with Israel; therefore, they are patriotic and nationalists. This conclusion forms the 
premise of the second argument scheme through which a prediction about the group’s 
future actions is justified. That is, Hizbollah and its party are patriotic and nationalists; 
therefore, their future actions (e.g. the Invasion of Beirut), are likely to be patriotic and 
serve the national interest. Indeed, this is the perspective that Nasrallah exploits in the 
rescue narrative (see below).  
Second, the negative representation of the 14th of March party also takes place at the level 
of these two argument schemes. That is, some leaders of the 14th of March party 
collaborated with Israel by signing the Treaty; therefore, they are traitors and unpatriotic 
(scheme from action to character). Having such a character quality means that the 14th of 
March party’s political aspirations and future actions are likely to be unpatriotic and not 
serve the national interest (scheme from character to action). In fact, Nasrallah explicitly 
states this conclusion: ‘this history has to remain present, to benefit from it in the future’ 
(lines 377–378) in order to ‘prevent ourselves from being misled or lost again’ (line 378). 
In other words, Nasrallah presents the two decisions taken by the government as actions 
that serve Israeli interests, thereby asserting the 14th of March leaders’ collaboration with 
Israel. This claim is substantiated through a fallacious variant of argument from authority.  
                                                          
112According to Walton (2006), the argument scheme from action to character consists of the following 
premises: (1) agent A did something that can be classified as fitting a particular character quality; (2) 
therefore, A has this character quality. The argument scheme from character to action consists of the 
following premises: (1) Agent A has a character quality that has been defined; (2) therefore, if A carries out 
some action in the future, this action is likely to be classified as fitting under that character quality.   
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Nasrallah emphasizes the moral obligation that he holds towards the public, i.e. supplying 
them with the truth. He, therefore, constructs himself as a credible and trusted source of 
information. What Nasrallah is going to disclose is his personal view and assessment 
concerning the events that preceded and followed the ‘Invasion of Beirut’ on the 7 May 
2008. On the one hand, this is an indirect appeal to the 14th of March audience’s duties, 
whereby they are encouraged to review their positions in light of the truth provided. On 
the other hand, this is an indirect way in which Nasrallah dissociates the 14th of March 
audience from their leaders.  
I (Nasrallah) find it my duty to comment on this issue (the Invasion of Beirut) in 
honour of the blessed blood of the martyrs who fell on May 7th, so no one gets confused 
in Lebanon or outside Lebanon, and to bring some light back to the truth.  
(lines 396–398) 
 
Nasrallah constructs the 14th of March party as a group worthy of blame in order to shift 
the blame onto them, i.e. they are responsible for the ‘Invasion of Beirut’. As such, 
Nasrallah shifts the focus from discussing what Hizbollah has done to the citizens of 
Beirut to what others have done instead. Nasrallah establishes a causal relation between 
the two decisions taken by the government on 5 May 2008 and invading Beirut two days 
later on 7 May 2008. 
I want to remind those (the14th of March party) talking about the 7th of May (Invasion 
of Beirut) to remember what they did on the 5th of May (two decisions taken by the 
government). (lines 400–401).  
 
To support his claim, Nasrallah provides evidence presented in the form of argumentum ad 
verecundiam. Nasrallah exploits the conclusions of the ‘Winograd Commission Report’ to 
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launch a direct ad hominem attack on the 14th of March party.113 According to Nasrallah, 
the ‘Winograd Report’ states that Hizbollah’s telecommunications network is the most 
important element in Hizbollah’s victory over Israel. 
If we (Lebanese) review the Winograd report which states that among Hezbollah’s 
elements and points of strength that Israel must dismantle is Hezbollah’s 
telecommunications network [---] the most important weapon of the Resistance in the 
July war (Israeli war in 2006) was the telecommunications network, because it is 
immune to eavesdropping and to Israeli breaches to an extremely large degree. 
 (lines 401–403, 408–412) 
 
It follows that the government’s decision on 5 May 2008 to dismantle Hizbollah’s 
telecommunications network serves Israeli interests. This means exposing Hizbollah’s 
officials to being tracked by Israel. In Nasrallah’s view, the government should be 
ashamed of itself because ‘the 5th of May (the two decisions) is a mark of disgrace 
stamped on its (government) forehead throughout history, because it (government) 
wanted to do what Israel failed to accomplish over thirty-three days of war (Israeli war in 
2006)’ (lines 418–420). In this respect, Nasrallah manages not only to present Hezbollah 
as a victim, instead of being the perpetrator, but also to villainize his opponents. Through 
this fallacious evidence, Nasrallah justifies the attribution of blame and absolves himself 
(and his party) of responsibility. In this case, blaming the 14th of March party rests on 
attributing a fictitious standpoint to a source, the ‘Winograd Report’. This is another 
instance of the straw man fallacy.114  
                                                          
113 The Winograd Commission was an Israeli-led investigation seeking to assess alleged failures in the 
performance of the Israeli government and army during the Israeli war on Lebanon in 2006.    
114 A thorough review of the Winograd report, which is published online, reveals that the report assesses the 
failings and shortcomings of the Israeli decision to wage war on Lebanon in 2006, such as flaws in 
preparedness, in the decision-making process, and the army’s performance. The report does not mention the 
need to dismantle Hizbollah’s telecommunications network nor does it assert its effectiveness during the 
war. On the contrary, Hizbollah is only mentioned for its ability to decide on the time of escalation with 
Israel and its growing missile arsenal. 
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The 14th of March party also accused Nasrallah of changing the power sharing system 
from a Christian-Muslim party to a tripartite rule. This is the second accusation that 
Nasrallah aims to refute. To falsify this accusation, Nasrallah shifts the burden of proof 
onto his opponents.  
This concept (tripartite) was fabricated by them (14th of March party), [---] No one in 
the opposition (Hizbollah’s party) spoke about the tripartite issue [---], I tell you that I 
do not understand their precise meaning. [---] they proposed the issue of tripartite rule 
only to put the opposition in a defensive position. I wish that the opposition [---] would 
ignore this fabrication. All they want is to make us defend ourselves. We (Hizbollah 
party) didn’t propose this issue, end of discussion, and their (14th of March party) claim 
does not have any factual basis at all. 
(lines 312–325)  
 
Nasrallah claims that Hizbollah (and his party) is not calling for a tripartite type of 
governance. In fact, Nasrallah mentions that he does not understand what is meant by 
tripartite rule. Nasrallah accuses the 14th of March party of inventing the issue of tripartite 
rule. He also asserts that the 14th of March party cannot provide evidence to support their 
claim. In this case, Nasrallah is appealing to ignorance. This means that Nasrallah’s claim 
(we did not propose this issue) should be accepted as true as long as the other party is 
unable to provide evidence that attests to the contrary (they do not have any factual basis 
to prove it). In this case, Nasrallah is shifting the burden of proof through argumentum ad 
ignorantiam.115 At this level, Nasrallah’s argumentation shifts from responding to 
accusations to legitimating the ‘Invasion of Beirut’.     
The 14th of March party criticised Hizbollah’s ‘Invasion of Beirut’ because it enflamed 
intra-sectarian conflict, i.e. the ‘Invasion of Beirut’ was a wrong action. Therefore, 
                                                          
115 This fallacy is a violation of Rule 2, the Obligation to Defend Rule. It amounts to shifting the burden of 
proof by requiring the other party to show that the protagonist’s standpoint is wrong.  
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Nasrallah attempts to rebut this claim through a set of argumentum ad consequentiam and 
show that the ‘Invasion of Beirut’ was right. In the second section of his argumentation, 
Nasrallah is directly addressing the 14th of March audience, in particular, the citizens of 
Beirut, where most of the clashes between Shiites and Sunnis took place. Nasrallah starts 
his defence by urging Beirut citizens to ask themselves a set of questions. The objective is 
to cast doubt on this group’s information related to the ‘Invasion of Beirut’ and to prepare 
them for new information that Nasrallah is going to disclose.    
I want to address our people in Beirut and urge them to ask: who were those (the 14th 
of March party) who turned Beirut into a city for militias under the heading of security 
companies, and who filled the city with centres for dispatching arms under the cover 
of this title? [---] Does anyone still doubt that thousands of fighters were brought to 
Beirut prior to the government’s decision? What was being planned? (lines 427–436) 
 
In these rhetorical questions, Nasrallah is referring to Sunni citizens (fighters) who came 
from different cities in an attempt to end Hizbollah’s siege of Sunni districts in Beirut, 
yet, they failed to do so. This is another instance of shifting the blame onto the 14th of 
March party and an implicit denial of Hizbollah’s responsibility for enflaming intra-
sectarian conflict. In other words, Nasrallah implicitly suggests that the ‘Invasion of 
Beirut’ was an act of defence, and not an offensive as his opponents claim. This view is 
further exploited in the rescue narrative (see below). Nasrallah’s new information is 
presented in the form of three hypothetical future scenarios, which, according to 
Nasrallah, were planned by the government.  
Each scenario consists of Hizbollah’s reaction to the government’s decisions and the 
latter’s response. To make these scenarios more convincing, Nasrallah narrates the events 
in the form of cause-effect relations. In the first scenario, the government expects 
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Hizbollah to resort to demonstrations and sit-ins as a response to the government’s 
decisions. According to Nasrallah, if this were the case, then the government would win 
and ‘this would be a preparatory step as whoever confiscates the telecommunications 
network, will later on confiscate other weapons’ (lines 440–441). In the second scenario, 
the government expects Hizbollah to reject the decisions, thus, a ‘confrontation will take 
place between Hizbollah and the army’ (lines 443–444). According to Nasrallah, this is a 
confrontation that Hizbollah will not be involved in, and as a result the government will 
succeed in implementing the decisions.  
In the third scenario, the government anticipates that Hizbollah will resort to violence, 
and thus be involved in civil strife. If Hizbollah chooses a violent response, then 
‘thousands of fighters’ – with instructions on ‘which areas they have to take over, the 
areas they have to cut off to separate them from other areas’ (lines 462-463) – are ready 
to confront Hizbollah. According to Nasrallah, if Hizbollah was involved in civil strife, 
then the government would take this as a pretext to call for foreign intervention.     
These events (intra-sectarian conflict) were meant to be taken as a pretext to demand 
the intervention of foreign forces under the title Sectarian war in Lebanon, to raise the 
call to the world saying 'Please help us stop the war, this is what was planned. 
 (lines 464–467) 
 
In Nasrallah’s view, the third scenario (foreign intervention) is the most dangerous one. 
Moreover, Nasrallah implicitly suggests that this scenario would have been implemented 
had Hizbollah not acted in the way it did on 7 May – the ‘Invasion of Beirut’.  
It (the invasion of Beirut) put a quick end to a sectarian war they had planned for, and 
for which they had made preparations. It brought a quick end to a plan to burn Beirut 
by sedition and civil war, it put a quick end to a major conspiracy that was prepared 
for this resistance. The 7th of May spared Beirut bloodshed, preserved the official 
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institutions of Beirut, the homes and families of Beirut, which they wanted to destroy 
and burn on the 5th of May. (lines 478–483) 
 
The hypothetical scenario that Nasrallah narrates constitutes the elements of a rescue 
narrative: the villains are ministers, who affiliated to or are members of the 14th of March 
party, and who supported endorsement of the two decisions, the victims are Hizbollah and 
the Lebanese people who will endure the consequences of foreign intervention, the 
hero/victim is Hizbollah who takes a pre-emptive measure to rescue itself and the 
Lebanese people. Through the rescue narrative, Nasrallah claims victimhood and presents 
members of the 14th of March audience, in particular the citizens of Beirut, as victims of a 
conspiracy prepared by their own leaders. The proposition that some Lebanese officials 
would call for foreign intervention evokes fear in all sections of the audience. This 
proposition alludes to the Syrian intervention during the Lebanese civil war.116 It thus 
reminds the 14th of March party, as well as its audience, of the negative consequences that 
they faced during the Syrian domination (e.g. marginalization, imprisonment and 
assassinations). Therefore, the consequences of foreign intervention evoke fear as well as 
nationalist and patriotic sentiments.  
The sense of fear which is propagated via the construction of a hypothetical scenario 
aims, on the one hand, to warn the audience of losing autonomy. Thus, it is used as a 
heteronomisation strategy. On the other hand, it urges the Lebanese to unify based on 
shared worries. Therefore, it is used as a unification strategy. In this case, the different 
                                                          
116 In 1976, the then Lebanese government asked Syria to intervene in the Lebanese civil war in an attempt 
to limit Palestinian presence in Lebanon. The Syrian occupation ended in 2005 as a result of the Cedar 
Revolution organised by the 14th of March party (see Chapter 1, section 5).   
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elements of the rescue narrative appear as premises in an argument from fear appeal. 
Adopting Walton’s et al. (2008) scheme, the argument can be reconstructed as follows:     
Premise 1: If Hizbollah did not invade Beirut, then sectarian strife would spread and foreign 
forces/ countries would intervene 
Premise 2:  This scenario is very bad for the resistance and for Lebanon  
Premise 3:  Therefore, the scenario ought to be prevented if possible 
Premise 4: But the only way to prevent this scenario was to invade Beirut in order to save the 
citizens of Beirut;  
Conclusion:  Therefore, Hizbollah had to invade Beirut   
 
Through the rescue narrative, Nasrallah constructs Hizbollah as a saviour or as the one 
whose actions bring salvation to the Lebanese people, especially to the citizens of Beirut. 
It follows that the ‘Invasion of Beirut’ is an act that should be praised and not criticised. 
To arrive at this conclusion, Nasrallah advances an argument scheme from moral values 
to justify the goal (saving Lebanon from foreign intervention). This means that sparing 
Beirut bloodshed and preserving families, homes and institutions in Beirut are reasons to 
evaluate the desirability of the action. This is an implicit call for the 14th of March 
audience to review their positions in light of Nasrallah’s new information. The 14th of 
March audience, especially citizens of Beirut, were against the ‘Invasion of Beirut’. 
Therefore, to make his justification cohere with their background knowledge and beliefs, 
Nasrallah leads them to access a less highly activated set of indisputable beliefs that 
weigh in favour of the action. This is achieved through reframing the ‘invasion of Beirut’ 
in such a way as to make it conform with nationalist and patriotic sentiments, i.e. via a 
rescue narrative.  
The events of the third hypothetical scenario constitute the elements of a rescue narrative 
and are configured as premises in an argument from fear appeal. The third scenario is also 
configured as premises for argumentum ad consequentiam (a variant which mimics the 
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argument scheme reductio ad absurdum). Foreign intervention is the negative 
consequence cited, had the ‘Invasion of Beirut’ not taken place. The scenario also 
outlines the positive consequences of invading Beirut. These constitute the premises for 
argumentum ad consequentiam (a variant which mimics the argument scheme from 
positive consequences). In addition to putting a quick end to sectarian war, to burning 
Beirut and to a major conspiracy etc., Nasrallah enumerates the positive effects of the 
‘Invasion of Beirut’ on Lebanese politics.  
This is the greatness of our martyrs’ blood. [---] I declare the 7th of May as one of the 
glorious days of the Resistance in Lebanon. And as a consequence, the 7th of May 
placed Lebanon on the path to resolution, and brought Lebanon out of the stymie they 
had placed it in, the 7th of May compelled them to return to dialogue table which they 
had previously rejected, the 7th of May led to the election of a president and the 
formation of a national unity government, the relative stability which Lebanese have 
enjoyed during the last year is one of the blessings of 7th May, thanks to the martyrs’ 
blood who fell in the 7th of May.  (lines 484–493) 
 
This means that the ‘Invasion of Beirut’ was carried out for the sake of achieving noble 
goals. In this case, argumentum ad consequentiam (a variant that mimics the argument 
scheme from negative consequences) is combined with the argument scheme for the 
nobility of a goal, via which actions are justified. Nasrallah mentions the negative 
consequences of the ‘Invasion of Beirut’ in terms of martyrs who belong to his political 
party and audience.117 It follows that the ‘invasion of Beirut’ is morally virtuous and 
religiously justified. This is also invoked through the use of lexis that conveys religious 
meanings, such as blessings and glory. Consequently, the positive consequences of the 
                                                          
117 Martyrdom is a religious concept that can only be understood in relation to the Islamic concept of Holy 
Struggle or Jihad, i.e. actions carried to defend Muslim nations, lands and sacred places, among others. In a 
speech that followed the ‘Invasion of Beirut’, Nasrallah declared that those who died from the other group 
are ‘victims for whom we are deeply saddened’.  
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‘Invasion of Beirut’ are realised due to those martyrs who sacrificed their blood for the 
sake of saving Beirut. Therefore, Nasrallah is advancing an argument from sacrifice 
(Walton et al., 2008, p. 322) that can be reconstructed as follows:    
Premise 1: For the thing X (saving Beirut and sparing Beirut blood) sacrifice S (martyrs) is made 
Premise 2: If a great sacrifice S has been made for X, then the value V of X will be greater  
Premise 3: A great sacrifice S has been made 
Conclusion: X (saving Beirut and spearing Beirut blood) is of great value V 
 
The overall argumentation that Nasrallah puts forward to legitimise and defend the 













In this stage, Nasrallah is directly addressing the 14th of March party, especially the 
citizens of Beirut: ‘I want to address our people in Beirut’ (lines 427–428), ‘I want to ask 
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Figure 7.1: Positive and negative consequences of invading Beirut    
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Beirut citizens’ (line 423). Nasrallah manages to establish communion with this audience 
through referential strategies, such as the pronoun ‘our’: ‘to our dear people in Beirut’ 
(line 478). Moreover, Nasrallah presents this section of the audience as those who are 
willing to change their position based on the truth which Nasrallah is supplying. 
Communion with this audience is enhanced through the events of the rescue narrative. 
Through this narrative, Nasrallah presents the ‘Invasion of Beirut’ as an action aimed at 
protecting and saving Beirut citizens: ‘The 7th of May, spared Beirut bloodshed, 
preserved the official institutions of Beirut, the homes and families of Beirut’ (lines 481–
483). Adaptation to the 14th of March audience is also evident in the way Nasrallah 
reframes the ‘Invasion of Beirut’ so as to meet the frame of reference of this audience, i.e. 
by invoking patriotic and nationalist sentiments.   
In his presentation of the arguments, Nasrallah presents two contrasting scenes. The first 
is related to the negative consequences had Hizbollah not invaded Beirut (third 
hypothetical scenario), whereas the second enumerates the positive effects that had 
already materialised (e.g. sparing Beirut bloodshed, preserving homes and institutions). In 
the hypothetical scenario, fear is evoked through the use of lexical terms that pertain to 
war: ‘struggle, confrontation, confiscate, weapons, clash with the army, areas to be taken 
over, intervention of foreign forces, burn Beirut, destroyed’. This dreadful scene is 
contrasted with the ‘Invasion of Beirut’, which is predicated with positive attributes. 
Thus, these serve as predication strategies: ‘protected, saved blood, saved homes and 
families, brought Lebanon out of the stymie’. Despite the pejorative language that 
Nasrallah uses to demonize his opponents, Nasrallah ends his argumentation by calling 
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for unity and emphasising solidarity. This is the perspective that is propagated in the 
concluding stage.   
Concluding Stage  
In this stage, Nasrallah explicitly announces the result of his argumentation: ‘I declare the 
7th of May (Invasion of Beirut) to be one of the glorious days of the Resistance in 
Lebanon’ (lines 486–487). This implies that the ‘Invasion of Beirut’ was not only right 
but also commendable. Nasrallah is making an absolute of the success of his defence, 
which amounts to the fallacy of concluding that a standpoint is true because it has been 
defended successfully. Nasrallah re-emphasizes religious values to legitimise the 
‘Invasion of Beirut’. In Arabic, glorious means that the action is bestowed by Divine 
blessings, i.e. the action is in accordance with Islamic law/ Sharia. This is the highest 
level of legitimation that an action can attain from an Islamic point of view. Based on this 
view, Nasrallah absolves himself (and Hizbollah) of any moral responsibility for killing 
other Lebanese. 
This form of religious justification appeals strongly to Nasrallah’s immediate audience. In 
contrast, Nasrallah dose not acknowledge the sacrifices of the 14th of March audience. 
There is neither explicit nor implicit reference to their human losses. Despite Nasrallah’s 
efforts to vilify the leaders of the 14th of March party, he ends his speech by emphasizing 
solidarity and pulling together (unification and cohesivation strategies). This is realised 
through lexical terms (presentational devices) that convey unification: ‘we (Hizbollah) 
call for cooperation and partnership, to overcome the past to concert efforts, to build our 




In this speech, Nasrallah attempts to achieve multiple political goals. Among these are 
publicising the 8th of March party’s political programme and mobilising supporters for the 
forthcoming elections. However, the analysis only focuses on those parts of the speech 
that relate to responding to accusations and legitimising the ‘Invasion of Beirut’. To this 
end, Nasrallah makes strategic choices: selecting topical potential, adapting to the 
audience, presenting his arguments. In the confrontation stage, Nasrallah evades 
mentioning the main points of disagreement. This permits him to present the 
confrontation in terms of two conflicting images, the image of the 14th of March party 
versus the image of the Hizbollah party. To construct both, Nasrallah resorts to historical 
events in order to applaud the decisions and actions pursued by his group and to denounce 
those of opponents. The lessons and assumptions conveyed in these historical events are 
taken as common starting points for the discussion. In the opening stage, facts relating to 
signing the 17th of May Treaty with Israel are manipulated through presuppositions 
conveyed in rhetorical questions. It might, thus, be safe to conclude that these 
presuppositions are strategically used to overcome the epistemic filters of the 14th of 
March audience.  
The argumentation stage is divided into two sections. In the first, Nasrallah indirectly 
responds to accusations through the construction of the correct image of Hizbollah. To 
this end, Nasrallah resorts to arguments form authority, arguments from analogy and 
example, arguments from action to character and from character to action in order to 
highlight the positive qualities of the 8th of March party. Similar types of arguments are 
used to construct a demonised image of the 14th of March party. In the second section, 
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Nasrallah attempts to legitimise the ‘Invasion of Beirut’ through exploiting a rescue 
narrative. Through this narrative, Hizbollah’s actions are reframed as those that brought 
salvation to Beirut citizens. A second level of justification is achieved via enumerating 
the positive consequences of invading Beirut as well as the negative consequences that 
the Invasion of Beirut prevented from materialising. The third type of justification 
consists of emphasising the moral and religious values that motivated the ‘Invasion of 
Beirut’. This allows Nasrallah to conclude his defence by announcing that the ‘Invasion 



















Reconstruction of the argument  
- Quasi-juridical defence to avoid blame:  
(1) (Nasrallah/Hizbollah should not be blamed) 
(1.1) (Nasrallah/Hizbollah should not be blamed for enflaming intra-sectarian strife that 
began with the Invasion of Beirut) 
(1.1.1) (This is an incorrect image of Hizbollah)  
 (1.1.2) (I/Nasrallah will present to you the correct image of Hizbollah)  
1.1.2.1a The large numbers of male and female graduates present  
one of the true faces of resistance 
(1.1.2.1a.1) (Hizbollah members are educated and well- 
informed citizens) 
(1.1.2.1b) (Hizbollah is a peaceful, tolerant and benevolent group that does  
not seek revenge)   
1.1.2.1b.1 The French resistance is used as an example 
1.1.2.1b.2 The French resistance executed thousands of  
those who collaborated with the Nazis 
1.1.2.1b.3 After the liberation, Hizbollah did not kill even a  
chicken from Antoine Lahad’s army  
1.1.2.1b.4 Hizbollah is much more civilized, humane and  
moral than the French resistance 
1.1.2.1c Hizbollah is capable and ready to rule the country alone  
1.1.2.1c.1 We tell those who doubted Hizbollah’s abilities  
that we are capable of managing Lebanon’s affairs   
1.1.2.1c.2 Take the example of the Israeli war  
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1.1.2.1c.3 Just as we were able to liberate our land and  
protect our country, we are able to build our country 
1.1.2.1c.4 Just as we were able to defeat the strongest army  
in the region, we are more than capable of managing 
a country a hundred times larger than Lebanon 
1.1.2.1d (Hizbollah is a nationalist and patriotic party)  
1.1.2.1d.1 Take the example of the 17th of May Treaty  
1.1.2.1d.2 It subjugates Lebanon to the Israeli project 
1.1.2.1d.3 Shiite leaders opposed the treaty  
1.1.2.1d.4 (This is patriotic and serves the national interest)  
(1.1.2.1d.4) (Hizbollah and his party are patriotic and  
nationalists)   
(1.1.2.1d.5) (Our future actions are patriotic and serve  
national interests)   
1.1.3 (The 14th of March party is to be blamed for the causes of the Invasion of  
Beirut) 
(1.1.3.1a) (This is the correct image of the 14th of March party)  
1.1.3.1a.1 The signing of the 17th of May Treaty is evidence  
1.1.3.1a.2 (Christian leaders and some Sunni leaders were  
involved in crowning Lebanon forever part the 
Zionist project) 
1.1.3.1a.3 They signed the shameful treaty  
1.1.3.1a.4 They subjugated Lebanon to Israeli conditions  
(1.1.3.1a.5) (They are traitors and unpatriotic)  
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(1.1.3.1a.6) (The 14th of March party is unpatriotic and  
traitorous) 
(1.1.3.1a.7) (Their future actions are unpatriotic and against  
the national interests)  
1.1.3.1a.7.1a The conclusions of the Winograd  
Report are evidence of their collaboration 
with Israel   
1.1.3.1a.7.1a.1 It mentions that the   
telecommunications network is the 
most important weapon in 
Hizbollah’s victory over Israel in 
2006 
1.1.3.1a.7.1a.2 The government wanted to  
do what Israel failed to accomplish in  
2006 
(1.1.3.1a.7.1a.3) (The government’s decision  
to dismantle Hizbollah’s 
telecommunication network serves 
Israel) 
1.1.3.1b It is my duty to tell Beirut citizens the truth 
(1.1.3.1b.1) (The 14th of March leaders brought militias to Beirut) 
 (1.1.3.1b.2) (The 14th of March party filled the city with centres  
for dispatching arms) 




(1.1.3.1b.4) (The 14th of March party had a plan) 
(1.2) (Hizbollah and its party should not be blamed for the tripartite issue). 
 1.2.1 This concept was fabricated by the 14th of March party 
1.2.2 I do not understand their precise intent 
1.2.3 Hizbollah and its party didn’t propose this issue 
1.2.4 Their claim does not have any factual basis at all 
-Legitimation of Action:  
(2) (The Invasion of Beirut was right)   
 (2.1) (Hizbollah responded to the two decisions taken by the government to prevent the 
worst war scenario)  
 (2.1.1) (Avoiding the worst war scenario is the right thing to do) 
2.1.1.1a Sectarian conflict would spread and foreign forces/countries  
would intervene 
2.1.1.1a.1 The government would demand foreign intervention 
  (2.1.1.1a.2) (Foreign intervention is very bad) 
(2.1.1.1a.3) (The Syrian intervention was bad)  
(2.1.1.1a.4) Foreign intervention should not be allowed  
2.1.1.1a.4.1a Our goal is to save Lebanon from foreign  
intervention 
2.1.1.1a.4.1a.1 We had to spare Beirut bloodshed, to  
preserve families, homes and institutions in Beirut  
2.1.1.1a.4.1a.2 Invasion of Beirut was the only means to 
achieve the goal  
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(2.1.1.1a.5) (The Invasion of Beirut should be positively evaluated) 
2.2 The Invasion of Beirut saved Beirut, Beirut citizens and Lebanon 
2.2.1 It ended intra-sectarian conflict and prevented foreign intervention  
2.2.2 It put a quick end to a plan to burn Beirut 
2.2.3 It out a quick end to a major conspiracy  
2.2.3 It put Lebanon on the path to resolution  
2.2.4 It led to the election of a new president and the formation of a new 
government 
(2.2.5) (The invasion of Beirut should be positively evaluated) 
2.3 I/Nasrallah declare the 7th of May to be one of the glorious days of the Resistance  
2.3.1 Thanks to the martyrs’ blood who fell on the 7th of May  
2.3.2 They sacrificed their blood to save Beirut  
2.3.4 Saving Beirut and its citizens are worthy of these sacrifices  










January 2011 Speech: Resignation from government  
1. Speech context  
After the assassination of the prime minister, Rafic Hariri (a prominent Sunni figure), in 
2005, the 14th of March party lobbied for the establishment of a Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon (STL). The objective was to carry out an international investigation under the 
auspices of the UN in order to bring perpetrators to justice.118 The different phases of the 
establishment of the tribunal, the juridical proceedings of the International Investigation 
Committee (IIC) and the contents of the expected indictment were severely and 
repeatedly criticized by Hizbollah.  
 After eighteen months of investigation, the International Investigation Committee (IIC) 
ordered Lebanese judicial authorities to arrest four pro-Syrian/ Hizbollah security 
officers. Those officers were detained for almost four years and only released after the 
new pre-trial judge, Daniel Franssen, reviewed the whole investigation process and the 
testimonies based on which the arrest warrants were issued. That is, the investigation 
depended on witnesses who falsified, distorted and fabricated facts in order to have 
arrested those with close ties to Hizbollah and Syria. This is known as the ‘file of false 
witnesses’. The release of the detainees was seen by Hizbollah as evidence of the 
Tribunal’s (SLT) politicization, lack of integrity, partiality and lack of objective 
                                                          
118 The 14th of March party accused Syria and four pro-Syrian Security commanders, while the 8th of March 
party considered Israel to be the prime suspect. On 9/8/2010, Nasrallah held a press conference in which he 
presented evidence of Israel’s involvement in the assassination. The conference proceedings are available 




standards. This view was enhanced through leaked documents, released by WikiLeaks, 
and media reports in international media outlets, such as Der Spiegel, the Washington 
Post and the Canadian CBC Channel. These reports revealed the names of some witnesses 
and the contents of their testimonies and explicitly accused four Hizbollah members of 
being involved in the assassination.  
The controversy over the STL is not restricted to ‘the file of false witnesses’. There is 
also disagreement over Lebanon’s part in funding the tribunal and the selection of 
participating judges, i.e. their political affiliation (pro- or anti-Hizbollah). The crux of the 
issue, however, is the would-be indictment, which is expected to accuse four members of 
Hizbollah of being involved in the assassination of Rafic Hariri. According to Nasrallah, 
such an accusation is ‘an open call for sectarian conflict, since four Shiite members would 
be accused, and later convicted, of assassinating a highly valued Sunni leader’.119  
To avoid the anticipated turmoil, Nasrallah called upon the 14th of March party to hold 
talks in order to arrive at a resolution that would spare Lebanon the consequences of 
accusing members of Hizbollah.120 This was seen by the 14th of March party as an 
ongoing effort by Hizbollah to disrupt the mission of the IIC and obstruct justice. 
Nevertheless, negotiations were held under the patronage of Syria and Saudi Arabia – 
known as the ‘Saudi-Syrian initiative’. It aimed to find means to spare Lebanon the 
repercussions of the expected indictment. As a result, a set of terms were requested from 
both sides of the struggle as part of the would-be agreement. The 14th of March party saw 
                                                          
119 This direct quote is taken from Nasrallah’s speech on 28/10/2010, in which he comments on the 
performance of the International Investigation Committee (IIC). The speech can be retrieved from 
Hizbollah’s website:  www.english.alahednews.com.lb 
120 For Hizbollah’s view on the SLT and the indictment see Chapter 1, section 5.  
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Hizbollah’s participation in the initiative as an indirect acknowledgment of its role in the 
assassination. Moreover, the 14th of March party branded its acceptance of the initiative 
terms a compromise made for the sake of saving Lebanon.  
In contrast, Hizbollah’s party saw the terms as serving the personal interests of some of 
the 14th of March leaders. Despite this debate, negotiations continued over several 
months, but were abruptly suspended. Shortly afterwards, eleven pro-Hizbollah ministers 
resigned from the unity government in which Hizbollah had veto power. From a 
constitutional point of view, the resignation of one third of the ministers meant the 
resignation (or toppling) of the ruling government, whereby its status automatically 
changes to a ‘caretaker government’. The resignation was seen by the 14th of Mach party 
as a coup against the Doha Agreement, which explicitly prohibits the resignation of either 
party so that the delicate balance of power is not dissipated. The 14th of March camp 
portrayed Hizbollah as the party responsible for suspending the negotiations. In their 
view, Hizbollah’s reluctance to accept the initiative terms and fulfil certain demands are 
the main reasons for ending the negotiations. After widespread discontent over the 
toppling of the government, Nasrallah gave a speech, on 16/1/2011, in which he 
responded to the 14th of March accusations.  
2. Speech analysis 
2.1. Preparatory step 
In this speech, Nasrallah aims, on the one hand, to defend himself (and his party) against 
accusations made by opponents, and to restore the legitimacy of a problematised political 
action, on the other. As for the former, Nasrallah responds to the following accusations: 
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(i) Hizbollah’s responsibility for ending the Saudi-Syrian initiative; and (ii) its 
responsibility for toppling the government. Nasrallah attempts to refute the accusations 
by: denying his (and his party’s) role in ending negotiations, casting doubt on the 14th of 
March party, scapegoating them and, finally, shifting the blame onto them. As for the 
latter, Nasrallah attempts to legitimise the action of toppling the government by stating 
the reasons that led to the resignation, highlighting the negative consequences of keeping 
the ruling government in office, and the positive consequences that the toppling of the 
government brought to the political arena.  
The main differences of opinion are, therefore, related to the suspension of the Saudi-
Syrian initiative and the resignation of the Hizbollah party from the government, which 
eventually led to the resignation (or toppling) of the ruling government. This means that 
the parts of the speech that relate to the recorded tapes broadcast by Al Jadeed Channel, 
which revealed how some testimonies were fabricated (lines 228–233), Nasrallah’s 
comments on previous elections (lines 372–405), the political measures that should be 
taken to form a new unity government (lines 444–512) and Hizbollah’s reaction to the 
expected announcement of the indictment are excluded from the analysis (lines 432–571). 
This is because these parts are not relevant to the resolution of differences of opinion.  
2.2. Reconstruction and analysis   
Confrontation Stage 
This speech is divided into two parts. The first part relates to refuting accusations, 
avoiding blame and holding the 14th of March party responsible for ending the Saudi-
Syrian initiative, i.e. a quasi-judicial defence. To achieve these goals, Nasrallah defends 
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the following claims: Hizbollah should not be blamed for ending the initiative or 
negotiations, and it should not be blamed for toppling the government. To support the 
first claim, Nasrallah chooses to address three issues: (i) Hizbollah made every effort 
possible to resolve the dispute (lines 47–70); (ii) Hizbollah accepted the terms stipulated 
by the initiative (lines 69–101, 178–194); and (iii) the 14th of March party ended the 
negotiations to comply with American demands (lines 124–141). As for the second claim, 
Nasrallah addresses the government’s inefficacy in solving pressing political, economic 
and social problems (lines 267–318), thus suggesting that the government is responsible 
for the reasons leading to the resignation.  
The second part of the speech is an attempt to restore the legitimacy of an action that has 
been severely criticized. This is achieved by rebutting opponents’ claim: toppling the 
government was wrong. Thus, the main claim defended in this part is: Hizbollah’s 
resignation from the government was right. In his defence, Nasrallah advances a series of 
argumentum ad consequentiam, in which he highlights the negative actions of the ruling 
government and the materialised positive consequences of the resignation. 
Nasrallah strategically manoeuvres in the confrontation stage, by leaving implicit the 
main points of disagreement (toppling the government and opponents’ accusations were 
wrong). This strategy permits Nasrallah to define the confrontation in terms of a conflict 
over facts and pursued goals (topical potential), i.e. facts presented by the 14th of March 
party versus facts presented by Nasrallah. In terms of goals, the conflict is between 
Hizbollah’s aim to protect and save Lebanon from the repercussions of the indictment 
versus personal gains pursued by the 14th of March leaders (e.g. closing the file on false 
witnesses). Nasrallah starts his defence by claiming that it is his responsibility to provide 
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the Lebanese, especially the 14th of March audience, with the facts. Nasrallah presents the 
task of providing the audience with facts as one that lies within the remit of rights and 
obligations.  
I find myself responsible for presenting the facts and analysing and commenting on 
them as well as sketching an image as close as possible to the course of events that 
took place in our country, because it is the right of the Lebanese people, the right of 
all Lebanese, the right of all those who love Lebanon and care about Lebanon, the right 
of the people in Lebanon, of the state, of the Resistance and for the future, to be 
acquainted with and be informed as much as possible about the course of events 
because the facts and the way things actually progressed can clearly reveal the 
intentions and the aims and what is being prepared for this country and for all of us. 
(lines 6–13) 
 
From the beginning of the speech, Nasrallah dissociates the 14th of March audience from 
their leaders who ‘talk about their wishes and not about facts and real events’ (lines 26–
27), and who ‘present unreal things to the people (14th of March audience)’ (line 29) for 
the sake of ‘deluding people (14th of March audience)’ (line 72). In this case, Nasrallah is 
casting doubt on the 14th of March leaders, using two variants of ad hominem attacks. The 
abusive variant attacks opponents’ bad character and unreliability, whereas the 
circumstantial variant casts doubt on opponents’ motives. To strengthen the dissociation 
between the 14th of March audience and their leaders, Nasrallah portrays the former as 
responsible citizens who, once presented with the facts, will be able to see ‘what is 
prepared for this country and for all of us’ (lines 12–13), i.e. appealing to the audience’s 
duty to revise their positions. Moreover, by taking on the role of disseminator of 
knowledge, Nasrallah positions himself as a credible source of information whose aim is 
to give the Lebanese a ‘clear picture’ (line 28) of the situation.  
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Nasrallah’s trustworthiness and credibility are contrasted with the 14th of March leaders’ 
lack of credibility and biased representations, which resulted in their failure to anticipate 
what was being planned for Lebanon. This implies that there are hidden scenarios, 
conspiracies or plots that are already planned, whose aim is to target Hizbollah and 
Lebanon as a country. This is an attempt to claim victimhood, or victim-perpetrator 
reversal in Wodak’s terms, achieved through the construction of elements of a rescue 
narrative. With respect to goals, Nasrallah presents Hizbollah’s participation in the 
initiative in terms of finding means that would protect and save Lebanon from the 
repercussions of the indictment, i.e. emphasising the nobility of the goal.  
We (Hizbollah) refuse the indictment, and we believe that it is politicized and we 
believe that we are targeted by America and Israel via the indictment, but Lebanon is 
our country and we are keen to protect this country. (lines 45–47) 
 
Hizbollah’s nobility is contrasted with the self-centredness of the 14th of March 
leaders, in particular the prime minister, Saad Hariri (the son of the late prime 
minister). According to Nasrallah, some of the terms requested by the 14th of March 
party – as part of the initiative – were for personal gain and ‘served the interests of 
Hariri’s political and security team’ (lines 186–187). In contrast, Hizbollah’s 
acceptance of the initiative terms aims to protect Lebanon and preserve its safety 
and interests.   
We (Hizbollah) were ready to concede political and non-political gains to the team of 
PM Hariri to protect Lebanon and, consequently, yes, we took this position 




In his adaptation to the audience, Nasrallah manages to create communion with the 
14th of March audience by constructing them as rational allies who are willing to 
accept his position, or at least revise their positions in light of the facts revealed. 
Moreover, creating empathy with this section of the audience is achieved through 
the use of referential strategies, such as the pronouns ‘us’ and ‘our’, which serve as 
a collectivisation strategy: ‘what is being prepared for this country and for all of us’ 
(lines 12–13), ‘Lebanon is our country’ (line 47). Nasrallah appeals to the audience 
by emphasising their right to know the facts: ‘it is the right of the Lebanese people, 
the right of all Lebanese, the right of all those who love Lebanon and care about 
Lebanon’ (lines 8–9). However, Nasrallah’s interest in revealing the facts is not 
absolute. For example, Nasrallah refrains from stating the terms that were proposed 
by the 14th of March party for reasons that he did not disclose: ‘for certain reasons I 
will not reveal these terms’ (lines 183–184). This does not only put Nasrallah in a 
privileged knowledge position and ask the audience to have faith in him, it also 
implicitly suggests that the facts he wants to disclose are limited to those that 
support his position.  
Nasrallah constructs the 14th of March leaders as those who are only motivated by 
their own welfare and interests, with total disregard for the national interest. To 
emphasise the distinction between the two parties, Nasrallah uses pronouns (e.g. 
they) and demonstratives (e.g. those) that indicate spatial distance, which serves to 
realise a perspectivisation strategy: ‘all those (14th of March leaders) who engage in 
sophistry’ (line 71), ‘they (14th of March party) talk about their wishes’ (line 27). 
Moreover, the negative representation of the 14th of March leaders is realised 
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through predications that attribute negative qualities to the group, such as ‘engage 
in sophistry’, ‘claim illusionary heroism’ (line 29), ‘present unreal things to 
people’. In contrast, Hizbollah’s actions aim to support the national interest and are 
motivated by moral values. Thus, these actions are qualified with positive attributes 
that serve to realise predication strategies, e.g. ‘we (Hizbollah) are keen to protect 
this country’ (line 47), ‘we took this position (accepting terms) taking into account 
Lebanon’s safety and interest’ (lines 190–191). Nasrallah’s claim – what is being 
prepared for this county – presumes that agreement over pre-existing plans, plots or 
hidden agendas is already established. In fact, this is a claim that Nasrallah should 
prove instead of presenting it as a common starting point for the discussion. This 
strategy is exploited further in the opening stage.  
Opening Stage 
In this stage, Nasrallah reveals the sources of his information. In his view, being 
acquainted with the facts and the actual progression of events is necessary in order to 
‘reveal the intentions and the aims and what is being prepared for this country and for all 
of us’ (lines 12–13)’. Thus, Nasrallah proceeds to reveal the factual basis of his position, 
and as such, he establishes clear starting points for the discussion. 
I will start briefly with the facts regarding the so-called the Arab Initiative or the Saudi-
Syrian effort following the talks related to the imminent announcement of the 
indictment […] which intends to accuse Hizbollah’s members or cadres. (lines 14–18) 
 
Nasrallah’s facts are of two types: Facts that are based on Nasrallah’s personal knowledge 
and expertise, as a participant in the negotiations (i.e. expert opinion), and those that are 
attributed to political figures. In either case, Nasrallah’s objective is to cast doubt on the 
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14th of March party, to present them as blameworthy in order to shift the blame onto 
them. As such, the process of revealing facts is used strategically to avoid blame. In the 
quasi-judicial part, Nasrallah’s facts seem to support two claims: Nasrallah/ Hizbollah 
should not be blamed for ending negotiations and toppling the government. Nasrallah 
starts his defence by casting doubt on the 14th of March audience’s pre-existing 
knowledge, followed by revealing the identity of those ‘who thwarted this course (of 
negotiations) and led things in this direction (ending the initiative)’ (lines 112–113). 
This suggests that Nasrallah/ Hizbollah is not responsible for ending the negotiations, 
someone else is. This presupposition is taken as a common starting point for the 
discussion. The first set of facts relates to denying Hizbollah having responsibility for 
ending the negotiations. Thus, Nasrallah presents facts related to different stages that the 
negotiations passed through, the terms demanded by both parties and the terms of a 
would-be agreement. Nasrallah asserts that Hizbollah’s participation in the negotiations is 
motivated by the will to save Lebanon from repercussions of the indictment. Moreover, 
Nasrallah elaborates on the different solutions proposed during negotiations and the final 
terms of the agreement that were approved by the 14th of March leaders. Despite this 
acknowledgement, Nasrallah ascribes failure in finalising the agreement, and 
consequently the suspension of the initiative, to the 14th of March party. 
PM Saad Hariri went to America and held meetings with the US administration, and 
without prior notice the Saudi side called the Syrian side to say that they were sorry 
and, due to the pressures and circumstances, they were unable to continue their efforts 
(initiative). (lines 107–109) 
 
According to Nasrallah, an agreement that would save Lebanon from a Sunni-Shiite 
conflict does not serve American and Israeli interests. Thus, the main function of the first 
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set of facts is to accuse the 14th of March leaders of complying with American and Israeli 
demands at the expense of the national interest.  
It's obvious that the Americans and the Israelis were against this Arab effort (initiative) 
[…] they (US and Israel) interfered in a decisive way and they informed that this issue 
(agreement) should not move on and has to stop, and thus the effort stopped […] the 
US and Israeli gambling and especially the Israeli gambling on the repercussions of 
the indictment which accuses members of Hizbollah. Is it possible that the Americans 
and the Israelis allow the Arab efforts to succeed and to hinder all these expectations 
and gambling? (lines 125–141) 
 
The effectiveness of Nasrallah’s claims can be attributed to the way he formulates them 
so as to escape doubt or criticism. For example, his claim (it is obvious that Americans 
and Israelis were against the initiative) is presented as self-evident, i.e. no proof is 
required. Presenting a standpoint as self-evident amounts to the fallacy of evading the 
burden of proof.121 Moreover, Nasrallah reasserts this claim by presenting it in a non-
falsifiable way. This is achieved through a rhetorical question: Is it possible that the 
Americans and the Israelis allow the Arab efforts to succeed and to hinder all these 
expectations and gambling?, via which the claim is made immune to criticism, i.e. no one 
can falsify the fact that Israel is against Lebanon’s interests. This is another instance of 
the fallacy of evading the burden of proof.   
The second set of facts relates to denying Hizbollah’s responsibility for toppling the 
government. These facts are drawn from Hizbollah’s party unproductive experience in 
government: ‘we (Hizbollah) acknowledge that we are in this government incapable of 
facing financial and administrative corruption and in executing financial, administrative 
                                                          
121 This fallacy is a violation of the Standpoint Rule, Rule 2, by which the protagonist evades the burden of 
proof by presenting a standpoint as self-evident.   
250 
 
and economic reforms’ (lines 283–285). Highlighting the difficulties that Nasrallah’s 
party faced in government (lines 267–318) provides concrete evidence to support his 
claim as well as enhance his objectivity. 
Nasrallah’s objective position is also enhanced through the use of arguments from 
authority, indirect speech and passive constructions (presentational devices). These 
linguistic means do not only promote objectivity but also serve as perspectivisation 
strategies, i.e. they convey Nasrallah’s detachment. This means distancing Nasrallah from 
having any direct influence or involvement in the course of events that feeds into a 
strategy of avoiding blame: ‘We (Hizbollah) were informed of the presence of an effort 
(initiative) of this kind’ (line 20), the ‘Saudi side said that they can't cancel the 
indictment’ (line 36), ‘We were told by the Saudi side that they agree’ (lines 74– 75), 
‘PM Saad Hariri made a statement in which he said that the agreement was finalized 
months ago’ (lines 97–98).  
In terms of adaptation to the audience, Nasrallah presents facts in the form of statements 
attributed to sources whom the 14th of March audience trust and respect. Invoking anti-
Israeli/ Zionist sentiments is another strategy via which Nasrallah aims to meet the frame 
of reference of the audience: ‘Is it possible that the Americans and the Israelis allow the 
Arab efforts to succeed and to hinder all these expectations and gambling?’ (lines 139–
141). This perceptive is further exploited in the argumentation stage.  
Argumentation Stage 
In his attempts to refute the accusation of ending the initiative, Nasrallah advances three 
lines of defence, all of which are based on facts that are either accessible to Nasrallah, as 
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a participant in the negotiations, or attributed to external sources. In his version of the 
different stages of the negotiations and the terms of the would-be agreement, Nasrallah 
invokes the authority of the Saudi king, the Syrian president (Bashar Al Assad), the 
Lebanese prime minister, Saad Hariri (the leader of the 14th of March party). For 
example, ‘the Saudi side said that they can't cancel the indictment’ (line 36), ‘We were 
told by the Saudi side that they (14th of March party) agree and that the PM Saad Hariri 
approved the terms that we proposed’ (lines 74–75), ‘PM Saad Hariri made a statement in 
which he said that the agreement was finalized months ago’ (lines 97–98). This set of 
statements attributed to sources supports the proposition that serious efforts were made, 
especially by Hizbollah, to resolve the dispute in order to protect Lebanon from negative 
consequences of the indictment.  
We (Hizbollah) were informed of the presence of an effort of this kind (initiative), and 
we supported it. We bet on this effort (initiative), as did all those who work for the 
welfare of Lebanon, so that Lebanon may overcome this ordeal (repercussions of the 
indictment) or the ordeal and sedition planned for Lebanon. (lines 20–24) 
 
Attributing statements to an external source does not only promote Nasrallah’s 
objectivity, it also serves to absolve Nasrallah of any responsibility for ending the 
initiative. Moreover, invoking the authority of the Saudi king (line19) and the Lebanese 
prime minister. who are trusted and valued by members of the 14th of March audience, 
serves to satisfy their epistemic filters, thereby enhancing the acceptability of Nasrallah’s 
propositions. In the statements attributed to the Saudis (mentioned above), Nasrallah 
reveals that the 14th of March leaders accepted Hizbollah’s demands or terms as part of 
the would-be agreement. According to Nasrallah, these terms are: withdrawing the 
Lebanese judges from the STL, ending the financing of the STL, and cancelling the STL 
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agreement with the UN (lines 50–56). In Nasrallah’s view, ‘if we (Hizbollah and the 
government) are committed to these three terms, this means protecting Lebanon and 
saving Lebanon from the repercussions of the indictment’ (lines 69–70). In this case, 
Nasrallah is simultaneously advancing three arguments: argument from positive 
consequences, argument from fear appeal and the false dilemma fallacy.  
As for the argument from positive consequences, Nasrallah asserts that implementing the 
terms will protect and save Lebanon from the repercussions of the indictment. According 
to Nasrallah, the indictment would ‘lead to conflict at the national level’ (lines 67–68) if 
these terms were not implemented. Thus, he is playing on the audience’s emotions by 
instilling fear (argument from fear appeal) and reducing the scope of alternatives to two 
options (false dilemma), i.e. either the government implements the terms or Lebanon will 
face a horrific scenario. In fact, the negotiations failed and, as a consequence, the terms 
were not implemented, yet the horrific scenario did not befall Lebanon. This means that 
the cause-effect relation that formed the basis of Nasrallah’s defence was fallacious. 
Nasrallah’s second line of defence relates to the second accusation raised by opponents 
and which he explicitly states. 
PM Saad Hariri made a statement in which he said that the agreement was finalized 
months ago […] but there are steps (terms/demands) that are required from the other 
side (Hizbollah), which the latter have not yet fulfilled. (lines 97–98) 
 
Saad Hariri’s statement implies that Nasrallah (or Hizbollah) is the one who is 
responsible for ending the negotiations/ initiative because he failed to meet the 14th of 
March party’s demands. Nasrallah falsifies this accusation by asserting that he (and his 
party) had accepted some of the terms while others were subject to further discussions: 
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‘Some of these terms were clear and we accepted them, but others needed further 
discussion’ (lines 82–83). The Hizbollah party procrastination is justified by claiming that 
some of these terms represent political gains that serve Saad Hariri’s interest at the 
expense of the national interest: ‘there are one or two terms that were in line with 
Lebanon’s interest but all the other terms served the interests of Hariri’s political and 
security team’ (lines 174–175). Despite this fact, Nasrallah presents his acceptance of 
some of the 14th of March party’s demands in terms of moral values.  
We (Hizbollah) were ready to concede political and non-political gains to the team of 
PM Hariri to protect Lebanon and, consequently, yes, we took this position 
(accepting terms), taking into account Lebanon’s safety and interest. (lines 185–187)  
 
Nasrallah’s defence consists of two argument schemes: argument from moral values 
which justifies the goal, and argument from the nobility of a goal scheme which justifies 
the means used to achieve the goal. In other words, Hizbollah’s aim – protecting and 
saving Lebanon – is motivated by the moral value of preserving Lebanon’s safety and 
interests. To achieve this goal, Hizbollah participated in negotiations and accepted some 
of its terms (i.e. emphasising the nobility of the goal). Nasrallah manages to deny any 
responsibility by giving the impression that he (and his party) had made painful 
concessions for the sake of protecting and saving Lebanon. At this point, Nasrallah’s 
defence shifts from denying accusations to explicitly accusing his opponents of ending 
the initiative. Shifting the blame onto his opponents represents the third line of 
Nasrallah’s defence.  
PM Saad Hariri went to America and held meetings with the US administration, and 
without prior notice the Saudi side called the Syrian side to say that they were sorry 
and, due to pressures (exercised by the US) and circumstances, they were unable to 
continue their efforts (initiative) […] As soon as he (Saad Hariri) went to America, 
this effort was beheaded […] This poses a very big question which I would like the 
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Lebanese to ask. All Lebanese are worried today about the situation in Lebanon. There 
was a possibility that we might not reach this point, so why have we reached it? (lines 
107–109, 158–162) 
 
According to Nasrallah, the US administration exercised pressure over Saad Hariri 
in order to end the initiative. In Nasrallah’s view, there is a link between Saad 
Hariri’s meetings with American officials and ending the initiative. This is another 
instance of post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy, in which a causal relation is based on 
observations and coincidence. To support this claim, Nasrallah presents facts 
derived from his own observations and knowledge as an expert in negotiations. 
Nasrallah claims that the US and Israel commanded the 14th of March leaders to end 
negotiations.  
It's obvious that the Americans and the Israelis were against this Arab effort (initiative) 
[…] when they realized that the process (negotiations) was yielding very positive 
results, they (the US and Israel) interfered in a decisive way and they informed (Saad 
Hariri) that this issue (agreement) should not move on and had to stop, and thus the 
effort stopped […] the US and Israeli gambling and especially the Israeli gambling on 
the repercussions of the indictment that accuses members of Hizbollah. Is it possible 
that the Americans and the Israelis allow the Arab efforts to succeed and to hinder all 
these expectations and gambling? (lines 125–141) 
 
Nasrallah asserts that his observations and conclusions are based on facts and American 
and Israeli statements, yet, he provides none. In this case, Nasrallah promotes the 
acceptability of his propositions by exploiting his authority as an expert in negotiations, 
and in Lebanese and international politics. Therefore, Nasrallah is advancing a fallacious 
ethotic argument, a variant of argumentum ad verecundiam. 
Based on the facts and based on available data, US and Israeli statements that preceded 
the efforts and followed stopping the efforts […] This is obvious from the announced 




In Nasrallah’s view, ‘this is the only interpretation’ (lines 134–135) that explains the 
sudden suspension of negotiations, asking ‘whoever has another interpretation’ (line 134) 
to present his claim. In this case, Nasrallah’s defence has features of argumentum ad 
ignorantiam fallacy. This means that Nasrallah’s standpoint is accepted as long as the 
opposite to the standpoint is not proved to be true.122 Therefore, Nasrallah shifts the 
blame onto the 14th of March leaders who submitted to US/Israeli pressure. This strategy 
also allows Nasrallah to construct himself (his party and Lebanon) as a victim.  
Nasrallah claims that either ‘the PM Hariri and his team from the very beginning refused 
this course (initiative) and did not want this agreement’ (lines 163–164) or that ‘they (PM 
and his team) were going along with the king and the Saudi side but there was a US force 
majeure’ (lines 167–168) that compelled them to stop negotiations. In either case, 
Nasrallah launches direct ad hominem attacks in order to discredit the moral character of 
the 14th of March leaders.  
This team (14th of March leaders) cannot be entrusted with Lebanese decision-making 
nor with safeguarding Lebanon's interests or Lebanon's stability, and they do not have 
the ability to help Lebanon or lead the country out of any impasse or difficulty that 
Lebanon might face if months-old efforts were put to an end during a one hour-stay in 
the USA. (lines 173–177) 
 
  
Nasrallah emphasises the untrustworthiness and unreliability of the 14th of March leaders 
by exploiting two argument schemes: the argument scheme from action to character, and 
the argument scheme from character to action (Walton, 2006, 194–195). That is, the 14th 
of March leaders, especially Saad Hariri, worked against national interests by ending 
                                                          
122 This fallacy is a violation of the Concluding Rule, Rule 9, by which a standpoint is considered true 




negotiations and complying with American and Israeli demands; therefore, they are 
conspirators, unpatriotic and self-centred (i.e. argument scheme from action to character). 
Having such character traits means that the 14th of March party’s future political actions 
are most likely to be unpatriotic and seek to jeopardize national interests (i.e. argument 
scheme from character to action). The different arguments presented above are related to 
shifting the blame for ending negotiations onto the 14th of March leaders, represented in 
the person of Saad Hariri. This leads Nasrallah to the final accusation that he aims to 
refute, as part of a quasi-judicial defence, i.e. being blamed for toppling the government. 
Nasrallah supports this claim with evidence presented in the form of cause-effect 
relations. 
After we were informed of this (ending initiative) and we were also informed that the 
indictment will be issued soon and that it might be issued within days, we consulted 
our allies […] and we unanimously agreed that it is our duty […] to resign from the 
government and consequently topple the government. (lines 114–117) 
 
This means that toppling the government came after ending negotiations and after news 
of the imminent announcement of the indictment. More importantly, the toppling of the 
government means that ‘if the General Prosecutor wants to help the Lebanese, […] it 
would not then be the job of the Lebanese government to arrest those accused […] which 
might lead to conflict at the national level’ (lines 65–68). This represents one of the 
advantages of toppling the government. To support his claim (he should not be blamed 
for toppling the government), Nasrallah provides further evidence based on the Hizbollah 
party’s experience in government. Nasrallah outlines the difficulties that his party faced 
through during their participation in an ‘unproductive’ government (line 272). These are: 
inability to address people’s problems, inability to combat corruption, inability to refer 
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the ‘file of false witnesses’ to the Judicial Council and, finally, inability to deal with the 
repercussions of the indictment. According to Nasrallah, these are the main reasons that 
prompted the resignation: ‘based on this diagnosis [---] we decided to resign’ (lines 334–
336). At this stage, Nasrallah’s argumentation shifts from refuting accusations to 
defending the legitimacy of toppling the government, achieved through a set of 
argumentum ad consequentiam.  
Nasrallah starts his defence by underscoring the positive consequences of toppling the 
government: ‘toppling an incapable government […] might open the door to form a 
capable, responsible, loyal government ready to hold the burden and ready to follow up, 
address issues and hold responsibilities’ (lines 323–328). Therefore, Nasrallah is 
advancing a variant of argumentum ad consequentiam, i.e. the fallacious counterpart of 
the argument from positive consequences. In Nasrallah’s view, ‘keeping the government 
would keep the door closed’ (lines 329). This proposition signals that the discussion shifts 
to what would have been the case had Hizbollah not resigned from or toppled the 
government.  
This government is incapable of facing the repercussions of the indictment; on the 
contrary, this government wants to continue financing a court that is conspiring against 
Lebanon and the Resistance and its Lebanese judges are accomplices in this 
conspiracy, and this government will later put itself in a difficult position, especially 
when the General Prosecutor requests it to arrest, unjustly, falsely and aggressively, 
Lebanese citizens. (lines 299–304) 
 
According to Nasrallah, the government and the Lebanese judges, who participate in the 
STL, are part of a conspiracy that aims to target Hizbollah by accusing four of its 
members. It follows that toppling the government put an end to this conspiracy and saved 
the unjustly and wrongfully accused members of Hizbollah being arrested. In this respect, 
258 
 
Nasrallah is appealing to the 14th of March audience’s feelings of compassion to win their 
sympathy through argumentum ad misericordiam. Moreover, Nasrallah’s statements 
suggest that had Hizbollah not toppled the government, it would have continued to 
conspire against the Resistance, and as a result, the accused members would have been 
arrested. Nasrallah is advancing a variant of argumentum ad consequentiam, which 
mimics the argument scheme reductio ad absurdum, in order to highlight what would 
have been the case had Hizbollah not toppled the government, i.e. constructing a 
hypothetical scenario. The hypothetical future scenario does not only appear as premises 
for argumentum ad consequentiam, it also constitutes the elements of a rescue narrative. 
Through the construction of a rescue narrative, Nasrallah manages to claim victimhood. 
However, the victim in this narrative is not only the Hizbollah party (or the Resistance), 
but Lebanon as a country, including the 14th of March audience, whose national stability 
and safety are threatened. As such, the 14th of March audience are implicitly constructed 
as victims of a conspiracy prepared by their own leaders.   
The country will be exposed, for we will not be able to know what the Israelis or the 
Americans will do, nor those (the 14th of March party) who want to ravage the country 
from inside and who always bet on sectarian strife and conflict. (lines 308–310). 
 
In this narrative, the villains are the leaders of the 14th of March party who succumbed to 
American and Israeli demands and ended the initiative. The victims are Hizbollah and the 
Lebanese people who will face the dire consequences of indictment, i.e. sectarian conflict. 
The hero is Hizbollah, who acts in advance not only to protect and save the Resistance 
but also to protect and save Lebanon, thereby fending off the conspiracy. It follows that 
toppling the government is an act of defence carried out in order to protect and save the 
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Resistance and Lebanon. This implies that the action conforms with the resistance 
ideology, and as such it is implicitly redefined as an act of resistance.  
Nasrallah’s hypothetical scenario, i.e. the threat of sectarian conflict as well as actions 
that could be taken by Israel or the US, aims to instil fear in the audience, especially the 
14th of March audience. On the one hand, Nasrallah’s allusion to sectarian conflict 
reminds the 14th of March audience of a frightening recent past – the ‘Invasion of Beirut’, 
and on the other hand, it evokes nationalist sentiments related to the fear arising from 
jeopardising Lebanon’s stability and safety. As such, fear is used as a heteronomisation 
strategy, by which the audience is warned of the risks of jeopardizing national security, 
and at the same time, it is a call to consolidate efforts in order to eliminate the source of 
fear. Thus, fear is used as a unification strategy. The elements of the rescue narrative also 
configure as premises in an argument from fear appeal. The argument can be 
reconstructed as follows:  
Premise 1: If Hizbollah did topple the government, then Hizbollah members would 
be arrested and Lebanon would face sectarian conflict (hypothetical 
scenario) 
Premise 2:  This is very bad for the Resistance and for Lebanon  
Premise 3:  Therefore, this ought to be prevented if possible 
Premise 4: But the only way to prevent this is by toppling the government  
Conclusion:  Therefore, Hizbollah had to topple the government  
 
 
Through this narrative, Nasrallah manages to present the Lebanese, including the14th of 
March audience, as victims who must be saved from a conspiracy that aims to target the 
Resistance and Lebanon. As a consequence, members of the 14th of March audience, who 
were originally against toppling a government led by their leader, are encouraged to 
review their position. To this end, Nasrallah reframes the action in such a way as to make 
it cohere with generally accepted background knowledge and beliefs. That is, Nasrallah 
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leads members of the 14th of March audience to access a less highly activated set of 
indisputable beliefs that weigh in favour of action (see Chapter 3, section 6.3.3). This is 
achieved through reframing the action of toppling the government so as to conform with a 
resistance ideology and nationalist views. This perspective is further asserted through 
Nasrallah’s indirect response to the negative consequences of toppling the government, 
i.e. argumentum ad consequentiam, as cited by his opponents. 
Keeping the current governmental status quo was impossible as would be unfair for 
the sake of the state and also unfair to state institutions and the people, and this 
(toppling the government) was the utmost national safety procedure and not vice versa 
(coup against the Doha Agreement). (lines 313–333)  
 
According to the 14th of March party, the toppling of the government violated the Doha 
agreement and threatened the current power-sharing formula, i.e. causing instability. 
Thus, Nasrallah indirectly falsifies this proposition by asserting that the toppling of the 
government ‘was the utmost national safety procedure and not vice versa’. This 
proposition asserts that the toppling of the government was in accordance with the 
national interest. Nasrallah reaffirms this claim by invoking undisputed sources of 
normativity, based on which the action is further legitimised. This is achieved through 
referring to constitutional rights and duties: ‘it was our national and moral duty to topple 
the government’ (line 329), ‘we (Hizbollah) took a constitutional, legal, democratic and 
very normal step, and this is our natural right’ (lines 336–337). This means that the 
negative consequences of toppling the government should be evaluated in terms of the 
constitutional and legal norms that governed the action. The argumentation that Nasrallah 
puts forward to legitimise the action of toppling the government can be reconstructed as 












In his attempt to adapt to the audience, especially the 14th of March audience, Nasrallah 
sketches out an appalling image of the government’s performance. Through this 
presentation, Nasrallah depicts the 14th of March audience (and all Lebanese) as people 
who have received unfair and unjust treatment from a government led by their own 
leadership: ‘it is unfair for the sake of the state and is also unfair to the state institutions 
and to the people’ (lines 331–332). This is because the government failed to address 
issues that pertain to the daily affairs of the Lebanese. This view is contrasted with the 
positive consequences that toppling the government would have on political and social 
levels: ‘open up the door to form a capable, responsible, loyal government ready to carry 
the burden and ready to follow up and address issues and take on responsibilities’ (lines 
326–327). Moreover, Nasrallah adapts to the audience by reframing events in such a way 
as to meet audience’s frame of reference. This is achieved through a rescue narrative in 
Opponent’s Counter-Claim: Toppling the 
government was wrong 
Rebut Counter-Claim: Toppling the government was right 
Negative Consequences 
of Toppling the 
Government: 
- Represents a coup 
against the Doha 
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Moral Values:  
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 -It is a national and 







- The government 
would continue to 
conspire against the 
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would arrest the 
accused members  
 







- Opens the door to 
form a capable, 
responsible and loyal 
government ready to 
carry the burden 
- Opens the door to 
form a government 
ready to confront the 
repercussions of the 
indictment  
Figure 7.1: Positive and negative consequences of toppling the government    
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which the action of toppling the government is reframed as an act of resistance. Thus, the 
action conforms with resistance ideology tenets, to which most Lebanese subscribe.  
Rhetorical questions, metaphors and vague expressions are among the presentational 
devices used in Nasrallah’s defence. The main function of rhetorical questions is to 
promote a negative representation of the 14th of March party by casting doubt on their 
motives and exposing their self-centredness. For example, ‘who are the ones who 
thwarted this course, and who led things in this direction?’ (lines 112–113), ‘is this in the 
interest of the nation or does it serve the interests of a specific political and security 
party?’ (lines 223–224). The construction of the 14th of March group is also realised 
through predications that attribute negative qualities to them, such as ‘this team cannot be 
entrusted’, ‘don’t have the ability to help Lebanon or lead the country’ (lines 173–176). 
Moreover, Nasrallah’s facts are presented in terms of metaphors pertaining to the medical 
profession. This is based on Nasrallah’s ‘diagnosis of this incapable and flaccid 
government’, so that he ‘decided to resign’. Thus, the situation is presented in terms of an 
ailment where drastic or urgent measures should be taken. It might, then, be safe to 
conclude that the metaphorical language used in this stage is in conformity with the 
rescue narrative that Nasrallah exploited. 
Concluding Stage  
Nasrallah begins this stage by reasserting that the indictment constitutes an important 
element in the conspiracy and reemphasising the need for defiance and resistance. To this 
end, Nasrallah reminds the audience of a series of actions that were carried out by the US 
and Israel, and Hizbollah’s response that resulted in victory. These lessons were learnt, 
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for example, from the 2006 Israeli war on Lebanon. Thus, Nasrallah ends his 
argumentation with an image of victory that can only be achieved through defiance and 
resistance. This means that Nasrallah has successfully defended his position and 
proceeding along similar lines is the expected conclusion. Thus, Nasrallah is making an 
absolute of the success of his defence, which amounts to the fallacy of concluding that a 
standpoint is true because it has been defended successfully. 
Nasrallah states the conclusion of his argumentation in terms of warning and threatening 
those who are conspiring against the Resistance: ‘we (Hizbollah) will not allow anyone to 
conspire against (us) […]  to unjustly and erroneously accuse us of shedding the blood of 
martyr PM Rafiq Hariri’ (lines 560–562). Through advice cloaked in a threat, Nasrallah 
appeals to the 14th of March leaders’ rationality and asks them to reconsider their 
position: ‘you are miscalculating and if you believe that you might make use of the 
indictment to target the Resistance, you are extensively miscalculating’ (lines 594–596).  
 
3. Conclusion  
In this speech, Nasrallah attempts, on the one hand, to shift the blame of ending the 
negotiations onto his opponents, and to restore the legitimacy of a controversial action 
(toppling the government), on the other. In the confrontation stage, Nasrallah strategically 
manoeuvres by leaving implicit the main points of disagreement. This evasion strategy 
permits Nasrallah to define the confrontation in terms of disagreement over facts and 
pursued goals. Nasrallah starts his defence by dissociating the 14th of March audience 
from their leadership. To this end, he portrays the 14th of March audience as rational 
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citizens who are amenable to change. This view is further exploited in the opening stage, 
where Nasrallah’s facts are presented in terms of statements that are attributed to political 
figures that this audience trust and highly value. In the argumentation stage, Nasrallah 
attempts to refute three accusations. These are: his responsibility for ending negotiations, 
his procrastination in accepting initiative terms, and his responsibility for toppling the 
government. Nasrallah’s main strategies in the quasi-judicial part are to deny any 
attribution of blame and to shift the blame onto his opponents.  
In the part that is related to legitimising the action, Nasrallah presents facts that attest to 
the desirability of toppling the government. Among the positive consequences highlighted 
by Nasrallah is saving Lebanon from a conspiracy that could lead to sectarian conflict. 
Therefore, the action’s conformity with national views and the resistance ideology is the 
first level of legitimacy conferred on the action. The second is the moral values that 
govern the action, while the third is related to constitutional and legal norms and rights.  
In the next chapter, I present the results of the analyses and discuss how the 









Reconstruction of the argument  
- Quasi-juridical defence to avoid blame:  
(1) (Nasrallah and his party should not be blamed) 
(1.1) (Nasrallah/Hizbollah should not be blamed for ending the initiative) 
(1.1.1) (We have made every effort to reach an agreement)  
   1.1.1.1a We supported the initiative  
 1.1.1.2 We wanted Lebanon to overcome the ordeal  
1.1.2.1a We are keen to protect this country 
  1.1.2.1a.1 We want to protect and save Lebanon from the repercussions of  
the indictment 
 1.1.1.3 We can protect Lebanon by implementing three terms  
 1.1.1.3a Implementing these terms will save and protect Lebanon from the  
repercussions of the indictment  
1.1.1.3a.1 If these were not implemented, then Lebanon would face intra- 
sectarian conflict 
(1.1.1.3a.2) (The government must commit to the three terms) 
1.2 Nasrallah/Hizbollah should not be blamed for not accepting the initiative terms  
 1.2.1 We accepted some of these terms, and we were discussing others 
 1.2.2. Some terms represent personal gains for the prime minister  
1.2.3. We (Hizbollah) were ready to concede political and non-political gains to  
the team of PM Hariri  
1.2.3.1a We take into account Lebanon’s safety and interest 
1.2.3.1a.1 (We accepted some terms for the sake of protecting and saving  
Lebanon from the repercussions of the indictment) 
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1.3. The 14th of March party is responsible for ending the initiative 
 1.3.1 The US and Israel are against the initiative  
1.3.1.1a The US and Israel bet on the repercussions of the indictment  
  1.3.1.1a.1 The agreement does not serve American and Israeli interests  
  1.3.1.1a.2 Facts, available data, US and Israeli statements prove this  
1.3.2 The US administration put pressure on Saad Hariri to end the initiative 
 1.3.2.1a As soon as Saad Hariri went to America, this effort was beheaded 
  1.3.2.1a.1 This is the only interpretation  
  1.3.2.1a.2 Whoever has another interpretation, let him present it to us 
1.3.3 The 14th of March leaders worked against the national interest by ending  
negotiations  
1.3.3.1a They submitted to American and Israeli demands 
1.3.3.1a.1 They are conspirators, unpatriotic and self-centred  
1.3.3.1a.2 Their future political actions are most likely to be unpatriotic  
and jeopardize the national interest  
1.3.3.1a.3 This team (14th of March leaders) cannot be entrusted with  
Lebanese decision-making and Lebanese stability  
1.4 Nasrallah/Hizbollah should not be blamed for toppling the government  
 1.4.1 We did not reach an agreement through negotiations 
1.4.2 We had a bad experience with this unproductive government  
1.4.3 It failed to address people’s problems, failed to combat corruption etc.  
1.4.4 This government is incapable of facing the repercussions of the indictment 
1.4.5 This government wants to continue financing a court that is conspiring  
against Lebanon and the Resistance  
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1.4.5.1a (The government is involved in a conspiracy against the  
Resistance) 
-Legitimation of Decision:  
(2) (Toppling the government was right) 
2.1 Hizbollah had to resign or topple the government  
 2.1.1 (The government is involved in a conspiracy against the Resistance) 
2.1.1.1a The government will arrest accused members of Hizbollah  
  2.1.1.1a.1 Those members are unjustly and wrongfully accused 
  2.1.1.1a.2 Toppling the government is an act of resistance  
 2.1.2 Toppling the government saved and protected the Resistance from the  
conspiracy     
2.1.2.1a After the announcement of the indictment, the country will be  
exposed 
2.1.2.1a.1 We do not know what the Americans, Israelis  
and some of the 14th of March leaders will do  
2.1.2.1a.2 Lebanon will face sectarian conflict  
   2.1.2.1a.3 We will not allow anyone to conspire against us 
   2.1.2.1a.4 (We had to topple the government to prevent the  
conspiracy) 
2.1.2.1a.5 (The action should be positively evaluated)  
2.2 Toppling the government will open the door to forming a capable, responsible, loyal 
government etc.  
 (2.2.1) (Toppling the government should be positively evaluated)   
2.3 Toppling the government was the utmost safety procedure, and not vice versa  
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 2.3.1 (It is not a coup against the Doha Agreement) 
  (2.3.1.1a) (It does not aim to change the current power-sharing formula)  
2.3.2 It was our national and moral duty to topple the government 
2.3.3 We took a constitutional, legal, democratic and very normal step, and this is  
our natural right 



















Discussion of results   
1. Introduction 
In the previous four chapters, Nasrallah’s speeches were analysed based on my proposed 
model for incorporating pragma-dialectics into the analytical toolkit of the DHA. To 
conduct the analyses, I followed the proposed procedure for implementing the model, as 
presented in Chapter 4, section 4.4. My aim in this chapter is to evaluate whether the 
proposed model and the associated analytical tools helped in providing answers to the 
thesis questions (see Chapter 1, section 7). In other words, I want to evaluate the 
feasibility of the proposed model and to assess whether the basic claims and assumptions 
that were taken as starting points for my proposal are still valid, or not. In an attempt to 
synthesize the different results obtained, I start this chapter by sketching out an overview 
of Nasrallah’s macro-, as well as, micro-strategies utilised in responding to accusations 
and rebutting opponents’ claims. This section represents a general summary of the 
analyses. After this general overview, I return to the thesis questions and clarify how the 
proposed model delivers adequate answers. Each section then deals with one or more of 
the thesis questions. 
2. Overview of Nasrallah’s defence strategies   
The analyses of speeches show that Nasrallah’s defence revolves around three macro-
strategies. The first is a macro-strategy of blame avoidance, achieved through denying 
responsibility for a criticised action or decision. This means that Nasrallah implicitly 
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admits that the criticised action or decision is wrong. Nasrallah uses this strategy in order 
to deny his (and his party’s) responsibility for: ending the Saudi-Syrian initiative (4th 
speech), fuelling intra-sectarian conflict that spreads with Hizbollah-backed 
demonstrations (2nd speech) and the Invasion of Beirut (3rd speech), and instigating war 
with Israel (1st speech). To avoid blame, Nasrallah uses a set of denial- and blame-
avoidance strategies, such as act-denial, blaming the victim, victim-perpetrator reversal, 
vague expressions and trivialisations, among others. These strategies are part of van 
Dijk’s (1992) typology for denying racism. Moreover, Nasrallah uses a set of argument 
schemes, the aim of which is to avoid blame and convey a positive, impeccable image of 
Hizbollah, e.g. ad populum, straw man fallacies, argument from analogy or from 
example, argument from moral values, from character to action and from action to 
character, etc. Some of these argument schemes are identified by DHA scholars in their 
research pertaining to avoiding blame (Angouri & Wodak, 2014; Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; 
Wodak, 2015) (see Chapter 3, section 7.1).  
The second macro-strategy is legitimising a problematised action or decision in such a 
way as to make it enjoy intersubjective recognition (Habermas, 1990). Utilising this 
strategy means that Nasrallah implicitly admits responsibility for carrying out an action or 
taking a decision, but denies it was bad. To this end, Nasrallah uses legitimation 
strategies, e.g. argument from authority, hypothetical future scenario, propagating fear, 
argument from negative consequences, argument from moral values etc. in order to 
restore legitimacy in a context of controversy. Most of these strategies appear in Reyes’s 
(2011) typology as well as in van Leeuwen and Wodak’s (1999) typology for legitimation 
strategies (see Chapter 3, section 7.2). Interestingly, the first and second macro-strategies 
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are the two main strategies involved in responding to accusations as proposed by Austin 
(1956) (see Chapter 3, section 7).  
The third macro-strategy is shifting the blame onto opponents. To achieve this, Nasrallah 
exploits a set of representation and argumentative strategies, such as ad hominem, tu 
quoque, ad verecundiam, rhetorical questions, presuppositions, exaggerations, metaphors 
and so on, in order to discredit opponents, scapegoat them and construct them as worthy 
of blame. These strategies, according to Reisigl and Wodak (2001), are part and parcel of 
a negative Other presentation. It seems reasonable to suggest that Nasrallah’s macro-
strategies are realised through the simultaneous use of representation and argumentation 
strategies. In fact, this is one of the basic claims of this thesis. The following section 
discusses how negative Other and positive Self presentation are enacted through 
representation and argumentation strategies.  
3. The discursive construction of in-/out-groups 
In his attempts to avoid blame, deny responsibility and shift blame onto opponents, 
Nasrallah constructs an image of the 14th of March party that is worthy of blame. In each 
of the four speeches, Nasrallah starts his argumentation by redefining differences of 
opinion in terms of conflict over facts (1st and 2nd speeches), moral values (3rd speech) or 
pursued goals (4th speech). This allows Nasrallah to cast doubt on his opponents’ 
knowledge, credibility, motives and positions, all of which are based on biased and 
distorted representations. In each speech, Nasrallah sketches out two contradictory 
images, i.e. the trustworthiness, credibility, patriotism, morality and nationalism of the 
Hizbollah party versus the 14th of March leaders’ lack of credibility, untrustworthiness, 
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self-centredness, collaboration with and subservience to Israel and the US. Both images 
are created via representation and argumentation strategies. In the analysis chapters, I 
refer to some of the referential, predication, perspectivisation and mitigation strategies 
that are involved in the negative presentation of the 14th of March party and the positive 
representation of Hizbollah’s party (8th of March party). In this section, however, I 
discuss the construction of in-/out-groups achieved via argumentation strategies. I also 
discuss how representation strategies construct argument schemes (see Chapter 4, section 
4.1).  
With respect to the negative representation of the 14th of March party, Nasrallah uses 
argumentum ad hominem, argument scheme from action to character, argumentum ad 
verecundiam and straw man fallacy. I will illustrate the function of each argument 
scheme involved in the discursive construction of the 14th of March party through an 
example. In the fourth speech, Nasrallah denies any responsibility for ending the initiative 
and considers this accusation as evidence of the 14th of March leaders’ manipulation of 
the facts in order to delude their audience. Thus, Nasrallah claims that the 14th of March 
leaders: ‘talk about their wishes and not about facts and real events’ (lines 25–26), ‘they 
present unreal things to the people (14th of March audience)’ (line 28) for the sake of 
‘deluding people’ (line 69). In this case, Nasrallah uses two variants of ad hominem 
attacks: abusive and circumstantial, in order to attack his opponents’ moral character and 
cast doubt on their motives.  
A negative representation of the 14th of March group is also realised through ad hominem 
attacks of the tu quoque type. In the second speech, Nasrallah accuses the 14th of March 
party of fuelling intra-sectarian struggle through their violent response to demonstrations. 
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He, thus, hints at a discrepancy between the 14th of March party’s moral values (freedom, 
sovereignty and independence) and their actions. Nasrallah states: ‘They (ruling party) 
were not able to withstand the democracy (right to demonstrate) that they claim to 
protect’ (line 197). Moreover, Nasrallah manages to construct the 14th of March leaders as 
conspirators and Israeli collaborators, whose actions serve American and Israeli interests. 
For example, Nasrallah relies on statements that are falsely attributed – straw man fallacy 
– to Israeli ministers: ‘How can we (the Israeli government) help this failing government 
in Lebanon?’ (line 83). Through argumentum ad verecundiam, Nasrallah implicitly 
suggests that Israel is supporting or looking for ways to support the ruling government 
(2nd speech, line 83). 
The aforementioned argument schemes are involved in the discursive construction of the 
14th of March leaders as social actors. Other argument schemes, such as argument from 
example, argument from action to character and from character to action, and post hoc 
ergo propter hoc are employed in the negative representation of the 14th of March party’s 
actions, in particular that their actions serve the interests of the US and Israel at the 
expense of the national interest. For example, in the fourth speech, Nasrallah relates the 
sudden suspension of the initiative to Saad Hariri’s visit to the US. Thus, he commits the 
post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy by claiming a causal relation based on personal 
observation: ‘As soon as he (Saad Hariri) went to America, this effort (initiative) was 
beheaded.’ The negative representation of the 14th of March actions is also conveyed 
through arguments from example. In the third speech, Nasrallah reminds the audience of 
the shameful Treaty with Israel (17th of May Treaty) in order to reveal the 14th of March 
leaders’ collaboration with Israel. This fallacious argument from example is presented in 
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the form of rhetorical questions that implicitly refer to the identity of the alleged group 
that signed the Treaty: ‘Who signed the treaty […]? Who are the leaders and political 
parties involved in crowning Lebanon forever as a country that belongs to the Zionist 
project? (lines 333–336). This example is taken as evidence of the 14th of March party’s 
collaboration with Israel and, as such, it is exploited to draw a generalisation about this 
group’s conduct, i.e. secundum quid.  
Argument from action to character is also used in the negative representation of the 14th 
of March party’s actions. In the fourth speech, ending the initiative is taken as evidence to 
cast doubt on the 14th of March leaders’ future actions: ‘This team (14th of March leaders) 
cannot be entrusted […] with safeguarding Lebanon's interests or Lebanon's stability [...] 
if months-old efforts (initiative) were put to an end during a one hour-stay in the USA’ 
(lines 162–166). According to Nasrallah, ending the initiative indicates that the 14th of 
March leaders are conspirators and unpatriotic (argument from action to character). This 
is taken as evidence to conclude that the 14th of March leaders’ future actions are most 
likely to be unpatriotic and seek to jeopardize the national interest (i.e. argument scheme 
from character to action).  
In a similar manner, the positive representation of the 8th of March party is realised via 
argumentation and representation strategies. The construction of this group as a social 
actor is promoted through arguments from example and arguments from action to 
character. In the second speech, Nasrallah accuses the 14th of March party of killing one 
of Hizbollah’s followers and instigating intra-sectarian conflict. Despite this fact, 
Nasrallah exonerates the 14th of March leaders and calls for unity and cooperation to form 
a new unity government: ‘the world will be surprised, we (Hizbollah party) are the 
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offspring of these values and this culture (Shiite Islam), a culture that calls for unity, 
forgiveness and love’ (lines 372–373). Thus, Nasrallah shows clemency, which in turn 
reveals the moral values that he and his party adhere to. Nasrallah’s statements also have 
features of the argument scheme from action to character. This means that, based on the 
group’s actions, group’s members can be described as loving, caring and calling for unity.  
The discursive construction of the Hizbollah party is also achieved through arguments 
that promote a positive representation of its actions. Argument from analogy, argument 
from example, argument from the nobility of a goal scheme etc. are used to promote a 
positive representation of the Hizbollah’s party actions. In the third speech, Nasrallah 
claims that Hizbollah’s party refuses to be involved in intra-sectarian conflict. Nasrallah 
provides evidence through an argument from analogy in which he compares the actions of 
the French resistance with the way Hizbollah treated conspirators and traitors after the 
liberation of the south of Lebanon: the ‘Resistance in Lebanon is much more civilized, 
humane and moral than the French resistance’ (lines 235–236). The conclusion of this 
argument is also exploited to formulate generalisations about the peaceful nature of 
Hizbollah’s activities, i.e. secundum quid. In the same speech, Nasrallah uses an 
argument from example to refer to Hizbollah’s heroic deeds during the Israeli war in 
2006. Through this example, Nasrallah dissipates the 14th of March party’s doubts 
regarding Hizbollah’s capabilities and readiness to rule Lebanon:  The hearts […] 
willpower and determination which defeated the strongest army (Israel) and the strongest 
country […] are more than capable of managing a country a hundred times larger than 
Lebanon’ (lines 93–96). 
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One of the salient argument schemes used by Nasrallah to support a positive image of the 
Hizbollah party is the argument scheme of the nobility of a goal. Through this scheme, 
Hizbollah’s actions are justified in terms of the noble goals that these actions are expected 
to serve. For example, in the fourth speech, Nasrallah exploits this scheme to justify his 
party’s acceptance of some of the 14th of March party’s demands, which represent 
personal gains for their leaders: ‘We (Hizbollah) were ready to concede political and non-
political gains to the team of PM Hariri to protect Lebanon […], Lebanon’s safety and 
interest’ (lines 176–179). It follows that Hizbollah’s actions are governed by moral values 
and are carried out to achieve noble goals.  
In this section, I will not elaborate any further on Nasrallah’s moral argumentation as this 
is one of the main topics of the following section. However, before moving on to the next 
section, I need to clarify two points. First, the aforementioned examples (and analyses) 
show that representation strategies play a significant role in constructing premises for 
arguments, in particular, referential, predication and perspectivisation strategies. In 
Chapter 4, I proposed that the three aspects of strategic manoeuvring are also realised 
through the DHA’s representation strategies. As a consequence, in the analysis chapters, I 
discussed in detail how representation strategies (with the exception of intensification 
strategies) play a role in realising the three aspects of strategic manoeuvring in each of the 
stages of critical discussion, i.e. the formulation of topical potential, establishing 
communion and empathy with the audience and presentational devices, e.g. metaphor, 
vague expressions, presuppositions, allusions etc. Second, the results of the analyses 
show that the discursive construction of in-out-groups is attained through representation 
and argumentation strategies. Thus, the discussion so far presents answers to the second 
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question (see Chapter 1, section 7), namely, how does Nasrallah construct and position 
partisans and opponents? In this section, I refered to some argument schemes that are 
involved in the justification of action, e.g. the argument scheme from the nobility of a 
goal. In the following section, I discuss the different levels of normativity invoked by 
Nasrallah in order to restore the legitimacy of controversial past actions or decisions.  
3. Legitimation of actions or decisions  
In Chapter 4, section 4.3, I claimed that Nasrallah’s speeches are attempts to restore 
intersubjective agreement over past actions or decisions that have been severely criticised. 
Nasrallah’s responses are an attempt to rebut opponents’ counter-claim, i.e. Nasrallah’s/ 
Hizbollah’s action or decision was wrong. Opponents’ counter-claim is mainly supported 
by argument from negative consequences, which underscores the negative effects that 
have already materialised. Consequently, Nasrallah advances argumentation in which he 
provides evidence that points to the contrary. In other words, Nasrallah supports his 
claim: the action/ decision was right via a set of argumentum ad consequentiam, which 
highlights the materialized positive consequences as well as the negative consequences 
had Hizbollah/ Nasrallah not carried out the action or decision.  
In his attempt to legitimize a problematized action or decision, Nasrallah invokes three 
levels of normativity. These are realised by: (i) capitalizing on emerging positive 
consequences to show that these outweigh the negative ones cited by opponents; (ii) 
magnifying the negative consequences of failing to act via the construction of a 
hypothetical future scenario; and (iii) downplaying and trivialising the impact of negative 
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consequences, i.e. to show that the goal is more important than the materialized negative 
consequences.  
As for argumentum ad consequentiam, Nasrallah highlights the positive effects that have 
already emerged. Thus, Nasrallah’s argument combines causal reasoning related to the 
consequences of an action or decision with moral considerations about the desirability of 
these consequences in order to defend a descriptive standpoint (doing A was right). 
Nasrallah’s detailed description of positive consequences can be seen as a direct response 
to the argument from negative consequences adduced by opponents. The emphasis on 
positive effects seems to suggest that the positive consequences outweigh the negative 
ones, which feeds into enhancing the desirability of an action or decision. This is the first 
level of normativity (i.e. the action was right due to the desirability of the materialised 
consequences) that Nasrallah exploits in his attempt to legitimise a past controversial 
action or decision.  
Nasrallah’s legitimation strategy also consists of highlighting the negative consequences, 
had not Nasrallah/ Hizbollah taken the criticised action or decision. These negative 
consequences are presented in the form of a hypothetical dreadful scenario, whose 
realisation the criticised action or decision prevented. Through a hypothetical scenario, 
Nasrallah sketches a gloomy picture of what would have been the case, had Hizbollah not 
acted in the manner proclaimed. One of the main features of Nasrallah’s hypothetical 
scenarios is the propagation of fear. Nasrallah invokes fear on two levels: on the personal 
level, where citizens are individually threatened by the horrific events narrated; and on 
the national level, where national sovereignty, security, safety, stability and freedom are 
threatened, for example, through foreign tutelage or intra-sectarian conflict. To this end, 
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Nasrallah depicts Hizbollah and the Lebanese people, including the 14th of March 
audience, as being victimised by the actions carried out by the 14th of March leaders. In 
this respect, the different events of the hypothetical future scenario construct elements of 
a rescue narrative.  
First, through a rescue narrative, Nasrallah claims that opponents’ actions, plans, plots or 
conspiracies aim to target Hizbollah or the Resistance. In the four analysed speeches, 
Nasrallah presents these conspiratorial scenarios as being prepared or encouraged by the 
US and Israel in order to serve their interests. Thus, claiming victimhood allows 
Nasrallah, on the one hand, to indirectly appeal to the audiences’ emotions to win their 
sympathy (i.e. argumentum ad misericordiam), and to invoke anti-Zionist and nationalist 
sentiments (i.e. ad populum), on the other. 
Second, through a rescue narrative, Nasrallah constructs himself as a saviour, whose aim 
is not only to save his political group, but also to save, rescue, and protect Lebanon and 
the Lebanese. To this end, Nasrallah redefines the criticised actions and decisions as 
being acts of resistance, i.e. actions or decisions that aim to protect and defend the 
Resistance, its members, reputation, dignity and existence. Moreover, Nasrallah 
emphasises the moral values that motivated the action or decision. Nasrallah claims that 
his (and his party’s) actions and decisions are motivated by the moral values of preserving 
Lebanon’s safety, freedom, independence, sovereignty, dignity and interests. Thus, 
Nasrallah frames the action so as to conform to undisputable background knowledge and 
beliefs, i.e. resistance ideology and nationalist views. Finally, Nasrallah legitimises 
actions or decisions by emphasising the noble goals that these actions or decisions are 
expected to serve. In the four analysed speeches, Nasrallah’s goal is saving, protecting 
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and rescuing Lebanon from projects or plans prepared by the 14th of March leaders, who 
aim to realise American and Israeli interests. This is the second level of normativity 
invoked by Nasrallah.  
The third level of normativity relates to invoking religious beliefs in an attempt to 
downplay or relativize the negative consequences of an action or decision. Negative 
consequences are most often related to human losses (martyrs). In Nasrallah’s view, these 
sacrifices are religiously justified as the path to the ‘promised victory’ is only attainable 
through martyrdom (i.e. argument from sacrifice). This is the highest level of normativity 
by which an action or decision gains legitimacy. However, in the fourth speech, where 
human losses are not the main negative consequence, Nasrallah invokes the authority of 
the constitution, the legal system and moral duties. This is also another undisputable or 
higher-level order of normativity. This means that Nasrallah’s actions or decisions gain 
legitimacy because they conform to widely shared values, beliefs, norms etc. that are 
themselves publicly recognised and justified. This interpretation echoes Fairclough and 
Fairclough’s (2012) view of legitimation. In their view, an action gains legitimacy 
through reference to “publicly shared and publicly justifiable, and sometimes even highly 
formalized, codified, institutional systems of beliefs, values, and norms” (p. 109) (see 
Chapter 3, section 7.2). 
The three levels of normativity invoked by Nasrallah to regain legitimacy constitute one 
mechanism by which Nasrallah attempts to persuade audiences, in particular, the 14th of 
March audience. The above discussion provides partial answers to the first question set 
for the thesis (see Chapter 1, section 7), namely, how does Nasrallah strategically 
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manoeuvre to resolve disagreements with opposition audiences? The following section 
provides additional answers.  
5. Charisma and epistemic vigilance  
In his attempt to persuade the 14th of March audience, Nasrallah orients himself to meet 
this audience’s frame of reference and establish communion. In the second speech, 
Nasrallah flatters the 14th of March audience by acknowledging their positive attitude 
towards the displaced during the Israeli war on Lebanon in 2006. In the third speech, 
Nasrallah directly addresses and greets the 14th of March audience by saying ‘our dear 
people in Beirut’ (lines 439–440). However, the dominant strategy in Nasrallah’s 
adaptation to the 14th of March audience is dissociating the latter from the wrongful and 
disrespectful actions carried out by their leaders, e.g. the alleged collaboration with Israel. 
Through this strategy, Nasrallah portrays them as rational citizens who are ready to be 
acquainted with the facts, and based on which they are expected to assess their positions.  
Nasrallah starts his defence by casting doubt on the 14th of March audience’s information 
and upholding the responsibility for offering them the ‘true facts’. Thus, Nasrallah 
positions himself as a credible and trustworthy source of information whose aim is to give 
the Lebanese a ‘clear picture’ (4th speech, line 27). To enhance his credibility, Nasrallah’s 
facts are based on statements attributed to sources that the 14th of March audience trust 
and highly value, e.g. Saad Hariri (leader of the 14th of March party), the Saudi king and 
Condoleezza Rice (former US Secretary of State), among others. This means that 
Nasrallah enhances the acceptability of his claims by satisfying the epistemic defences of 
the 14th of March audience (see Chapter 3, section 6.3.3). In contrast, accusing the 14th of 
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March leaders of distorting, hiding or misrepresenting facts amounts to ad hominem 
attacks, which serves two interrelated goals. On the one hand, ad hominem attacks serve 
to satisfy the epistemic defences of the 14th of March audience towards the source of 
information, i.e. Nasrallah, and point to the untrustworthiness and lack of credibility of 
their leaders, thereby weakening the acceptability of their claims, on the other hand.  
Projecting an image of trustworthiness and credibility is also achieved through strategies 
pertaining to the legitimation of assertions, which feeds into the construction of the 
communicator’s ethos or charisma. In Chapter 3, section 6.3.3, I argued that the 
construction of ethos (competence, benevolence, and trustworthiness) is linked to the 
discursive construction of charisma, i.e. projecting a proper image of the Self. I also 
argued that the discursive construction of a trustworthy image is attained through 
linguistic resources that underpin the legitimation of assertions (see Chapter 3, section 
6.3.4), i.e. evidence that the communicator provides in order to show the degree of 
commitment, reliability, and certainty towards the communicated representation. 
Following Hart’s (2011) typology, I present examples, taken from the four speeches, 
related to the evidence that Nasrallah provides in order to satisfy the epistemic filters of 
the addressees, which feeds into constructing his image as a credible and trustworthy 
source of information (i.e. constructing charisma).  
Nasrallah provides evidence for the truth of his claims by using linguistic cues related to 
the domain of PERCEPTION: ‘it seems that these were preparations for the aggression’, 
‘the course of events can clearly reveal for us’, ‘I want to be very clear so that all 
Lebanese would have a clear picture.’ Evidentials expressing OBVIOUSNESS are used 
to support the view that Nasrallah’s claims are beyond doubt: ‘facts that will lead to one 
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obvious conclusion’, ‘It's obvious that the Americans and the Israelis were against this 
Arab effort’, ‘based on the facts and based on available data, the US and Israeli 
statements that preceded the initiative’. Moreover, Nasrallah provides PROOF of his 
objective stance by showing that his facts are taken from external, independent sources, 
e.g. ‘All information confirms’ (line 14), ‘According to American estimations’, 
‘thwarting the Saudi-Syrian effort has confirmed that this government is not qualified’. 
Objectivity is also promoted through attributing statements to experts, i.e. EXPERT 
KNOWLEDGE, e.g. the Winograd report which states that’, ‘According to the US 
secretary’s speech in which she declares the birth of the new Middle East’.  
According to Hart (2011), intensification strategies identified by DHA scholars (see 
Chapter 4, section 2) can be linked to strategies pertaining to the legitimation of 
assertions, inasmuch as these qualify or modify the illocutionary force of propositions. In 
his presentation of facts, Nasrallah relies heavily on zero-marked modality to convey his 
commitment to truth. For example, ‘The enemy was going to this war’, ‘there are 
obstacles’, ‘this is the truth that we have reached’, ‘we are the most able’, ‘there was a 
plan ready to put in place’. Nasrallah’s certainty is conveyed through modals showing 
high probability, e.g. ‘we will win’, ‘our steadfastness will change the reality around us’, 
‘blood must win over the sword’, ‘history has to remain present’, ‘so no one will repeat 
the follies of the 5th of May’, ‘we must all cooperate and collaborate together’, ‘this must 
not be part of any agreement or settlement’, ‘we will defend our dignity’.  
The aforementioned examples show that strategies underpinning the legitimation of 
assertions serve to satisfy audiences’ epistemic vigilance towards the source, as well as 
playing a role in projecting a credible and trustworthy image of the communicator. 
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Therefore, through the construction of charisma, i.e. projecting a proper image attained 
partially through strategies pertaining to the legitimation of assertions, audiences’ 
epistemic filters are satisfied. Hence, the acceptability of Nasrallah’s claims by the 14th of 
March audience is enhanced. Another way charisma can be linked to epistemic vigilance 
is through the construction of rescue narratives (see section 5). Through these, Nasrallah 
reframes highly disputed actions or decisions to make them cohere with tenets of the 
resistance ideology and nationalist views that most Lebanese adhere to. This means that 
through rescue narratives past actions that threatened national security, e.g. the Invasion 
of Beirut and toppling the government, are reframed as actions that save, protect, and 
rescue Lebanon. This means that through the construction of rescue narratives, Nasrallah 
leads the audience to access a less highly activated set of beliefs and background 
knowledge that weigh in favour of the actions, thus enhancing their acceptability.  
The above discussion focuses on the strategies that Nasrallah employs in his attempt to 
persuade the 14th of March audience. In this section, I have addressed the first and third 
questions (see Chapter 1, section 7), in particular, I have shown how Nasrallah manages 
to resolve disagreements with the 14th of March audience and the effects of charisma on 
this group’s epistemic vigilance.  
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have endeavoured to evaluate the feasibility of my proposed model for 
integrating pragma-dialectics into the analytical framework of the DHA. I have also 
shown how the model provides answers to the questions set for this thesis. In my 
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discussion, I have addressed the first three questions. The last question, however, is 






























Implications and Conclusion 
1.  The proposed model as a contribution 
In this thesis, my main aim is to examine the argumentative, as well as the representation 
strategies, that Nasrallah employs in his attempts to legitimise past controversial actions 
or decisions. To this end, I have proposed a model that fully integrates pragma-dialectics 
into the analytical toolkit of the DHA. The starting point for the model rests on the 
assumption that both functions are simultaneously achieved. I further propose that the 
DHA’s strategies play a significant role in formulating premises for arguments as well as 
in constructing argumentative moves and stages of critical discussion. As such, the 
proposed model is the main contribution of the thesis. The model aims to make 
contributions at different levels of enquiry. In particular: 
 
• The model offers a systematic way of integrating pragma-dialectics into the 
analytical framework of the DHA by suggesting that representation strategies are 
necessary for a text to attain its argumentative function. 
 
• The model considers strategic manoeuvring as an aspect of legitimation, and thus 
suggests that resolving a difference of opinion in one’s own favour has political 
and/or social implications, rather than being restricted to the domain of logic or 
improving individual competency with the aim of persuading others. It is at this 
stage that pragma-dialectics, I believe, should extend its scope and move from 
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assessing the fallaciousness or reasonableness of argumentative moves to show 
how these shape, construct or change political reality. The analyses show that 
dominant or hegemonic ideologies, beliefs and values – as in the case of this 
study –  are configured as premises in arguments (Fairclough & Fairclough, 
2012). The analyses also show that resistance ideology precepts, nationalist 
views, moral values and religious duties are exploited by Nasrallah in order to 
legitimise Hizbollah’s actions and decisions. In other words, the political and 
moral values invoked by Nasrallah to legitimise actions serve to perpetuate, 
promote and naturalise Resistance as a hegemonic identity and ideology.   
 
• The model systematically incorporates argumentation analysis and reconstruction 
into the analytical framework of the DHA, and it claims that such rigorous 
attention to argumentation enriches the DHA’s explanatory critique. The results 
of the analyses show that fallacies, such as immunising a standpoint against 
criticism and presenting standpoints as self-evident, which tend to act as vehicles 
to promote a particular ideology, are rarely touched upon in a DHA analysis. The 
analyses also reveal that silencing, downplaying and trivialising an opponent’s 
arguments, e.g. trivialising the negative consequences of an action, feed into 
perpetuating dominant ideologies. Moreover, the analyses show that alternative 
actions and solutions are completely ignored and Nasrallah’s representations, in 
most of the analysed speeches, have the features of the false dilemma fallacy, the 
aim of which is to marginalise other discursive practices. All these argumentative 
moves would have been excluded from the discussion, had I conducted only 
DHA analyses of the speeches. The list could also include presuppositions and 
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allusions that are exploited in arguments and feed into the analysis of the 
manipulative character of discursive events.   
  
The model incorporates insights from cognitive pragmatics and proposes connecting 
research on epistemic vigilance with research on the discursive construction of charisma. 
Thus, this is also a contribution that can be seen on the following levels: 
• The discursive construction of ethos is part and parcel of the discursive 
construction of a proper image (charisma), which is attained through strategies 
pertaining to the legitimation of assertions. Thus, the construction of a proper 
image affects audiences’ epistemic filters through providing them with evidence 
that attests to the trustworthiness and credibility of the communicator.  
 
• The construction of rescue narratives also serves to promote the acceptability of 
claims through framing events to meet an audience’s frame of reference and 
induces the audience to access beliefs and background knowledge that cohere with 
the incoming representation.  
 
• Moreover, this model proposes that the elements of a rescue narrative and 
hypothetical future scenarios appear in premises for arguments, in particular, ad 
consequentiam and argument from fear appeal. In this case, the pragmatic function 
of a rescue narrative is acknowledged. This represents a further contribution.  
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The above-mentioned points also address the last question set for the thesis, i.e. question 
four. Despite these cited contributions, the limitations of the study as well as suggestions 
for further research are discussed in the following section.  
2. Limitations of the study and suggestions for further research 
One of the main limitations of the study is the limited number of analysed speeches. This 
is because Nasrallah’s speeches are relatively long and the thesis focuses on just one 
dimension of argumentative activity, i.e. retrospective argumentation. Thus, the data are 
not a representative sample of Nasrallah’s argumentative practices; however, they do shed 
light on one particular aspect (see Chapter 2, section 5). Moreover, the implementation of 
the model shows that referential, predication, perspectivization and mitigation strategies 
are involved in formulating premises for arguments but falls short of accounting fairly for 
intensification strategies. Thus, further research should be conducted, or alternative 
analytical tools put in place, in order to have a better account of intensification and 
mitigation strategies. In fact, further research should be conducted on different political 
contexts and genres in order to assess the feasibility and viability of the model in other 
contexts, in particular, the integration of pragma-dialectics into the DHA’s analytical 
framework. 
Moreover, the provisional structure for the legitimation of an action or decision (see 
Chapter 4, section 4.3) is applied to discourses produced in a non-democratic type of 
governance. Thus, further research should be conducted on discourses in political 
contexts that favour deliberative democracy to see whether similar or alternative 
strategies are employed. This thesis hypothesises a relation between charisma and 
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epistemic vigilance, thus further research should be conducted in order to evaluate the 
effects of charisma on audiences who seem to be persuaded by charismatic leaders.  
3. Conclusion   
This thesis aims to bring different fields of enquiry into a coherent model. It is hoped that 
the proposed model and its implementation can open up discussion and encourage further 
research in order to bring argumentation theory and CDS into a more fruitful dialogue for 
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Appendix A  
Overview of the code of conduct and the associated violations (adapted from van 
Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 540-551) 
Violations of Rule 1 (Freedom Rule) by the protagonist or the antagonist at the 
confrontation stage 
1  Placing limits on standpoints or doubts 
- fallacy of declaring standpoints sacrosanct 
-  fallacy of declaring standpoints taboo 
2  Restricting the other party’s freedom of action 
*  putting the other party under pressure 
- fallacy of the stick (= argumentum ad baculum) 
-  fallacy of appeal to pity (= argumentum ad misericordiam) 
-  fallacy of attacking the other party’s person (= argumentum ad hominem) 
-  fallacy of depicting the other party as stupid, bad, unreliable, etcetera 
(= direct personal attack/“abusive” variant) 
-   fallacy of casting suspicion on the other party’s motives (= indirect  
personal attack/“circumstantial” variant) 
-   fallacy of pointing out a contradiction in the other party’s words and/or  
deeds (= tu quoque variant) 
 
Violations of Rule 2 (Obligation to Defend Rule) by the protagonist at the opening 
stage 
1  Shifting the burden of proof to the other party 
*  in a non-mixed difference of opinion, instead of defending his or her own 
standpoint, the protagonist forces the antagonist to show that the protagonist’s 
standpoint is wrong 
-  fallacy of shifting the burden of proof 
*  in a mixed difference of opinion the one party does not attempt to defend his or 
her standpoint but forces the other party to defend their standpoint 
-  fallacy of shifting the burden of proof 
2  Evading the burden of proof 
*  presenting the standpoint as self-evident 
-  fallacy of evading the burden of proof 
*  giving a personal guarantee of the rightness of the standpoint 
- fallacy of evading the burden of proof 
*  immunizing the standpoint against criticism 
- fallacy of evading the burden of proof 
 
Violations of Rule 3 (Standpoint Rule) by the protagonist or the antagonist at all 
discussion stages         
1  Attributing a fictitious standpoint to the other party 
*  presenting one’s own standpoint wrongly as the opposite standpoint 
-  fallacy of the straw man 
*  referring to the views of the group to which the opponent belongs 
-  fallacy of the straw man 
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*  creating a fictitious opponent 
-  fallacy of the straw man 
2  Misrepresenting the other party’s standpoint 
*  taking utterances out of context 
-  fallacy of the straw man 
*  oversimplifying or exaggerating 
-  fallacy of the straw man 
 
Violations of Rule 4 (Relevance Rule) by the protagonist at the argumentation stage 
1  The argumentation has no relation to the standpoint under discussion 
-  fallacy of irrelevant argumentation (= ignoratio elenchi) 
2  The standpoint is defended by means other than argumentation 
*  non-argumentation 
-  fallacy of playing on the sentiments of the audience (= pathetical fallacy/ 
argumentum ad populum) 
-  fallacy of parading one’s own qualities (= ethical or ethotic 
fallacy/argumentum ad verecundiam) 
Violations of Rule 5 (Unexpressed Premise Rule) by the protagonist or the 
antagonist at the argumentation stage 
1  Adding an unexpressed premise that goes beyond what is warranted 
-   fallacy of distorting an unexpressed premise 
2  Refusing to accept commitment to an unexpressed premise implied by one’s 
defense 
-   fallacy of denying an unexpressed premise 
 
Violations of Rule 6 (Starting Point Rule) by the protagonist or the antagonist at the 
argumentation stage 
1  Meddling with the starting points by falsely denying that something is an accepted 
starting point 
-   fallacy of falsely denying an accepted starting point 
2  Meddling with the starting points by falsely presenting something as an accepted 
starting point 
-  fallacy of making unfair use of presuppositions in making assertions 
-  fallacy of making unfair use of presuppositions in asking questions (= 
fallacy of many questions) 
- fallacy of using an argument that amounts to the same thing as the 
standpoint (= fallacy of circular etc. 
-  fallacy of circular reasoning/petitio principii (begging the question) 
 
Violations of Rule 7 (Validity Rule) by the protagonist at the argumentation stage 
1  Reasoning in which a sufficient condition is treated as a necessary condition 
-  fallacy of denying the antecedent 
-  fallacy of affirming the consequent 
2  Reasoning in which the properties of parts and wholes are confused 
-  fallacy of division 
-  fallacy of composition 
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Violations of Rule 8 (Argument Scheme Rule) by the protagonist at the 
argumentation stage 
1  Using an inappropriate argument scheme 
- populist fallacy (symptomatic argumentation) (= argumentum ad populum) 
-  fallacy of confusing facts with value judgments (causal relation) 
(= argumentum ad consequentiam) 
2  Incorrectly applying an argument scheme 
- fallacy of authority (symptomatic argumentation) (= argumentum ad 
verecundiam) 
-  fallacy of hasty generalization (symptomatic argumentation) (= secundum 
quid) 
- fallacy of false analogy (comparison argumentation) 
-  fallacy of the slippery slope (causal argumentation) 
 
Violations of Rule 9 (Concluding Rule) by the protagonist or the antagonist at the 
concluding stage 
1  Meddling with the conclusion by the protagonist 
-  fallacy of refusing to retract a standpoint that has not been successfully 
defended 
-  fallacy of concluding that a standpoint is true because it has been defended 
successfully 
2  Meddling with the conclusion by the antagonist 
-   fallacy of refusing to retract criticism of a standpoint that has been  
successfully defended 
-   fallacy of concluding that a standpoint is true because the opposite has not  
been successfully defended (= argumentum ad ignorantiam) 
 
Violations of Rule 10 (Language Use Rule) by the protagonist or the antagonist at all 
the 
discussion stages 
1 Misusing unclearness 
-   unclearness fallacy (implicitness, indefiniteness, unfamiliarity, vagueness) 
2 Misusing ambiguity 










Appendix B: The English version of the speeches 
1st Speech 
The July 2006 Speech: The Israeli war on Lebanon   
1 After two weeks of confronting the barbaric Zionist aggression and the miraculous                   
2 forbearance of the people, the steadfastness of this proud and dignified people and this  
3 brave Resistance, I want to talk to you, because there are things that I need to comment 
4 on, and there are specific attitudes that should be taken in order to know how to                        
5 continue our days ahead. 
 
6 At the political level, we have to know and understand the true reality of this war and                
7 the background to the aggression. After two weeks, things are clearer now, with the                   
8 availability of information, from political speeches, public statements either from                         
9 officials in the American administration or the Zionist enemy, or from those who rotate 
10 within their orbit, and from political analysis and from facts which will all lead to the 
11 one obvious conclusion. If we know which war we are now fighting, we can know              
12 how to continue the march. 
 
13 After the US Foreign Secretary of State’s statement about the new Middle East, by               
14 which she means the American-Israeli new Middle East, can anyone believe that this 
15 huge enormous project was born a few days after the Resistance captured the two                
16 Israeli soldiers? 
 
17 All the evidence confirms that the preparation to launch this project started at least one 
18 year ago. According to American estimations there are obstacles facing the new                     
19 Middle East. This project means that the region is going to be under the American                 
20 control, so the US will solely exploit its resources and wealth and where Israel will be 
21 its first partner. In the new Middle East, there is no place for any Resistance                          
22 Movement, so work is needed to remove these obstacles exemplified by the Resistance 
23 Movements in Lebanon, Palestine, Syria and Iran.  
 
24 The project started in Palestine. What was required was the termination of the                     
25 Resistance Movement in Palestine. Elections were held, and the Resistance Movement 
26 won the elections, and this fact embarrassed them. They killed Palestinian people,                 
27 starved them, deprived them of humanitarian aid, and they were pushing things to the 
28 verge of internal strife. Then the operation to capture the Israeli soldier in Gaza took 
29 place. The importance of this operation is that it pushed away the danger of internal    
30 strife, and returned Palestinians to their true and original battle. 
  
31 In Lebanon, and throughout the previous year, there were direct and indirect American 
32 efforts. The Americans were closely monitoring the developments of the internal                
33 situation in Lebanon. They bet, but their bets failed at the local level, for they did not 
34 find anyone capable of terminating the Resistance Movement and ending its existence 
35 in Lebanon. They were surprised by the public support that the Resistance Movement 
36 enjoys. They had to find another option and within a year they assessed the situation of 
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37 the Lebanese Army, and we know that there were many military delegates who visited 
38 and asked a lot of questions. They were surprised that this national Army can’t be                
39 involved in such a battle because it is a national and patriotic Army. Its leaders,                    
40 officers, and soldiers are patriotic as well. Because of the Army’s ideology and                   
41 convictions, the Army refused to engage in this conspiracy, and the Army                           
42 commanders and leaders acted wisely during this critical situation which Lebanon has 
43 passed through. 
  
44 They bet that Hizbollah’s participation in the government will make Hizbollah busy  
45 with political positions and projects, which will lead Hizbollah to abandon its jihadist 
46 responsibilities, yet this didn’t happen. 
 
47 Therefore, all information concerning the local situation proved that there is no way to 
48 bet on this. They waited for the results of the national dialogue. They were closely            
49 following the details, and they reached the conclusion that they can’t achieve their               
50 goal. The Americans were convinced that there is no local way they can bet on to                    
51 terminate the Resistance Movement and wipe out its existence.   
52 At the regional level, they bet a lot on our friends in Syria and Iran, and despite all lies, 
53 they found that neither Syria nor Iran is ready to terminate the Resistance in Lebanon 
54 or Palestine. They reached the inescapable decision: There is one way that we can              
55 depend on to terminate the Resistance in Lebanon and Palestine, so later on they will 
56 isolate Syria and Iran to threaten them. 
 
57 The Israeli War  
58 Based on this reading it was an American decision to wage an Israeli war on Lebanon, 
59 and the data that we have confirm that the enemy’s military drills during the last few 
60 months, especially in the north and south of Occupied Palestine, were preparations for 
61 the aggression on Lebanon, which was designed or planned to take place either at the 
62 end of September or the beginning of October. They were also in need of sometime to 
63 continue gathering information from intelligence services to complete their warfare          
64 plan. 
  
65 The plan entails that all of a sudden, with or without a pretext, the enemy - keeping in 
66 mind the international support that the Israeli enjoys around the world - launches a          
67 wide ground offensives to take full control of the south of Litani region in order to      
68 prevent launching missiles. At the same time, the Israeli Air Force strikes the homes of 
69 senior Hizbollah officials, Hizbollah’s headquarters and institutions, and infrastructure 
70 to cripple the Resistance and the whole country in order to provoke the people against 
71 the Resistance, and to prevent the Resistance from taking the initiative. This was                
72 intended to be a harsh blow from which it is difficult to recover. This is the scenario 
73 that would have been implemented had we not captured the Israeli soldiers, and I am 
74 clear and transparent. We are asked whether we expected such a response or not.                
75 When the capturing operation took place, the Resistance, unknowingly, prevented the 
76 most dangerous plan and the worst war scenario for Lebanon and Resistance, and the 




78 This is the truth that we have reached. Because of the capturing operation the Zionist 
79 enemy found himself in a humiliating position as this is an unacceptable blow.             
80 Therefore, they rushed the war which they had already prepared. The importance of      
81 this lies in the first place in depriving the enemy from taking us by surprise. They              
82 expected that we will be sleepy and in oblivion. In a single moment, the south of                
83 Litani is invaded. Homes, centres and institutions are raided. We would, thus, lose               
84 control, the ability to communicate together and the ability to manoeuvre, as a result 
85 the Resistance is terminated with minimal losses from the enemy’s side. The first           
86 scenario is foiled and the enemy lost the element of taking us by surprise. This was the 
87 most dangerous element which the scenario depended on. Moreover, the enemy was 
88 forced to go to this war before completing the preparations which would have helped a 
89 lot.  
 
90  Dear Lebanese people and the peoples all around the world who are whole heartedly 
91 with us, we have now realized, more clearly and precisely, the backgrounds and the  
92 goals of this war, and so all this argument. The enemy was sooner or later going to this 
93 war and what the Resistance did is guided by the Divine Mercy. Today the project,           
94 based on which this war was grounded and planned, intends to bring Lebanon back           
95 under American-Israeli domination and control, meaning, it is worse than the 1982            
96 Invasion and the 17th of May Agreement. What is required is to extract Lebanon               
97 entirely out of its history, commitment, culture and real identity. To be under the             
98 control of the Americans and the Zionists through American facades that would only 
99 obey and follow orders. Our destiny is to fight, together with the noble patriots, this 
100 horrific project and to prevent this war from achieving its goals and to engage in the 
101 battle of liberating the rest of our land and prisoners and to engage in the battle of 
102 true sovereignty and true independence and this is what we have declared in the last 
103 few days. 
 
104 Today political and diplomatic efforts started and they have given the enemy the time 
105 needed and they will give him more time. Before Rice many delegates visited us, and 
106 all those who came they provide us with the American-Zionist conditions and terms, 
107 however, they did not offer compromises or resolutions for the current crisis and the 
108 current struggle. 
 
109 I will not embark on discussing the propositions nor the terms because we prefer to 
110 leave this discussion to the private meetings and agreed upon mechanisms, this is  
111 because this file is being followed by people whom we trust and on whom we             
112 depend. But just a quick comment to make it clear for the whole world: I want to          
113 ascertain that we are not going to accept any condition or term which will humiliate 
114 the country or our people or our Resistance nor are we going to accept any formula 
115 that is against national sovereignty, interests and independence, especially after all 
116 these sacrifices and no matter how long this confrontation lasts and no matter how 
117 huge the sacrifices will be. Our true and basic slogan is dignity first. Houses were 
118 destroyed and they will be rebuilt by Allah’s Will, the infrastructure was destroyed 
119 and it will be rebuilt by Allah’s Will. But we can’t accept humiliating terms. We are 
120 open to political solutions and to political debates and we work with responsibility 
121 and flexibility. But there is a red line. After the visit of Miss Rice to Lebanon and  
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122 then to the Occupied Palestine she gave the enemy another chance. A week or 10  
123 days is before us, as the Israelis themselves say, we are in front of decisive and           
124 critical days during which we are in need of more steadfastness, unity, self-control 
125 and patience, and they bet and the whole issue is who cries first. 
  
126 We are going to continue the fight, and I want to declare from here for now I move to 
127 discuss issues related to the battle field. After all this aggressive assault from the            
128 Israeli enemy, we are now moving beyond the Haifa phase. I announce that we are 
129 going to strike beyond the Haifa province, and this means that we have entered a new 
130 phase of the struggle. Yes, we will not be confined to sending rockets to the boarders 
131 of Haifa no matter what the reaction of the enemy was. We will now move to areas 
132 beyond Haifa district and if things deteriorated, then, we will choose the time when 
133 we will start a new phase that stretches beyond the Haifa district.  
  
134 This is the first thing that I wanted to mention. Secondly, the jihadists of the             
135 Resistance made great accomplishments in the battle field and they nailed the enemy 
136 down: in terms of casualties from soldiers to officers as well as destroying a large 
137 number of tanks and airplanes. Now we are fighting in Bent Jbil and we will fight 
138 just as we did in Maroun Alrass, and as we will fight in every village, town or           
139 position. We are not a classic army and we don’t defend in a traditional manner. We 
140 follow the guerrilla warfare type or tactics. The most important criteria in the battle 
141 field is the amount of losses that we inflict on the enemy. And no matter where the 
142 invasion reaches we will not stop sending rockets to the Israeli settlements in the            
143 north of the Occupied Palestine. I say to you that despite the accomplishments that 
144 the enemy might have during his ground invasion to Lebanese territories, the enemy 
145 will not achieve his goal which is: preventing us form sending rockets to the north of 
146 the Occupied Palestine. Every newly invaded inch will be a new motive to us to         
147 continue fighting. If the Zionist enemy steps on our ground, this will make him more 
148 vulnerable. It will widen the scope of immediate combat and leads to the attrition of 
149 the enemy forces. The enemy likes to stay behind barracks and only uses its Air            
150 Force power to destroy villages and to kill more women and children. In the ground 
151 battle, we will have the upper hand. Any land the enemy occupies we will definitely 
152 restore it. So, for the ground battle we are prepared and ready for it and we bet on 
153 The All Mighty and on those brave hands and hearts full of faith and those               
154 knowledgeable minds and the souls that aspire to meet the All Mighty.  
 
155 In this battle, we have to be aware of the psychological aspect of the war. I am being 
156 transparent and honest. If any of our leaders or fighters died we will proudly              
157 announce the news. If we have many martyrs we will be proud to announce this. If 
158 we have casualties or injuries we won’t deny. If the enemy took some of us as          
159 prisoners we will announce that. We do not deny facts. When we were fighting in 
160 Maroun Alrass we declared that and when we withdrew, we said that the battle was 
161 over. You have to listen to us and not to the psychological war which the Zionist            
162 enemy is promoting. Two days ago, the enemy said that they took over Bent Jbil but 
163 they were unable to occupy Bent Jbil and there are, till the moment of recording this 




165 The enemy speaks about hundreds of martyrs from Hizbollah, where are those            
166 hundreds? The enemy talks about capturing 20 prisoners, where are they? Few days 
167 ago, they spoke about two prisoners in Maroun Alrass and then they released them 
168 because they were civilians and they do not have any relation whatsoever with the 
169 Resistance.  
 
170 So, the enemy will speak about invading cities, towns and villages and the killing of a 
171 huge number of people to affect the morale of the jihadists and the people. I say that 
172 all these are lies and you should not listen to these allegations. Listen to us. When we 
173 have a martyr, we will announce his death. When we leave a city after a heroic fight, 
174 we will announce that we had withdrawn form that city. We do not lie at our people, 
175 but the enemy does. It is he who imposes censorship on his media. It is he who does 
176 not tell the truth to his people. This is a proof of weakness. The fact that we are being 
177 honest and transparent with our people is an evidence of our strength and willpower.  
178 In any case, when we have chosen this road we knew that this road is full of thorns 
179 and that it is the road of martyrdom which creates victory. We are determined to           
180 continue fighting and to stand up to protect our dignity and our sovereignty and our 
181 freedom and the freedom of our country. What is needed is patience, more fighting 
182 for things will not be the same. We have been promised victory by the All Mighty, 
183 and we will win this battle just as we won before. Our steadfastness will change the 
184 reality around us, and the reality of the region as well as the international one. At the 
185 end, this blessed blood of innocent civilians from women and children, from the          
186 jihadists and the fighters either from the Resistance Movement or from the national 
187 Lebanese Army or in any position that requires sacrifice, this blessed blood must win 
188 over the sword. This is Allah’s tradition. And may the mercy and blessings of Allah 
























2nd Speech  
 
December 2006 speech: The formation of a new government 
  
1 In the name of Allah, the all-merciful, the all-compassionate. Praise be to Allah, Lord of 
2 the Lords, to him I raise prayers, and peace be upon our Prophet, the Seal of the                      
3 prophets, Abu Qassim Mohamed Bin Abi Abdullah, on his infallible household, on his 
4 chosen companions and on all the prophets and messengers.   
 
5 Dear brothers and sisters, dear demonstrators picketing for the sake of Lebanon, for the 
6 sake of Lebanon’s sovereignty, Lebanon’s independence, Lebanon’s dignity and                   
7 Lebanon’s freedom. I wish I were among you in one of the squares of honour and in     
8 one of the squares of steadfastness and resistance. Despite the cold weather, the               
9 ambience is full of warmth, love, cooperation, the warmth of brethren, of those who                 
10 gathered for the sake of Lebanon and for the sake of the nation. 
  
11 I hope, by Allah’s Will, that someday I will be able to join you in this square. Before I 
12 start my speech, and taking notice of the limited time allotted to this speech,                          
13 unfortunately, we, Lebanese, have a bad habit of firing arms during celebrations. I               
14 hope that those who are listening to me now, will not fire arms after I finish my                     
15 speech. We have to give up this bad habit. We have to avoid firing arms in any                      
16 direction even if it is directed towards the sky. Bullets should only be directed to the 
17 chest of Lebanon’s enemies - the Israeli enemy. Therefore, and as a precaution, I hope, 
18 and I insist on, and I consider any one who fire arms at the end of my speech a                    
19 conspirator whose aim is to offend me, offend us and all the Lebanese opposition’s              
20 front.  
 
21 First, I want to extend my condolences to the parents of the martyr Ahmad Mahmoud, 
22 and I want to say to them that their son died in the battle of defending Lebanon,                  
23 defending Lebanon’s dignity, and Lebanon’s pride, in the battle of liberating Lebanon. 
24 The martyr, Ahmad Mahmoud, is the martyr of the Resistance par excellence. He is  
25 not a martyr who gave his life in a street fight, he is a martyr who died for the sake of 
26 defending Lebanon’s independence, Lebanon’s sovereignty, a martyr of the public              
27 movement to rescue Lebanon.  
 
28 I also have to thank you. You are the most honourable people, the most pure people, 
29 the most lovable, and the dearest of all. I have also to thank those who gathered on             
30 Friday in Riyad-Solh Square and in Martyrs Square for the sake of rescuing Lebanon, 
31 and those who are gathering every night for the sake of rescuing Lebanon. I say to you 
32 that what you are doing is a great and honourable thing because it serves a noble,                 
33 honourable and national goal, which is rescuing Lebanon by ending the state of                    
34 monopoly, authoritarianism and exclusivity and this will pave the way for establishing 
35 a national unity government to ensure participation and cooperation and achieve                                        
36 reconciliation and solidarity.  
 
37 Dear brothers and sisters, they have tried during the past few days, through                            
38 provocations, riot and attacking protestors, which resulted in killing the martyr Ahmad 
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39 Mahmoud, to instil fear into your hearts, to prevent you from picketing in the squares. 
40 They failed. They have forgotten that fear has no place in your hearts. Today they bet 
41 that with time you would be weary and bored, but they don’t know that you are a                 
42 diligent and inexorable nation.   
           
43 Yesterday, they said that they are expecting screams of surrender to come out from             
44 your squares due to the cold and rainy weather. However, they have forgotten how             
45 you, in the near past, endured the most violent and brutal air strikes ever seen in recent 
46 decades during the 33-day war. You stood up and you didn’t give up despite being             
47 displaced from your home towns, despite the killing and the massacres. You were                
48 embraced by your fellow Lebanese all the Lebanese districts, areas and from all sects. 
49 Yes, from the first day, they asked us to surrender, but we refused to surrender. They 
50 bet on our defeat but we were not defeated and we remained here in our land. We       
51 remained strong and proud in the land of our fathers and forefathers, we didn’t bow     
52 and our will was not broken, we didn’t get bored, tired or become weary for the sake 
53 of Lebanon and for the sake of the nation. Tell them, today, from 48 the demonstration 
54 square, tell them, tomorrow, on Friday’s prayer, tell them every night, on Sunday, on 
55 the biggest rally ever, that those who bet on our surrender, they are deluded, deluded, 
56 deluded. Tell them that we don’t know weariness and that we defeat hunger and                  
57 boredom. We are stronger than rockets, so how about words? We are stronger than   
58 war, so how about intimidation? We are a nation who in the battle of will shall not be 
59 defeated.  
 
60 Dear brothers and sisters, it is not a coincidence that the political powers, with all its 
61 different religious, political and sectarian factions, which embraced the Resistance and 
62 its audience during the July-August war, are those themselves who today form the                      
63 Lebanese opposition front and support the Lebanese Opposition Front. Neither is it a 
64 coincidence that the governments, nations and nobles of the world who sided with the 
65 Resistance during the war, are now standing with and supporting the Resistance. On 
66 the other hand, it is no coincidence that all those who supported Israel in its war on               
67 Lebanon, are the same ones who now support this failing government. I call on your 
68 behalf, the Arab countries who care about Lebanon not to interfere by supporting one 
69 party at the expense of another. Those who care about Lebanon’s safety and                         
70 Lebanon’s unity and salvation ought to embrace all the Lebanese parties and that they 
71 should not depend solely on their ambassadors’ reports. Come to Lebanon and be                    
72 acquainted with the political realities, facts on the ground and the public support and 
73 then direct your appreciated efforts to help Lebanon and to rescue Lebanon. And I tell 
74 the government, or those remaining in office, the illegitimate government, that your   
75 reliance on American and Western support will do you no good. Today, those on                    
76 whom you rely, especially George Bush is the one who needs help and he is the one      
77 who is in need of others to rescue him. 
  
78 Let’s take Iraq as an example. In Iraq, there are more than 150,000 American soldier 
79 and billions of dollars are spent in Iraq. In Iraq, the whole US administration closely 
80 monitors and follows the situation in Iraq. Iraq is not like Lebanon, a file in the         
81 drawers of the US State Department. Nonetheless, what is the result in Iraq? Failure, 
82 disintegration, sectarian war with no horizon, these are the outcomes and this is the               
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83 fate of any country that bets on Bush’s support, on his army or his administration.                
84 What can America offer you while it is drowning in the region’s mud from                          
85 Afghanistan to Iraq to Palestine to Lebanon? This government, and for the last one and 
86 half year, received support and is still receiving support from the US and the West                 
87 which no other government in Lebanon’s history has ever received. Doesn’t this raise 
88 doubts and evoke suspicions? Why is this American passion with this government and 
89 its prime minister? But what raises more doubt and intensifies the suspicion is the                 
90 daily Israeli commendation to the ruling party in Lebanon. Is there something behind 
91 this praise that we are not aware of? Isn’t it shameful that the Israeli-Zionist                         
92 government convenes, which usually meets when there is a serious matter threatening 
93 Israel’s security or interests; isn’t it shameful that the Israeli government meets to                  
94 discuss a single item on its agenda, which is: how can we help this failing government 
95 in Lebanon? Some of them said that we can help them by withdrawing from the                  
96 southern part of occupied Ghajar town. Others said that we can withdraw from Shebaa 
97 farms to present them as a gift and as a sign of political and psychological support for 
98 the ruling party in Lebanon. But what did they really do? They didn’t withdraw neither 
99 from Ghajar nor from Shebaa. They were even reluctant to give this psychological   
100 support. Doesn’t this American, Western and Israeli support call for contemplation? 
101 Dear brothers and sisters, we, in the Lebanese Opposition Front, reemphasize our   
102 demand and our goal which is the formation of a real national unity government. But 
103 why? Because Lebanon’s plurality and diversity means that a single-party                        
104 government and the domination of one political party had always led Lebanon to a 
105 deadlock. Lebanon can’t be governed unless all parties cooperate, participate, and 
106 have their say in the decision-making process but not through monopoly. We want a 
107 national unity government because it is the only way to prevent any foreign tutelage. 
108 Let the whole world know that we want a Lebanese government to be led by                      
109 Lebanese leaders and to take decisions based on Lebanon’s interests. This is what we 
110 are looking for and this government will be the guarantee that secures Lebanon’s  
111 safety, future, security, stability, prosperity and unity. This is what we aspire. We  
112 refuse any kind of tutelage be it a friend or a foe. This is the truth.  
 
113 Today, they ask us the following question: if you, the current opposition party,                
114 someday won the majority in the parliament, and you formed the government, will 
115 you give us the third-quorum or the veto-power? I tell them, on behalf of Hizbollah, 
116 and as a party in the opposition, I say, yes. We are with giving any Lebanese                      
117 opposition the third-quorum because we belief in participation, we belief in                      
118 cooperation and we don’t believe in single-party rule at the expense of other groups. 
119 And if we were the majority, we would give with confidence any opposition a third 
120 of the quorum because we are not afraid of anything or anyone, and we don’t have 
121 any international or regional commitments. We want Lebanon’s interest, and the           
122 Lebanese interest is the one which is reached through consensus. Dear brothers and 
123 sisters, when the doors of dialogue were shut, and the negotiations were stopped, and 
124 we were faced with monopoly and authoritarianism, our only solution was going into 
125 the streets. Although we are in streets, in sit-ins, in demonstrations, we continued the 
126 dialogue and we didn’t close the doors of negotiations. To all those who are asking us 
127 to continue negotiations, I tell them, yes. The doors of dialogue are open in order to 
128 negotiate with the opposition leaders and we are ready to discuss any initiative, but 
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129 certainly we are not in need of a fancy dialogue just to waste of time. We will not get 
130 out of the streets to have a dialogue through which we will be deceived again. We 
131 will remain in the streets, and those who want to negotiate or want to have                               
132 discussions with the opposition can meet the opposition’s leaders and their doors will 
133 always remain open.  
 
134 Today, there is an initiative proposed by the Council of the Maronite Bishops. We 
135 believe that this initiative holds a lot of positive elements and some of its items worth 
136 to be discussed, so we can accept what we believe is fair for us and refuse others. The 
137 door is open for negotiations and it is not true that the opposition party doesn’t                      
138 negotiate, debate or discuss. All options remain open to discussion. I want them to 
139 negotiate, discuss and have a debate with us, but, on behalf of all those who gathered 
140 tonight, yesterday and tomorrow, we will not vacate the streets before we achieve the 
141 goal that rescues Lebanon.   
 
142 Dear Brother and sisters, as we continue in our sit-in, I want to reemphasis the rules 
143 or regulations which we had already talked about from the first day. No insults. Some 
144 fervid demonstrators use derogatory slogans when talking about some ministers, and 
145 we refuse any personal insult to anyone. Any insult, any obscene or unethical                                        
146 expression should not come from your sit-ins. We reassert the civilized and peaceful 
147 nature of our sit-in, off course, by killing the martyr Ahmad Mahmoud, they wanted 
148 to drag us into an armed conflict. But, in the name of the martyr Ahmad Mahmoud, 
149 and on behalf of all his colleagues, on behalf of every man and woman, every child 
150 and elderly who affiliates with the Lebanese national opposition, I tell the ruling             
151 party and its political forces, and I regrettably mention its militias too that: we refuse 
152 to be dragged into civil war. We refuse any strife between sects and any discord                        
153 between political parties. We refuse to be involved in any type of street conflict. We 
154 wanted a civilized and peaceful movement. We proved this on Friday in the                           
155 unprecedented rally in Lebanon’s history even if their media outlets debilitated your 
156 enormous rally in order to belittle your actions and to magnify theirs. However, the 
157 picture remains crystal clear to the whole world. I will tell the Lebanese and the                
158 peoples of this region, who are the ones pushing things to the verge of civil war. In 
159 the civil war everyone losses, I won’t say that you will lose and we will win. No. We 
160 will all lose. All Lebanese will lose in civil war or in sectarian sedition. In Iraq                   
161 everybody is losing, in Palestine everybody is losing. What some of the Arab kings 
162 are promoting, unfortunately, like the civil war in Lebanon, Iraq and Syria are severe 
163 losses to all of us and the net profit will go to Israel, to America, to the neo-           
164 and to the advocates of the theory of Creative Chaos. In Lebanon, we will not be               
165 dragged into any conflict, even after you have killed Ahmad Mahmoud, even if you 
166 killed thousands like Ahmad Mahmoud. We will not raise our weapons in the face of 
167 anyone.  
 
168 Those, those, have forgotten, and many of them held posts in the government which 
169 prohibited the demonstrations in September 1993. Arms were fired at us: 10 martyrs 
170 died and 50 were wounded, yet, we didn’t raise arms against anyone. I tell you, that 
171 we are in no need of arms to defeat you because our weapons are only directed to the 
172 Zionists. With our voices, we defeat you. With the blood of Ahmad Mahmoud, we 
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173 defeat you, with our insistence on unity, fraternity and amiability we defeat you. Let 
174 the whole world hear, and let the Arab nations know, whom they are trying with lies 
175 to turn them against us. They are killing us and yet we say to them, we want to be 
176 with you and we want you to be with us, to be together. To you murderers, I say that 
177 with blood we will win over your swords. 
 
178 Dear Lebanese, I heard, and with sorrow I’m saying this, that some political and              
179 religious leaders are provoking against the Resistance during their internal meetings 
180 by saying that: Hizbollah has 30 thousand rocket which are directed to your homes. 
181 This has never been our conduct. And from here, I tell those leaders and those                 
182 listening to them: whoever we had destroyed his house in Lebanon let him come             
183 forward and lay his claim, whoever we shed his blood let him step forward and           
184 present his case. In contrast, it is you who burned houses, how many houses have you 
185 destroyed, and how many lives have you shed. Honestly, we don’t want to threaten 
186 anyone and we won’t. The blood of every Lebanese and I want to reemphasize this. 
187 In some areas they are spreading rumours, especially in the city of Beirut, that a              
188 specific group in the opposition party, from a specific sect, wants to attack your                
189 streets to provoke sectarian strife. Let all the citizens of Beirut listen to me and all the 
190 Lebanese to listen to this: the blood of every Lebanese is like ours, the honour of                   
191 every Lebanese is like ours, the money of every Lebanese is like ours, the house of 
192 every Lebanese is like ours. This is the red line that we protect with our blood even, 
193 if you kill, and this is the red line that we protect with our eyelashes even if you                    
194 conspired against us and if you want to drag us into war, we will not fall into this           
195 trap. We will not fall into civil war or sectarian strife, or any other form of internal 
196 conflict.  
 
197 Today, we have a real, national guarantee and an internal immunity which is                  
198 manifested by the Army Institution whose leaders, soldiers and officers have proved 
199 that it is the Army to all Lebanese. This guarantee we all have to protect and we                
200 should not allow any disintegration or discord to take place. Political parties should 
201 refrain from using some of its leaders or officers for their own interests because if the 
202 Army collapsed this will deprive Lebanon from its immunity. To the Internal           
203 Security forces, I tell them, that you have also to show that you are a true and                  
204 national institution and that you don’t work to favour the interests of one group at the 
205 expense of another, so you can form with the Army a true and national guarantee. 
206 Dear brothers and sisters, can you tell me how did the other party treat you when you 
207 were in the streets on Friday, and in your sit-in on Friday night and on Saturday night 
208 and in your rally on Sunday? The party which claims and speaks about democracy 
209 and about public liberties and freedom of speech? Your movement is a civilized one, 
210 as acknowledged by the whole world. You always astonish the world whether during 
211 war, peace or while protesting. What did they do? How did they react? They             
212 debilitated your unprecedented rally. They resorted to riot, they sent their gangs, and 
213 I am deeply saddened, because some of them sit with us around the dialogue table to 
214 discuss the issue of Hizbollah’s disarmament despite the fact that it has never been 
215 used at the domestic level while they store and distribute weapons in many areas.   
216 They sent their gangs to attack you during your return journey and kill the martyr   
217 Ahmad Mahmoud and injure others. They were not able to withstand the democracy 
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218 that they claim to protect. How many times did they threaten the opposition leaders, 
219 especially the threats that were directed to the national figures of the Sunni sect?               
220 Didn’t they send their cars, their gangs to besiege the houses of those figures? Is this 
221 democracy? Is this freedom? You have earlier on demonstrated for so many days and 
222 I want to ask you, to ask the Lebanese and the whole world, was anyone of you               
223 attacked, or prevented from going to or coming from the demonstrations during the 
224 security forces’ tutelage? Was a demonstrator ever killed on his way to or from               
225 demonstrations?  
 
226 But, what is more dangerous today is the sectarian incitement. They have stopped 
227 their Muslim-Sunni incitement. Today, there is no talk of the sort, Muslims versus 
228 Christians in Lebanon, all the talk is related to the Sunni and Shiite struggle. They 
229 claim that the biggest rally ever on Friday was a Shiite demonstration and they                        
230 ignored the large and hefty participation of all sects in order to present the issue as a 
231 Shiite protest against a Sunni-led government. However, the truth is that neither the 
232 demonstration was formed of Shiites nor he government is a Sunni-led one. Then     
233 they tried to isolate Amal Movement’s participation in this demonstration to claim 
234 that this demonstration is led solely by Hizbollah and his members. Then they            
235 focused their media and political campaign on Hizbollah and their media rhetoric                             
236 asserts that the demonstrations are supported by Hizbollah and its allies. They want 
237 to ignore the other national powers of the opposition. Anyway, in the past few days 
238 these allegations were falsified because the demonstrations and the night rallies were 
239 true and genuine expressions of all the parities forming the national Opposition Front. 
240 This sectarian slogan has fallen and will fall even if they continued in their scheme. 
241 All their allegations are directed to the Sunni audience in Lebanon, and in turn the 
242 Sunni audience throughout the whole Arab and Muslim worlds, thinking mistakenly, 
243 that by this they can disrepute Hizbollah or the other forces in the national                
244 Opposition Front. They claim that the opposition wants to change the Taif Accord, 
245 yet, this is a slur and a lie, and at other times, they claim that these demonstrations 
246 are used to cover up those who killed the martyr, prime minister Rafic Hariri. One of 
247 their most recent lies, with which they clearly contradict themselves, is their claim 
248 that the Saraya is besieged while at the same time they broadcast, through their TV 
249 channels, scenes of delegates parading to the Saraya. How can the Saraya be besieged 
250 and the delegates are coming in and getting out the Saraya?  
251 Anyway, sectarian sedition is a grave sin and a crime at both the religious and                                        
252  political levels, and if it found ears, it will burn everyone. Sectarian sedition is like 
253 playing with fire. Today, I call for an Arabic investigation committee supported by 
254 the Arab League and by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to identify the party 
255 which is advancing sectarian or religious rhetoric. I believe that whoever uses such a 
256 rhetoric is a traitor. Let this committee investigates who is the party which is                    
257 distributing pamphlets provoking against this sect or the other, and who is the party 
258 which is responsible for transforming the political struggle into a sectarian strife.              
259 They know, and this is a testimony to us, that we in Hizbollah, and the other                     
260 opposition forces as well, are very sensitive regarding sectarian sedition and very   
261 sensitive to the Sunni-Shiite strife. They also claim that our status in the Arabic world 
262 has dwindled and they advise us daily that we shouldn’t jeopardize our reputation in 
263 the Arab world. The Arab world knows that we have a sacred and honourable cause 
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264 which we serve diligently. We are not after political posts nor fame, and our demand 
265 to establish a unity government, doesn’t mean that we are asking for Hizbollah’s             
266 share in the coming government. I clearly declare in front of you that: we will give 
267 the cabinet seats that are assigned to Hizbollah to our allies in the national Opposition 
268 Front. We are not seeking political posts or power. We have a cause for which we 
269 sacrifice our blood and our sons. I tell them, so they know whom they are facing. We 
270 are a nation who is not intimidated by insults, obscene language or allegations. Let 
271 them hear me well, we remain faithful to our cause and to our nation, to our people 
272 and for whom we sacrifice our blood, our souls and our children; it doesn’t matter to 
273 us whether we are crowned or lay in tombs. 
  
274 Secondly, I want to address every Lebanese and all the Arab and Islamic nations who 
275 closely follow the details of the events in Lebanon and I want to direct a question to 
276 them. Does any Lebanese, or any Arab accept that we remain silent or support a            
277 government which is daily supported by Bush and Olmert? Do you accept that we 
278 remain silent or support a government which is unable to take national decisions, but 
279 it complies with the will and the decisions of the American ambassador, Feltman, and 
280 Condoleezza Rice? We want a national Lebanese government which is free from any 
281 foreign tutelage, be it a foe or a close friend. To defend the authoritarianism and the 
282 monopolization of the ruling party, they hide behind sectarian titles like the Sunni-
283 Shiite struggle. They are falsely trying to promote, to the Sunnis of Lebanon and to 
284 the world, that the opposition is targeting the Sunni-led government in Lebanon. This 
285 is not true. This illegitimate government is not the government of the Sunnis in                    
286 Lebanon and it won’t be a national government unless it becomes a national unity 
287 government. This is the government of the American ambassador. I tell you, and let 
288 the whole world hears, and I’m being honest as I have always had: if this government 
289 were the government which represents the Sunni Lebanese, I would have been the 
290 first one to applaud its rule. Let them stop playing with sectarian titles. If you want to 
291 address the issue, we have bright and shinning records in contrast to you. If you want 
292 to take the Iraqi case, you know that: we were from the onset against the American 
293 invasion to Iraq and we announced our stance openly. We were insulted for taking 
294 such a stance, but we didn’t bother because our position was the right one.                      
295 However, it was you, advocates of the continuation of the American occupation to 
296 Iraq which you praised because you perceive it as right and you were against ending 
270 this occupation, who asked the Bush’s administration to occupy Syria and to occupy 
271 more Arab and Islamic land. We are with the Resistance in Palestine, in Iraq, in                      
272 everywhere there is a noble patriot who holds his weapon to free his land from                    
273 occupation, domination and tutelage.  
 
274 Don’t mix up things nor make them indiscernible. Don’t take the stance of one Shiite 
275 group as a pretext, similarly, no Shiite is allowed to take the stance of one or more 
276 Sunni group as a pretext. It is not permissible for a Shiite to hold the venerable and 
277 the dear Sunni brethren or the Sunnis of the world, the responsibility, of signing a 
278 peace treaty with Israel in Camp David by a Sunni Arab leader. It is not permissible 
279 to blame the Sunnis because one or more Sunni leader shakes hands with the Zionist 
280 enemy and calls for the normalization of the relations with Israel while Israel is            
281 working on terminating the Intifada in Palestine? Not at all. Shiites are not one single 
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282 group, camp or political entity, Sunnis as well are not a single group, camp or entity. 
283 In every country, there are Shiites from this group or that and Sunnis from this group 
284 or that. There are Muslims from one group or the other as well as Christians from one 
285 group or the other. Let us judge one another based on the national or the patriotic  
286 stance of each one of us and how we serve the national interests of our countries.              
287 Leave this matter aside. Yet, it is saddening and disappointing that in the last few   
288 days they circulated a memo which calls for the reopening of the July-August war 
289 file in order to hold Hizbollah the responsibility of war, destruction and the economic 
290 repercussions etc.   
 
291 I was always in favour of postponing any discussion in this file for the sake of            
292  Lebanon’s interests. However, if you are insisting on opening up the issue, so listen 
293 well. But before I start explaining and clarifying, I want to say to all the Opposition 
294 Front, especially, to the Resistance audience that: what I’m going to say should not 
295 have any effects and does not yield any reactions and the world will be astonished 
296 how humble, moral and forgiving we are. What I’m going to disclose will not affect 
297 the goal, and we will continue to ask them to cooperate with us to form a national 
298 unity government. Now listen to the war story. I call for the formation of a Lebanese 
299 investigation committee formed of impartial judges or to the formation of an Arab 
300 investigation committee also formed of impartial and honest judges to open an                
301 investigation regarding the causes of the last war.  They accuse us, but today I will 
302 accuse them. Who officially asked America, Dick Cheney and George Bush to wage 
303 war on Lebanon – by virtue of the following evidence: the dialogue related to the    
304 disarmament of the Resistance’s weaponry has reached a dead lock and there is no 
305 internal way to disarm the Resistance’s weaponry because it enjoys wide public              
306 support as results of public opinion polls confirm, and because the army is a national 
307 and patriotic army and refuses to engage in a conflict with the Resistance so – are 
308 those who told the US that there is no internal way to put an end to the Resistance 
309 issue, hence, the only way is for the US administration to ask Olmert’s government to 
310 wage a massive and destructive war not only on Hizbollah but also on all those who 
311 support and embrace the Resistance in order to eradicate this movement and to               
312 eliminate its presence.  
 
313 The US administration acquiesced and wanted to invest this issue in the                    
314 congressional elections, meaning, that if the war turned out as expected, then Bush 
315 and the neo-conservatives would brag about terminating one of the most important 
316 terrorist organizations in the world. As part of the plan, they had prepared a prison in 
317 the occupied north of Palestine, called Roshbina, which is a military air force base 
318 with a capacity of 10,000 prisoners. Are all those prisoners exclusively from                   
319 Hizbollah? No. The would-be prisoners will be any one who opposes the dominating 
320 ruling party in Lebanon. The American administration accepted and it gave its orders 
321 to Israel. Who asked? I don’t accuse all of 14th March party, I don’t accuse everyone 
322 in the ruling party, and I don’t accuse all their leaders. I didn’t mention names in                      
323 front of anybody, not in front of an American or non-American journalist. However, 
324 those who sat down with the Americans and requested Israel to wage war on us, they 
325 know themselves very well, and I know them and I hope that the day in which I                  
326 would be obliged to mention their names will not come.  
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327 Who holds the responsibility of waging war on Lebanon is not the Resistance which 
328 was given the right to liberate the land and the prisoners as the terms of the                                     
329 ministerial statement stipulate. When this right is given to the Resistance, the                    
330 Resistance is a movement and not a state department, this right means that liberation 
331 is achieved through an armed conflict and not through negotiations and diplomatic 
332 means. We were given this right in the ministerial statement and we acted                       
333 accordingly. Who holds the responsibility of waging war and destruction is the one 
334 who asked the US and Israel to take this operation as a pretext to wage war on                       
335 Lebanon and I’m open to an independent judiciary or an independent investigation 
336 committee. Also, during the war, I told you that John Bolton, whose departure from 
337 the corridors of diplomacy is not to be regretted, wants to stir up conflict between the 
338 Lebanese when he expressed his surprise with Lebanese officials who approved the 
339 US-French resolution draft only to break their promises later on. But he was saying 
340 the truth. They initially accepted the US-French resolution draft but when they were 
341 faced with public discontent and dissension they retracted their commitments. I told 
342 you, during the war, that Olmert wants to incite conflict among us, but back then I 
343 didn’t say that he was lying, I used a vague expression that has multiple meanings. 
344 When he said that some parties in the Lebanese government contacted us and asked 
345 us to continue our fight against Hizbollah. Olmert spoke the truth and we know who 
346 they are, and I hope the day when I will be forced to disclose these names in front of 
347 the world won’t come. 
 
348 I ask the prime minister of the illegitimate government, and the witnesses are still  
349 alive, I ask him: during the war - when the Zionists destroyed all the bridges,                    
350 highways and crossroads to sever the supply lines of the Resistance in the south             
351 region. They certainly didn’t destroy the bridges, highways and crossroads as an end 
352 in itself, but to cut off the supply lines of the Resistance, but they failed and the     
353 military supply continued till the last day – haven’t you ordered the Lebanese army to 
354 confiscate the Resistance weaponry which was being transported to the south? Would 
355 any Lebanese accept, be it a Muslim or a Christian, be it a Sunni, a Shiite or a Druze, 
356 such a thing to take place? Would any Arab, be it a Muslim or a Christian, be it a  
357 Sunni or a Shiite accept that the Lebanese prime minister to work on cutting off the 
358 supply lines of the Resistance while it was engaged in the battle of defending                    
359 Lebanon and the nation? Should I remain silent just because he is a Sunni? Were he a 
360 Shiite, I would have mentioned him from the first day. Tomorrow, the prime minister 
361 of the illegitimate government will speak out and say: that Sayed Hassan is falsely 
362 accusing me. I call for an investigation and the witnesses are still alive, those whom I 
363 sent in the middle of the night as mediators to ask him to freeze this decision. What is 
364 more important and dangerous - in Lebanon we pay taxis and the government in turn 
365 pays the salaries of the military and security personnel, approves state budget and 
366 purchases equipment - that the money that the Lebanese people pay for the sake of 
367 enhancing the security forces has, supposedly, to be directed towards protecting and 
368 defending the Lebanese, their security and properties. During the war, it was              
369 expected from the security forces which affiliate with the ruling party work to track 
370 spies and their networks and the Israeli networks that was providing the coordinates 
371 to the Israelis to bomb specific targets. Unfortunately, I tell you, and I’m ready for an 
372 independent impartial investigation committee, one of the branches of the security 
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373 forces that affiliates with the ruling party was working during the war on providing 
374 the Israelis with the specific locations of Hizbollah’s officials, and this branch                 
375 worked on tracking my place during the war.  
 
376 I will say no more about the war, and if I want to continue, whether my brothers in 
377 and comrades in the opposition agree or not, had we not been driven by our concern 
378 to this country, had we not been conscious of the complexities of the sectarian                 
379 struggle, I would have stood up on the 14th of August not to speak about a national 
380 unity government but to speak about traitors who have to be taken to trail. Despite 
381 what I have said, and here the world will be surprised, we are the off springs of these 
382 values and this culture, the culture that calls for unity, forgiveness and love, I forgive 
383 them and if they want to take me to trail, I’m ready. Few months ago, a group was 
384 arrested, sadly, this group affiliates with a fundamentalist Sunni group and its                   
385 members were planning to assassinate me, and a number of clergy and non-clergy 
386 falsified the issue and I forgave them and I dropped the charges. However, they are 
387 still in prison and the court has not proved them guilty nor innocent, but I call upon 
388 the judicial system in Lebanon to set the members of this group free and to send them 
389 back to their homes in Beirut and in Tarik Aljadideh. My Allah forgive them all.  
390 I Again address them, I address the ruling party clinging to power: you won’t be able 
391 to intimidate us through riot, you won’t be able to prevent people from picketing in 
392 Riyadh Solh square and Martyrs’ squares, you won’t be able to drag us to sectarian 
393 strife, you won’t hear the screams of surrender nor can you count on our weakness or 
394 infirmity because our demands are just. We are still saying: let us cooperate together 
395 to form the coming national unity government and I also say: time is not in your side, 
396 your master in the White House is shaking and collapsing. Let us come together as 
397 Lebanese, don’t be stubborn, there is still room for negotiations. We didn’t say that 
398 the resignation of the government is the only demand, we said let us change this          
399 current government to a national unity government, the same government which is 
400 headed by Fouad Saniora, and you will have the majority in it and we only want the 
401 third of the quorum which represents the guarantee for the sake of Lebanon. But if 
402 you remained stubborn and insisted on refusing, we have started to think about other 
403 options. After a while we won’t accept that the new unity government to be headed 
404 by a personality from your party. After some time, we won’t accept and our goal will 
405 be the toppling of the government and the formation of a caretaker government              
406 whose main objective will be to run early parliamentary elections and you know to 
407 whom the majority will be and who will win. In 2005 elections you won the elections 
408 through an unjust and an unfair election law backed by deceitful allegiances. In the 
409 upcoming elections, there will be no place for deception because a fox is not taken 
410 twice in the same snare. After the early elections, the opposition will gain the                
411 majority, will form its government and will be headed by a national and honourable 
412 Sunni personality and the whole world will testify to its integrity. Those nationalist 
413 Sunni figures in Lebanon are so many and are all able to lead the country. However, 
414 we will not exclude you from power, we will at least give you the third of the quorum 
415 and to let you participate in the government because we believe that Lebanon is the 
416 country that can’t be ruled except with the participation and the cooperation of all its 
417 parties.  
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418 Dear brothers and sisters, I ask you tonight, I address this call to you, especially the 
419 Muslims to participate in tomorrow’s prayer – Friday prayer – which will be held in 
420 your squares, the square of honour, the square of true political resistance and not the 
421 faked or alleged ones. This call is an expression of our peaceful and civilized               
422 movement. I urge you to participate in Friday’s prayer which will be an expression of 
423 our unity, and cohesiveness in the face of all forms of sedition and segregation. This 
424 prayer will be led by the respectful religious leader Fathi Yakan. I ask you and I ask 
425 everyone who is listening to me now, to the full participation in the Friday’s prayer. 
426 This prayer is not only meant to be a religious exercise, but also as an expression in 
427 face of all those who wants to fish in the muddy waters for the sake of instigating  
428 sedition, discord and conflict. You might find a fruitful land for sedition and civil    
429 strife in every spot in the world, but not in Lebanon. In Lebanon, there will be no  
430 armed conflict between Shiites and Sunnis. The second thing that I want to stress, I 
431 also ask you and ask those who are listening to me to participate in the biggest rally 
432 ever on Sunday at 3 o’clock to reassert our stance and to ascertain the public            
433 participation and the public support for the national Opposition Front and we will say 
434 to them every night, we will say to them on Sunday, the ruling party will hear us               
435 from their castles, they will hear from the squares, the homes of the poor, from huts 
436 and from tents, from the destroyed homes and from those who were displaced – we 
437 will make them hear the voice of the Opposition Front that we will not surrender, we 
438 will remain in the squares until we form a national unity government that represents a 
439 guarantee for Lebanon, for all the Lebanese, which will rescue Lebanon, which will 
440 defend Lebanon and which is capable of attending to and solving Lebanon’s               
441 economic, social and political problems. 
  
442 We will make them hear that we insist on our goal and we will continue no matter 
443 what the sacrifices are. Dear brothers and sisters, from all sects, from all parties, from 
444 all movements, by Allah’s will you will be victorious. And as I used to promise you 
445 victory before, I again promise you victory. They continue the battle of July-August 
446 war and we continue our battle of defending Lebanon’s identity, unity, safety. Long 
447 live all of you, blessings be upon the martyr Ahmad Mahmoud, blessings be upon 
448 your martyrs. Long live Lebanon. Peace, Allah’s compassion and blessings be upon 


















3rd Speech  
 
May 2009 speech: The invasion of Beirut 
 
1 In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful. Thanks, and Praise be to Allah,                 
2 Cherisher and Sustainer of the Worlds. Peace and prayers be on the last prophet,            
3 Prophet Muhammad, his infallible progeny, his chosen companions and on all the                 
4 prophets and messengers. 
 
5 Brothers and sisters, Peace and Allah's mercy and blessings be upon you all. On this              
6 blessed event and at this specific time, there are many topics and issues that need to be 
7 addressed, but on this occasion and owing to the nature of the ceremony, I would like to 
8 speak in a certain direction. 
 
9 There are issues of high importance which I will address on Monday night by Allah’s 
10 will, on Al-Manar TV, regarding the Nakbah (catastrophe) commemoration that befell 
11 this nation, when Palestine fell victim to occupation and rape. Tonight, I will not speak 
12 about the Nakbah and the Israeli drills nor about the Israeli spy networks in Lebanon 
13 and about our obligations towards these issues. Everything that is related to the Israel 
14 affairs I will leave it for Monday’s speech as I promised. The nature of the subject of 
15 the Nakbah, the drills and spy networks are topics that are better suited for a television 
16 message rather than in a public ceremony speech. Today I want to talk to you not in a 
17 television-message style, because many watch television addresses and say that the      
18 Sayyed appears very calm, but when I give a public speech they say that the Sayyed is 
19 furious. In fact, I am neither furious in a public speech, nor I am calm in a television 
20 address. Each medium has its purpose. A television address differs a lot from speeches 
21 given at public gatherings. 
 
22 Today, I want to speak about you, the Radwan graduate group, about the brothers and 
23 sisters and parents, about Lebanon and Lebanese affairs, as we are in an important           
24 phase in the elections; I will also conclude the speech by tackling the issue of May 17th 
25 and May 7th. First, I would like to congratulate all the graduates, the brothers and           
26 sisters, whom we are celebrating their graduation today. Congratulations to them for 
27 their success and their academic accomplishments which were the outcome of                        
28 determination, willpower, faith, perseverance, persistence, effort, Jihad, and attending 
29 schools. According to our Islamic doctrine, education is jihad in the path of the                      
30 Almighty, and some prophetic sayings explain that the angels lower their wings to the 
31 education seeker. In the name of the brothers and sisters in Hizbollah’s march, I                   
32 declare our pride of you and your accomplishments and I would like to extend my             
33 thanks and high appreciation to the parents - the dear fathers and mothers - as it is             
34 customary in every graduation ceremony, for their persistence and support that they  
35 have shown to their sons and daughters to continue the path of academic achievement, 
36 at the university level and in the different fields of specialization, and for holding the 
37 burden that accompanies such decision and we know that the vast majority of                       
38 Lebanese people and Lebanese families live in poverty, and some even below the            
39 poverty line. However, we see that fathers and mothers make the efforts and bear great 
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40 burdens and responsibilities to provide for their children the opportunity for education 
41 and specialization and the chance to make a real future. I bow in front of the fathers    
42 and mothers, the Mujahedeen, because the one who works hard to support his             
43 dependents, is like the Mujahid in the path of Allah. This hard work is not only to fill 
44 the stomachs of his dependents and to protect them from hunger, but also to educate 
45 and raise the status and the livelihood of his off springs, and to safeguard their                     
46 afterlife. Those are the Mujahedeen on the path of Allah. I must extend my thanks to a 
47 segment of our society whom we usually pay little attention to: the spouses. The            
48 number of sisters graduating is more than the brothers. This is a healthy phenomenon 
49 since many of them continue their education after marriage. Many husbands allow              
50 their wives to continue their studies, and of course, a wife who continues her higher  
51 education, imposes a burden on the husband and the household. But thanks to Allah, 
52 we see that this phenomenon is spreading and growing in our society and it is a                    
53 healthy phenomenon. Wives, too, help their husbands to continue their studies despite 
54 the demands placed by maintaining a marital life. This joint cooperation and              
55 endurance lead to such good results. Thus, today, I want to devote special thanks to the 
56 spouses who facilitated for their husbands and wives, the opportunity to continue their 
57 education and academic achievements, the despite all resulting burdens. 
 
58 Dear brothers and sisters, your group holds the 'al-Radwan' title, the name of the                 
59 cherished martyr commander Hajj Imad Mughnieh-Hajj Radwan May Allah bless his 
60 soul. Here I want to point out something that many people don’t know, that al-Hajj,      
61 May Allah have mercy on his soul, throughout carrying his Jihadist and leadership              
62 responsibilities, he used to encourage the Mujahedeen, the brothers working under his 
63 command not to abandon academic pursuit. This was his concern and I know he           
64 always sought for it and tried to secure the financial and organizational facilities to   
65 give a large number of our brothers and sisters the opportunity for the university                    
66 studies. This was not just his personal desire, but it was based on a strategic vision,                
67 this vision which the Resistance and its movement embodies. Because our resistance, 
68 my dear brothers and sisters, and since its foundation to this date, our Resistance has 
69 been based on knowledge, faith, resolve, determination, intent and sacrifice, but it has 
70 also been defined by education, knowledge, specialization and bright minds. This has               
71 been acknowledged by our enemies on the battlefield and in more than one area of              
72 confrontation, in security and psychological warfare, in military combat, in the             
73 development of the capabilities, in tactics, leading to the formation of a special               
74 military combat school, neither Westerner nor Easterner but the school of Islamic                
75 Resistance in Lebanon, made by Mujahedeen from Lebanon. Therefore, for your                 
76 group to carry this title is a source of pride and honour, just as the martyr, from his               
77 heavenly place, commander Radwan would be proud and honoured to hold his name 
78 and to follow his path and to renew the covenant with his blessed blood and with all  
79 the martyrs who have gone before. 
 
80 Dear brothers and sisters, this large number of male and female graduates from the              
81 heart of this faithful procession of Jihad presents to Lebanon and to all the world one 
82 of the true faces of this procession and one of the shining faces that reflects the                
83 Resistance march in Lebanon, and its faith, humanitarianism and patriotism, its                     
84 sincerity and dedication, its diligence and perseverance, its knowledge and labour, and 
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85 its great hope in the future. Today you present to the world a picture of the faithful             
86 believer who is not hindered by poverty and deprivation to seek education, success and 
87 progress, a picture of a believer not hindered by shortage of money, by having few              
88 supporters, or frail equipage to continue Jihad and Resistance to pursue his quest for 
89 dignity and freedom, the image of the faithful believer whose ultimate quest is             
90 achieving justice, and to see the smile he dreamt off on every lip, and the joy he                     
91 dreamt off to fill the hearts, the quest of all the prophets throughout history. Today you 
92 also present a strong scene and send a clear message to all those who doubted the                     
93 power of the opposition party to manage Lebanon’s affairs in all fields and disciplines, 
94 they bet on the opposition's failure to run the affairs of the country, and they say that if 
95 the opposition wins the majority, we do not want to participate in the would-be                    
96 government, not out of asceticism or modesty, but out of betting on failure. I say to all 
97 those gamblers, we want you to participate in governing the country with us, as we are 
98 proponents of partnership, but if you choose not to, and we win the majority, we will 
99 not beg you to, if you are betting on the failure of the opposition, the only answer is 
100 this, and this is one out of many ceremonies and one stage out of many stages, with 
101 2883 graduates in all fields of specialization, I tell you that, the hearts, minds, souls, 
102 willpower and determination which defeated the strongest army and the strongest           
103 country in the region backed by the strongest tyrant in this world, are more than            
104 capable managing a country a hundred times larger than Lebanon. Some people             
105 accuse us that we want to establish an empire, will it be, then, difficult for us to rule 
106 10452 square kilometres? 
 
107 And as we were able with our Lebanese minds and hearts, with our Lebanese                     
108 willpower and sacrifices to liberate our land and prisoners and protect our country, 
109 we are able, yet the most able by Allah’s will, to build our country and nation and 
110 promote development. 
 
111 Today, I tell you that we are interested in a new phase and we must bear full                    
112 responsibility and not from a detached or edgewise position, hold the responsibility to 
113 build our country, land and to build a strong and a fair state, because strength without 
114 justice is destruction and dictatorship and lead to injustice; and justice without          
115 strength has no protection or means for implementation. We look forward to a             
116 Lebanon, to be home to all its sons and families, all have equal rights and obligations, 
117 a homeland to one unified nation and one unified state; one nation which is the                  
118 Lebanese people, and we don’t have a problem talking about our pluralistic                        
119 multicultural society. In the past, some of the elites, intellectuals and thinkers used to 
120 indulge in long debates about whether what we have is pluralism or diversity? There 
121 is no difference in the terminology used, basically because pluralism or religious and 
122 intellectual diversity is a gift and a blessing, which we can turn into the most                   
123 important component of strength in our country as well as the world, starting from 
124 our homeland. 
 
125 We are one nation, in one land, we speak one language, and we have similar interests 
126 in security, stability, freedom, sovereignty, independence, social welfare, science, 
127 education, economy, finance and all of life related affairs pertaining to individuals, 
128 families, political parties, groups, religious confessions and regions. Our interests are 
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129 deeply the same but we might differ in expressing and diagnosing those interests, but 
130 we essentially are one people, who should have long ended the prejudice regarding 
131 the quality or the quantity. Today, education in Lebanon cut across all confessions, so 
132 does poverty, honour, dignity, betrayal and, unfortunately, collaboration with the     
133 enemy. We have to end the qualitative and quantitative debate. We must look at our 
134 people as one nation and if there are certain fissures or severe disunity, we all must 
135 cooperate and collaborate together to address these divisions or fractures.  
 
136 We look forward to a unified Lebanese state and to one unified land, and as I spoke 
137 of people’s unity and unity of land I speak about a unified state. Therefore, we as  
138 Hizbollah have always rejected the idea of Lebanon's division and we will stand            
139 against any plan to divide Lebanon that may cross anyone's mind today or in the                
140 future. To my surprise now, after the failure of all past division plans and regional 
141 and international gambling, there are few people who are still thinking of dividing 
142 Lebanon. But I honestly tell you, that division plans still tantalize the minds of some 
143 political players in Lebanon. I know that these are not mere dreams but actual hopes 
144 which some speak about in private meetings and are planning to achieve them under 
145 the title of federalism. Such plots will find no place in Lebanon. We want Lebanon to 
146 be a unified country, a unified people, land, State and system; Lebanon cannot                 
147 withstand any form of federalism, which we only see it as a step towards division. It 
148 is interesting to see those who currently accuse us of working to achieve a tripartite-
149 rule, are themselves working for federalism. 
 
150 We also look forward to a Lebanon as a Lebanese state par excellence, free of racism, 
151 for some classify themselves as being more Lebanese than others, free of any feeling 
152 of racial superiority or prejudice which has no basis in reason, law, or in the values of 
153 the surrounding environment we live in, particularly towards our neighbouring Arab 
154 world, and in our relations with each other. 
 
155 We look forward to a Lebanon with an Arab identity, but without fanaticism, because 
156 racism and fanaticism are obscurantism and have no relation whatsoever with reason, 
157 religion, knowledge and humanity. 
 
158 Concerning the state and the system, I do not think the Lebanese differ over many of 
159 these titles, but they may differ in their interpretation, or ways and means to achieve 
160 them. According to the political system we have put forward in our election                  
161 programme, and as stated in the Taif Accord, we call for the formation of the                   
162 supreme national authority for the abolition of political sectarianism. We were              
163 precise in our election programme; we did not say that we want to abolish political 
164 sectarianism, there is one item that is mentioned in the Taif Accord which no one has 
165 yet approached, which is the formation of the supreme national authority for the          
166 abolition of political sectarianism. What we are asking for is the formation of this  
167 supreme body, to convene and study this issue, no matter how long this might take 
168 even if it took years, to see whether we wish to continue with the existing sectarian 
169 formula. If the study’s result were to continue with the existing formula, then let’s 
170 continue with it. But then there are some developments, improvements and                     
171 amendments which can be discussed to arrive at an agreement. On the other hand, if 
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172 the Lebanese, through the supreme national body for the abolition of political           
173 sectarianism, reached the conclusion that we must abolish sectarianism from our             
174 system of governance, then we need to put in place a plan to abolish sectarianism and 
175 find an alternative system which we should all concede. On this particular point, we 
176 do not call for urgency or for imposing the choices of some of the Lebanese over            
177 other Lebanese, because any substantial amendment in the system has to be based on 
178 a national dialogue that is real, deep and serious, coupled with genuine national             
179 consensus, because hast changes or imposing the will of some over others, when it 
180 comes to changes in system structure, might have far more serious repercussions and 
181consequences than it would be to continue with the existing current formula, despite 
182 its defects which we all agree on. This is one point. 
 
183 Another point is that we look forward to a unified country, and I do not want to           
184 defend Hizbollah here, but I can assure you that since our inception we supported the 
185 formation of one state; that is why over all the past years we have never practiced any 
186 authority of the so-called, within parentheses "authority Zone", even after the        
187 liberation of the border zone. Nine years ago, I stood in the town of Bint Jubail, and I 
188 said that we are not a substitute for the State or the authorities and we do not have a 
189 judiciary system, nor do we want to put people on trial, even the collaborators who 
190 killed us, who shed our blood, wounded and jailed us, who whipped our skin and  
191 destroyed our homes; we left them to the Lebanese state to put them to trial. We do 
192 not present ourselves as a state or an authority. While, during the past three decades, 
193 those who now brag about wanting a single unified State, have actually practiced  
194 local statehood, canton and local governance we have never done this in the past, and 
195 now we are not doing this anywhere despite all media distortion which is intended to 
196 target certain areas, especially the southern Dahiyeh suburbs. 
 
197 We are with a unified capable State, with a strong government with a strong and   
198 decent parliament, which properly represents the will of the Lebanese people, we are 
199 also with an independent and strong judiciary system, and a strong army and strong 
200 security services. In this we do not differ with others. Yes. There is a contentious    
201 point with some Lebanese related to the issue of the Resistance and its weapons and 
202  the defence strategy and there is a great deal of controversy and debate around this 
203 point and we will discuss this matter, but given the developments that are happening 
204  all around us, we still do not see any incompatibility for Lebanon to have both a             
205 strong Resistance and a strong State, and the strong State is the one which is capable 
206 of taking Lebanon to a stage where it can be said to the Resistance that now there is a 
207 State capable of protecting its people, land, security and stability, and you in the              
208 resistance, can now go back to your school benches, factories, fields and to your                
209 normal lives. This is the natural route. 
 
210 In this context too, we look forward to a State that exercises real administrative         
211 reforms, a good effective and productive governance, free from corruption and               
212 bribery. We, therefore, call for the implementation of decentralization as stated in the 
213 Taif Accord. We call for a modern election law that allows the best representation of 
214 the society's segments and we wholeheartedly support the proportionality law. We 
215 call for a State that is capable of addressing social crises and life problems. A State 
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216 that gives these issues real and serious priority, and not like what we saw during the 
217 past years. We call for a State that is genuine about balanced development, and one 
218 of its conditions is the restoration of the Ministry of Planning, that analyses           
219 Lebanon's capabilities, resources and needs to put them in an overall comprehensive 
220 view, and execute plans that take into account this quantitative and qualitative               
221 balance. Therefore, I say to the graduating brothers and sisters: you stand before a 
222 challenge of the labour market, to take advantage of the academic degrees that you 
223 have just received. We have two paths: the personal partial path, related to how each 
224 one of us finds a job for his son or daughter, through an association, institution,               
225 leader or party. The other path is to have a government in the near future that places 
226 the pains, hunger, poverty and unemployment at the forefront of its concerns, and not 
227 spend another four or five years in political struggle over political issues, which they 
228 already know from the beginning, that even if they used all their political, military, 
229 security and media tools they will fail in achieving any of them.  
 
230 We look forward to assist in the formation of a government that is earnest, sincere 
231 and honest, a government elected from the people, from them, from their hunger and 
232 deprivation in order to bring forward serious and sincere solutions to the social,                 
233 financial, economic, developmental, and employment issues. We also look forward to 
234 a strong and independent judiciary system, free from the influence of politicians and 
235 from all official and non-official political positions. What we have in Lebanon is not 
236 a judicial authority, even if the Supreme Judicial Council says we do. We have fair 
237 and honest judges, and the corrupt as well, we have free and independent judges as 
238 well as the subordinate who held themselves in pledge to others. Tell me what is the 
239 image of the judiciary system which lightly punishes Zionist spies and collaborators 
240 who worked and collaborated with Israel for decades and committed treason against 
241 their homeland? What is and who is this judicial system that sentence collaborators 
242 for six months, or a year, then they are released later on to return to work as spies. 
243 And who is this same judicial system that places four senior security officers in          
244 prison for three years and eight months without investigation or any evidence. Is this 
245 an independent or fair judiciary system? This is shameful that those who collaborated 
246 with Israel for many years go into prison for two or three months and then are               
247 released. From the beginning, we pledged to hand in collaborators to the Lebanese 
248 judiciary, and we did not do what other Resistance movements had done. All              
249 Resistance movements in history held trials and punished collaborators and traitors, 
250 nationals of their own homeland except the Resistance in Lebanon.  
 
251 Few years ago, I said to the French Ambassador after Jospin’s visit to occupied              
252 Palestine and the subsequent reactions in Bir Zeit University, due to his description 
253 of Hizbollah as a terrorist party. Few months after that incident, we liberated our land 
254 and it happened that I was reading about the French Resistance, and I said to the           
255 French Ambassador at that time: Give my greetings to your Prime Minister and say 
256 to him that the Resistance in Lebanon is much more civilized, humane and moral        
257 than the French resistance because yours back then held field trials, executed                     
258 thousands of French nationals without trial, those who were charged with                        
259 collaborating with the Nazi army, while we in Lebanon, we did not even kill a            
260 chicken from Antoine Lahad's Army. We had faith in the state and its judiciary              
329 
 
261 system. Now some from 14th of March may come out and say that this judiciary             
262 system was during the period in which we were under Syrian administration and           
263 tutelage. However, the judiciary system at the present time is under your                       
264 guardianship, yet, act in the same manner. We pledged not to harm those                         
265 collaborators and to accept the rulings of the Lebanese judicial system, and many of 
266 these collaborators returned to their homes and villages; and I say to you now that we 
267 keep our pledge and none of them will be harassed unless proven guilty through           
268 approved processes. We look forward to a truly strong independent judicial authority 
269 to be fair in implementing the law. 
 
270 We are advocates of partnership in governance and the cooperation of various             
271 components or representatives of the various components of the Lebanese society in 
272 managing the country's affairs. Therefore, we are advocates of a national unity              
273 government, and this experience has not proved its failure, they wanted to present it 
274 as a failed experience. The equation that they are working on these days is either you 
275 submit to their will or they consider it a failed government. This national unity                   
276 government, if the parties act with conviction and sincerity, it will not be a failure, 
277 but it is the best for Lebanon. Because any government that ignores key components 
278 from the Lebanese people under the pretext that they got a majority of half + 1 or 2 
279 MPs, this does not work in Lebanon, whether this was the claim of the opposition or 
280 the loyalists. If we all say that Lebanon has a certain idiosyncrasy we must work              
281 according to the requirements of this idiosyncrasy, and if there is no idiosyncrasy, 
282 then let us open a debate from now, and if we decide to adopt full democracy, then 
283 the best formula for a full democracy that could deliver a democratic rule in Lebanon, 
284 is to have a parliament that is the result of democratic elections, that are based on an 
285 election law of proportionality and that Lebanon to be one electoral constituency. 
 
286 We accept full democracy, but if we do not go for full democracy because it may   
287 affect certain sects, or some Lebanese demographic features, we then must take into 
288 account these specifications through partnership and the non-cancellation of anyone 
289 at all. As for the story of the obstructing-third or veto power in the Cabinet, which 
290 they say it disrupts the country when in fact it does not. And here I must call on our 
291 brothers in the Future Movement especially, to review out of their sense of duty, the 
292 martyred Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri's experience, and ask all those who were close 
293 to him about the difficulties he met through the process of forming the governments 
294 which he used to head, and the reason which made him refuse to preside the last           
295 government prior to his assassination. They will find that the reason – and this topic 
296 was discussed by PM Hariri and I during the lengthy meetings which were held      
297 months before his martyrdom - he used to say to me: I will not form or head a                  
298 government in which I do not have in it or name one third of its ministers myself         
299 otherwise let them form the government they want without me. That is why in all the 
300 governments he presided, he always sought to secure third of the ministers from the 
301 various sects, and when he was unable to do that in the last government before his 
302 martyrdom, thus he apologized. Therefore, PM Omar Karami was then appointed for 




304 The real reason why PM Hariri did not form the last Government was because he was 
305 unable to nominate the third of ministers. They can ask Martyr Hariri's friends and 
306 associates that this is a normal thing in the country for anyone who wants to be a real 
307 partner. 
 
308 I am not saying that Hizbollah wants the third of the government, but I say that the 
309 opposition demanded the third, the opposition which is formed from a variety of           
310 spectra and political parties, and represented half of the Lebanese people in the past 
311 years, and this is natural. But to return to the tone of tripartite rule, I will tell you          
312 what that story is about. This concept was fabricated by them, they laid the egg,             
313 which hatched into a chick which they fed and raised, until it became a rooster now 
314 standing on podiums crowing: tripartite Governance. No one in the opposition spoke 
315 about the tripartite issue, no one thought of it and no one understands what they mean 
316 by it. Is it confessional tripartite-rule, tri-sectarian government or tripartite political 
317 alliances? I, as a Lebanese citizen, when you ask me about what I understand from 
318 the tripartite they are speaking off, I tell you that I do not understand their precise  
319 meaning. There are many hypotheses on this issue; they proposed the issue of                  
320 tripartite-rule only to put the opposition in a defensive position. I wish that the             
321 opposition including the brothers in Hizbollah would ignore this fabrication. All they 
322 want is to make us defend ourselves. Why should we in every speech have to negate 
323 or confirm that 296 the tripartite concept they have fabricated it, they want us to           
324 defend ourselves. We didn’t propose this issue, end of discussion, and their claim     
325 does not have any factual basis at all. Yes, there is another goal in raising the          
326 tripartite issue, which is to target the Christians in the opposition. When we say that 
327 certain political forces in the opposition, for example the Shiites, if they want a             
328 tripartite rule- if they mean confessional tripartite- and since Lebanon is equally            
329 shared between Muslims and Christians, a confessional tripartite would give a third 
330 to each for Shiites, Sunnis and Christians respectively, rather than the current half 
331 share the Christians currently enjoy in the current governing structure. Hence, they 
332 suppose that if this is offered, the Shiites would accept a third share in a tri-sectarian 
333 rule, carved out from the current equal share.  
 
334 This supposedly serves the Shiites of the opposition, and if the Sunnis too would           
335 accept such an offer, hence this tripartite would also serve the Sunnis in the                  
336 opposition. However, they are not focusing on these two parts of the opposition, their 
337 main issue is to target the Christians of the opposition. It is an attempt to say that          
338 Lebanese Christians and General Aoun, Ministers Franjieh and Skaaf, and other               
339 personalities from the opposition but especially General Aoun and the Free Patriotic 
340 Movement made a deal with Hizbollah and the opposition, whereby he is happy with 
341 a tripartite rule. In other words, he wants to lower the Christians' share in governance 
342 from half to a third-share. This of course is not the first media, political and electoral 
343 injustice directed at our Christians allies in the opposition and will certainly not be 
344 the last. Since this is a lie and has no basis, neither General Aoun nor the Christians 
345 in the opposition think this way, nor has anyone else in the opposition mentioned or 
346 discussed such a topic, General Aoun did not even accept tripartite share in Jezzine’s 




348 Therefore, we should not be in the defence position, but we must be clear about it. 
349 Yes, we are advocates of partnership, and the implementation of the Taif Accord, and 
350 to work quietly developing our political system on the basis of forming the supreme 
350 national political system council to diffuse tension and to discuss the abolition of  
351 political sectarianism. 
 
352 We also look forward to a State, capable of protecting itself, protecting its decisions,  
353 citizens, land and security, without the need for UNIFIL forces, with all due respect 
354 to them in South Lebanon, and without the need for external security apparatuses, 
355 and as Lebanese we have the military and security competencies that enable Lebanon 
356 to build such a capable force. Here, also out of respect to the memory of and the           
357 commemoration in the following few days of 17th May treaty. It is a pity and very 
358 unfortunate that those who stood against May 17th treaty are, we, the Lebanese, easily 
359 forget. We tend to forget that those who stood against the Agreement signed by the 
360 Lebanese system at that time, from a weakened, defeated and servile position, and 
361 through which it subjugates Lebanon to Israel's security, military and political terms? 
362 Who signed that treaty on May 17th? Who wanted to attach Lebanon to Israel through 
363 the May 17th treaty? Who are the leaders and political parties involved in crowning 
364 Lebanon forever as a country that belongs to the Zionist  project? And who              
365 opposed the 17th of May treaty? Who were the clergy, the men and women,                  
366 especially in Bir al-Abed from the Imam Reza Mosque? Whose blood was shed to 
367 announce Lebanese people's rejection of the 17th of May treaty, other than martyr     
368 Mohamed Najdeh? Who gave his blood for Lebanon to be independent from Israel? 
369 Who are those who signed with their own ink the Agreement of humiliation with                  
370 Israel? 
 
371 Today those who wanted to subjugate Lebanon forever to Israel are now themselves 
372 symbols of independence, sovereignty and freedom, whereas those who sacrificed 
373 their blessed blood for the liberation of Lebanon are now the titles of subordination, 
374 treason and foreign dependence. Isn’t this historical injustice? Is it possible to forget 
375 that? Now they come up to say the Sayyed has resorted to accusatory language and 
376 the language of treason. These are not accusations, these are facts from history, I am 
377 not issuing judgments here, and this history has to remain present, to benefit from it 
378 in the future, not for vengeance, but to prevent ourselves from being misled or lost 
379 again, to prevent selling our country in the new international slave market. We want a 
380 strong and capable state that regains its land by its will, and not by pleading, or to 
381 have a piece of our land returned as a favour from Netanyahu during an election           
382 season. 
 
383 Like this time of the year, our people, the men and women in south Lebanon, were 
384 storming barricades, wire fences, and military sites in the previously occupied            
385 southern villages, making the historic liberation. This is the Lebanon we look                  
386 forward to, based on this I reach the point which I want to highlight. Yes, we want 
387 Lebanon that is cooperative, fraternal and collaborative, a Lebanon far-away from 
388 conflicts and controversies. Few days ago, was the May 7th commemoration, in the 
389 opposition we have in one way or another adopted a policy not to raise this topic            
390 because of the sensitivities that it might evoke. Unfortunately, the other side has been 
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391 raising the issue before and after May 7th, and they still do. They have been raising 
392 this issue in all media outlets, in all platforms and speeches which caused a                        
393 sandstorm, they mistakenly took our silence and lack of comment on that incident as 
394 an indication of our sense of shame, weakness or embarrassment. In fact, although 
395 we have in Hizbollah chosen to stay out of this debate, but I find it my duty to            
396 comment on this issue in honour of the blessed blood of the martyrs who fell on May 
397 7th, so no one gets confused in Lebanon or outside Lebanon, and to bring some light 
398 back to the truth.  
 
399 I want to remind those, and I don’t want to speak in a provoking language to stir           
400 tension, I want to remind those talking about 7th May to remember what they did             
401 on the 5th of May. If we review the Winograd report which states that among                   
402 Hizbollah’s elements and points of strength that Israel must dismantle is Hizbollah’s 
403 telecommunications network. Does anyone in Lebanon today have any doubt that 
404 Israel eavesdrops on our mobile phone networks? Is there any doubt that Israel                 
405 eavesdrops on our civil landline telephone networks? Is there any doubt that Israelis 
406 eavesdrop all available means of communication? There is certainly no doubt about 
407 that, the latest American and international telecommunication tapping technologies 
408 are found in Israel. Not one of the most important weapons of the resistance, but the 
409 most important weapon of the resistance, and I will repeat to and this is what I meant 
410 by reminding, the most important weapon of the Resistance in the July-war was the 
411 telecommunications network, because it is immune to eavesdropping and to Israel 
412 breaches to an extremely large degree. On the night of May 5th, the Lebanese          
413 government convened and from outside the meeting's agenda, took the decision to 
414 dismantle the telecommunications network, accusing Hizbollah of operating it            
415 outside the law, misusing public funds and violating the sovereignty of the State. So, 
416 they took a decision to refer all those connected with this network, to the court. Put 
417 these two scenes in front of you I will not make judgments. The former illegitimate 
418 Lebanese government must notice that the 5th of May is a mark of disgrace stamped 
419 on its forehead throughout history, because it wanted to do what Israel failed to              
420 accomplish over thirty-three days of war. This is one point. 
 
421 The second question, in the last few days, media campaigns with video tapes aired on 
422 television the news that thousands of fighters who had been brought into Beirut from 
423 outside the city, in the lead up to the 5th of May, I want to ask Beirut citizens who are 
424 being told to make their vote a response to the 7th of May. Anyway, a large segment 
425 of Beirut citizens already decided who they will vote for according to their political 
426 choices and inclinations and regardless of whether there was May 7th or not, as there 
427 are different trends based on which people will vote. But I want to address our people 
428 in Beirut and urge them to ask: who were those who turned Beirut into a city for               
429 militias under the heading of security companies, and who filled the city with centres 
430 for dispatching arms under the cover of this title? You can also ask, who were those 
431 who brought thousands of fighters from outside Beirut and dispersed them                      
432 throughout Beirut neighbourhoods, centres and apartments, in synch with a political 
433 media campaign launched against Hizbollah and the telecommunications network, 
434 before making that Cabinet decision on May 5th. Are these legitimate questions or 
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435 not? Does anyone still doubt that thousands of fighters were brought to Beirut prior 
436 to the government’s decision? What was being planned? 
 
437 What was planned on the 5th of May is that the government takes the decision? And 
438 wait to see what Hizbollah’s response would be? If Hizbollah did not do anything, 
439 and resort to statements, sit-ins and demonstrations they will have succeeded, and 
440 this would be a preparatory step as whoever confiscates the telecommunications  
441 network, will later on confiscate other weapons, under similar headings – this in case 
442 Hizbollah allowed them to remove the network in the first place. But if Hizbollah did 
443 not move in this direction, this means a confrontation will take place between           
444 Hizbollah and the army, and this is what they want.  
 
445 Those who claim that they care about the army and the strong state they want, I will 
446 tell you what their project was in the last years, they have been working on                 
447 instigating conflict and a  battle between the army and the resistance. They failed          
448 because in Lebanon, we have a patriotic army with patriotic leaders, officers and        
449 soldiers. This project was studied by foreign bodies, who carefully analysed the           
450 Lebanese Army and assessed whether its leaders, officers and soldiers, were willing 
451 and prepared to enter into a battle against the resistance. The outcome they reached 
452 was that this army was not mentally, psychologically, culturally, nationally, prepared 
453 to fight the resistance. That is why they deprived it from all military assistance,             
454 because they consider it an army which cannot be trusted. 
 
455 Not to be trusted on what? The country? The elections? Or the political regime? No, 
456 none, this army is not trusted to fight resistance. The army should consider this as an 
457 honour, the army deeply represents an element of safety, security and it is the            
458 national guarantee to Lebanon.  
 
459 If Hizbollah didn’t not hush up and instead calls for civil disobedience and to a         
460 confrontation in Beirut, thousands of fighters will be ready to mobilize. Here I want 
461 to say something we did not say back then; there was a plan ready to put in place, and 
462 these fighters had instructions about what to do, which areas they have to take over, 
463 the areas they have to cut-off to separate from other areas, the project was to take    
464 Beirut to a sectarian strife that was meant to continue for weeks. These events were 
465 meant to be taken as a pretext to demand the intervention of foreign forces under the 
466 title Sectarian war in Lebanon, to raise the call to the world saying, 'Please help us 
467 stop the war’, this is what was planned. 
 
468 Just to know that the decisions taken on the 5th of May were not made for              
469 implementation. If these decisions were not for implementation, then why did you 
470 stay up till morning before you issued them? Why did you call from inside the        
471 convened Ministerial Cabinet, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, U.S., France and others? These 
472 things are no longer secret? You can ask the ministers who were there with you in 
473 that Government, just hear what they say here and there, I am not revealing secrets, 
474 the issue is not about decisions not for implementation, and the previous illegitimate 
475 government took the decision to take Lebanon to a sectarian war between Shiites and 




477 I say to all Lebanese, especially to the Shiites and Sunnis in Lebanon and particularly 
478 to our dear people in Beirut, what happened on the 7th of May, put a quick end to a 
479 sectarian war they had planned for, and for which they had made preparations. It          
480 brought a quick end to a plan to burn Beirut by sedition and civil war, it put a quick 
481 end to a major conspiracy that was prepared for this resistance. The 7th of May,            
482 spared Beirut bloodshed, preserved the official institutions of Beirut, the homes and 
483 families of Beirut, which they wanted to destroy and burn on the 5th of May. This is 
484 the 7th of May, and this is the greatness of our martyrs’ blood. As far as we are              
485 concerned, throughout last year I was mindful and took great care not to raise this 
486 point, but with what I have heard in the past two weeks, I declare the 7th of May to be 
487 one of the glorious days of the Resistance in Lebanon. And as a consequence, the 7th 
488 of May placed Lebanon on the path to resolution, and brought Lebanon out of the 
489 stymie they had placed it in, the 7th of May compelled them to return to dialogue          
490 table which they had previously rejected, the 7th of May led to the election of a            
491 president and the formation of a national unity government, the relative stability             
492 which Lebanese have enjoyed during the last year is one of the blessings of 7th May, 
493 thanks to the martyrs’ blood who fell in the 7th of May. 
 
494 In the past two weeks, I heard slogans saying that ‘we do not forget the 7th of May, 
495 and that ‘they will not forget’. They made speeches, chanted slogans, this is great      
496 news, we do not want you to forget the 7th of May, oh dear brother, that is what we 
497 want, what we want is not to forget the 7th of May, so that no one will repeat the        
498 follies of the 5th of May. As for the people whom you brought from different distant 
499 areas, I want to do them justice. It was said that thousands of fighters were bought 
500 few days before that time from the two regions of Akkar and Bekaa. I want to do           
501 these young men justice, for we know that the people of Akkar and the Bekaa are  
502 strong and brave men, on whom one can depend, and no one doubts that they are      
503 definitely no cowards at all, nor do they escape from the battlefield, but you did not 
504 bring them to fight Israel, try them in fighting Israel. You brought them to fight their 
505 own people and the resistance, which the people of Akkar and in the Bekaa consider 
506 it the source of their honour, pride and glory. You brought them to fight the                     
507 Resistance which every Arab, whatever their religion or sect, - considers it his glory 
508 and pride in this time and age. Therefore, they did not have the incentive and                 
509 motivation to fight their folks and brothers in the resistance. And those who brought 
510 them ought to have known this. No one shall say that the people of Akkar or the           
511 Bekaa are cowards. Never. It is just that they were brought to the wrong battle, a          
512 battle which they did not believe in at all, not for a single moment.  
 
513 Brothers and sisters, yes, we do not want to build on the 7th of May nor on the 17th of 
514 May, we read the past to deduce lessons from it for the future, despite everything, we 
515 call for cooperation and partnership, to overcome the past to concert efforts, to build 
516 our country together and bring it out of its various crises. As I said to them when we 
517 came out victorious in July war-a victory which until now they didn’t acknowledge-it 
518 does not matter anyway-I told them we have to put our arms together and work            
519 shoulder to shoulder to build Lebanon, regardless of the outcome of the next                  
520 parliamentary elections, we need all this cooperation and coordination to build          
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521 Lebanon together, to protect it together and to raise together its name high throughout 
522 the entire world. 
 
523 Brothers and sisters, once again we congratulate our brothers and sisters the           
524 graduates for their accomplishment and success. Peace, Allah's mercy, and blessings 














































January 2011 Speech: Resignation from government 
 
1 In the Name of Allah, The Compassionate, The Most Merciful. Praise be to Allah, The 
2 Lord of the world. Peace be on the Seal of prophets, our Master and Prophet, Abi Al             
3 Qassem Mohammad and on his chaste and pure Progeny, chosen companions and all               
4 prophets and messengers. Peace be upon you all and Allah's mercy and blessings. 
 
5 Due to the developments that took place in the past few days and due to the importance  
6 of the stage, I find myself responsible for presenting the facts and analysing and               
7 commenting on them as well as sketching an image as close as possible to the course of 
8 events that took place in our country, because it is the right of the Lebanese people, the 
9 right of all the Lebanese, the right of all those who love Lebanon and care about              
10 Lebanon, the right of the people in Lebanon, of the state, of the Resistance and for the 
11 future, to be acquainted with and be informed as much as possible about the course of 
12 events because the facts and the way things actually progressed can clearly reveal the 
13 intentions and the aims and what is being prepared for this country and for all of us. 
 
14 First, I will start with the facts and I will not go far back to the previous months. I will 
15 start briefly with the facts regarding the so called the Arab Initiative or the Saudi-                   
16 Syrian effort following the talk related to the imminent announcement of the                       
17 indictment by the Tribunal General Prosecutor in which he intends to accuse                       
18 Hizbollah’s members or cadres, the kind initiative took place on behalf of the Saudi          
19 and Syrian sides – on behalf of King Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz and President Bashar 
20 Assad and we were informed of the presence of an effort of this kind, and we                      
21 supported it. We told all our friends who called to offer help: We suggest that you                 
22 support the Saudi-Syrian effort. In fact, we bet on this effort as did all those who work 
23 for the welfare of Lebanon so that Lebanon may overcome this ordeal or the ordeal                
24  and sedition planned for Lebanon. 
 
25 The talks started despite that some in Lebanon denied the existence of these talks,             
26 ideas, papers or terms and despite denying reaching an agreement because they are             
27 talking about their wishes and not about facts and real events. 
 
28 On this issue, I want to be very clear so that all Lebanese would have a clear picture so 
29 that later no one claims illusionary heroism or present unreal things to people. From    
30 the very beginning, the Saudi side was clear and they said that the STL can't be             
31 abolished because the STL was established following a resolution issued by the              
32 International Security Council, and this issue is in within the hands of America,                    
33 Britain, France and so on and we said that we understand this and I hinted to this on     
34 the speech I gave on the night of Ashura. They were clear. In fact, this was not                    
35 discussed. So, from the very first days and from the first meeting, it was clear that the 
36 Saudi side said that they can't cancel the indictment and we also understood this                  
37 because the indictment is not in the Saudi hands but rather in the hands of the               
38 Americans and the Israelis. Consequently, it is not expected that the Saudi side will be 




40 From the very beginning two things were suggested: First: postponing the issuance of 
41 the indictment for several weeks or months until an agreement on another thing is                
42 reached. Second let's sit to discuss how we can protect Lebanon from the                     
43 repercussions of the indictment. All this that took place on the first days, and in fact all 
44 these negotiations remained secret. We said that we understand this and that we don’t 
45 have any problem and off course we refuse the indictment, and we believe that it is              
46 politicized and we believe that we are targeted by America and Israel via the                        
47 indictment, but Lebanon is our country and we are keen to protect this country and                
48 during the talks we reached the following: How to protect Lebanon: I also hinted to   
49 that in the night of Ashura.  
 
50 We can protect Lebanon via three terms: the Lebanese government meets and says:              
51 Due to the developments, risks, possibilities and so on and apart from its evaluation of 
52 the STL and the indictment, it carries on three things: 
53 First, withdraws the Lebanese judges. 
54 Second, stops the Lebanese financing of the STL. 
55 Third, abrogates the agreement memorandum between the Lebanese government and 
56 the STL.  
 
57 Had the current Lebanese government or any other government take these three terms 
58 into consideration, this does not mean abolishing the STL by any means. The STL             
59 exists apart from our viewpoint on it. If the Lebanese judges were pulled out, the STL 
60 has its own law or the Security Council would amend its law so as to replace them by 
61 judges from other nationalities. If the Lebanese financing stopped, this would spare the 
62 Lebanese people some money and there are many financing resources in the world, so 
63 they have no problem in financing or in completing the number of judges. As for the 
64 agreement memorandum, abrogating it means that apart from the repercussions of the 
65 STL and the indictment, if the General Prosecutor wants to help the Lebanese, there is 
66 international Interpol and other means to arrest them and it would not then be the job 
67 of the Lebanese government to arrest those accused by Bellemare which might lead to 
68 conflicts at the national level.  
 
69 If we are committed to these three terms, this means protecting Lebanon and saving    
70 Lebanon from the repercussions of the indictment while it won't mean by any means 
71 abolishing the STL or the indictment – and to all those who engage in sophistry and    
72 aim at deluding people – despite our conviction which I would like to repeat again and 
73 again that it is an American-Israeli tribunal and this is an American and Israeli                       
74 resolution. However, we want to reach a mid-way. We were told by the Saudi side that 
75 they agree and that PM Saad Hariri approved the terms that we proposed. They  
76 said that to be able to reach an agreement (I do not like to name it settlement) or an            
77 accord, there are other things which are requested from you as an opposition or as              
78 Hizbollah or as Hizbollah and Amal Movement and that you have to accept these                
79 terms and consequently, we will have a comprehensive agreement or accord ready for 




81 These terms were put forward with the condition that these remain secret to guarantee 
82 the success of the negotiations. Actually, they remained secret. Some of these terms   
83 were clear and we accepted them, but others needed further discussion with our allies 
84 because we had some comments them. However, the atmosphere which was reflected 
85 was positive. The atmosphere which was conveyed by President Bashar Assad to the 
86 Saudi side was positive and things were getting along. 
 
87 Well, the illness of the king, his leaving for the USA and the presence of his son –                
88 Prince Abdul Aziz with him as he was the one following these negotiations – slowed 
89 down considerably the negotiation process and it was carried through the phone and at 
90 discontinuous intervals. 
 
91 Two weeks ago, or a little more, it was confirmed that the king had a surgery and his 
92 health is improving and he is determined to continue his effort to reach an agreement 
93 and to finalize this issue and within short time the king's son was expected to arrive in 
94 Damascus and Beirut to agree on all the terms and on the mechanism of                                
95 implementation and it was also said that PM Saad Hariri will be asked to travel to the 
96 USA to finalize this issue and prepare for it. 
 
97 Before leaving Beirut to the USA, PM Saad Hariri made a statement in which he said 
98 that the agreement was finalized months ago. Indeed, this needs scrutiny but it is good 
99 that he acknowledged that there is an agreement and said that it was finalized a month 
100 ago but there are steps that are required from the other side which the latter have not 
101 yet fulfilled. Some of us considered this statement as positive because for the first 
102 time someone from the other party who used to deny the existence of ideas, drafts, 
103 negotiations and a settlement as they call it – acknowledges the existence of an               
104 agreement but it states who has to start first and makes the other party responsible for 
105 not fulfilling their part. Some read something positive in that statement and saw it as 
106 a prelude to the Saudi-Syrian promised steps. 
 
107 PM Saad Hariri went to America and held meetings with the US administration and 
108 without prior notice, the Saudi side called the Syrian side to say that they were sorry 
109 and due to the pressures and circumstances, they were unable to continue their efforts 
110 and May Allah bless you and see what you can do. We were informed that the effort 
111 suddenly stopped without any indications or preludes and this has to do with the             
112 analysis and evaluation later: who are the ones who thwarted this course and who led 
113 things in this direction? 
 
114 After we were informed of this and we were also informed that the indictment will be 
115 issued soon and that it might be issued within days. We consulted our allies in the 
116 opposition and with the parties that have ministers in the government because of the 
117 short lapse of time, we unanimously agreed that it is our duty – and I will explain  
118 why later – to resign from the government and consequently topple the government 
119 for reasons I will mention later. In a constitutional, legal and very natural move, the 
120 resignations were submitted and we now in front of a new status whether at a         
121 governmental level or at the national level and tomorrow – Monday – parliamentary 




123 These are the facts. 
124 Now let's try to understand what happened. What took place and why did things              
125 reach this direction? First: It's obvious that the Americans and the Israelis were           
126 against this Arab effort from the very beginning and they let this effort to move on 
127 for some time betting that the S-S efforts (Syrian-Saudi sides) will not lead to an            
128 agreement because of the difficulty and the complications of the issue and               
129 consequently they do not need to intervene or thwart. However, recently when they 
130 realized that the process was yielding very positive results and there are positive              
131 atmospheres to reach an agreement, they interfered in a decisive way and they                 
132 informed that this issue should not move on and had to stop and thus the effort                 
133 stopped. 
 
134 Whoever has another interpretation, let him present it to us. This is the only             
135 interpretation based on the facts and based on available data, the US and Israeli              
136 statements that preceded the efforts and followed stopping the efforts, the US and 
137 Israeli gambling and especially the Israeli gambling on the repercussions of the                
138 indictment that accuses members of Hizbollah. This is obvious from the announced 
139 statements which they make day and night. Is it possible that the Americans and the 
140 Israelis allow the Arab efforts to succeed and to hinder all these expectations and    
141 gambling? 
 
142 Second: There is no doubt that this has not only to do with America and there is no 
143 doubt, there are political parties in Lebanon who in principle used to deny the                  
144 existence of ideas, a settlement and an initiative and those worked extensively day 
145 and night and provoked American, western and Arab sides to thwart the Saudi-Syrian 
146 effort and in some meetings, they used obscene and indecent phrases lashed out at 
147 King Abdullah because they found that he was truthful and serious in finalizing the 
148 accord and reaching an agreement. 
 
149 Third: As for PM Saad Hariri and his team’s view regarding this issue, he said that 
150 the agreement was finalized, and that there are people who were required to do things 
151 which they did not carry out and definitely this is not true. But I will go along with 
152 him that an agreement has been made and we waited for several months. Well               
153 wouldn’t I wait, if I was interested in the welfare of the country and in transcending 
154 this ordeal? Wouldn’t I wait for a week or two until we put the final touches and              
155 agree on a mechanism to implement it? What is required from you? What is required 
156 from us and with the Trust in Allah we’ll overcome this difficult stage. What                   
157 happened?  
 
158 As soon as he went to America, this effort was beheaded and it was aborted and we 
159 came back to square one. This poses a very big question which I would like the               
160 Lebanese to ask. All Lebanese are worried today about the situation in Lebanon.               





163 Fourth: In my understanding it is either that PM Hariri and his team from the very 
164 beginning refused this course and did not want this agreement and initially carried on 
165 due to KSA pressure and consequently it is not only that they do not want, but they 
166 also provoked the Americans and others to exercise pressure on the Saudi side to stop 
167 this effort or they were going along with the King and the Saudi side but there is a 
168 US force majeure– and between parenthesis (I here ask where is the freedom,             
169 sovereignty, independence, the independent decision and national interests)- The             
170 Americans say no; so it's no. So, it is either one of these two cases because it is            
171 supposed and based on his statements and based on the given data, things were               
172 moving on and heading towards finalization. 
 
173 This comment or interpretation stresses at this moment or at this night, that this team 
174 cannot be entrusted with Lebanese decision-making nor with safeguarding Lebanon's 
175 interests or Lebanon's stability and they do not have the ability to help Lebanon or 
176 lead the country out of any impasse or difficulty that Lebanon might face if months-
177 old efforts were put to an end during a one hour-stay in the USA. 
 
178 Fifth: As a continuation to this point, PM Hariri said after his return that the demands 
179 which he requested – which he called gains – are national gains. Anyway, I have the 
180 terms which were required from us because we were informed of them and we were 
181 discussing them to find answers. I said that we have given answers and that we were 
182 dealing with some of them positively while we were still in negotiations. This exists. 
183 Also, to be precise, tonight and for certain reasons, I will not reveal these terms and 
184 requirements. However, if others revealed them one day, the Lebanese will be able to 
185 judge and will discover that among these terms there are one or two terms that were 
186 in line with Lebanon’s interest but all other terms served the interests of Hariri’s             
187 political and security team. 
 
188 This is what we were negotiating on and yet we were dealing positively with them 
189 and we were ready to concede political and non-political gains to the team of PM  
190 Hariri to protect Lebanon and, consequently, yes, we took this position taking into 
191 account Lebanon’s safety and interest but even this was aborted despite discussions 
192 pertaining to some terms and details. Yes, I will allow myself to speak about one of 
193 these terms as a proof which I will mention in the commentary section and this will 
194 be as evidence to this subject. 
 
195 When we participated in the government, we told them: O brothers! There is an issue 
196 called the issue of the false witnesses which is sensitive and dangerous and has great 
197 repercussions: There are top security officials were imprisoned for many years based 
198 on these testimonies; the Lebanese-Syrian ties were ruined and even destroyed, and 
199 the worst sectarian atmosphere prevailed in Lebanon based on these testimonies.           
200 There used to be sectarian conflicts in Lebanon but not up to the level of the sectarian 
201 conflicts that took place in the past five years which were the worst due to the             
202 repercussions of these testimonies and parliamentary elections were held and              
203 governments were formed based on the political results of these testimonies, so you 
204 are invited to hold the false witnesses accountable as well those who fabricated them 
205 because these led to moral, humanitarian, national, economic and security                   
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206 catastrophes and because they also mislead the investigation and we took this issue to 
207 the government and we did not take it to any other place and we did not defame                
208 people, we only said take this issue to the judicial council! Well, is it shameful if we 
209 called for voting and we are those who always called for consensus democracy? 
 
210 These issues need consensus and we are the losing party in the vote and we asked 
211 them to vote. This is not shame on us, on the contrary, this is a positive act from our 
212 behalf as we resorted to institutions in an issue that necessitates consensus, we are 
213 willing to accept the result of the voting even if it was against our interests and                             
214 against the interests of such a great cause, but they did not accept to vote and we said 
215 that we are willing to accept the results. This is the issue which stalled the                  
216 government; it was not us who thwarted the cabinet. Well, what is the term? One of 
217 required terms was to close the file of the false witnesses and this is part of the               
218 settlement, meaning in exchange for protecting Lebanon and while the STL and the 
219 indictment are still chasing us, it was requested through the agreement to close the 
220 ‘false witnesses’ file. Well, why are you interested in the ‘false witnesses' case? This 
221 must not be part of any agreement or settlement. You should be the most eager to                
222 hold the false witnesses and those who fabricated them accountable! Still this term 
223 was mentioned in the settlement. Is this in the interest of the nation or does it serve 
224 the interests of a specific political and security party? 
 
225 Today we began to understand why the vote on the false witnesses' issue in the                                             
226 cabinet was prohibited and that this issue be referred to the judicial council. Now we 
227 began to understand why it is permitted to cripple the country and the government all 
228 through these weeks to protect the false witnesses. With my respect to any evaluation 
229 which might be said on what Al Jadeed Channel broadcasted yesterday and today I 
230 did not manage to watch the second episode. 
 
231 Well, as a first reaction, a note was circulated within the Future Movement - cadres 
232 and coordination directories - to the effect that this dialogue is fabricated. Some                
233 officials also said that the video is fabricated and was cut and attached… 
 
234 Well this is funny. Why? Because there was a meeting and a discussion is taking               
235 place. Technically this is possible. I do not know. Anyway, there are experts who   
236 might say whether this is fabricated or not. But what is funny is that these cadres,   
237 coordination directories and people are ready to accept an indictment which might 
238 destroy the country and the region and which is based on communication data which 
239 any communication or mobile company might fabricate. This is the easiest thing that 
240 can be fabricated, but the tape which was broadcasted by AlJadeed Channel, on the 
241 spot they said it is fabricated. However, a while ago the head of the government's     
242 media office –the provisional government –issued a statement which says that this 
243 incident took place, but it took place as such and with the aim of such and such,                
244 meaning they are discussing the denotative meanings and background of the speech 
245 but it did not deny the meeting and what took place in the meeting. 
 
246 And before I came to address you – maybe it is inappropriate to me to go into such 
247 details – but I was told that the Future Channel will broadcast the full document of 
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248 this meeting. Here, I have a question: If this is one of the documents of the STL and 
249 the international investigation is secret, how come you have this document? Now    
250 how did Al-Jadeed Channel and others come to possess this document, this is its own 
251 business. But you want to broadcast the full document, from where did you get this 
252 record knowing that they are secret documents! This is what the statement issued by 
253 PM office mentions when criticizing what was broadcasted while stating that these 
254 documents are secret, so how did it leak? Allow me to talk in our colloquial                     
255 language: "good morning!" For five years we have been saying that what is taking 
256 place in the international committee appears in newspapers, magazines, televisions, 
257 councils and the political and security leaders in Lebanon and with all the embassies 
258 in Lebanon have knowledge about it. This is what I liked to highlight. 
 
259 This is what took place before finishing off the Arab Initiative. I understand that it 
260 was put to an end when the Americans intervened and we were informed of that.            
261 Well how can we explain our action? Why did we resign and even toppled the                  
262 government and it was not the resignation of 10 ministers only? By the way, I find it 
263 my duty to praise the honourable and nationalist stance taken by Minister Adnan             
264 Sayyed Hassan who acted in accordance to his conscience and dignity. It is normal 
265 that the others will blame him for his action because they have their own views and 
266 considerations. 
 
267 And we are political parties who participated in the government, and we have                  
268 ministers in the government and as being part of the government and after an                 
269 experience that lasted for a year and several months, if we were to make an                         
270 evaluation after all these developments, are we able to carry on in this government? 
271 Prior to these developments, there was suffering resulting from the fact that this              
272 government is unproductive. Is the PM following up the cases, plans, project? Is              
273 there seriousness? From the very first day of the formation of the national unity               
274 government, there were people who were against its formation, bet on its failure and 
275 worked to fail it. This is clear from the productivity and the achievements of the              
276 government, and I believe that the ministers on the past couple of nights tackled and 
277 addressed this issue, yet we were not in a haste to topple the government. We bet that 
278 with time, with following up and seriousness let’s give the government chance on 
279 these issues which come under the heading of government performance and                     
280 achievement and let’s activate the government, through addressing people’s issues, 
281 fighting financial corruption, etc. but that existed from the very first day. 
 
282 In this framework comes the most important point. Yes, we came to a place now in 
283 which we acknowledge that we are in this government incapable of facing financial 
284 and administrative corruption and in executing financial, administrative and             
285 economic reforms. Why should we lie on people? Yes, we were still betting on time. 
 
286 For several months, the ministers and the parliamentary financial and budgetary             
287 committee were asking about the 11 billion dollars which were spent under previous 
288 governments. Just tell us how and where they were spent and following whose            
289 decision? Eleven billion dollars? Where are they? Whose money is this? Is it the           




291 We are significant political party. Perhaps not only 10 ministers; perhaps 11 or 12 
292 ministers were making this request and we were unable to reach any solution with 
293 them and if you requested a bill statement for the 11 billion dollars, they will                  
294 instantly say that you are evoking sectarian sedition and targeting the Taa’f Accord. 
295 What is this? This is just the first one, and this is part of the governmental status quo. 
 
296 Second: The government was incapable of referring the false witnesses’ case – which 
297 is a great, dangerous and sensitive case - to the Judicial Council. We failed even              
298 through voting to do that. 
 
299 Third: This government is incapable of facing the repercussions of the indictment on 
300 the contrary, this government wants to continue financing a court that is conspiring 
301 against Lebanon and the Resistance and its Lebanese judges are accomplices in this 
302 conspiracy and this government will later put itself in a difficult position especially 
303 when the General Prosecutor or the STL requests it to arrest, unjustly, falsely and  
304 aggressively, Lebanese citizens. 
 
305 This government is not qualified and thwarting the Saudi-Syrian effort has confirmed 
306 that this government is not qualified to confront the repercussions of the indictment 
307 and when the indictment will be issued which accuses members from Hizbollah, then 
308 things are over and the country will be exposed for we will not be able to know what 
309 the Israelis or the Americans will do, nor those who want to ravage the country from 
310 the inside and who always bet on sectarian strife and conflict. This government left 
311 the country to be exposed especially as we were informed that Mr. Bellemare told the 
312 President of the Republic and the Prime Minister that the indictment will be issued 
313 tomorrow or on Monday or he will hand it in to Fransen to be announced on Tuesday. 
314 Anyway, there is no time anymore and this government and the prime minister               
315 specifically acted in a way which prevented the government from protecting Lebanon 
316 against the repercussions of the indictment. When we became in front of an incapable 
317 government of this kind we became false witnesses. This is the feeling of all the            
318 ministers and you may ask them one by one. When we reach this conclusion and            
319 what is even worse is that people have demands and they might use the street and  
320 calls of this kind started to raise and we are asked to prevent people from taking any 
321 move on the street and we are required to defend the government and its policies and 
322 its conduct which does not convince anyone. In front of this status quo, the            
323 resignation and the toppling of an incapable government are a must. Toppling an              
324 incapable government might open the door – this is not absolutely confirmed because 
325 that has to do with the parliamentary consultations to name a new prime minister     
326 tomorrow – might open the door to form a capable, responsible, loyal government 
327 ready to hold the burden and ready to follow up, address issues and hold                           
328 responsibilities. Toppling the government might open the door but keeping the                  
329 government would keep the door closed and thus it was our national and moral duty 
330 to topple the government. In our view, and contrary to some of the comments which 
331 we heard, keeping the current governmental status quo was impossible as it would be 
332 unfair for the sake of the state and also unfair to state institutions and the people and 




334 Seventh: based on our diagnosis of this incapable and flaccid government status quo 
335 – I do not want to say more than incapable and I do not want to judge intentions – 
336 based on this diagnosis we decided to resign. We took a constitutional, legal,            
337 democratic and very normal step and this is our natural right. We did not topple a    
338 government in the street and we did not block roads and we did not burn wheels and 
339 we did not demonstrate and we did not resort - as some promoted– to arms. This did 
340 not take place at all. Rather in a constitutional, legal, democratic and civilized way, 
341 we presented our reasons and submitted our resignations. 
 
342 What happened afterwards? As if (don't blame me for using this comparison) the           
343 opposition demolished the Kaaba; the USA, France, the West and some Arab states 
344 started saying that this move threatens the whole region and puts it on the verge of 
345 tension. Yes, to this extent! Why was the whole world moved? What happened? Just 
346 for the possibility – as it is not final or definite – that if the people in light of the           
347 latest developments in Lebanon, head to parliamentary consultations, there is a              
348 possibility that the opposition nominate a figure rom the respected Sunni Sect who 
349 might be designated to form the government and consequently the PM won't be Saad 
350 Hariri. Just for this possibility all capitals around the world made contacts, exercised 
351 pressure and issued statements. What is the interpretation of all of that? 
352 Anyway, I like to say that we in the Lebanese opposition hold our national               
353 responsibilities, and we will act in line with these national responsibilities and we 
354 won’t be frightened by speeches, statements or threats made by anyone around the 
355 world as we were not frightened by their wars, aircrafts and navy fleets; so how about 
356 being frightened by their hollow statements and threats? We are practicing our               
357 convictions based on our evaluations of the interests of our country and the means 
358 which we resorted to are absolutely our right, instead we should be thanked for that. 
359 We should hear that you are a group of people who acted in a constitutional, legal 
360 way and within the framework of the state institutions. 
 
361 They appeared from most of the world capitals to criticize and accuse us. What is   
362 this? What does that mean? I want to tell the Lebanese: do you know what does that 
363 mean? This means that it is not allowed in Lebanon for anyone to object or exercise 
364 his right or raise his voice or make reforms, changes or find solutions. 
 
365 It is required that all of us must surrender.  Should you open your mouth, the USA, 
366 the West, Israel and the Arab world will on the spot raise the issue that you are               
367 seeking sectarian sedition. 
 
368 This is shameful and this also indicates and confirms that the other party which is   
369 moving along this track and within this perspective is where, in which position?        
370 Within which project and within which viewpoint? For whose interests, it is          
371 working? 
 
372 Eighth: According to my information related to whom the opposition will nominate, 
373 in the last hours it has become clear to me that the opposition will not nominate PM 
374 Saad Hariri to form a new government. In fact, in the previous government, we did 
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375 not nominate anyone, but we accepted to take part in a national unity government. 
376 However, following this experience – i.e. the one year and several months experience 
377 and our evaluation of it and the efforts and our interpretation of all what happened 
378 especially recently, we are clear that we will not make this nomination and we will 
379 rather take another direction. Tonight, I will not announce who is the opposition            
380 candidate. This will be expressed by the opposition parliamentary blocs during              
381 tomorrow's consultations, but I want to ask the following question: why is the whole 
382 world intervening in this internal national constitutional event? Mrs. Hilary Clinton 
383 made several calls here and there. Let the Lebanese know that tomorrow there are 
384 parliamentary consultations and that some parliamentary blocs have complicated           
385 conditions and this is quite understandable. But there is a Lebanese national            
386 opposition which is engaged in the battle of parliamentary consultations equipped 
387 with national tools, and there is another party who is engaged in the consultations    
388 battle backed by international and regional intervention and support and this is well 
389 known. Today governments, foreign ministries and presidents are intervening so that 
390 PM Saad Hariri be elected to head the government. Is this how the state of freedom, 
391 sovereignty and independence comes into being? 
 
392 Let the people work at ease and let the overwhelming majority nominates whomever 
393 it wants and who gains the majority of votes wins? This is a democratic,                            
394 constitutional track, yet there are sides that are capable of diagnosing their interests 
395 or they might neither vote for the candidate of the opposition nor for the candidate of 
396 the other party; but they are subject to pressure from countries here and there and     
397 threatens their interests. Is this how we move in the right democratic, legal,            
398 constitutional track? Is the Cabinet that is formed as a result of such a track                     
399 constitutional, clear, clean and pure? We overcame the past parliamentary elections 
400 without making any trouble in the country despite all the flaws and when                          
401 parliamentary elections held in a state as the size of Lebanon and during which the 
402 other party spent more than a billion and 200 million dollars and when the price of a 
403 vote in some directories was in the morning 1000 dollars, at noon 2000 dollars and 
404 before sunset 5000 dollars, will the elections and the resulting parliament express  
405 people’s will? Yet we overcame this issue. 
 
406 I also want to ask: Will the results of the parliamentary consultations which take                  
407 place under international and regional intervention and endless pressure express the 
408 true will of deputies and their diagnosis of national interests and consequently                   
409 represent people’s will. 
 
410 So, why is this intervention taking place? Imagine that the US Ambassador went              
411 today to Zahle to meet deputy Nicola Fattoush! Why? Did she go to address Zahle’s 
412 – development, economy, and job opportunities? Or did she go to deputy Nicola             
413 Fattoush because they are working on deputies individually? This is what we see in 
414 the media. Allah only knows what is beyond the media and what is taking place             
415 behind the scenes. 
 
416 There is something even worse from all this international and regional intervention, 
417 pressures and contacts to name PM Saad Hariri as head of the government, knowing 
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418 that there is no reason for being that much worried and so far, it is not yet confirmed 
419 whether the opposition candidate or their candidate will win and it might seem from 
420 the first impression that their situation is better than the opposition and despite this 
421 we see all this intervention. What if it was confirmed that the parliamentary              
422 consultations tomorrow or the day after will lead to the nomination of another Sunni 
423 figure? There are great, competent Sunni leaders with honourable history to hold this 
424 post. So, what if the decision-making capitals and the world were sure that the             
425 opposition candidate will win? What will happen? What will be then the magnitude 
426 of the intervention that we expect? 
 
427 I will say again that what is even worse from all of this– which in my view is another 
428 scandal for Mr. Bellemare – what I knew that after the Arab effort was thwarted in 
429 America, instead of delaying the indictment, Mr. Bellemare was asked rush the                
430 issuance of the indictment. This is part of the battle. However, the scandal is that Mr. 
431 Bellemare reported yesterday that on Monday he will hand in the indictment to                
432 Fransen. What is this timing? The indictment and the STL – even the timing of the 
433 issuance of the indictment is part of the political battle fought in Lebanon and is             
434 targeting us, our group, the Resistance and country. Couldn't he have waited until         
435 Wednesday or until the parliamentary consultations take place and a new PM is            
436 designated? Couldn't he have waited until Thursday? I am not saying that the               
437 indictment will be issued but I know for sure that the Lebanese state was officially 
438 informed about that. That was also announced in the media. I am not talking about 
439 private information. So, couldn't he have postponed the issuance until Wednesday, 
440 Thursday, Friday or Saturday? Haven’t you earlier on postponed it for two months or 
441 a month and a half? You could've waited for a couple of days or for three days. No! 
442 What is required is to announce the indictment during the parliamentary consultations 
443 in order to be part of the political investment to serve the interests of a specific           
444 candidate. This is the status quo. I like to be clear and straightforward. Tomorrow, 
445 and the day which follows and the few days to come, there will be two tracks moving 
446 at the same time. 
 
447 There is the track of the parliamentary consultations which will lead to electing a new 
448 prime minister, and there is the track of Mr. Bellemare who said that he will hand in 
449 the indictment to Fransen and its anticipated announcement. 
 
450 I will talk first about the first track and then I will talk about the second track. Indeed, 
451 in our view the timing was exploited to serve the interests of the parliamentary        
452 consultations, but we will disentangle these two tracks. That means there is             
453 exploitation; but to us they are two tracks: the independent track of the parliamentary 
454 consultations, and the track of Mr. Bellemare and the indictment which is also                  
455 independent. 
 
456 Whatever the results of the parliamentary consultations were, the issue of the                
457 indictment and how we are going to deal with it is something else. As for the first 
458 track: We believe that this is a democratic, constitutional, legal and normal track and 
459 in fact, it is we who called for that when we resigned and we could have remained in 
460 the government and fought from within the government despite the fact that the               
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461 government is incapable and is doing nothing to the false witnesses' case. No, we  
462 resigned and this made that the current government to be a provisional government 
463 and consequently a date is set for consultations.  
 
464 This is the normal track which will yield results and apart from results, we are            
465 participating in this track and will go to the Presidential Palace to give our             
466 nominations as will the other parliamentary blocs. Of course, in this track, political 
467 leaders and parties who have deputies and parliamentary blocs tomorrow or the                 
468 following day are in front of a great national responsibility and a great historic                   
469 responsibility and apart from fanaticism, and pre-set positions, let them say where 
470 they want to take the country. What will the government be like? This is because            
471 through the person of the prime minister we deduce the type and the personality of 
472 the upcoming government. What type of government are they giving the Lebanese 
473 people? What is the conduct and the performance that they want to undertake in front 
474 of the Lebanese people? There is an internal situation and a regional situation and at a 
475 critical stage. Leave them to their conscience, to their sense of responsibility and           
476 evaluation and it is basically they who are expected to vote and give their view on 
477 this issue eventually the consultations will move along and the result of the votes will 
478 determine the prime minister that will elected based on which people will decide how 
479 to act. 
 
480 We have experienced this government and the previous one and according to us – 
481 and I am talking about Hizbollah in particular – indeed it was a new experience to us 
482 as we didn’t participate in any government through the past years and we might have 
483 an evaluation for this participation, yet apart from this evaluation, I like to be clear: 
484 any government that will be formed will be a government that is expected to hold     
485 responsibility. I believe that the other parties in the opposition might share with us 
486 this view and even more decisive. According to us, it is impossible for us from now 
487 on to remain silent about any government which protects false witnesses and now 
488 that the Arab initiative has come to an end, there is a file called false witnesses which 
489 has not been dealt with yet, and the new government will decide what to do with it: 
490 will it refer it to the Judicial Council or will deny it? How will it act? This is the              
491 business of the new government. We can't remain silent regarding any government 
492 that protects the false witnesses especially if it was formed from those who have             
493 fabricated the false witnesses. We will not remain silent about any government that 
494 protects financial corruption and even manages financial corruption and no one            
495 threaten us whether from outside or internally. Let no one holds banners or brigades 
496 to face us. We are unable to remain silent on any government that fails in holding its 
497 responsibilities by addressing people’s matters who are living the worst living           
498 conditions at all levels. Also - and I am not making compliments – we are not                
499 demanding the government to protect the Resistance and I always used to say this. 
500 During July War, we did not ask anyone to protect the Resistance and all those who 
501 protected it were honourable, and this position was expression of their conscience, 
502 responsibility, dignity, humanity and nationality. We always used to urge the                   
503 government not to conspire against the resistance, not to make provocations against 
504 the Resistance and not to go to this capital or that to incite governments and           
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505 countries against the Resistance in Lebanon. And from now on, and I will be clear, 
506 we will not remain silent on any government that conspires against the Resistance 
507 because it is our duty to preserve all the elements of strength in Lebanon before the 
508 existing and imminent Israeli threats, greed and risks. We all know that in the region 
509 no one protects anyone, Lebanon is protected by its people, army and Resistance and 
510 we are not awaiting any navy fleets from anywhere in the world to come to protect 
511 Lebanon. If anyone conspires against the elements of strength that we have in           
512 Lebanon, be it governmental or non-governmental, we will not remain silent.  
 
513 We hope that the Lebanese will be able to form a capable, active and national         
514 government to whom its priorities are the very priorities of the people so as to              
515 achieve their interests. I have to say that what is happening in Tunisia these days            
516 must be a lesson. In this occasion, I have to bless the Tunisian people for their               
517 revolution and historic apprising. Where is the moral? It is not only in "If the people 
518 once longed-for life…" the lesson lies in the president of this regime and his team 
519 who remained all these long years with France, America and the West –  and even 
520 opened ties with Israel and the stance of this regime from all the basic issues in the 
521 region was well known – yet they were not welcomed by all those whom they served 
522 well all these years. They did not grant him a visa and they did not allow his plane to 
523 land in their airports. They even told all his relatives: 'Go away you are not welcomed 
524 here'. The moral is that we as Lebanese people or any people, government or          
525 authority must know that this country will carry on if the people sat down together 
526 and held talks and when it was said that the S-S talks reached a dead end, political 
527 leaders in Lebanon came out to say – and that was even discussed in Rabiyeh when 
528 the ministers announced their resignation - that they wanted a Lebanese-Lebanese 
529 solution; but if we as Lebanese are incompetent to make a solution and unable to      
530 reach at a resolution, then we have a problem. 
 
531 Now if America and the West interfered in the Lebanese affairs that will lead to        
532 internationalization of the crisis in Lebanon, and will complicate the problem in            
533 Lebanon which will lead to the entanglement of great and serious interests in               
534 Lebanon at a time when the magnitude of our problem is well known and we as             
535 Lebanese are able to sit down and address it, yet the other party insists that they do 
536 not want to address the problem and even when the Syrian-Saudi effort was taking 
537 place and there was a possibility that it reaches somewhere, the way out was thwarted 
538 with Lebanese participation. We never close doors and we say that the future of             
539 Lebanon depends on dialogue, meeting, cooperation and being positive, but if anyone 
540 wants to threaten a section of the Lebanese people through America and the West and 
541 the world, they are mistaken and must take lessons from all the experiences that have 
542 taken place so far in the region. 
 
543 Some people say: Wait until you see the indictment and the evidences that it presents. 
544 But we have already read the evidences in Dir Spiegel, Le Monde, the Kuwaiti          
545 Asseyassiyeh Newspaper and CBC. They are all well known to everyone and on           
546 what does the indictment depend on? On what basis it was fabricated, how was this 
547 issue prepared from its very beginning to its very end. There is no evidence that             
548 attests to the secrecy of investigation or the secrecy of documents… Everything           
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549 exists everywhere. That's why we refused the indictment and we said that this          
550 tribunal is in such and such a situation and the investigation is so and so and we did 
551 not insult anyone, instead we said that these are the facts and these are the data and 
552 based on them we said it is an American-Israeli tribunal. 
 
553 This track is independent from the track of the government and indeed we will see 
554 what will happen tomorrow and the day after concerning the indictment and on light 
555 of that we will see how we will act and we will defend our dignity, existence and   
556 reputation. How we will act? This has to do with the leaders in Hizbollah and the       
557 results of the consultations with our allies. Surely, we hold the responsibility to           
558 dealing with this issue and I will say again we have untangled the two tracks. Indeed, 
559 we are acting according to all what we have been talking about in the past months. 
560 We will not let anyone to damage our reputation and dignity, and we will not           
561 allow anyone to conspire against us and we will not allow anyone around the globe to 
562 unjustly and erroneously accuse us of shedding the blood of martyr PM Rafiq Hariri 
563 – even if it was a sheer indictment or an accusation because some people ask us to be 
564 patient for the tribunal will prove if someone is innocent or not. He who put the           
565 indictment will put the decision of the tribunal and this tribunal is absolutely within 
566 the hands of America and Tel Aviv and anyone who moves along with this tribunal is 
567 serving this project whether he knew or not. 
 
568 I will leave this section for tomorrow or the day after and in light of what will be           
569 issued, we will read and see and by Allah’s will we might say how we will act and 
570 the timing, the content and the mechanism have to do with our diagnosis to the          
571 interests. 
 
572 This is the status quo and as a result of greed, this country has been for years thrust in 
573 this crisis and ordeal and my reading and the evidences which I presented previously 
574 in the press conference revealed that the Israelis killed PM Hariri and carried out the 
575 assassinations in Lebanon to cause a total change in the Lebanese situation.  
 
576 In the past years and especially in the past couple of years, they expressed their             
577 frustration because the project which meant that the so and so party which was         
578 expected to control Lebanon didn't succeed and was incapable and unable, but they 
579 did not give up and they are continuing their targeting to complete the isolation and 
580 the blockade and they carry on in their aspirations to have control over Lebanon to 
581 change it to a totally different position with a totally different internal and regional 
582 status. However, I like to tell them that during all the past years and in the most                      
583 difficult and intense conditions when George Bush was in Washington and when the 
584 American army were marching towards the Arab and Islamic capitals and when they 
585 were talking about a New Middle East, we stood here and we were here and we              
586 remained here.  
 
587 During the past years, nothing remained that we did not confront: political war,               
588 media war, misleading, distortion, lies, security war, assassinations and military war 
589 in 2006 and you can see where we are now and I reiterate and stress that those who 
590 are still with this project make great miscalculations. In my previous speech about the 
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591 five stages, I enumerated and explained where their miscalculations are and here you 
592 are also miscalculating. It is possible that the consultations may bring back PM Saad 
593 Hariri, after all, we do not know the inclinations of the deputies, but this is the               
594 beginning of a new stage and not the end of a stage and you are miscalculating and if 
595 you believe that you might make use of the indictment to target the Resistance, you 
596 are extensively miscalculating and I do not need to go into details any further because 
597 in the light of what Mr. Bellemare will do in the next couple of days, I will make          
598 another speech.  
 
599 I hope that Allah Al Mighty will assist the Lebanese people and bestow wisdom,          
600 responsibility and care on all the Lebanese leaderships so that they would be able to 
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 الخطاب الاول  
 حرب تموز
بعد مضي أسبوعين من المواجهة والعدوان الصهيوني الهمجي والصمود الذي يقترب من المعجزة، صمود هذا 
الشعب الأبي وهذه المقاومة الشجاعة. أود أن أتوجه إليكم، لأن هناك ما يحتاج إلى تعليق واتخاذ مواقف محددة، 
  .لنعرف كيف نواصل أيامنا المقبلة
لجانب السياسي يجب أن نعرف ونستوعب حقيقة الحرب وخلفيات العدوان. بعد أسبوعين أصبحت الأمور أوضح في ا
بكثير، وتوفر الكثير من المعطيات والمواقف والتصاريح العلنية سواء من مسؤولي الإدارة الأميركية أو العدو 
قائع التي تؤدي الى استنتاج واحد وواضح. لو الصهيوني، أو من يدور في فلكهم، وأيضا ًالكثير من التحليلات والو
  .عرفنا أية حرب نخوض الآن، نستطيع أن نعرف كيف نواصل المسيرة
بعد حديث وزيرة الخارجية الأميركية عن شرق أوسط جديد، يعني شرق أوسط أميركي إسرائيلي جديد، هل يتصور 
  سر المقاومة للجنديين الإسرائيليين؟أحد أن هذا المشروع الضخم الكبير ُولد في يوم أو يومين من أ
كل المعطيات تؤكد أنه كان يتم التحضير لإطلاق هذا المشروع منذ سنة في الحد الأدنى. في تقدير الأميركيين أن 
هناك عقبات أمام شرق أوسط جديد. فهو يعني المنطقة التي تسيطر عليها الإدارة الأميركية وتتفرد في إدارة شؤونها 
يراتها، وتكون شريكتها الأولى إسرائيل. في الشرق الأوسط الجديد لا مجال لأي حركة مقاومة، ومواردها وخ
  .المطلوب العمل على إزالة العقبات وهي حركات المقاومة في لبنان وفلسطين وتاليا ًسوريا وإيران
ت، وانتصرت حركة بدأ الأمر في فلسطين. كان المطلوب تصفية حركات المقاومة في فلسطين. جاءت الانتخابا
المقاومة، ما أوقعهم في حرج شديد. ضربوا الشعب الفلسطيني، جّوعوه، أقفلوا عليه، منعوا المساعدات عنه، وكانوا 
يدفعون الأمور في فلسطين إلى الاقتتال الداخلي. وكان الخطر الذي يواجه الشعب الفلسطيني هو الاقتتال الداخلي. 
لي في غزة. أهمية هذه العملية أنها دفعت خطر الاقتتال الداخلي عن الفلسطينيين، جاءت عملية أسر الجندي الإسرائي
  .وأعادته الى المعركة الأساسية والحقيقية
في لبنان، خلال عام كامل كانت هناك جهود أميركية مباشرة وغير مباشرة. كان الأميركيون يتابعون تطورات 
ي وحثيث، وكانوا يراهنون، وفشلت رهاناتهم على مستوى الداخل، الأوضاع الداخلية في لبنان بشكل واضح وتفصيل
ولم يجدوا من يعمل على القضاء على تيار المقاومة ووجودها في لبنان. فوجئوا بحجم الالتفاف الشعبي حول المقاومة. 
كرية التي جاءت ذهبوا الى خيار آخر، خلال سنة درسوا واقع الجيش اللبناني، ونعرف أن هناك الكثير من الوفود العس
ووجهت الكثير من الأسئلة. وفوجئوا أن هذا الجيش اللبناني لا يمكن أن يقدم على معركة من هذا النوع لأنه جيش 
وطني. قياداته وضباطه ورتباؤه وجنوده. عقيدة الجيش تأبى أن تنخرط في مؤامرة من هذا النوع، وقيادة الجيش قامت 
  .التي مّر بها لبنان في أوضاعه الداخلية بدور حكيم ودقيق في المرحلة الصعبة
راهنوا على إدخال حزب الله في الحكومة وإشغاله في المناصب والمشاريع، ويمكن أن يدفعه ذلك الى التراجع عن 
  .المسؤوليات الجهادية، وهذا ما لم يحصل
ئج الحوار الوطني. كانوا يواكبون إذا ًكل المعطيات الداخلية كانت أن لا سبيل للرهان على هذا الأمر. انتظروا نتا
بالتفصيل، ووصلوا الى نتيجة أنه لا يمكن الوصول الى هذا الهدف. وقد انتهى الأميركيون الى نتائج أنه ليس هناك من 
  .طريق داخلي يمكن الرهان عليه للإجهاز على المقاومة وتيارها ووجودها
في سوريا وإيران، ووجدوا رغم كل الأباطيل والأراجيف، أن لا على المستوى الإقليمي، راهنوا كثيرا ًعلى أصدقائنا 
إيران ولا سوريا حاضرتان للإجهاز على المقاومة في لبنان أو في فلسطين. وصلوا الى الاستحقاق الذي لا بد منه في 
سوريا  نظرهم. هناك جهة واحدة للتعويل عليها لضرب المقاومة في لبنان وفي فلسطين، ولاحقا ًيعملون على عزل
  .وإيران وتهديدهما
  الحرب الإسرائيلية
بناء على هذه القراءة كان خيار الاميركيين الحرب الاسرائيلية على لبنان. وما توافر لدينا من معلومات أن كل 
المناورات التي كانت تجريها قوات العدو في الاشهر القليلة الماضية، وخصوصا في شمال فلسطين المحتلة وجنوب 
المحتلة، يبدو أنها كانت تحضيرات للعدوان على لبنان، والذي كان معدا ًأو يجري العمل على أساسه إما فلسطين 
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أواخر أيلول أو اوائل تشرين الاول. كانوا بحاجة ايضا الى بعض المعطيات أو المعلومات الاستخبارية لاستكمال 
  .خطتهم الحربية
سبب أو بدون سبب، خصوصا أنه يحظى بتأييد دولي وغطاء من أكثر الخطة كانت تقضي انه دفعة واحدة يقوم العدو ب
من مكان في العالم، بحملة برية قوية تسيطر على منطقة جنوب الليطاني بالكامل لمنع إطلاق صواريخ الكاتيوشا. وفي 
بنية نفس الوقت يقوم سلاح الجو الاسرئيلي بضرب جميع بيوت قيادات ومسؤولي ومراكز ومؤسسات حزب الله وال
التحتية بما يؤدي الى شلل تام في حركة المقاومة وفي حركة البلد وتحريض الشارع اللبناني على المقاومة، وإفقاد 
المقاومة القدرة على استعادة المبادرة، وإلحاق ضربة قاسية فيها لا يمكن أن تقوم بعدها على الاطلاق. هذا السيناريو 
نا شفاف وواضح. ودائما كنا نتساءل انه عندما أقدمنا على هذه العملية كنا نتوقع كان سينفذ لو لم نقم بعملية الاسر، وأ
هذا الرد أو لم نكن نتوقع هذا الحجم من الرد. عندما قامت عملية الاسر فإن المقاومة من حيث لا تعلم أحبطت الخطة 
  .ب في لبنانالاخطر والسيناريو الاسوأ للحرب على لبنان وعلى المقاومة في لبنان وعلى الشع
هذه الحقيقة التي توصلنا اليها. من خلال عملية الاسر وجد العدو الصهيوني نفسه انه في حالة إذلال لا يمكن أن يتحمل 
هذه الضربة فاستعجل الحرب التي كان يعد لها. أهمية هذا الاستعجال تكمن في الدرجة الاولى في ان العدو فقد عنصر 
كون غافلين نائمين. في لحظة واحدة، جنوب الليطاني في الحد الادنى يتم احتلاله. تقصف المفاجأة. كان يفترض اننا سن
بيوتنا ومراكزنا ومؤسساتنا. نفقد الادارة والسيطرة والتواصل وإمكانية الحركة وبالتالي يجهز إجهازا كاملا على 
و أخطر عنصر كان يعتمد عليه في هذا المقاومة بأقل خسائر ممكنة. أحبط السيناريو الاول وسقط عنصر المفاجأة، وه
السيناريو. أضف الى ان العدو اضطر للقيام بهذه العملية قبل وقتها وقبل استكمال المعلومات والمعطيات 
  .والتحضيرات اللازمة والمكملة لهذه العملية والتي كان يمكن ان تساعد على نجاحها أكثر من أي زمن مضى
ا شعوب العالم التي يخفق قلبها لنا، نحن الآن بدأنا ندرك بشكل قاطع وواضح خلفيات أيها الشعب اللبناني العزيز وي
وأهداف هذه الحرب، وبالتالي كل هذا السجال. العدو كان سيقدم على هذه الحرب وما قامت به المقاومة فيه لطف 
ة لبنان الى دائرة إلهي. اليوم المشروع الذي انطلقت على أساسه الحرب وخططت على أساسه الحرب هو إعاد
ايار. المطلوب ان يخرج لبنان كليا ًمن  71واتفاق  28السيطرة والهيمنة الاميركية الاسرائيلية. يعني أسوأ من اجتياح 
تاريخه والتزامه وثقافته وهويته الحقيقية، أن يصبح أميركيا ًوصهيونيا ًمن خلال واجهات أميركية تطيع وتلتزم ولا 
ا مع كل الوطنيين الشرفاء أن نواجه هذا المشروع المشؤوم وأن نسقط أهداف هذه الحرب، وأن حول لها ولا قوة. قدرن
نخوض معركة تحرير ما تبقى من أرضنا وأسرانا وأن نخوض معركة السيادة الحقيقية والاستقلال الحقيقي وهذا ما 
  .أكدنا عليه خلال الايام القليلة الماضية
الدبلوماسية وقد أعطت العدو الفرص المطلوبة وستعطيه فرصة إضافية. جاءت قبل اليوم بدأت التحركات السياسية و
رايس وفود، وكل من جاؤوا حتى الآن جاؤوا بالاملاءات الاميركية الصهيونية، ولم يقدموا تسويات وحلولا للازمة 
  .القائمة والصراع القائم
ضل ان نتركه للآليات المعتمدة وللجلسات الخاصة، لن أدخل الآن في مناقشة الطروحات والشروط لان هذا الامر نف
خصوصا ان هذا الملف في جزئياته وفي كلياته يتابع من خلال الايدي الامينة الموثوقة التي نراهن عليها. ولكن أريد 
دنا أو أن أقول تعليقا سريعا فقط ليكون واضحا لكم وللعالم كله. أود أن أجزم بأننا لا يمكن أن نقبل بأي شرط مذل لبل
لشعبنا أو لمقاومتنا أو بأي صيغة يمكن أن تكون على حساب المصالح والسيادة الوطنية والاستقلال الوطني، 
وخصوصا بعد كل هذه التضحيات مهما طالت المواجهة ومهما عظمت التضحيات. نحن شعارنا الحقيقي والاساسي 
ية التحتية ضربت ويعاد بناؤها. ولكن الكرامة لا يمكن أن اولا الكرامة. البيوت هدمت ويعاد بناؤها ان شاء الله. البن
نسمح بأن يهدرها أحد. لا يمكن أن نقبل بأي شروط مذلة. نحن منفتحون على المعالجة السياسية وعلى النقاش السياسي 
ين ونتعاطى بمسؤولية وبمرونة، ولكن هناك خطا ًأحمر. بعد ان جاءت السيدة رايس الى لبنان وغادرت الى فلسط
أيام كما يقول الاسرائيليون أنفسهم، أمام أيام  01المحتلة أعطت للعدو فرصة إضافية. بالتأكيد نحن أمام أسبوع وأمام 
حاسمة ومصيرية بحاجة الى المزيد من الصمود والتماسك الداخلي والصبر هم يراهنون، والمعركة كلها من يصرخ 
  .اولا
وهنا أنا أنتقل الى الشق الميداني انه بعد كل هذا الوقت وكل هذا التمادي من نحن سنستمر في مواجهتنا، وأود أن أعلن 
قبل العدو الاسرائيلي، نحن كنا قد دخلنا في مرحلة حيفا، أنا أعلن أننا سندخل في مرحلة ما بعد حيفا، وبالتالي هناك 
رحلة الجديدة. نعم لن يبقى حدود مرحلة جديدة من المواجهة والصراع يفرضها العدو علينا كخيار لا بد منه في الم
قصفنا حدود حيفا مهما كانت ردات فعل قوات العدو. سوف ننتقل الى مرحلة ما بعد حيفا، واذا تطورت الامور سوف 
  .نختار الزمان الذي ننتقل فيه الى ما بعد بعد حيفا
هذا اولا. ثانيا في المواجهة الميدانية الارضية حتى الآن قام مجاهدو المقاومة بإنجازات كبيرة جدا وكبدوا العدو 
خسائر كبيرة في ضباطه وجنوده وطائراته ودباباته. اليوم نحن نواجه في بنت جبيل وسنقاتل في بنت جبيل كما قاتلنا 
ة وموقع ونقطة. طبعا كما قلت قبل أيام نحن لسنا جيشا كلاسيكيا، لا في مارون الراس، وكما سنقاتل في كل قرية وبلد
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نشكل خطا دفاعيا كلاسيكيا. نحن نقاتل بطريقة حرب العصابات. الكل يعرف أسلوب القتال. المهم في المعركة البرية 
العدو الاسرائيلي وهو ما نلحق بالعدو الاسرائيلي من خسائر. وأقول لكم أيا ًيكن التوغل البري الذي يمكن أن ينجزه 
يملك قوات كبيرة على هذا الصعيد، إلا ان هدف هذا التوغل لن يتحقق وهو منع قصف المستعمرات في شمال فلسطين 
المحتلة. هذا القصف سيستمر أيا ًيكن التوغل البري والاحتلال الجديد. ان احتلال أي شبر من أرضنا اللبنانية سيكون 
تمرار المقاومة ولتصاعد المقاومة. ان مجيء جيش الصهاينة الى أرضنا سيمكننا أكثر من أن وازعا ًودافعا ًإضافيا ًلاس
ننال منه، من جنوده وضباطه ودباباته، سوف يعطينا فرصة أوسع وأكبر في الاشتباك المباشر ولاستنزاف قوات هذا 
جّوه القوي في دك القرى والبلدات  العدو بدلا من أن يبقى مختبئا خلف حصونه عند الحدود الدولية ومكتفيا بسلاح
وقتل الاطفال والنساء المدنيين. في المواجهة ستكون يدنا هي العليا، المعيار في المواجهة البرية هو ما نلحقه من 
استنزاف له وليس ما سيبقى في أيدينا من أرض أو ما يخرج من أيدينا من ارض لأننا لا نقاتل بطريقة نظامية. أي 
عدو سنستعيدها بالتأكيد بعد ان نلحق بهذا العدو كل الخسائر. اذا ًفي الحرب البرية نحن جاهزون أرض يحتلها ال
ومستعدون ومستمرون ورهاننا وتوكلنا على الله سبحانه وتعالى وعلى تلك السواعد القوية والقلوب المليئة بالايمان 
وتعالى، فيهون كل الدنيا وهوان الدنيا وأهوال الدنيا في والعقول المليئة بالمعرفة والنفوس التي تعشق لقاء الله سبحانه 
  .عينها فتقف ثابتة القدم في المواجهة
أريد أن ألفت في قضية المواجهات الميدانية الى طبيعة الحرب النفسية التي يخوضها العدو والتي يجب أن نلتفت اليها 
ن لا نخفي شهداءنا. لو قتل أي من قادتنا وكوادرنا كمقاومين وكشعب. أنا أؤكد لكم اننا معكم شفافون وصادقون. نح
سنعلن ذلك وسنفتخر بذلك. لو سقطت لنا أعداد كبيرة من الشهداء سنعتز بذلك ونفتخر بذلك. لو وقع هناك جرحى أو 
أسرى في يد العدو لن ننكر ذلك. لو وقع هناك جرحى أو أسرى لن ننكر ذلك. وهذه هي سيرتنا حتى عندما كان القتال 
ي مارون الراس قلنا هناك قتال، وعندما خرجنا قلنا مارون الراس انتهت. عليكم ان تستمعوا الينا وليس الى الحرب ف
النفسية التي يخوضها العدو الاسرائيلي. العدو منذ يومين يقول انه سيطر على مدينة بنت جبيل، ويساعده ويروج له 
ية، وهم لم يسيطروا على مدينة بنت جبيل، ولا زالت كل مدينة بنت للاسف العديد من وسائل الاعلام اللبنانية والعرب
  .جبيل في يد المجاهدين حتى تسجيل هذه الرسالة وهم يقاتلون ويواجهون ويصمدون
 02اسيرا، اين هم هؤلاء ال 02العدو يتحدث عن مئات الشهداء من حزب الله اين هم هؤلاء المئات؟ يتحدث عن 
  .ن أسيرين في مارون الراس، ثم أطلق سراحهما لانهما مدنيان لا علاقة لهما بالمقاومةاسيرا؟ قبل ايام تحد ث ع
اذا ًالعدو سيتحدث عن احتلال مدن واحتلال قرى وقتل أعداد كبيرة للمس بمعنويات المجاهدين والناس. أنا أقول لكم 
علن شهداءنا. عندما نخرج من بلدة بعد ان هذه الاكاذيب لا تصدقوها. استمعوا الينا. نحن عندما يسقط منا الشهداء سن
نقاتل فيها قتال الابطال سوف نعلن اننا خرجنا. نحن لا نكذب على شعبنا، ولكنه هو الذي يكذب على شعبه. هو الذي 
يمارس الرقابة الاعلامية. هو الذي لا يقول الحقائق لشعبه ولا للعالم. هذا دليل على ضعفه. أما شفافيتنا ووضوحنا 
  .على قوتنا وعلى إرادتنا فدليل
في كل الاحوال عندما اخترنا هذا الطريق كنا نعرف اننا نمضي في طريق ذات الشوك والشهادة التي تصنع النصر. 
نحن مصرون على الوقوف وعلى الصمود وعلى ان نحفظ كرامتنا وسيادتنا وحريتنا وحرية وطننا. المطلوب ان 
لامور لن تبقى كما هي. نحن ان شاء الله موعودون بالنصر وسوف ننتصر نصبر وان نصمد وان نواصل وبالتالي ا
في هذه المعركة كما انتصرنا في غيرها. صمودنا سوف يجعل الواقع من حولنا يتغير، الواقع الاقليمي والواقع الدولي. 
العدو. في نهاية المطاف هذه  لن يكون هناك وقت طويل متاح للعدو أيا ًتكن التغطية التي تقدمها الادارة الاميركية لهذا
الدماء الزكية التي تنزف من النساء والاطفال والمدنيين المظلومين ومن الشهداء والمجاهدين المقاومين المظلومين 
سواء في المقاومة أو في الجيش الوطني اللبناني أو في أي موقع من مواقع التضحية، اليوم هذه الدماء لا بد أن تنتصر 
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ايها الاخوة و الاخوات، ايها المعتصمون من اجل لبنان، من اجل سيادة لبنان واستقلال لبنان وكرامة لبنان و حرية  
لبنان، السلام عليكم جميعا ورحمة الله وبركاتة. كنت اتمنى ان اكون بينكم في ساحة من ساحات الشرف وساحة من 
ساحات الصمود والمقاومة في هذا الطقس البارد باجوائه الطبيعية ولكنه الحار بالمودة و التعاون ودفئ الاخوة الوطنية 
 من اجل لبنان ومن اجل الامة.
 
تي هذه اليكم، اتمنى ان شاء الله ان اكون في يوم من الايام بينكم في تلك الساحة، لكن قبل ان ابدأ قبل ان ابدأ كلم
واحتياطا لختام الكلمة، للاسف لدينا بعض العادات اللبناتية السيئة وهي اطلاق الرصاص ابتهاجا بمناسبة او اخرى. انا 
ا اي رصاص. هذه عادة سيئة يجب ان نقلع عنها كلبنانين. اتمنى على من يستمعون الي عند انتهاء الكلمة الا يطلقو
نحن يجب ان نتجنب اطلاق الرصاص في اي اتجاه حتى في اتجاه السماء. المكان الوحيد للرصاص هو صدر اعداء 
لبنان، العدو الاسرائيلي. لذلك واحتياطا اتمنى واكد واعتبر ان هذه الليلة عند انتهاء الكلمة من يطلق الرصاص هو 
 الي والينا والى كل المعارضة الوطنية اللبنانية.  مدسوس، يريد الاساءة
 
في ساحة الدفاع عن لبنان و اولا، اتوجه الى اهل الشهيد احمد محمود بالتعزية والمواساة لاقول لهم ان ابنكم استشهد 
بامتياز وهو ليس شهيدا في شوارع لبنان وعزة لبنان وتحرير لبنان. الشهيد احمد محمود هو شهيد المقاومة  كرامة
لبنان الداخلية بل هو شهيد في الدفاع عن استقلال لبنان وسيادة لبنان وفي التحرك من اجل انقاذ لبنان وساعود الى 
 الشهيد في طمن الكلمة.
 
للذين جاؤوا يجب ايضا، ان اتوجه بالشكر اليكم، انتم. يا اشرف الناس اطهر الناس واحب الناس واعز الناس. الى كل ا
من كل المناطق اللبنانية يوم الجمعة الى ساحتي رياض الصلح و الشهداء من اجل انقاذ لبنان. كل اللذين ما زالوا 
يحتشدون في كل ليلة من اجل انقاذ لبنان، اتوجه اليكم بالشكر واقول لكم ان ما تقومون به هو امر عظيم وشريف لانه 
انقاذ لبنان من خلال انهاء حالة الاستئثار والتسلط والتفرد ولاقامة حكزمة وحدة  يخدم هدفا وطنيا نبيلا وشريفا، هو




ايها الاخوة والاخوات، لقد حاولوا في الايام الماضية من خلال الشغب والاعتداء على المعتصمين ذهابا و ايابا وصولا 
حمد محمود ان يدخلوا الخوف الى قلوبكم، ان يمنعوكم من المجئ الى ساحات الاعتصام ولكنهم فشلوا الى قتل الشهيد ا
ونسوا انكم شعبا لا مكان للخوف في قلبه. اليوم يراهنون على تعبكم او على مللكم وهم لا يعلمون انكم شعبا لا يمل ولا 
اتكم صرخة الاستسلام وهم تناسوا بالامس القريب كيف يكل ولا يتعب. قالوا بالامس انهم يتوقعون ان تنطلق من ساح
يوما ليس فقط في البرد او تحت المطر او في العراء وانما تحت اعنف قصف جوي ومدفعي في العقود  33وقفتم انتم 
ئف الماضية. صمدتم رغم التهجير والقتل والمجازر. احتضنكم اهلكم اللبنانيون في كل المناطق اللبنانية ومن كل الطوا
نا ولكننا اللبنانية ولم تستسلموا. نعم، هم دعونا للاستسلام من اول يوم ولكننا رفضنا ان نستسلم. هم راهنوا على هزيمت
ارضنا. في ارض الاباء والاجداد اعزاء، اقوياء لا تنحني لنا قامة ولا تنكسر لنا ارادة لا نعرف  لم نهزم وبقينا هنا في
اجل لبنان ومن اجل الامة. قولوا لهم اليوم من ساحة الاعتصام، قولوا لهم غدا في  التعب ولا الملل ولا الكلل، من
صلاة الجمعة وقولوا لهم في كل ليلة قولوا لهم يوم الاحد في الحشد الكبير وقولوا لهم بعد الاحد انكم ايها المراهنون 
قوى من البرد واقوى من الجوع واقوى على استسلامنا واهمون، واهمون، واهمون. قولوا لهم نحن اقوى من التعب وا
من الكلل واقوى من الملل واقوى من قصف الصواريخ، فكيف بقصف الكلمات. نحن اقوى من الحرب، فكيف 
 بالتهديد. نحن شعب في معركة الارادة لن ننكسر. 
 
ائفية و المذهبية والسياسية ايها الاخوة والاخوات، ليس من الصدفة ان تكون القوى اللبنانية على اختلاف انتمائاتها الط
و المناطقية التي احتضنت المقاومة وشعب المقاومة في حرب تموز وأب هي نفسها اليوم التي تشكل المعارضة 
وكذلك ليس من الصدفة ان الشعوب والحكومات والاشراف في  الوطنية اللبنانية وتدعم المعارضة الوطنية اللبنانية.
المقاومة في الحرب هم اللذين يقفون الى جانب المعارضة اليوم. وفي المقابل، ليس من  العالم اللذين وقفوا الى جانب
الصدفة ان كل اولئك اللذين دعموا الحرب الاسرائيلية على لبنان هم اللذين يدعمون بقية الحكومة الساقطة المتواجدة 
ان لا تتدخل كطرف ولا تدعم فريق على  في السرايا الحكومي. انا باسمكم ادعوا الدول العربية الحريصة على لبنان
حساب فريق. من يريد سلامة لبنان ووحدة لبنان وخلاص لبنان يحب ان يمد يده الى كل اللبنانين، والا تكتفوا بتقارير 
سفراءكم في لبنان. تفضلوا الى لبنان وتعرفوا على الحقائق السياسية والشعبية و الميدانية عن قرب وابذلوا جهودكم 
ورة من اجل مساعدة لبنان وانقاذ لبنان. واقول للحكومة لبقية الحكومة، الفاقدة الشرعية، ان استنادكم الى الدعم المشك
الامريكي والغربي لا يجديكم نفعا على الاطلاق. اليوم من تستندون اليه وفي مقدمتهم حورج بوش، هو احزج ما يكون 
الف جندي  051فلناخذ مثلا العراق. في العراق يوجد اكثر من الى المساعدة، وهو احزج ما يكون الى من ينقذه. 
امريكي في العراق وينفق مئات مئات المليارات. في العراق كل الادارة الامريكية تتابع الموضوع العراقي. العراق 
، تمزق ليس ملفا كلبنان في يد الوزارة، وزارة الخارجية الامريكية، ومع ذلك ما هي النتيجة في العراق. الفشل
اي بلد يراهن على بوش وعلى  المسدودة. هذه هي النتيجة ومصير العراق، الحرب الطائفية، الحرب المذهبية، الافاق
جيشه وعلى ادارته. ماذا يمكن ان تقدم لكم امريكا وهي الغارقة في وحول المنطقة، من افغانستان الى العراق الى 
لى مدى سنة ونصف السنة تلقت ، وما زالت، من الدعم الامريكي ومن فلسطين الى لبنان. هذه الحكومة اللبنانية ع
الدعم العربي ما لم تتلاقاه اي حكومة في تاريخ لبنان. الا يثير هذا الشكوك والشبه. لماذا هذا الغرام الامريكي بهذه 
ي اليومي لهذا الفريق الحكومة وبرئيس هذه الحكومة. لكن ما يثير الشبه اكثر والشكوك اكثر هذا المديح الاسرتئيل
الحاكم في لبنان. هل هناك ما وراء الاكمة ما لا نعرف وما نجهل. اليس من العار ان تجتمع الحكومة الصهيونية 
المصغرة، وهي عادة تجتمع عندما يكون هناك امرا يتهدد مصالح اسرائيل او امن اسرائيل. اليس من العار ان تجتمع 
جلستها فقط، كيف يمكن ان نساعد هذه الحكومة المتهالكة في لبنان. وقال بعضهم حكومة اسرائيل المصغرة وموضوع 
يمكن ان نساعدهم بان نخرج من القسم الجنوبي من بلدة الغجر. وفال بعض بعضهم فلنخرج من مزارع شبعا و 
من الغجر ولا من  لنقدمها هدية ودعم سياسي ومعنوي للفريق الحاكم في لبنان. ولكن ماذا فعلوا لكم؟ لم يخرحوا لا
مزارع شبعا. حتى في هذه زهدوا في ان يقدموا لكم دعما معنوياز الا يدعوا كل هذا الدعم الامريكي و الغربي 
 والاسرائيلي الى التوقف والتامل.
 
ها الاخوة الاخوات، نحن في المعارضة الوطنية اللبنانية نصر على مطلبنا وعلى هدفنا وهو تشكيل حكومة وحدة يا
وطنية لبنانية حقيقية لماذا؟ لان تركيبة لبنان الخاصة المتعددة المتنوعة تعني ان حكومة فريق واحد وتسلط فريق واحد 
كان دائما يضع لبنان امام الحائط المسدود في كل شيئ. لبنان لا يقوم الا بالمشاركة، والا بالتوافق، والا بالتضامن، 
حكومة وحدة وطنية لانها السبيل الوحيد لمنع اي وصاية اجنبية. ليسمع العالم والا بالتعاون وليس بالاستئثار. نريد 
لبنانية، قرارها لبناني، ارادتها لبنانية، ساداتها لبنانيون. هذا ما نتطلع اليه. وهي التي تشكل  نريد حكومة كله، نحن
اللذي  وسلامة لبنان، وحدة لبنان. هذا هالضمانة للبنان ولمستقبل لبنان و لامن لبنان، اسقرار لبنان، ازدهار لبنان، 




اليوم يسالوننا، لو كنتم انتم المعارضة الحالية اصبحتم في يوم من الايام اكثرية نيابية ، وشكلتم حكومة، هل ستعطونا 
اقول لهم باسم حزب الله، و كفريق في المعارضة، اقول نعم، نحن نؤيد اعطاء اي معارضة في الثلث الضامن؟ انا 
لبنان ثلثا ضامنا لاننا نؤمن بالشراكة، ولاننا نؤمن بالتعاون ولا نؤمن بحكم فريق على حساب فريق اخر. وعندما 
، لان ليس هناك ما نخافه على نعطي لاي معارضة لوكنا اكثرية، نعطيها الثلث الضامن، نعطيها ونحن واثقون
 الاطلاق وليس لدينا اي التزامات دولية او التزامات اقليمية نريد ان نقوم بتمريرها من خلال حكومة اكثرية معينة.
مصلحة لبنان هي تلك التي نتوافق عليها جميعا. ايها الاخوة و الاخوات، عندما سدت و نحن نريد مصلحة لبنان،  
طاولة التشاور ووجهنا بالاستئثار والاصرار على التسلط، كان خيارنا الاخير النزول الى ابواب الحوار وعطلت 
الشارع. ولكننا ونحن في الشارع، في الاعتصام، في التظاهر، لم نوقف ولن نقفل ابواب التفاوض. كلاللذبن يدعوننا 
موز المعارضة وابواب المبادرات الى الحوار نقول لهم، نعم. ابواب الحوار مفتوحة مع قادة المعارضة،  مع ر
بحاجة الى العودة الى طاولة حوار فضفاضة اتضيع الوقت. لن نخرج من الشارع لنذهب  امفتوحة. لكن بالتاكيد لسن
الى طاولة حوار يتم خداعنا فيهل من جديد. نحن سنبقى في الشارع، ومن يريد ان يتفاوض مع المعارضة ويتحاور 
 اختلافهم مفتوحة. معها، فابواب قادتها على 
 
العديد من الايجابيات  اليوم، هناك مبادرة مجلس المطارنة الموارنة اللذي تحترم، ونحن نعتبر هذه المبادرة تحمل
تناقش وان يتلاقى على اساس بنودها. فيقبل ما يقبل ويعلق او يؤجل ما يعلق او يؤجل. الباب مفتوح  وتستحق ان
لا تحاور ولا تفاوض ولا تناقش. بل الخيارات كلها مفتوحة. لكن، انا اقول لهم، للتفاوض وليس صحيحا ان المعارضة 
فاوضونا وحاورونا ونفاوضكم ونحاوركم ولكننا باسم كل المحتشدين الليلة، وبالامس وغدا، لن نخرج من الشارع قبل 
 تحقيق الهدف اللذي ينقذ لبنان.
 
دمنا مستمرين في اعتصامنا، اريد ان اكد على الضوابط التي تحدثنا ايها الاخوةو الاخوات، ايها الاخوة والاخوات. ما 
عنها منذ اليوم الاول. لا شتائم. البعض من المتحمسين في ساحات الاعتصام قد يطلق شعارات مهينة لشخصيات في 
لا يجوز  الحكومة، ونحن نرفض اي اهانة شخصية لاي احد. اي اهانة، اي شتيمة، اي كلام غير لائق او غير اخلاقي
ى اعتصامنا وتحركنا السلمي والمدني و الحضاري. طبعا، هم عندما قتلوا لان يصدر من اعتصامكم. نحن نؤكد ع
الشهيد احمد محمود، هم ارادوا ان يجرونا الى الصراع المسلح والى القتال. ولكن، باسم الشهيد احمد محمود، باسم كل 
كبير في المعارضة الوطنية اللبنانية، اقول للفريق الحاكم ولقواه  ل وامرءة و طفل صغير وشيخجرفاقه، باسم كل ر
السياسية. وللاسف، لبعض مليشياته، نحن نرفض الحرب الاهلية. نحن نرفض الفتنة بين الطوائف، او الفتنة بين 
ذلك يوم  القوى السياسية. نحن نرفض اي نوع من انواع التصادم في الشارع. اردناه تحركا حضاريا سلميا. اثبتنا
سابقة في تاريخ لبنان، ولو وهنوا به في وسائل اعلامهم التي تكبر ما يفعلون  عة في الحشد الكبير اللذي ليس لهالجم
وتصغر ما تفعلون. ولكن الصورة واضحة لكل العالم. انا اقول للبنانيين ولكل شعوب المنطقة من يدفع الامور باتجاه 
لكل خاسر، لن اقول لكم انتم تخسرون ونحن نربح. لاء. كلنا يخسر. كل اللبنانيين الحرب الاهلية. في الحرب الاهلية ا
المذهبية. في العراق الكل يخسر، في فلسطين الكل يخسر.ما  الى الحرب الاهلية او الى الفتنةيخسرون في الذهاب 
خسارة لنا جميعا والربح يعدنل به بعض الملوك العرب، لللاسف، من حروب اهلية في لبنان والعراق و فلسطين هي 
والى اصحاب نظريات الفوضى الخلاقة. نحن  الصافي سوف يذهب الى اسرائيل والى امريكا، والى المحافظين الجدد
مثل احمد محمود. نحن لن نرفع السلاح في وجه  ، لو قتلتم الفافي لبنان لن ننجر الى اي فتنة، لو قتلتم احمد محمود
 احد.  
 
 01و اطلق النار علينا وسقط لنا  39هؤلاء، هؤلاء نسوا وكثير منهم كانوا في الحكومة التي منعت التظاهر في ايلول 
جريحا ولم نرفع السلاح في وجه احد. اقول لكم، نحن لسنا بحاجة للسلاح لنهزمكم، لان سلاحنا فقط  05شهداء و 
ود نهزمكم، باصرارنا على الوحدة وعلى الاخوة وعلى الالفةز بوجه الصهاينة. نحن باصواتنا نهزمكم. بدم احمد محم
فليسمع العالم و لتعرف، خصوصا، الشعوب العربية التي يحاولون تاليبها على المعارضة اللبنانية بالأكاذيب. هم 
الدم سننتصر يقتلوننا ونحن نقول لهم، نحن نريد ان نكون معكم و ان تكونوا معنا، سويا. ايها القتلة. اقول لكم نحن ب
 على سيوفكم. 
 
ان لدى  تقول:أيها اللبنانيون سمعت وللاسف ان بعض الزعامات الدينية او السياسية تحرض في مجالسها الداخلية و 
الف صاروخ موجه الى بيوتكم. ليس هذا. لم يكن سلوكنا في يوم من الايام. وانا من هنا اقول لهؤلاء  03حزب الله 
هم: من هدمنا له دار في لبنان فلياتي ويطالبنا. من سفكنا له دما في لبنان فلياتي ويطالبنا. الزعامات ولمن يصغي الي
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ولكن انتم اللذين تحرقون، كم دمرتم من بيوت وكم قتلتم من انفس وكم سفكتم من دماء. بكل صراحة نحن لا نريد ان 
ذا المعنى اليوم. في بعض المناطق يثيرون الكثير نهدد احدا ونحن لن نهدد احدا. ان دم كل لبناني، وانا اريد ان اكد ه
من الشائعات وخصوصا في مدينة بيروت ويقولون لهم ان قوى سياسية معينة في المعارضة ذات لون مذهبي تريد ان 
تهاجم احياكم من اجل استثارة النعرات المذهبية والطائفية. فليسمعني اهل بيروت وكل اللبنانين: ان دم كل لبناني هو 
منا وان عرض كل لبناني هو عرضنا وان مال كل لبناني هو مالنا وان كل بيت لبناتي هو بيتنا. هذا هو الخط الاحمر د
اللذي نحميه بدمنا لو سفكتموه وهذا هو الخط الاحمر اللذي نحميه برموش عيوننا ولو تامرتم علينا او اردتم جرنا الى 
ر الى الحرب الاهلية ولا الى الفتنة ولا الى اي شكل من اشكال التقاتل الفتنة. نحن لن ننجر الى الفتنة. نحن لن ننج
 الداخلي. 
 
الحمد الله، اليوم لدينا حماية وطنية حقيقية، هي مؤسسة الجيش اللبناني اللذي اثبت حتى الان بقياداته و ضباطه و 
يجب ان لا نسمح باي تشرذم او تشقق  رتباءه و جنوده انه جيش كل لبنان. هذه الضمانة يجب ان نحافظ عليها جميعا و
في داخل مؤسسة الجيش ويجب ان تترفع القوى عن التفكير باستخدام اي ضابط او جنود الجيش اللبناني لمصلحتها 
لان انهيار الجيش سوف يفقد لبنان مناعته. لقوى الامن الداخلي اقول: يجب ان تثبتوا ، ايضا، انكم مؤسسة وطنية 
عملون لمصلحة فريق لبناني على حساب فريق لبناني لكي تشكلوا ايضا الى جانب الجيش ضمانة حقيقية، وانكم لا ت
وطنية حقيقية. ايها الاخوة و الاخوات، عندما نزلتم الى الشارع في يوم الجمعة و اعتصمتم ليلا مساء الجمعة ومساء 
ذي يدعي ويتحدث عن الديموقراطية وعن السبت واحتشدتم يوم الاحد، كيف تعامل معكم الفريق الحاكم، الفريق الل
الحريات العامة وعن حق حرية التعبير. كانت حركتكم حضارية واعترف بها كل العالم وكان انضباتكم مدهشا. وانتم 
دائما تدهشون العالم في الحرب، في السلم، في التظاهر. ماذا فعلوا؟ كيف تصرفوا؟ وههنوا بحشدكم الغير مسبوق. 
ى الشغب، ارسلوا شللهم المسلحة، وانا يحزنني، البعض يجلس معنا على طاولة الحوار ليناقش سلاحا ولكنهم لجؤوا ال
مقاوما لم يوجه الى الداخل ويريد ان ينزع هذا السلاح. وهو ياتي بالسلاح و يخزن السلاح ويوزع السلاح في اكثر من 
العودة وتقتل الشهيد احمد محمود وتجرح اخرين. منطقة واكثر من مكان. ارسلوا شللهم المسلحة لتعترضكم في طريق 
ضاقت صدورهم بالديموقراطية التي يدعون انهم يحافظون عليها. كم وجهوا من تهديدات الى شخصيات المعارضة 
وخصوصا تلك الشخصيات الوطنية التي تنتمي الى الطائفة السنية الكريمة. الم يرسلوا السيارات والمسلحين لمحاصرة 
ماكن التي تنتسب الى هؤلاء الزعماء و الشخصيات؟ هل هذه هي الديموقراطية، هل هذه هي الحرية؟ لقد البيوت والا
تظاهرتم لايام وليالي طويلة وانا اسالكم واسال اللبنانيين واسال العالم في ظل نظام الاجهزة الامنية، كما تسمونها، هل 
ل قتل متظاهر لانه ذاهب الى الاعتصام او عائد من قطع عليكم احد الطريق، في طريق الذهاب  او الاياب؟ ه
الاخطر فيما يجري اليوم، الاخطر هو التحريض المذهبي. لقد كفوا عن التحريض الطائفي، اليوم ليس  الاعتصام. لكن
هناك حديث عن مسلمين و مسيحيين في لبنان، كل الحديث عن سنة وشيعة في لبنان. قالوا عن الحشد الكبير يوم 
ان هذه المظاهرة شيعية وتجاهلوا المشاركة الكبيرة و العارمة من كل الطوائف ليصوروا وكان المسالة  الجمعة
 مظاهرة شيعية في مواجهة حكومة سنية. لا المظاهرة شيعية ولا الحكومة سنية. 
 
د ذلك ليركزوا حملتهم جاؤا بع هذه هي الحقيقة. ثم جاؤوا ليحيدوا حركة امل  وليقولوا ان هذه المظاهرة لحزب الله. ثم
الشديدة على حزب الله وخطابهم الاعلامي المنسق و المتفق عليه، يقولون اعتصام حزب الله وحلفائه. يريدون ان 
يتجاهلوا بقية قوى المعارضة الحقيقية. على كل حال، خلال الايام الماضية انكشف زيف هذا الادعاء. وان التظاهر 
قي وصادق من كل اطياف المعارضة الوطنية اللبنانية. هذا الشعار المذهبي سقط والاحتشاد الليلي هو تعبير حقي
هم و خطابهم، يستهدفون و وسيسقط، ولكنهم يواصلون العمل على اساسه. في كل الادعاءات السابقة في اعلام
سلامي ويتصورون الشارع السني في لبنان، و من خلاله ايضا الشارع السني على امتداد العالم العربي والا يخاطبون
انهم بذلك يسيئون الى مكانة حزب الله والى مكانة القوى المشاركة في المعارضة الوطنية اللبنانيية. تارة يقولون 
المعارضة تريد تغير اتفاق الطائف. وهذا افتراء وكذب، واخرى يقولون التظاهر هدفه التغطية على قتلة الرئيس 
العراق وغير العراق، ولااريد ان ادخل في التباسات هذا الاستحضار. و اخر الشهيد رفيق الحريري، ثم يستحضرون 
هذه الاكاذيب، ويناقضون انفسهم عندما يقولون: السرايا الحكومي محاصر وفي نفس الوقت يبثون عبر شاشاتهم 
 . مشاهد الوفود التي تتقاطر الى السرايا الحكومي. كيف يكون السرايا محاصرا وتاتي كل هذه الوفود
 
كبرى، واذا اخذت مكانها  في كل الاحوال، التحريض المذهبي خطيئة و جريمة تاريخية و دينية وانسانية وسياسية
فانها تحرق الجميع. التحريض المذهبي لعب بالنار. و اليوم انا اطالب بلجنة تحقيق عربية من جامعة الدول  الطبيعي
تاتي الى هنا و تحقق. انا اقول من يحرض مذهبيا او طائفيا هو العربية او اسلامية من منظمة المؤتمر الاسلامي 
خائن. وليحققوا من اللذي يقدم اليوم خطابا طائفيا او مذهبيا، من اللذي يوزع البيانات تحلل قتل ابناء هذه الطائفة او 
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ون هذه شهادة لنا، تلك الطائفة. من اللذي يحول الصراع السياسي في لبنان الى صراع مذهبي. ثم يعرفون هم ويعتقد
اننا في حزب الله تحديدا وفي بقية المعارضة الوطنية حساسون جدا اتجاه الفتنة الطائفية و حساسون جدا اتجاه الفتنة 
المذهبية بين السنة و الشيعة. وايضا يحاولون ان ينالوا من حزب الله و يقولون ان مكانتنا في العالم العربي تراجعت.و 
ه النصح لحزب الله ولي شخصيا، و يقولون لا تضيعوا ما جمعتموه، ولا تضيعوا مكانتكم في ينصحوننا، كلهم يوج
العالم العربي. العالم العربي يعرف، وحصلنا على هذه المكانة لانه يعرف، اننا اصحاب قضية مقدسة و شريفة ونحن 
حكومة الوحدة الوطنية  نخدم قضيتنا. نحن لسنا طلاب مناصب ولا طلاب مكانه، ولا طلاب شهرة، حتى في
بوضوح: ان المقاعد الوزارية التي تعطى لحزب الله في  المقبلة،نحن لا نطالب بحصة لحزب الله. انني اعلن امامكم
حكومة الوحدة الوطنية سنتخلى عنها ليشارك فيها حلفاؤنا في المعارضة. نحن لسنا طلاب سلطة ولا طلاب منصب، 
وابنائنا، واقول لهم ليعرفوا من يخاصمون اليوم ومن يواجهون اليوم. نحن قوم لا نحناصحاب قضية نفتديها بدمائنا 
نخاف من الشتائم و لا من السباب ولا من الاتهامات، فليسمعوني جيدا: نحن نخلص لقضيتنا و شعبنا و امتنا و نقدم من 
 س على العرش او يشيع في نعش.اجلها ابنائنا ودمائنا وارواحنا وماء وجوهنا، لا نفرق عند الواحد منا ان يجل
 
ثانيا: اخاطب كل لبناني وكل الشعوب العربية و الاسلامية اللذين يتابعون اليوم احداث لبنان بشكل تفصيلي واسالهم 
لنبحث عن مكانتنا عندهم. هل يرضى اي لبناني او اي عربي ان نسكت او ندعم حكومة يعلن عن دعمها كل يوم 
حكومة ثبت بالدليل القاطع انها لا تملك قرارا وطنيا جورج بوش وايهود اولمرت؟ هل تقبلون ان ندعم او نسكت عن 
لبنانيا و انما تخضع لارادة و قرار السفير الامريكي فلتمان و من ورائه كونداليزا رايس؟ نحن نريد حكومة لبنانية 
ريق وطنية لا تخضع لاي اجنبي كما قلت، سواء كان عدوا او صديقا او شقيقا. هم ليدافعوا عن تسلط و استئثار الف
الحاكم، يختبئون خلف العنوان المذهبي السني و الشيعي، و يحاولون ان يصوروا للسنة في لبنان وللسنة في العالم، ان 
المعارضة تستهدف حكومة السنة في لبنان. هذا ليس صحيحا. هذه الحكومةالغير شرعية ليست حكومة السنة في لبنان 
كومة وحدة وطنية، هذه حكومة السفير الامريكي. وانا اقول لكم وليست حكومة وطنية الا اذا تشكلت على اساس ح
وليسمع كل العالم واقول صادقا وقد عودتكم على الصدق: لو كانت هذه الحكومة حكومة السنة في لبنان لكنت انا اول 
الى ساحة  المطيعين لهذه الحكومة. فليتوقفوا عن اللعب بالمذهبية، ولو اردتم ان تدخلوا الى الملف الفلسطيني،
الصراع، فصفحة قوى المعارضة اللبنانية مشرقة ومضيئة فيما يعني فلسطين. و لكن اين صفحتكم. لو اردتم ان 
تعرفون: نحن اصلا ضد الغزو الامريكي للعراق واعلنا هذا بوضوح،  لتباسات الموقف في العراق، فانتمتدخلوا ا
ا انتم، فادعياء بقاء الاحتلالا الامريكي، وتمدحون هذا الاحتلال وشتمنا، و لم نهتم للشتائم لان الموقف كان حقا. ام
وترونه صائبا و تعارضون انهائه و تدعون ادارة بوش الى احتلال سوريا والى احتلال المزيد من الارض العربية و 
تحرير  الاسلامية. نحن مع المقاومة في فلسطين، في العراق، في كل مكان يحمل فيه وطني شريف سلاحه من اجل
 ارضه من الاحتلال والهيمنة و الوصاية.
 
لا تخلطوا المسائل ولا تشبهوا الامور على الناس لا تحتجو بموقف فئة شيعية هنا او هناك، كما لا يجوز ان يحتج احد 
ام و الاحباء والاخوة، اهل من الشيعة بموقف فئة سنية هنا او هناك. هل يجوز لشيعي ان يقف ويحاسب الاهل الطر
في العالم لان رئيسا عربيا وقع صلحا مع اسرائيل في كامب ديفيد ويحمل اهل السنة مسؤولية صلح كامب ديفيد؟  لسنةا
هل يجوز ان يحمل احد اهل السنة مسؤولية بعض الزعماء اللذين يصافحون الصهاينة ويطبعون مع الصهاينة 
حدا، و السنة ليسوا حسابا واحدا وليسوا معسكرا ويحاصرون الانتفاضة في فلسطين؟ ابدا. الشيعة ليسوا حسابا وا
واحدا و ليسوا مشروعا واحدا. في كل بلد هناك شيعة و سنة هنا وهناك، هناك مسلمون هنا و هناك. هناط مسيحيون 
هنا وهناك. فليحاسب بعضنا الاخر على اساس مواقفه الوطنية و القومية التي تخدم مصالح وطنه ومصالح امته. دعوا 
فتح ملف لامر جانبا. ولكن من المؤسف و المحزن انه في الايام الاخيرة عمموا على بعضهم البعض واعادوا هذا ا
اب، ليعيدوا تحميل حزب الله مسؤولية الحرب و الدمار و التبعات الاقتصادية والى اخره،  الحرب الاخيرة في تموز و
 و يبدو ان هناك تعميم واضح وتركيز واضح. 
 
كانوا يحرصون دائما على تاجيل الكلام في هذا الملف لمصلحة اللبنانيين، ولكن ما دمتم تصرون  انا من اللذين
فاسمعوا، قبل ان اشرح و اوضح اقول للمعارضة جميعها و خصوصا للجمهور اللذي يعتبر نفسه معنيا مباشرة 
م نحن و انتم اخلاقيون ومتسامحون بالمقاومة، ما اقوله ليس له عندنا نتائج ولا ردات فعل وسوف يستغرب العالم: ك
كومة وحدة ومتواضعون وحريصون، ما اقوله لن يغير من الهدف شيئا، وسوف نبقى نقول لهم: تعالوا معا لنشكل ح
الحرب: انا ادعواالى تشكيل لجنة قضائية لبنانية من قضاة نزيهين او لجنة قضائية عربية  وطنية، ولكن اسمعوا عن
ح تحقيقا في مسالة الحرب الاخيرة. هم يتهموننا، ولكن انا اليوم بصراحة ساتهمهم. الذي طلب من قضاة نزيهين، ولتفت
حول سلاح  من امريكا، من جورج بوش وديك تشيني بشكل رسمي ان تشن الحرب على لبنان بدليل ان الحوار
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لمقاومة لانها قوية وذات جمهور المقاومة باعتقادهم وصل الى طريق مسدود لا امكانية داخلية لبنانية لانتزاع سلاح ا
لبناني عريض من  كل الطوائف وهذا ما اكدته استطلاعات الراي العامة، ولان الجيش اللبناني جيش وطني يرفض 
لانهاء مسالة المقاومة، الطريق الوحيد هو ان تطلب الادارة  قالوا لهم لا سبيل لبناني ومحلي الصدام مع المقاومة،
ولمرت ان تشن حربا كبيرة مدمرة قاضية ليس على حزب الله فقط بل على حزب الله وعلى كل الامريكية من حكومة ا
 في المستقبل قائمة. الذين يؤيدونه او يحتضنونه حتى لا تبقى لهذه المقاومة باقية ولا تقوم لها حتى
 
رت بمعنى انه لو نجحت الادارة الامريكية قبلت هذا الطلب و ارادت ايضا توظيفه في انتخابات الكونغرس التي ج
الحرب لجاء بوش والمحافظين الجدد ولقالوا للامريكان ها نحن قضينا على احد اهم التنظيمات الارهابية في العالم، 
وفي المخطط حضروا لسجن في مستوطنة في شمال فلسطين المحتلة اسمها روشبينا وهي قاعدة عسكرية ايضا و 
هؤلاء السجناء سيكونون فقط من حزب الله، لا، كان السجناء سيكونون من  قاعدة جوية تتسع لعشرة الاف سجين. هل
كل من يعارض الفريقالمتسلط الحاكم في لبنان. وقبلت الادارة الامريكية واعطت الامر لاسرائيل. من الذي طلب؟ انا 
اسماء امام احد، لا امام أذار، لا اتهم كل الفريق الحاكم، لا اتهم كل الشخصيات، انا لم اكر  41لا اتهم كل فريق 
صحفي امريكي و لا غير صحفي امريكي، لكن الذين جلسوا مع الامريكين وطلبوا منهم ان تشن اسرائيل علينا 
 الحرب يعرفون انفسهم و انا اعرفهم واتمنى ان لا ياتي يوم من الايام اقول اسمائهم.
 
ف لها البيان الوزاري بوضوح بان لها الحق بالعمل الذي يتحمل مسؤولية الحرب في تموز ليست المقاومة التي يعتر
يست وزارة خارجية. من اجل تحرير الارض والاسرى. عندما يعطى هذا الحق للمقاومة، المقاومة، مقاومة ول
الارض والاسرى بالسلاح وليس بالمفاوضات والدبلوماسية. نحن اعطينا الحق في البيان الوزاري و  المقاومة تحرر
الذي اعطيناه في البيان الوزاري. الذي يتحمل مسؤولية الحرب والدمار هو الذي طلب من امريكا فعلنا بالحق 
واسرائيل ان تتخذ هذه العملية ذريعة لتشن الحرب على لبنان، وانا اقبل بقضاء محايد ولجنة تحقيق محايدة. ايضا انا 
د ان يوقع بيننا الفتنة كلبنانيين عندما اعلن عن في ايام الحرب قلت لكم ان جون بولتون غير المئسوف على رحيله يري
مفاجاته ان المسؤولين في لبنان قبلوا مسودة المشروع الامريكي الفرنسي ثم تخلفوا عن ذلك، ولكنه كان يقول صدقا. 
الفرنسي لكن عندما ووجهوا بالرفض الوطني في لبنان عدلوا عن ذلك. قلت لكم  م قبلوا بمسودة المشروع الامريكيه
ايام الحرب ان اولمرت يريد ان يوقع بيننا ولكن لم اقل لكم لكم انه يكذب، استعملت عبارة حمالة اوجه. عندما كان 
 يقول ان جهات في الحكومة اللبنانية تتصل بنا وتصر علينا ان نواصل القتال، هذا الكلام من اولمرت صحيح ونحن
 فيه اسماءهم امام العالم. نعرف من هؤلاء، وارجوا ان لا ياتي اليوم الذي اذكر
 
الحكومة الفاقدة للشرعية. انا اساله و الشهود كلهم ما زالوا احياء، اساله يا دولة  انا اخاطبكم من هنا وبجواركم رئيس
الرئيس: في وسط الحرب عندما دمر الصهاينة بالغارات الجوية كل الجسور والطرق و المعابر من اجل قطع خطوط 
الجنوب، وهم ما ضربوا الجسور من اجل الجسور ولا الطرقات من اجل الطرقات وانما كانوا امداد المقاومة في 
له: الم تامر انت يا يريدون قطع خطوط الامداد للمقاومة وفشلوا وبقى الامداد مستمرا حتى اخر يوم ولم يتوقف. اسا
ام لا؟ هل يقبل لبناني سواء كان مسلما ام  الى الجنوب الجيش اللبناني بمصادرة سلاح المقاومة الذي ينقل دولة الرئيس
مسيحيا، هل يقبل لبناني سواء كان سنيا او شيعيا او درزيا ان يحصل هذا في ايام الحرب؟ هل يقبل اي عربي سواء 
كان مسلما او مسيحيا سنيا او شيعيا ان يعمل رئيس حكومة لبنان على قطع خطوط الامداد للمقاومة التي كانت تخوض 
دفاع عن لبنان وعن الامة؟ فقط لانه سني يجب ان اسكت عنه لو كان شيعيا لذكرته منذ اليوم الاول. سوف معركة ال
يخرج غدا رئيس الحكومة الساقطة شعبيا ليقول: السيد حسن يتجنى علي. انا اقبل بلجنة تحقيق والشهود احياء، من 
ما زالوا على قيد الحياة. ولكن الاهم والاخطر، نحن في ارسلتهم ليتوسطوا لديه في الليل من اجل ان يجمد هذا القرار، 
لبنان ندفع الضرائب للحكومة وهي بدورها تدفع رواتب الموظفين في المؤسسات العسكرية والامنية و المدنية و تدفع 
ان تبني  ةالموازانات وتشتري التجهيزات، من المفترض ان الاموال التي يدفعها الشعب اللبناني و تبني بها اجهزة امني
اللبنانيين وحماية امنهم وممتلكاتهم والدفاع عنهم، في الحرب كان من المفترض ان تعمل  الاجهزة الامنية لحماية
الاجهزة الامنية التابعة للفريق الحاكم على ملاحقة الجواسيس و الشبكات الاسرتئيلية التي كانت تقدم المعلومات 
سف الشديد اقول لكم،وانا حاضر ايضا للجنة تحقيق مستقلة ومحايدة، ان احد للا سرائيليين ليقوموا بالقصف، ولكنللا
الحاكم كان يعمل في فترة الحرب للبحث عن اماكن قيادات حزب الله  ة الامنية الرسمية التابع للفريقالاجهز
ت اتواجد فيه انا لتشخيصها، وقد عملت مجموعة من هذا الجهاز الامني الرسمي للاسف الشديد لتحديد المكان الذي كن




اكتفي بهذا المقدار عن الحرب، ولو اردت ان استمر سواء قبل الاخوة والرفاق في المعارضة او لم يقبلوا، لو لم نكن 
حريصين على هذا الوطن، لو لم نكن مدركين للحساسيات المذهبية و الطائفية لوقفت في الرابع عشر من اب ليس 
 . لكن مع كل الذي قلته لكم، وهناعن حكومة وحدة وطنية وانما لاتحدث عن خونة يجب ان يحاكموا في لبنان لاتحدث
يتفاجا العالم وتتفاجئون، نحن ابناء هذه القيم مهذه الثقافة ثقافة الحرص على الوحدة، ثقافة التسامح و ثقافة المحبة، انا 
ساب. اليوم وايضا حرصا على الحساسيات المذهبية، قبل اشهر اعتقلت اسامحهم واذا ارادوا ان يحاسوني انا جاهز للح
مجموعة للاسف انها كانت تنتمي الى جهة اصولية سنية وكانت تخطط لاغتيالي، وقام الكثيرون من عمائم وغير 
لم يحسم  عمائم وطعنوا في هذه المسالة وانا سامحتهم، وقلت انني اسقط حقي. ما زالوا في السجن امام القضاء الذي
مسالتهم حتى الان ولا اعرف لماذا، ولكن انا اطلب من القضاء اللبناني ان يطلق اعضاء هذه المجموعة التي كانت 
تخطط لاغتيالي وان تعيدهم الى بيوتهم في بيروت وفي الطريق الجديدة وسامحهم الله جميعا. مجددا اخاطبهم، اخاطب 
ترهبونا بالشغب ولن تستطيعوا ان تمنعوا الناس من المجئ الى ساحتي الفريق الحاكم المستاثر: لن تستطيعوا ان 
عف ولا وهن لان رياض الصلح و الشهداء، لن تستطيعوا جرنا الى الفتنة المذهبية، لن تسمعوا صرخة استسلام ولا ض
صلحتكم، ابدا، فهذا زلنا نقول لكم، تعالوا لنقيم حكومة وحدة وطنية، واقول لكم: الوقت لا يلعب لم مطالبنا محقة. ما
سيدكم في البيت الابيض ترتجف اعصابه ويتهاوى في كل مكان. تعالوا لنعود الى بعضنا البعض كلبنانيين، لا مكان 
للعناد، الفرصة ما زالت متاحة وابواب التفاوض ما زالت قائمة ولا زلنا نقبل في المعارضة، لم نقل ان مطلبنا الوحيد 
الوا نحول الحكومة الحالية الى حكومة وحدة وطنية، الحكومة التي يراسها فؤاد السنيورة، هو اسقاط الحكومة، قلنا تع
ولكم فيها الاغلبية وللمعارضة ثلث ضامن من اجل ان نضمن لبنان. لكن اذا اصريتم على العناد ورفضتم، نحن الان 
اجد منكم. بعد مدة لن نقبل سيتحول في المعارضة بدانا ندرس خيارا اخرا، بعد مدة لن نقبل حكومة وطنية يراسها 
هدفنا الى اسقاط هذه الحكومة وتشكيل حكومة انتقالية تجري انتخابات نيابية مبكرة وانتم تعرفون لمن الاكثرية ولمن 
على عجل بقانون ظالم وبتحالفات المخادعة، في الانتخابات المقبلة لن  اخذتم الاكثرية 5002في انتخابات الغلبة. 
للخداع لان المؤمن لا يلدغ من جحر مرتين. بعد الانتخابات المبكرة ستكون المعارضة اكثرية وستشكل يكون مكان 
حكومتها وسيرأس حكومتها شخصية سنية وطنية شريفة نظيفة نزيهة يعرف العالم كله نزاهتها. وهؤلاء السنة 
لكن لن نلغيكم ولن نشطبكم، سنعطيكم في الوطنيون في لبنان كثر القادرون على تحمل مواقع قيادية من هذا النوع. و
الحد الادنى، انا اوافق ان نعطيكم الثلث الضامن ونشارككم لاننا نؤمن ان لبنان بلد الشراكة والمشاركة والتوافق 
 والتعاون. 
 
ذا ايها الاخوة والاخوات، لتعبير عن استمرارنا في هذا  التحرك السلمي الحضاري، انا ادعوكم الليلة، يعني في ه
النداء وفي هذا الخطاب. طبعا، ادعوا المسلمين بالتحديد للمشاركة غدا في صلاة الجمعة التي ستقام في ساحاتكم ، 
ساحات الشرف والمقاومة السياسية الحقيقية وليس المزيفة او المدعاة. ادعوكم الى المشاركة في صلاة الجمعة التي 
فتنة و التفرقة بامامة سماحة العلامة الشيخ الدكتور فتحي يكن. ستعبر عن وحدتنا وتلاحمنا في وجه كل اشكال ال
واقول للمصلين من المسلمين الشيعة، باعتبار اننا عادة نصلي الظهر غالبا، ان صلاة الجمعة هذه تجزئكم عن صلاة 
ل من الظهر ويمكنكم بعدها  ان تصلوا صلاة العصر وتكفيكم. هذا تفصيل فقهي على كل حال. ادعوكم وادعوا ك
يستمع الى اوسع مشاركة في صلاة الجمعة هذه لانها عبادة لله الواحد الاحد، لانها تعبير نريد ان نوجهه لكل اولئك 
الذين يتربصون بنا. من اجل الفتنة والتفرقة والتصارع. قد تجدون ارضا للفتنة و الحرب الاهلية في مكان ما في 
ل بين الشيعة والسنة. والامر الثاني، ادعوكم وادعوا كل المشاهدين العالم. لكن في لبنان لن، لن يكون هناك قتا
عصرا لتجديد التعبير عن الموقف و  3والمستمعين الي، المشاركة في الحشد الجماهيري الكبير يوم الاحد في الساعة 
قول لهم الاحد عصرا لتاكيد الحضور الشعبي والاصرار الشعبي للمعارضة الوطنية اللبنانية و نقول لهم في كل ليلة سن
سيسمعوننا في كل قصور الفريق الحاكم من الساحات، من بيوت الفقراء من الاكواخ من الخيم من البيوت المهدمة من 
احياء المهاجرين بالفقر والهجرين بالحرب. سنسمعهم صوتنا في المعارضة الوطنية اللبنانية لن نستسلم سوف نبقى في 
ى نقيم حكومة الوحدة الوطنية اللبنانية الضامنة للبنان لكل اللبنانيين، المنقذة  للبنان، الساحات سنبقى في الساحات حت
المدافعة عن لبنان التي تعالج ازماته الاقتصادية و السياسية والاجتماعية. لنسمعهم باننا مصرون على الهدف 
ئف، من كل المذاهب، من كل وسنواصل الطريق مهما كانت التضحيات. ايها الاخوة و الاخوات، من كل الطوا
الاحزاب، من كل التيارات. انتم منتصرون حكما. وكما قلت لكم في الدعوى، كما كنت اعدكم بالنصر دائما، اعدكم 
بالنصر مجددا. هم يواصلون حرب تموز واب ونحن نواصل  معركتنا في الدفاع عن هوية لبنان ووحدة لبنان وسلامة 

















 9002/5/51في   في حفل تخريج طلاب الجامعة
 
أعوذ بالله من الشيطان الرجيم بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم والحمد لله رب العالمين والصلاة والسلام على أشرف الخلق 
سيدنا ونبينا وحبيب قلوبنا أبي القاسم محمد بن عبد الله وعلى آله الطيبين الطاهرين وأصحابه   وأعز المرسلين
 المنتجبين.
. في هذا الحفل المبارك و في هذا الزمان بالتحديد تتعدد العناوين والقضايا، ولكنني في السلام عليكم رحمة الله وبركاته
 في اتجاه معين.هذا الحفل بمناسبته وطبيعته، اود ان اتحدث  
 
هناك قضايا على درجة عالية من الاهمية سوف اتحدث عنها يوم الاثنين ليلا ان شاء الله ,عبر شاشة المنار, في 
مناسبة النكبة ,التي حلت بهذه الامة عندما وقعت فلسطين فريسة الاحتلال والاغتصاب. والحديث عن النكبة 
الحديث عن الشبكات الاسرائيلية في لبنان وكل ما يرتبط بهذا الشأن والمناورات الاسرائيلية وواجباتنا تجاهها، 
الاسرائيلي لن اتحدث عنه اليوم, وانما اتركه الى يوم الاثنين كما وعدت سابقا. وطبيعة هذا الحديث في موضوع النكبة 
ال جماهيري، , في موضوع المناورات, في موضوع الشبكات هو اقرب للحديث في رسالة تلفزيونية منه في احتف
فالكثيرون ينظرون إلى  لأنني أريد اليوم ان اتحدث اليكم وان اخطب فيكم ليس على طريقة الرسالة التلفزيونية,
الرسالة التلفزيونية ويقولون السيد "كتير رايق", لكن عندما اخطب يقولون "السيد معصب"، لا حين أخطب أكون 
ق"، لكل مقام مقال. طبيعة الرسالة التلفزيونية تختلف عن الخطاب في معصبا ولا في الرسالة التلفزيونية أكون "راي
 حشد جماهيري. 
 
اليوم أريد ان أتحدث عنكم، عن دفعة الرضوان,عن الاخوة والاخوات والاهل، وعن لبنان عن الشأن اللبناني ونحن 
 ايار.  7ايار وعن  71عن في مرحلة مهمة جدا، فيما يرتبط بالانتخابات ,وأنهي الحديث في وقفة لا بد منها 
أولا أود أن أتوجه بالتبريك الى جميع الاخوة والأخوات الخريجين الذين نحتفي بهم اليوم. ابارك لهم نجاحهم , ابارك 
لهم انجازهم العلمي الذي كان حصيلة عزم وإرادة ونية وجدية ودأب وتعب وجهد وجهاد، والجلوس على مقاعد 
لديني ,هو جهاد في سبيل الله عز وجل,وان الملائكة وكما جاء في بعض الاحاديث الدراسة,في فهمنا الاسلامي ا
الشريفة ,لتضع اجنحتها لطالب العلم. وأعلن باسم اخواني واخواتكم في مسيرة حزب الله,افتخارنا بكم واود ان اتوجه 
,الآباء والامهات ,الذين اصروا  بالشكر والتقدير العاليين,الى الاهل الكرام الآباء والامهات كما في كل حفل تخرج
ودعموا مواصلة ابنائهم وبناتهم,للتحصيل العلمي ,في المراحل الجامعية والتخصصية وتحملوا أعباء هذا القرار, 
ونحن نعرف ان الاغلبية الساحقة من اللبنانيين ومن العائلات اللبنانية تعيش شظف العيش وعلى خط الفقر وكثير منهم 
ذلك نجد ان الآباء والامهات يبذلون جهودا ويتحملون الكثير من الاعباء والتبعات ليوفروا لأبنائهم  تحت خط الفقر, مع
فرصة التعلم والتخصص, وفرصة الصناعة الحقيقية للمستقبل. انا انحني اجلالا أمام الآباء والامهات المجاهدين في 
والكد على العيال ليس من اجل ملء بطونهم إبعادا عن  سبيل الله ايضا لان الكاد على عياله كالمجاهد في سبيل الله،
الجوع, وانما الكاد على عياله ليطعمهم وليعلمهم وليرفع شأنهم وليبني لهم دنياهم ويصون لهم آخرتهم مجاهد في سبيل 
لله ان هناك الله. هناك شريحة يجب ان اتوجه لها بالشكر, عادة لا يتم الالتفات اليها هي شريحة الازواج لانه والحمد 
ظاهرة واضحة ولذلك هذا يمكن ان يفسر جوانبه ان عدد الاخوات اكبر من عدد الاخوة 'هناك شريحة في ظاهرة جيدة 
انه حتى بعد الزواج ,الكثير من الازواج يسمحون لزوجاتهم ان يواصلوا الدراسة , وطبعا الزوجة التي تواصل 
اء ,على الزوج وعلى البيت لكننا الحمد لله تعالى, نجد ان هذه الظاهرة الدراسة الجامعية ,هذا امر يرتب نوع من الاعب
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تنتشر وتكبر في محيطنا وفي بيئتنا وهي ظاهرة طيبة جدا ,كذلك الزوجات اللاتي يساعدنا ازواجهن على المضي في 
ن هذا النوع ,ولذلك الدراسة بالرغم من تكوين البيت الزوجي، هذا التعاون والتحمل المشترك يؤدي الى نتائج طيبة م
انا اريد ان اخصص اليوم شكرا خاصا للازواج الذين سهلوا لازواجهم او زوجاتهن, فرصة مواصلة الدراسة 
 والتحصيل العلمي ,بالرغم من كل التبعات المترتبة على ذلك. 
 
غنية الحاج رضوان رحمة ايها الاخوة والاخوات , تحمل دفعتكم اسم الرضوان ,اسم الشهيد القائد الحبيب الحاج عماد م
الله عليه. وانا هنا اريد ان أشير الى امر لا يعرفه الكثير من الناس, وهو ان الحاج رحمة الله عليه, طوال توليه 
المسؤولية الجهادية والقيادية الملقاة عليه كان دائما يشجع الاخوة المجاهدين ,الذين يعملون تحت إمرته, على ان لا 
ان يحمل هذا الهم وانا اعرف انه سعى وكان يسعى دائما لتأمين الامكانات المالية والتسهيلات يتركوا الدراسة, وك
التنظمية لتواصل اعداد كبيرة من اخواننا واخواتنا فرص التحصيل الجامعي وهذا ليس مجرد رغبة شخصية وانما 
المقاومة ,لان مقاومتنا ايها الاخوة  كان مبنيا على رؤية استراتيجية, هذه الرؤية التي جسدتها المقاومة , وحركة
والاخوات , مند انطلاقتها الى اليوم , صحيح كانت مقاومة العلم والايمان ومقاومة الارادة والعزم ,والتصميم 
والتضحية , ولكنها ايضا كانت مقاومة العلم والمعرفة والتخصص والعقول الذكية, هذا ما اعترف لنا به أعداؤنا في 
وفي اكثر من ميدان , في المواجهة ,وفي الحرب الامنية والنفسية ,والقتال العسكري, وفي تطوير  ساحات المعركة
الامكانات وفي تطوير التكتيكات ,وصولا الى تكوين مدرسة عسكرية قتالية خاصة لا شرقية ولا غربية وانما مدرسة 
فان حملكم لهذا العنوان، هو عز لكم ,وفخر لكم , المقاومة الاسلامية في لبنان التي صنعها مجاهدون من لبنان. ولذلك، 
كما ان القائد رضوان في عليائه يعتز بكم ويفتخر بكم عندما تعلنون اسمه وتواصلون دربه وتجددون العهد مع دمه 
 الطاهر وكل الشهداء الذين مضوا. 
 
لمسيرة المؤمنة المجاهدة, يقدم اليوم ايها الاخوة والاخوات هذا العدد الكبير من المتخرجين والمتخرجات,من قلب هذه ا
للبنان وللعالم وجها من الوجوه الحقيقية لهذه المسيرة , وجها مشرقا من الوجوه المشرقة التي تعبر عن مسيرة المقاومة 
في لبنان وعن ايمانها وعن انسانيتها وعن وطنيتها وعن صدقها وإخلاصها، وعن جدها واجتهادها، وعن علمها 
سعيها وأملها الكبير بالمستقبل المؤمن، انتم تقدمون اليوم للعالم صورة المؤمن الذي لا يقعده الفقر وعملها، وعن 
والفاقة والحرمان عن طلب العلم وعن النجاح وعن التقدم، وصورة المؤمن الذي لا تقعده القلة، لا قلة العدد ولا قلة 
ة والحرية، وصورة المؤمن الذي أقصى ما يتطلع إليه هو الناصر ولا ضعف العدة عن الجهاد والمقاومة طلبا ًللكرام
تحقيق العدل بين الناس والابتسامة التي يحلم أن ترتفع على شفاه الناس جميعا، والبهجة التي يحلم أن تغمر قلوب 
 الناس جميعا، وهذا كان هدف الأنبياء طوال التاريخ. 
أولئك الذين يشككون بقدرة قوى المعارضة على إدارة لبنان  أنتم اليوم أيضا تقدمون مشهدا قويا ورسالة واضحة لكل
في كل المجالات وفي كل الاختصاصات، ويراهنون على فشل قوى المعارضة في إدارة شؤون البلد، ويقولون إذا 
فازت المعارضة بالأكثرية لا نريد أن نشاركها، ليس زهدا ًولا تعفاف، وإنما مراهنة على الفشل، أقول لكل أولئك 
المراهنين، نحن نحب أن تشاركونا لأننا دعاة شراكة، ولكن لو أردتم أن لا تشاركونا إن فزنا بالأكثرية فلن نتوسل 
إليكم، وإذا كنتم تراهنون على فشلنا أو فشل المعارضة، الجواب هو فقط، وهذه حفلة من الحفلات ومرحلة من 
م إن العقول والقلوب والنفوس والإرادات والعزائم خريجا وخريجة في كل الاختصاصات، أقول لك 3882المراحل، 
التي هزمت أقوى جيش وأقوى دولة في هذه المنطقة يدعمها أقوى جبار في هذا العالم هي أقدر على أن تدير بلد مئة 
كلم  25401مرة أكبر من لبنان. هناك أناس يتهموننا أننا نريد أن نقيم أمبراطورية في المنطقة فهل سيعصى علينا 
 ربع. م
وكما استطعنا بعقول لبنانية وقلوب لبنانية وإرادات لبنانية وتضحيات لبنانية أن نحرر أرضنا وأسرانا وأن نحمي بلدنا، 
 نحن قادرون إن شاء الله بل الأقدر إن شاء الله على أن نبني بلدنا ووطننا وأن نعلي البنيان. 
 
جديدة ويجب ان نتحمل فيها المسؤولية كاملة وليس من بعيد ولا اليوم، أتوجه إليكم لأقول، نعم، نحن معنيون بمرحلة 
مجانبة، مسؤولية ان نبني بلدنا أن نبني وطننا وان نبني الدولة القوية العادلة لان القوة بلا عدل خراب وديكتاتورية 
بنائه وعائلاته، متساويين ومدعاة ظلم، ولأن العدل بلا قوة لا حامي له ولا منفذ له. نحن نتطلع الى لبنان وطنا ًلجميع أ
في الحقوق والواجبات، وطن فيه شعب واحد ودولة واحدة، شعب واحد هو الشعب اللبناني ويجب أن نتخلص في 
العلن وفي السر عن أي حديث عن شعوب لبنانية، نحن شعب لبناني واحد وليس لدينا عقدة من الحديث عن تعددية 
نخب والمثقفين والمفكرين يقومون بسجالات طويلة هل أن ما عندنا هو حضارية أو ثقافية.في الماضي كان بعض ال
تعدد أو تنوع؟ لا خلاف في الاصطلاح، أساسا التعدد أو التنوع الثقافي والحضاري والديني والفكري هو نعمة ورحمة 
 طننا. ويمكن أن نحوله بأيدينا إلى أهم عنصر من عناصر القوة في وطننا وفي العالم أيضا انطلاقا من و
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نحن شعب واحد في ارض واحدة نتكلم لغة واحدة ولدينا مصالح واحدة في الامن والاستقرار والحرية والسيادة 
والاستقلال والرفاه الاجتماعي والعلم والتربية والاقتصاد والمال وكل شأن حياتي كأفراد وعائلات وأحزاب وفئات 
ختلف في التعبير عن هذه المصالح أو في تشخيص هذه وطوائف ومناطق، نحن مصالحنا واحدة في العمق، قد ن
المصالح، ونحن شعب واحد يجب أن ننتهي فيه من روح النوعية والكمية، اليوم، العلم عندنا عابر للطوائف، والفقر 
عندنا عبر للطوائف، والشرف والكرامة عندنا عابرة للطوائف، والعمالة والخيانة للأسف الشديد أيضا عابرة 
. يجب أن ننتهي من مقولة النوعية والكمية وأن ننظر إلى شعبنا على أنه شعب واحد، وإن كان هناك من للطوائف
تمزقات معينة أو افتراقات حادة معينة، يجب أن نعمل جميعا ًبالتضافر والتعاون من أجل معالجة هذه الافتراقات أو 
 التمزقات. 
 
نتطلع الى لبنان بلدا ًواحدا،ً أرضا واحدة، كما تحدثت عن وحدة الشعب، وحدة الأرض ووحدة الدولة، ولذلك نحن في 
حزب الله دائما رفضنا تقسيم لبنان وسنقاوم أي فكرة عن تقسيم لبنان قد تخطر في بال أحد اليوم أو في المستقبل. 
هانات الإقليمية والدولية أن هناك من يفكر بالتقسيم، ولكن أقول لكم والحمد لله الآن بعد فشل كل مشاريع التقسيم والر
بصراحة، هناك صنو للتقسيم ما زال يدغدغ عقول بعض الجهات السياسية في لبنان، وأنا أعلم أن هذه ليست مجرد 
لفدرالية، أحلام وإنما آمال يتحدث عنها في بعض المجالس الخاصة والداخلية ويخطط للوصول اليها، وهي موضوع ا
هذا لن يكون له مجال في لبنان، نحن نريد لبنان بلدا واحدا شعبا واحدا أرضا واحدة ودولة واحدة ونظاما واحدا، 
ولبنان لا يتحمل أي صيغة من صيغ الفيدرالية التي لا نرى فيهاإلا خطوة على طريق التقسيم. من الجميل أن بعض 
 ل الفدرالية. الذين يتهموننا بالمثالثة هم يعملون من أج
 
أيضا ًنتطلع إلى لبنان وطنا ًلبنانيا ًبامتياز ولكن بلا عنصرية، بلا أحاسيس تفوق عنصري ليس لها أساس لا من عقل 
ولا من قانون ولا من قيم تجاه المحيط الذي نعيش فيه، وبالتحديد تجاه المحيط العربي، أو اتجاهه بعضنا البعض، 
  أكثر من الآخر. ليأتي بعضنا ويصنف نفسه لبنانياً 
 
نتطلع إلى لبنان وطنا ًعربي الانتماء، عربيا،ً ولكن بدون عصبية، لأن العنصرية والعصبية جاهلية لا تنتمي إلى العقل 
 والدين والمعرفة والانسانية بصلة. 
 
ولكنهم قد يختلفون في فيما يعني الدولة والنظام، في كثير من هذه العناوين، لا أعتقد أن اللبنانيين لديهم خلاف حولها، 
ترجمتها أو في وسائل وطرق تحقيقها. نحن في النظام السياسي طرحنا في برنامجنا أننا ندعوا ، كما ورد في اتفاق 
الطائف، إلى تشكيل الهيئة الوطنية العليا لإلغاء الطائفية السياسية. نحن كنا دقيقين في برنامجنا السياسي الانتخابي، لم 
اننا نريد الغاء الطائفية السياسية، هناك شيء في الطائف لم يتقرب إليه أحد بعد، اسمه تشكيل هيئة نقل في البرنامج 
وطنية عليا لإلغاء الطائفية السياسية، ما نطالب به هو تشكيل هذه الهيئة العليا التي عليها ان تجلس وتدرس، بغض 
د ان نستمر بالصيغة الطائفية؟ إذا كانت النتيجة النظر عن الوقت الذي تحتاجه ولو طال لسنوات، ما اذا كنا نري
الاستمرار، فلنستمر وحينئذ هناك بعض التطوير والتحسين والمعالجات يمكن مناقشتها والتوافق حولها، أما إذا وصلنا 
نضع خطة إلى نتائج في الهيئة الوطنية العليا لإلغاء الطائفية السياسية أنّنا يجب أن نلغي الطائفية من نظامنا حينئذ 
لإلغاء الطائفية وتنظيم البديل الذي ينبغي أن نتوافق عليه، في هذه النقطة بالتحديد نحن لا ندعو إلى أي استعجال، كما 
أننا لا ندعو إلى فرض خيارات لبعض اللبنانيين على البعض الآخر وإنما أي تعديل جوهري في النظام يجب أن يقوم 
قي وعميق وتوافق وطني جدي، لأّن الإستعجال أو التعاطي بغلبة إرادة على اساس حوار وطني ونقاش وطني حقي
على إرادات فيما يتعلق بجوهر النظام قد تكون تداعياته ونتائجه أخطر بكثير من بقاء النظام بصيغته الحالية وبرغم 
 كل السلبيات التي نتفق عليها، هذه نقطة. 
 
أريد أّن أدافع عن حزب الله، أنا أؤكد لكم أننا منذ تأسيسنا ندعم قيام  نقطة أخرى، نحن نتطلع إلى دولة واحدة، وأنا لا
دولة واحدة، ولذلك وعلى مدى كل السنين الماضية لم نمارس أي سلطة فيما يسمى، بين هلالين، مناطق النفوذ، حتى 
لسنا بديلا عن الدولة بعد تحرير الشريط الحدودي، أنا وقفت في مدينة بنت جبيل في مثل الأيام القادمة وقلت نحن 
وعن السلطة، ليس لدينا قضاء ولا نريد أن نحاسب الناس حتى العملاء الذين قتلونا وسفكوا دماءنا وظلمونا وسجنونا 
وجلدوا ظهورنا وهدموا بيوتنا، (تركناهم لكي) تحاسبهم الدولة اللبنانية. ولكن نحن لم نعرض أنفسنا في يوم من الايام 
يما في تاريخ العقود الثلاثة الماضية غيرنا ِممَّ ن يزايد علينا بالحديث عن الدولة الواحدة مارس لا دولة ولا سلطة، ف
الدولة ومارس الكانتون ومارس السلطة المحلية ونحن لم نفعل ذلك في يوم من الأيام،والآن نحن لا نفعل ذلك في أي 




نحن مع الدولة الواحدة الدولة المقتدرة والدولة التي لديها حكومة قوية ومجلس نيابي قوي ولائق ومناسب ومعبر عن 
إرادات الشعب اللبناني، وسلطة قضائية مستقلة وقوية وجيش قوي وأجهزة أمنية قوية، وفي هذا لا نختلف مع 
ك نقطة هي نقطة الخلاف مع الآخرين هي مسألة المقاومة وسلاح المقاومة والإستراتيجية الدفاعية الآخرين، نعم هنا
وهذه نقطة يوجد فيها الكثير من الجدال والنقاش ولكن نحن لا زلنا لا نرى وسنناقش هذا الأمر وما زلنا نناقش هذا 
ي منافات بين أّن يكون للبنان مقاومة قوية الأمر، وبالنظر إلى كل ما يجري حولنا من تطورات نقول ليس هناك أ
ودولة قوية، والدولة القوية هي التي يمكن أن توصل لبنان إلى المرحلة التي تقول فيها حتى للمقاومة هناك دولة قادرة 
على حماية أرضها وشعبها وأمنها واستقرارها وأنتم أيّها المقاومة عودوا إلى مقاعد دراستكم وعودوا إلى مصانعكم 
 وحقولكم وإلى حياتكم الطبيعية، وهذا هو الطريق الطبيعي. 
 
في هذا السياق أيضا، نحن نتطلع إلى دولة تمارس إصلاحا إداريا حقيقا، إدارة جيدة فاعلة منتجة بعيدة عن الفساد 
عصري  والرشوة، ندعو إلى تطبيق نظام اللامركزية الإدارية كما ورد في اتفاق الطائف، ندعو إلى قانون انتخاب
يتيح أفضل تمثيل لشرائح الناس ونحن قلبا وقالبا مع قانون يعتمد على التمثيل النسبي، نحن ندعو إلى دولة قادرة على 
معالجة الأزمات الإجتماعية والمعيشية وتعطي هذه الأزمات أولوية حقيقية وجدية وليس كما كنا نشهد خلال كل 
سألة الإنماء المتوازن، والذي نعتقد أّن شرطه الطبيعي هو إعادة السنوات الماضية، ندعو على دولة صادقة في م
العمل بوزارة للتخطيط تضع قدرات وإمكانات وحاجيات لبنان في نظرة شاملة واحدة وتخطط بنظرة واحدة وتضع 
ق العمل آليات تنفيذ تراعي هذا التوازن الكمي والنوعي، ولذلك اقول للإخوة والأخوان الخريجين أنتم أمام تحٍد سو
وتحدي فرص العمل والإستفادة من الشهادات والإختصاصات التي حصلتم عليها، أمامنا طريقان : الطريق الشخصي 
والجزئي هو أن يفكر كل واحد منا كيف يوفر وظيفة لولده أو ابنته من خلال جمعية أو مؤسسة أو زعيم أو حزب أو 
المستقبل القريب تضع نصب عينيها آلام وجوع وفقر الناس جهة، والطريقة الأخرى هي أن تكون لدينا حكومة في 
ومشكلة البطالة، "ومش نقضيها اربع خمس سنين" بصراع سياسي على عناوين هم كانوا يعرفون من البداية أنه لو 
 استخدموا كل الوسائل السياسية والأمنية والعسكرية والإعلامية سيفشلون في تحقيق أّي ٍمنها. 
 
في إيجاد حكومة جادة ومخلصة وصادقة وحكومة من سنخ الناس ومن بينهم ومن جوعهم ومن نتطلع أن نساعد 
حرمانهم حتى تضع حلولا جادة وصادقة في المسألة الإنمائية والإجتماعية والمالية والإقتصادية وفي مسألة العمل، 
ة الرسمية وغير الرسمية. ما هو أيضا نتطلع إلى سلطة قضائية قوية ومستقلة عن سياسيين وعن كل المواقع السياسي
موجود لدينا في لبنان ليس سلطة قضائية حتى لو مجلس القضاء الأعلى يقول هذا، ليس لدينا سلطة قضائية على 
الإطلاق، لدينا قضاة فيهم النزيه الآدمي وفيهم الفاسد، فيهم الحر المستقل بضميره وقراره وفيهم المرتهن والتابع، وإلاّ 
قولي لي ما هي صورة القضاء الذي يعاقب عملاء الصهاينة الذين عملوا وتعاملوا مع إسرائيل  عودا على بدء،
لعشرات السنين وارتكبوا بحق وطنهم الخيانة العظمي ما هو هذا القضاء ومن هو هذا القضاء الذي يشهر هؤلاء شهر 
هو هذا القضاء الذي يزج بأربع  أو ستة أشهر أو سنة ثّم يطلق سراحهم ليعود بعضهم إلى شبكات التجسس، ومن
ضباط كبار ثلاث سنوات وثمانية أشهر في السجن بلا تحقيق وبلا دليل هل هذا قضاء مستقل أو نزيه؟ هذا عيب أن 
من يتعامل مع إسرائيل سنوات طويلة يدخل السجن شهرين أو اثنين أو ثلاثة ويخرج، ونحن منذ البداية تعهدنا أن نسلّم 
اللبناني ولم نفعل كما فعلته أي مقاومة في التاريخ، كل مقاومات التاريخ أقامت محاكما ميدانية هؤلاء إلى القضاء 
وعاقبت العملاء والخونة من أبناء وطنها إلا ّالمقاومة في لبنان، وأنا قلت في تلك الأيام للسفير الفرنسي بعد زيارة 
دما وصف حزب الله بأنه حزب ارهابي وبعد ذلك جوسبان لفلسطين المحتلة وما جرى عليه في جامعة بير زيت، عن
بأشهر قليلة حصل التحرير وكنت قد قرأت عن المقاومة الفرنسية، قلت للسفير الفرنسي في ذلك الوقت أبلغ رئيس 
حكومتك سلامي وقل له أّن مقاومتنا في لبنان أكثر حضارية وإنسانية وأخلاقية من المقاومة الفرنسية، لأنكم أقمتم 
ميدانية وبدون محاكمات أحيانا قتلتم عشرة آلاف عميل فرنسي بتهمة التعاون مع الجيش النازي ونحن لم نقتل محاكما 
 حتى دجاجة من جيش انطوان لحد. 
 
آذار ليقول هذا القضاء كان بزمن الوصاية والإدارة السورية،  41وثقنا بالدولة والقضاء، وهنا قد يخرج أحد من 
لقضاء في هذا الزمن في وصايتكم يتصرف نفس الأمر، سلمنا العملاء للقضاء وتعهدنا أن القضاء في أي زمن وهذا ا
نقبل بحكم القضاء اللبناني وأن لا نمس بهؤلاء العملاء، وكثيرا منهم عادوا إلى قراهم وبيوتهم، وأنا أقول لكم الآن 
بالوسائل المعتمدة. نحن نتطلع إلى سلطة نحن عند تعهدنا ولا يجوز أن يمس أحد بأحد من هؤلاء إلا ّإذا ثبت تورطه 




نحن من دعاة الشراكة في السلطة وتعاون مختلف مكونات أو ممثلي مكونات الشعب اللبناني في إدارة شؤون البلد، 
ه التجربة ليست فاشلة، هم يعملون على تقديمها كتجربة فاشلة، إّما أن ولذلك نحن من دعاة حكومة الوحدة الوطنية وهذ
تخضع لإرادتهم أو تكون الحكومة فاشلة وهذه المعادلة التي يعملون عليها هذه الأيام. هذه الحكومة حكومة وحدة 
حكومة تتجاهل وطنية إذا تصرفت الأطراف بقناعة وإخلاص لن تكون حكومة فاشلة بل هي الأفضل للبنان، لأّن أي 
مكونات أساسية من الشعب اللبناني تحت عنوان أننا حصلنا على أغلبية بنصف زائد نائب أو نائبين هذا لا يصلح في 
لبنان لا من قبل المعارضة ولا من قبل الموالاة، إذا كنّا جميعا نقول أّن للبنان خصوصية يجب أن نعمل بمستلزمات 
صية فلنذهب من الآن لنناقش، تريدون ديموقراطية فلتكن ديموقراطية كاملة هذه الخصوصية، وإذا لم يكن فيه خصو
وأفضل صيغة للديموقراطية الكاملة التي يمكن أن تؤدي إلى حكم ديموقراطي في لبنان هو أن ينبثق مجلس نيابي عن 
  انتخابات ديموقراطية على أساس قانون انتخابات نسبي يكون فيه لبنان دائرة انتخابية واحدة.
 
نحن نقبل بالديموقراطية الكاملة، أّما إذا كنّا لا نذهب إلى الديموقراطية الكاملة لأنها تمس بخصوصيات الطائفية أو 
المذهبية أو المناطقية اللبنانية إذا يجب أن نراعي في تشكيل سلطتنا هذه الخصوصيات من خلال الشراكة وعدم إلغاء 
ل والتي يقولون عنها أن تعطل البلد وهي ليست معطلة للبلد، أنا أدعو احد على الإطلاق. أّما قصة الثلث المعط
خصوصا الإخوة في تيار المستقبل أن يراجعوا من واجب تجربة الرئيس الشهيدة رفيق الحريري وأن يسألوا كل 
بل المقربين منه عن معاناته في تشكيل الحكومات التي كان يتراسها وعن السبب في عدم ترؤسه لآخر حكومة ق
اغتياله، سيجدون أّن السبب ـ وهذا الموضوع جرى نقاش فيه بيني وبين الرئيس الحريري في اللقاءات المطولة خلال 
أشهر قبل استشهاده ـ كان يقول لي : "أنا إذا ما بيكون لي ثلث الوزراء في الحكومة لألي وأن مسميهم ومتل ما بدو 
لوا الحكومة "اللي بدون ياها". ولذلك كان دائما في الحكومات بيمشي" فلن أشكل حكومة ولن أترأس حكومة وليشك
التي ترأسها كان يسعى لأن يكون له ثلث الوزراء من مختلف الطوائف وعندما لم يتمكن من ذلك في آخر حكومة 
 اعتذر عن المشاركة في بيانه المعروف وتم تكليف دولة الرئيس عمر كرامي بتشكيل الحكومة حينها. 
 
قيقي خلف عدم تشكيل الرئيس الحريري لآخر حكومة هو أنّه لم يتمكن من تسمية ثلث الوزراء ويقدرون السبب الح
 على سؤال الأصدقاء والمقربين أن هذا الأمر طبيعي في البلد، أي أحد يريد أن يكون شريكا حقيقا 
 
لث الحكومة , المعارضة المتشكلة من أنا لا أقول ان حزب الله يريد ثلث الحكومة وإنما أقول المعارضة كانت تطالب بث
أطياف وتيارات متنوعة والتي كانت تمثل نصف الشعب اللبناني خلال السنوات الماضية , وهذا أمر طبيعي , اما 
العودة إلى نغمة المثالثة , انا أقول لكم ما هي قصة المثالثة , هذه فكرة هم اخترعوها "هم باضوها وهم عملوا منها 
رت ديك تتصيح على المنابر" هذه المثالثة , لا احد في المعارضة حكي عن المثالثة ولا احد فكر صوص وكبروها صا
بالمثالثة ولا احد فهمان ما هي المثالثة التي يتكلمون عنها , المثالثة يعني ماذا؟ مثالثة الطوائف, مثالثة مذاهب , مثالثة 
ون عن مثالثة ماذا تفهم ؟ أقول لك أنا والله لست افهم ما هو تحالفات سياسية , أنا كمواطن لبناني تقول لي هم يتكلم
قصدهم بالتحديد, في فرضيات عديدة بهذا الموضوع , هم طرحوا موضوع المثالثة فقد ليحولوا المعارضة إلى موقع 
وضعنا  الدفاع , وأنا أتمنى على قوى المعارضة وعلى الإخوة أيضا في حزب الله ان نطلع من هذه القصة, هم يريدون
بموضع دفاع , لماذا نجلس بكل خطاب نقول مثالثة لا , والمثالثة أبدا, يريدون وضعنا بموضع دفاع عن النفس , نحن 
لم نطرح هذا الموضوع والسلام , هذا ليس له أي أساس من الصحة , نعم انا أقول لكم هناك هدف اخر من طرح 
يوم عندما نقول مثلا انه في قوى سياسية معينة ان شيعة المثالثة هو التصويب على مسيحي المعارضة , لان ال
المعارضة على سبيل المثال يريدون مثالثة , هم يقصدون المثالثة الطائفية , وان لبنان اليوم مناصفة بين مسلمين 
و ومسيحيين ومثالثة يعني ثلث للشيعة وثلث للسنة وثلث للمسيحيين والدروز يكونوا ضمن حصة المسلمين في شكل أ
بآخر , طيب يمكن إذا أتيت وقلت للشيعة وتقول لهم أريد ان انقل لكم حصة من ضمن المناصفة إلى ثلث البلد , 
بالشراكة السياسية ما بيزعلوا , طيب شفافين اذن هذا يخدم المعارضة شيعيا, وإذا أتينا للسنة وتقول لهم انا أريد ان 
يخدم المعارضة السنية, وهم ليس كثير واضعين أعينهم على استهداف انقل لكم جزء من مناصفة إلى مثالثة , عال هذا 
المعارضة في هاتين الساحتين ولأسباب كثيرة. الموضوع للأساسي هو استهداف مسيحيي المعارضة, ومحاولة القول 
للمسيحيين في لبنان ان العماد عون والوزير فرنجية والوزير سكاف وشخصيات أخرى في المعارضة ولكن في 
لأخص العماد عون والتيار الوطني الحر وانه عمل صفقة مع حزب الله والمعارضة وهو راض بالمثالثة أي انه يريد ا
خفض حصتكم يا مسيحيين من النصف إلى الثلث , وهذا طبعا ليس أول ظلم ولن يكون أخر ظلم إعلامي وسياسي 
هذا كذب وليس له أي أساس من الصحة , لا العماد وانتخابي وإعلامي موجه إلى حلفائنا من مسيحيي المعارضة . لان 
عون فكر هكذا ولا مسيحيي المعارضة فكروا هكذا ولا احد جاء بسيرة هذا المعارضة ولا تناقشوا بهذا الموضوع , 
 وهو في جزين لم يقبل ثلثين بثلث , أتوا لاتهامه بالمثالثة . 
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وإنما يجب ان نكون واضحين فيه , نحن نعم من دعاة الشراكة إذن هذا الموضوع لا يجب ان نبقى فيه في موقع الدفاع 
وحضور الجميع وتطبيق اتفاق الطائف والعمل بهدوء على تطوير نظامنا السياسي على أساس تشكيل الهيئة الوطنية 
 العليا لإغاثة النظام السياسي لبحث إلغاء الطائفية السياسية . 
 
حمي نفسها وتحمي قرارها وأرضها وشعبها وأمنها , دون حاجة إلى قوات نحن أيضا نتطلع إلى دولة قادرة على ان ت
طوارئ دولية لا تقدم ولا تؤخر مع احترامنا إليهم هم ضيوفنا في جنوب لبنان ودون حاجتها إلى أجهزة أمنية خارجية 
لى هذا الأساس , وهنا ولدينا كلبنانيين من الكفاءات العسكرية والأمنية ما يمكن لبنان من ان يكون له قوة جديرة ع
أيار, من المحزن جدا ومن المؤسف جدا ان يصبح الذين  71أيضا احتراما للذاكرة ولذكرى الأيام القليلة المقبلة 
أيار , "نحنا اللبنانيين بنسونا بسرعة مش انو مننسى بسرعة أي بقدر ما في ضخ إعلامي ومشاكل  71ناهضوا اتفاقية 
أيار , الاتفاقية التي وقعها النظام  71نا بنسونا والا الناس ما بتنسى" , اتفاقية وهموم ومصائب تكركب على رؤوس
اللبناني في ذلك الحين من موقع الضعف والهزيمة والهوان والتي خضع لها لشروط إسرائيل الأمنية والعسكرية 
أيار ؟ من  71ئيل من خلال اتفاقية أيار ؟ من الذي كان يريد ان يلحق لبنان بإسرا 71والسياسية , من الذي وقع اتفاقية 
هي القيادات والقوى السياسية الضليعة في تلك المرحلة من محاولة تتويج لبنان بلدا تابعا وللأبد للمشروع الصهيوني؟ 
أيار؟ من علماء ورجال ونساء وخصوصا في بئر العبد في ذلك المسجد المبارك مسجد  71ومن الذي وقف في وجه 
أيار غير الشهيد محمد نجدي؟ من  71؟ من الذي سفك دمه ليعلن الرفض اللبناني الشعبي لاتفاقية الإمام الرضا (ع) 
 الذي قدم دمه ليكون لبنان مستقلا عن إسرائيل ؟ ومن الذي وقع بحبره اتفاقية الذل مع إسرائيل ؟ 
 
ة والحرية والذين قدموا دمائهم زكية اليوم الذين أرادوا إلحاق لبنان بإسرائيل والى الأبد هم رموز للاستقلال والسياد
من اجل تحرير لبنان هم عناوين للتبعية والعمالة والارتهان للخارج , أليس هذا ظلم تاريخي ؟ هل يجوز ان ننسى ذلك 
؟ الآن يطلعوا ويقولوا السيد يعود إلى لغة التخوين, هذا تاريخ, أنا لا اصدر أحكام, ويجب ان يبقى التاريخ حاضرا 
منه للمستقبل ليس لنثار من بعضنا البعض , وإنما حتى لا نضلل من جديد ولا نضيع من جديد ولا يباع بلدنا  لنستفيد
من جديد في أسواق النخاسة الدولية , نحن نريد دولة قوية عزيزة مقتدرة تستعيد أرضها بإرادتها وليس بالتوسل لا من 
 أمر جزئي بسيط.  عليها نتنياهو بإعادة قطعة ارض بموسم انتخابي , هذا
 
في مثل هذه الأيام كان شعبنا وكان أهلنا في جنوب لبنان الرجال والنساء قبل حملة البنادق يقتحمون الحواجز 
والأسلاك والمواقع القرى ويصنعوا معجزة التحرير التاريخية هذا هو لبنان الذي نتطلع إليه , وعلى هذا الأساس أيضا 
أشير إليها , نعم نحن نريد لبنان المتعاون لبنان المتآخي لبنان المتضافر , لبنان البعيد أصل إلى النقطة التي أحببت ان 
أيار نحن تبانينا في المعارضة بشكل او بآخر ان هذا  7عن النزاعات وعن الصراعات , قبل أيام قليلة كانت ذكرى 
سم انتخابي , والطرف الآخر للأسف الموضوع لا نثيره لان إثارته سيؤدي إلى المزيد من الحساسيات ونحن في مو
أيار وما زال, وأثار هذا الموضوع في كل وسائل الأعلام في كل المنابر وفي كل الخطب  7ايار وبعد 7الشديد قبل 
وأثار عاصفة غيار وكأنه اعتبر ان سكوتنا وعدم تعليقنا على تلك الحادثة كأنه إحساس بالخجل او إحساس بالضعف او 
نا في الحقيقة كما تبانينا في حزب الله لا ندخل في سجال ولكن وجدت من واجبي ان اعلق على هذا إحساس بالحرج , أ
أيار وحتى لا يحصل التباس لا في لبنان ولا في غير لبنان وحتى  7الأمر وفاء لدماء الشهداء الطاهرة التي سقطت في 
ولا أريد ان أتكلم في لغة فيها إثارة او إعادة تشنج ,  يقال بعض الحق في هذه المسالة , بناء عليه أنا أعيد في التذكير
أيار , بيكفي أن نأتي بتقرير فينوغراد وان نقرا  5أيار ان يتذكروا ماذا عملوا في  7أريد ان اذكر الذين يتكلمون عن 
مل على فيه لما اعتبر ان من عناصر قوة حزب الله كذا وكذا وكذا ومن جملة عناصر قوة حزب الله التي يجب الع
إنهائها وتفكيكها هي شبكة الاتصالات السلكية التي أقامها حزب الله, اليوم هل من احد لديه شك بان الإسرائيلي يتنصت 
على الخليوي ؟ هل من احد لديه شك بان الإسرائيلي يتنصت على التلفون المدني ؟ هل من احد عنده شك بان 
حة ؟ ما في شك وما في نقاش , واحدث تقنيات العالم الأميركية الإسرائيلي يتنصت على كل وسائل الاتصال المتا
موجودة عند إسرائيل في هذا المجال , نعم أهم سلاح في المقاومة ليس من أهم أسلحة المقاومة , سأعيد وهذا قصدي 
ا جدا جدا بالتذكير, أهم سلاح للمقاومة في حرب تموز كانت شبكة الاتصالات السلكية لانها محصنة بدرجة كبيرة جد
أيار  5عن التنصت وعن دخول الإسرائيلي على هذه الشبكة , هذا خذوه بعين الاعتبار , اجتمعت الحكومة اللبنانية ليلة 
أيار ومن خارج جدول الأعمال قررت تفكيك شبكة الاتصالات واعتبارها خروجا على القانون ونهبا للمال  5أظن يوم 
ارا بإحالة كل من له علاقة بهذه الشبكة بهذا القضاء , ضعوا هذين المشهدين العام ومسا بسيادة الدولة واتخذت قر
أيار  5أمامكم وأنا لا أريد ان احكم ولا أريد ان اقضي , الحكومة اللبنانية السابقة غير الشرعية يجب أن تنتبه أن يوم 





السؤال الثاني في الأيام الماضية ظهرت تسريبات وبثت بعض الأشرطة على التلفزيونات لماذا تم استقدام آلاف 
المقاتلين من خارج مدينة بيروت قبل الخامس من أيار، أريد أن أسأل أهل بيروت، أهل بيروت الذين يطالبونهم بأن 
ا على السابع من أيار، على كل حال هناك جزء كبير من أهل بيروت هذا خيارهم السياسي وانتماؤهم ينتخبوا ويردو
أيار، هناك اتجاهات مختلفة والناس ستنتخب بحسب  7أيار وإن لم يكن هناك  7السياسي وسينتخبون إن كان هناك 
حول مدينة بيروت إلى مدينة للميليشيات  اتجاهاتها، لكن أنا أحب أن أوجه لأهل بيروت: يمكنكم أن تسألوا من الذي
تحت عنوان الشركات الأمنية، ومدينة مليئة بمراكز التسليح عبر عنوان الشركات الأمنية، ويمكنكم أن تسألوا أيضا 
من الذي جاء بآلاف المقاتلين من خارج بيروت ووزعهم داخل أحياء بيروت وفي المراكز وفي الشقق أثناء شن حملة 
مية على حزب الله وعلى شبكة الاتصالات السلكية قبل اتخاذ القرار في الخامس من أيار؟ هذا سؤال سياسية إعلا
مشروع أم ليس مشروعا؟ هل هناك اليوم أحد مازال لديه شك بأنه استقدام آلاف المقاتلين إلى مدينة بيروت قبل أن 
 تتخذ الحكومة هذا القرار؟ ما الذي كان مخططا له؟ 
 
له أنه في الخامس من أيار تتخذ الحكومة القرار، ماذا يفعل حينها حزب الله؟ إذا لم يفعل شيئا واكتفى ما كان مخططا 
بمظاهرة، باعتصام، ببيان، يكونون قد نجحوا ويكون هذا مقدمة _ فمن يصادر السلكي يصادر الأسلحة الأخرى لاحقا 
، أما إذا لم يسمح بذلك فهذا يعني الصدام مع الجيش هذا إذا حزب الله سمح لهم بإزالة السلكي -تحت عناوين مشابهة
 وهذا ما يريدونه. 
كان مشروعهم في السنوات  -أنا أقول لكم  -هؤلاء الذين يدعون الحرص على الجيش والحرص على الدولة القوية 
ولدينا قيادة  الماضية العمل على إيجاد صراع وقتال بين الجيش والمقاومة وفشلوا لأنه لدينا في لبنان جيش وطني
وطنية وضباط وجنود وطنيون. وتم دراسة هذا الأمر من قبل جهات أجنبية وضعت الجيش اللبناني تحت المجهر 
ودرست هل هذا الجيش بقيادته وضباطه وجنوده موافق وجاهز نفسيا أن يدخل في معركة مع المقاومة ووصلت إلى 
وغير مؤهل نفسيا وعقائديا وفكريا ووطنيا أن يقاتل المقاومة  نتيجة مفادها أن هذا الجيش لا يمكن أن يدخل في ذلك
 ولذلك حرموه من كل المساعدات لأنهم اعتبروه جيشا غير مأمون. 
 غير مأمون على ماذا؟ على البلد؟ غير مأمون على الانتخابات؟ غير مأمون على السلطة السياسية؟ لا... 
يش، هذا عمق الأمان والأمن والضمانة الوطنية التي يشكلها الجيش هو غير مأمون على قتاله للمقاومة وهذا شرف للج
 اللبناني. 
 
حسنا، إذا لم يسكت حزب الله وذهب إلى عصيان مدني وإلى مواجهة في بيروت، آلاف المقاتلين جاهزون وأنا أريد أن 
ن والمناطق التي سيحتلونها أقول شيئا لم نقله حينها، كان هناك خطة موضوعة وهؤلاء لديهم التعليمات ماذا سيفعلو
وأي مناطق سيقطعونها عن بعضها البعض، وكان المشروع هو أخذ بيروت إلى فتنة مذهبية تستمر لأسابيع يتم على 
أساسها استدعاء قوات من الخارج تحت عنوان أن هناك حرب مذهبية في لبنان، تعالوا يا عالم ساعدونا في وقف 
 الحرب، هذا ما كان مخططا له. 
علموا أن ما كان في الخامس من أيار ليس قرار ليس للتنفيذ، هكذا قرار ليس للتنفيذ؟ إذن لماذا سهرتم حتى الصبح؟ لت
ولماذا اتصلتم من داخل جلسة مجلس الوزراء بالسعودية وبمصر وبأميركا وبفرنسا وبآخرين؟ هذا لم يعد سرا. يمكنكم 
تلك ماذا يقولون هنا وهناك، أنا لا أقوم بكشف أسرار، الموضوع لم  أن تسألوا الوزراء الذين كانوا معكم في الحكومة
يكن موضوع قرار ليس للتنفيذ، هذه الحكومة السابقة البتراء اللاشرعية اتخذت قرار بوضع لبنان أمام حرب مذهبية 
"جسم لبّيس"  في لبنان بين الشيعة والسنة، وما فعلته المعارضة ويريدون تحميلها لحزب الله فقط؟ نحن جاهزون،
 ويعجبكم. 
 
أنا أقول للبنانيين جميعا ولكن بالخصوص للشيعة والسنة في لبنان وبالأخص لأهلنا الكرام الأعزاء في مدينة بيروت، 
ما حصل في السابع من أيار وضع حدا ًسريعا جدا ًلحرب مذهبية كانوا يخططون لها وأعدوا لها العدة، وضع حدا ً
الفتنة والحرب الأهلية، وضع حدا ًسريعا ًلمؤامرة كبرى كانت تحضر لهذه المقاومة،  سريعا ًلإحراق بيروت بفعل
السابع من أيار حقن الدماء في بيروت، السابع من أيار حفظ المؤسسات في بيروت، السابع من أيار حفظ البيوت 
و السابع من أيار، وهذه هي والعائلات في بيروت التي أرادوا لها أن تخترب وأن تحترق في الخامس من أيار. هذا ه
 عظمة دماء شهدائنا. 
بالنسبة لنا، أنا كل السنة الماضية كنت أراعي وأداري، ولكن أمام ما سمعته في الأسبوعين الماضيين أنا أعلن السابع 
الحل،  من أيار يوما ًمجيدا ًمن أيام المقاومة في لبنان، وفي النتيجة السابع من أيار هو الذي وضع لبنان على طريق
السابع من أيار هو الذي أخرج لبنان من المأزق الذي وضعوه فيه، السابع من أيار هو الذي فرض عليهم أن يعودوا 
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إلى طاولة الحوار التي كانوا يرفضونها، السابع من أيار هو الذي أدى إلى انتخاب رئيس توافقي وإلى تشكيل حكومة 
ستقرار نسبي خلال العام الماضي هو من بركات السابع من أيار وبفضل وحدة وطنية، ما نعم به اللبنانيون من سنة ا
 دماء الشهداء الذين سقطوا في السابع من أيار. 
 
سمعت شعارات خلال الأسبوعين الماضيين، أنهم يقولون لا ننسى السابع من أيار، يقولون لن ننسى، خطبوا وقالوا 
ألا تنسوا السابع من أيار، وهذا هو المطلوب يا حبيبي يا أخي يا ورددوا الشعارات، عظيم جدا بشرتمونا، نحن نريد 
عيني هذا هو المطلوب.المطلوب ألا ننسى السابع من أيار حتى لا يكررّن أحد حماقة الخامس من أيار. أما الناس الذين 
الحين من منطقتي عكار  أتيتم بهم من المناطق أنا أريد أن أنصفهم، قيل أنه جيء بآلاف المقاتلين في قبل أيام في ذلك
والبقاع، أنا أريد أن أنصف هؤلاء الشباب، نحن نعلم أن أهل عكار وأهل البقاع رجال شجعان أقوياء يُتكل عليهم ولا 
أحد لديه نقاش في هذا الأمر، ليسوا جبناء أبدا ًولا يهربون من المعركة ولكن أنتم بأهل عكار وبأهل البقاع لا ليقاتلوا 
م في قتال إسرائيل، أتيتم بهم ليقاتلوا أهلهم، أتيتم بهم ليقاتلوا المقاومة التي يشعرون في عكار وفي إسرائيل، جربوه
البقاع أنها عزهم وشرفهم وفخرهم. أتيتم بهم ليقاتلوا المقاومة التي يعتبرها كل عربي مهما كان دينه أو مذهبه يعتبرها 
حافز والدافع ليقاتلوا أهلهم وإخوانهم في المقاومة وعليهم أن يدركوا عزا ًله في هذا العصر، ولذلك لم يكونوا يملكون ال
ذلك ولا يقولن أحد أن أهل عكار أو أهل البقاع جبناء، أبدا.ً ولكن جيء بهم إلى المعركة الخطأ التي لا يؤمنون بها 
 لحظة واحدة على الإطلاق. 
 
من أيار ولا على السابع عشر من أيار، نحن نقرأ  أيها الأخوة والأخوات، نعم نحن لا نريد أن نبني على السابع
الماضي لنعتبر منه في المستقبل، بالرغم من كل ما حصل نحن ندعو إلى التعاون وندعو إلى الشراكة وندعو إلى 
تجاوز الماضي وندعو إلى تضافر الجهود والأيدي والأكتاف لبناء وطننا وإخراجه من أزماته المختلفة وكما قلت لهم 
خارجون من حرب تموز منتصرين ولم يعترفوا بانتصارنا حتى اليوم، لا يهم، قلت لهم نحن يجب أن نضع يدا ونحن 
بيد وكتفا على كتف لنبني لبنان، والآن أيا ًتكن نتيجة الانتخابات النيابية المقبلة، نعم نحن بحاجة على كل هذا التعاون 
 ا ولنرفع اسم لبنان عاليا في كل العالم معا. وكل هذا التضافر لنبني لبنان معا ولنحمي لبنان مع
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ي حصلت في الأيام الأخيرة في لبنان ولأهمية المرحلة أجد نفسي مسؤولا ًعن عرض الوقائع نظرا ًللتطورات الت
وتحليل هذه الوقائع والتعليق عليها وأيضا ًرسم صورة تقريبية لمسار الأمور في بلدنا لأنه من حق الشعب اللبناني 
ان، للشعب في لبنان، وللدولة، للمقاومة، وحق اللبنانيين جميعا ًومن حق كل أولئك الذين يحبون لبنان ويهتمون للبن
للمستقبل، أيضا ًأن يطلعوا وأن يحيطوا بالقدر الممكن الذي يمكن قوله حول مسار الأمور لأن الوقائع ومسار الأمور 
 تستطيع أن تكشف لنا بوضوح النوايا والاستهدافات وما يحضر لهذا البلد ولنا جميعا.ً
كثيرا إلى الأشهر السابقة. سوف أبدأ وباختصار في الوقائع منذ بدء ما سّمي بالمبادرة  أولا:ً أبدأ من الوقائع. لن أعود
العربية أو بالمسعى السعودي السوري على إثر الحديث عن قرب صدور قرار اتهامي من قبل مدعي عام المحكمة 
يمة من قبل الجانب السعودي الدولية ينوي فيه توجيه الاتهام إلى أفراد أو كوادر من حزب الله، قامت مبادرة كر
والجانب السوري، من قبل الملك عبد الله بن عبد العزيز والرئيس بشار الأسد وأبلغنا بأن هناك مسعى من هذا 
ونحن دعمنا هذا المسعى وكل الأصدقاء الذين اتصلوا للمساعدة. كنا نقول لهم: نحن نقترح أن تدعموا المسعى  النوع 
المحنة  قة نحن راهنّا عليه كما راهن كل الذين يريدون الخير للبنان وأن يتجاوز لبنان هذه السعودي السوري. في الحقي
 أو ما يعد ّله من محن ومن فتن.
وجود محادثات أو وجود أفكار أو وجود أوراق أو  بدأت المحادثات بالرغم من أن البعض في لبنان كان ينكر أصلا ً
إلى اتفاق لأنهم كانوا يتحدثون عن أمانيهم وليس عن الحقائق الخارجية وجود بنود فضلا ًعن أنه ينكر التوصل 
 والوقائع الخارجية.
أنا أحب في هذا الموضوع أن أكون واضحا ًجدا ًحتى يكون لدى اللبنانيين جميعا ًصورة واضحة، وحتى لاحقا لا 
 يصطنع أحد بطولات وهمية أو يقدم أمورا ًغير واقعية للناس.
الجانب السعودي كان واضحا،ً قال: "لا يمكن إلغاء المحكمة الدولية، لأن المحكمة الدولية أقيمت بقرار من منذ البداية، 
مجلس الأمن الدولي، وهذا الموضوع عند أمريكا وبريطانيا وفرنسا ووو..". وقلنا نحن نتفهم ذلك وأنا أشرت إلى هذا 
ا الموضوع لم يجِر حوله محادثات. هذا من الأيام الأولى المعنى في خطاب ليلة عاشوراء. كانوا واضحين. أصلا ًهذ
 من اللقاء الأول كان واضحا.ً
إن الجانب السعودي قال إنه لا يمكن إلغاء القرار الظني، ونحن أيضا تفّهمنا هذا الموضوع، لأن القرار الظني ليس 
 يُتوقع من الجانب السعودي أن يستطيع أن عند السعودي، بل القرار الظني عند الأمريكي وعند الإسرائيلي، وبالتالي لا
 يمون على الأمريكي والإسرائيلي لإلغاء القرار الظني.
ُطرح منذ البداية أن الممكن أمران: الأمر الأول: تأجيل صدور القرار الظني لعدة أسابيع أو لعدة أشهر ريثما يمكن 
 التفاهم على الأمر الآخر.
كيف يمكننا أن نحمي لبنان من تداعيات القرار الظني، هذا كله جرى في الأيام الأمر الثاني: تفضلوا نجلس لنناقش 
 الأولى، وطبعا ًكل هذه المفاوضات كانت سرية.
نحن قلنا إننا نتفهم، ونحن ليس لدينا مشكلة، وطبعا ًنحن نرفض القرار الظني ونعتقد أنه مسيّس ونعتقد أننا مستهدفون 
 ار الظني، ولكن لبنان بلدنا ونحن حريصون على حماية البلد.من قبل أمريكا وإسرائيل عبر القر
وبالمداولات وصلنا إلى نتيجة تقول ما يلي: كيف نحيّد لبنان؟ وهذا أنا أشرت له أيضا ًفي ليلة عاشوراء، كيف نحيّد 
 لبنان؟
 ر والأحتمالات و وو.نحيّد لبنان من خلال ثلاثة بنود. الحكومة اللبنانية تجتمع وتقول: نظرا ًللتطورات والأخطا
 وبمعزل عن تقييمها للمحكمة الدولية وللقرار الظني تقوم بثلاثة أمور:
 الأمر الأول: سحب القضاة اللبنانيين.
 الأمر الثاني: وقف التمويل اللبناني للمحكمة الدولية.
 الأمر الثالث هو إلغاء مذكرة التفاهم بين الحكومة اللبنانية والمحكمة الدولية.
بنود الثلاثة إذا أخذت فيهم الحكومة اللبنانية الحالية أو أي حكومة أخرى، فهذا لا يعني إلغاء المحكمة الدولية أبدا.ً هذه ال
  المحكمة الدولية قائمة بمعزل عن رأينا فيها.
بقضاة من لو سحب القضاة اللبنانيون، فالمحكمة لديها قانون، أو أن مجلس الأمن يعدل قانونها، فيتم الإستعاضة عنهم 
 جنسيات أخرى.
لو توقف التمويل اللبناني نوفّر على الشعب اللبناني بعض المال، هناك مصادر تمويل كثيرة في العالم،. ليس لديهم 
 مشكلة لا بالتمويل ولا باستكمال القضاة.
ذا كان المدعي العام وأما بالنسبة لمذكرة التفاهم فإلغاؤها يعني أنه بمعزل عن التداعيات المحكمة والقرار الظني، إ
يريد لبنانيين، هناك إنتربول دولي وهناك وسائل أخرى، هم يذهبون ويَرون كيف يمكنهم اعتقالهم، وليست وظيفة 
 الحكومة اللبنانية أن تعتقل من يتهمهم بلمار، مما قد يؤدي إلى مشكلات على المستوى الوطني.
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لبنان وحماية لبنان من تداعيات القرار الظني ولا يعني على الإطلاق  إذا التزمنا بهذه البنود الثلاثة، فهذا يعني تحييد
إلغاء المحكمة الدولية ـ لكل من يغالط ويعمل على تضليل الناس ـ ولا يعني إلغاء القرار الظني، مع اعتقادنا الذي أود ّ
 قوله وأكرره إن هذه المحكمة أمريكية إسرائيلية وهذا قرار أمريكي إسرائيلي.
نود الوصول إلى حل وسط بالموضوع. أبلغنا من الجانب السعودي أنهم موافقون على هذه البنود الثلاثة وأن  لكن نحن
 الرئيس سعد الحريري موافق على هذه البنود الثلاثة.
وقالوا: حتى نستطيع أن ننجز اتفاقا ً(أنا لا أحب تسميته تسوية)، أو تفاهم، هناك أمور أخرى مطلوبة منكم كمعارضة، 
و كحزب الله، أو كحزب الله وحركة أمل، إن هذه البنود أو هذه الأمور عليكم أن تقبلوا فيها وبالتالي يكون عندنا تفاهم أ
 واتفاق كامل ونتكل على الله.
وتم عرض البنود علينا مع اشتراط أن يبقى هذا الأمر سريا ًلنجاح المفاوضات. وبالفعل بقي سريا ًالأخيرة لأن هناك 
د واضحة ونحن كنا موافقين عليها ولكن هناك بعض البنود تحتاج إلى بعض النقاش وعليها ملاحظات بعض البنو
للجانب  ونقاش مع بعض حلفائنا، لكن الجو الذي انعكس هو جو إيجابي، والجو الذي نقله الرئيس بشار الأسد 
 ايجابي وكانت الأمور تتواصل. السعودي هو جو 
ره إلى الولايات المتحدة ووجود الأمير عبد العزيز نجله معه، وهو من كان يتابع بطبيعة الحال، مرض الملك وسف
 المفاوضات، بطأا كثيرا ًهذا الأمر وأصبحت المفاوضات على الهاتف وبفترات متقطعة.
قبل أسبوعين تقريبا ًأو أكثر بقليل، أتى تأكيد أن الملك خضع للعملية ووضعه الصحي جيّد وهو عازم على مواصلة 
ذا الجهد وعلى الوصول إلى اتفاق وإنهاء هذا الأمر. وفي وقت قريب يمكن أن يأتي نجل الملك إلى دمشق والى ه
بيروت من أجل الاتفاق على كل البنود وحول آليات التنفيذ.وقيل أيضا ًإنه سيتم طلب سفر الرئيس سعد الحريري إلى 
 الولايات المتحدة من أجل إنجاز هذا الأمر والتحضير له.
والرئيس سعد الحريري قبل أن يغادر بيروت ويتوجه إلى الولايات المتحدة أطلق تصريحا ًيقول فيه إن الاتفاق أنجز 
منذ أشهر. طبعا ًهذا يحتاج إلى تدقيق، ولكنه أمر جيّد إنه يعترف أن هناك اتفاقا ًويعتبر أنه أُنجز منذ أشهر ولكن هناك 
 ها الطرف الآخر.خطوات مطلوبة من الطرف الآخر لم يقم ب
بعضنا اعتبر أن هذا الكلام إيجابي لأن فيه للمرة الأولى اعتراف من قبل أحد في الفريق الآخر الذي كان ينكر وجود 
أفكار ووجود مسودات ووجود مفاوضات ووجود تسوية كما كانوا يسمونها فيعترف بوجود اتفاق ولكنه يتحدث عّمن 
لآخر بأنه لم يبدأ، البعض قرأ جانبا ًإيجابيا ًفي هذا التصريح وان هذه مقدمة يبدأ أولا ويحّمل المسؤولية للطرف ا
 للخطوات الموعود بها سعوديا ًوسوريا.ً
سافر الرئيس سعد الحريري إلى أمريكا وأجرى اللقاءات الأمريكية هناك، وبدون أي سابق إنذار يتصل الجانب 
ة الضغوط والأوضاع نحن لسنا قادرين على مواصلة العمل في السعودي بالجانب السوري ويقول له نحن نعتذر، نتيج
 هذا المسعى، الله يعطيك العافية "وشوف شو بدك تعمل".
تم إبلاغنا بأن هذا المسعى توقف فجأة بلا مقدمات ولا إشارات ولا أي شيء، وهذا له علاقة بالتحليل وبالتقييم لاحقا،ً 
 إلى ما وصلت إليه؟أن من الذي عّطل هذا المسار وأوصل الأمور 
بعدما تبلغنا ذلك، وأيضا تبلغنا أنه سيتم استعجال صدور القرار الظني والإتهامي وقد يصدر خلال أيام تشاورنا مع 
حلفائنا في المعارضة، مع القوى التي لها وزراء في الحكومة لأن الوقت كان ضيقا،ً وأجمعنا أنه بات من الواجب ـ 
م استقالتنا من هذه الحكومة وبالتالي إسقاط هذه الحكومة، للأسباب التي سأذكرها بعد وسأشرح لاحقا لماذا ـ أن نقدّ 
قليل. وبشكل دستوري وقانوني وطبيعي جدا ًقُدّمت الاستقالات وأصبحنا أمام وضع جديد سواء على المستوى 
 الحكومي أو على المستوى الوطني وغدا ً(الأثنين) توجد استشارات نيابية للتكليف.
 الوقائع. هذه
  نأتي لنحاول أن نفهم الذي جرى. ماذا حدث ولماذا وصلت الأمور إلى هنا؟
أولا:ً من الواضح أن الأمريكيين والإسرائيليين كانوا يرفضون منذ البداية هذا المسعى العربي منذ البداية وهم تركوا 
سين" سورية والسعودية لن يستطيعوا هذا المسعى يمشي لفترة من الزمن باعتقاد أنهم كانوا يراهنون أن "السين 
  التوصل إلى اتفاق لأن الموضوع صعب ومعقد وبالتالي هم ليسوا بحاجة للتدخل أو أن يعطلوا أو يجهضوا.
لكن في الآونة الأخيرة عندما رأوا أن الأمور متقدمة بشكل كبير وهناك أجواء إيجابية لإنجاز اتفاق حول هذا الأمر 
 يتوقف ولذلك توقف بهذا الشكل المفاجئ. م وأبلغوا بأن هذا الأمر لا يمكن أن يستمر وعليه أن تدخلوا بقوة وبشكل حاس
َمن لديه تفسير آخر يتفضل ويشرح لنا. هذا هو التفسير الوحيد بناًء على كل الوقائع وبناًء على كل المعطيات، 
المساعي، والرهانات الأمريكية  ت إنهاء التصريحات الأمريكية والتصريحات الإسرائيلية التي سبقت المساعي ولحق
والإسرائيلية وخصوصا ًالإسرائيلية على تداعيات القرار الظني الذي يتهم أفرادا ًمن حزب الله. هذا كلام واضح 
ومعلن ويقولونه في الليل وفي النهار هل يمكن للأمريكيين والإسرائيليين أن يسمحوا للمسعى العربي بالنجاح ليعطل 
 هذه الآمال وكل هذه الرهانات.عليهم كل 
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ثانيا:ً لا شك أن الموضوع ليس أمريكيا ًفقط، ولا شك أن هناك أطرافا ًسياسية في لبنان وهي التي كانت تنكر أصلاً 
وجود أفكار وتسوية ومبادرة عملت في الليل وفي النهار وحرضت أطرافا ًأمريكية وغربية وعربية لإفشال المسعى 
خدمت أيضا ًفي بعض اللقاءات عبارات نابية وغير لائقة بحق الملك عبد الله لأنهم وجدوا أن السعودي السوري واست
 الرجل صادق ويسعى، وجاد في إنجاز هذا التفاهم وفي الوصول إلى هذا الاتفاق.
طلوب منهم ثالثا:ً بالنسبة للرئيس سعد الحريري وفريقه في هذا الموضوع، هو يقول إن الاتفاق أنجز وأن هناك أناسا ًم
صحيح لكن سأمشي معه هناك اتفاق أنجز وانتظرنا عدة أشهر. ألا أنتظر، إذا  لم يقوموا بها. طبعا ًهذا غير  أشياء 
كنت حريصا ًعلى مصلحة البلد وتجاوز هذه المحنة، لا أنتظر بعد أسبوعا ًأو أسبوعين حتى نكمل الاتفاق أو نتفق على 
 آلية التنفيذ؟ ما هو المطلوب منك؟
  "شو عدا عما بدا"؟ على الله ونتجاوز ببلدنا هذه المرحلة الصعبة،  ما هو المطلوب منا، نتكل 
  مجرد أن ذهب إلى أمريكا تم قطع رأس هذا المسعى وتم اجهاضه والعودة إلى نقطة الصفر.
اليوم قلقون على الوضع هذا في الحقيقة هو موضع تساؤل وسؤال كبير، وأنا أحب أن يسأل اللبنانيون، اللبنانيون كلهم 
  وكان هناك إمكانية أن لا نصل إلى هذا الموضوع، لكن لماذا وصلنا له؟ في لبنان، 
رابعا ًأيضا ًفي هذا السياق، أنا فهمي أن الرئيس الحريري وفريقه يا أما هم من البداية غير قابلين ولا يريدون هذا 
المملكة العربية السعودية وبالتالي، ليس هم لا يريدون فقط، وإنما  المسار وهذا التفاهم، وساروا في البداية نتيجة ضغط
هم أيضا ًذهبوا وحّرضوا الأميركيين وغير الأميركيين للضغط على الجانب السعودي لإيقاف هذا المسعى، وإما لا، 
ن ( أين تصبح هم كانوا سائرين مع الملك ومع الجانب السعودي ولكن هناك إرادة أميركية قاهرة، وهنا بين هلالي
فهذا يعني لا، لا يعدو واحدة من  الحرية والسيادة والاستقلال والقرار المستقل والمصالح الوطنية) الأميركي يقول لا 
الاحتمالين لأنه من المفترض حسب تصريحاته هو وحسب كل المعطيات أن الأمور كانت سائرة وستصل إلى 
  خواتيمها.
هذه اللحظة أو في هذه العشيّة أن هذا الفريق لا يمكن ائتمانه لا على القرار اللبناني ولا هذا التعليق او هذا الفهم يؤكد ب
على المصلحة اللبنانية ولا على استقرار لبنان ولا يملك القدرة على تجاوز مساعدة لبنان أو قيادة لبنان لتجاوز أي 
ي خلال ساعات في الولايات المتحدة محنة أو مصاعب يمكن أن يواجهها إن كانت مساعي أشُهر يمكن أن تنته
 الأميركية.
خامسا:ً أيضا ًباستكمال هذه النقطة، الرئيس الحريري قال بعد ما عاد إن المطالب التي قدّمها والتي سّماها مكاسب هي 
د مكاسب للوطن. على كل حال ما كان مطلوبا ًمنا من بنود هو موجود عندي لأنه تم إبلاغنا به وكنا نناقشه لكي نر
عليه بأجوبة، وأنا قلت إننا أعطينا أجوبة عليه، وبعضها كنا نتعاطى معه إيجابيا لما كنا ما زلنا نناقش. هذا موجود. 
أيضا ًحتى نكون دقيقين الليلة أنا طبعا ولأسباب معينة لن أكشف ما هي هذه البنود وما هي هذه المتطلبات، ولكن إذا 
يون يقدرون أن يحاكموا، وسيكتشفون أن هذه البنود فيها بند أو بندان يمكن القول كشفها غيري في يوم من الأيام فاللبنان
  نعم فيها مصلحة وطنية، أما بقية البنود ففيها مصلحة للفريق السياسي والأمني للرئيس الحريري.
ية وغير هذا الذي كنا نتفاوض عليه، ومع ذلك كنا نتعاطى بإيجابية ، نحنا كنا حاضرين أن نعطي مكاسب سياس
سياسية لفريق الرئيس الحريري من أجل تجنيب لبنان، وبالتالي نعم، هذا الموقف نعم، نراعي فيه السلامة الوطنية 
والمصلحة الوطنية، ولكن حتى هذا أُجهض بمعزل عن بعض النقاش في بعض البنود والتفاصيل، نعم أريد أن اسمح 
  نقاط التعليق وهذا يعبر لنا عن شاهد بهذا الموضوع. لنفسي، هناك بند واحد كشاهد أنا سأذكره في سياق
لما نحن ذهبنا إلى الحكومة وقلنا لهم يا أخوان هناك ملف اسمه ملف شهود الزور، خطير وحساس وكبير، وهذا الملف 
له تبعات كبيرة جدا،ً هناك ضباط وغير ضباط وهناك أناس ألقي بهم في السجون سنوات بناء على هذه الشهادات، 
لعلاقات اللبنانية السورية تم تخريبها لا بل تدميرها، بناء على هذا، أسوأ جو مذهبي حصل في لبنان هو بناء على هذه ا
الشهادات، كان هناك صراعات طائفية ولكن على المستوى المذهبي والسنوات الخمس التي مرت هي أسوأ أجواء 
نيابية أجريت وحكومات رّكبت بناًء على النتائج السياسية لهذه مذهبية بناء على نتائج هذه الشهادات، وهناك انتخابات 
الشهادات، تفضلوا وحاسبوا شهود الزور ومن صنع هؤلاء الشهود الزور لأنه أدى إلى كل هذه الكوارث الأخلاقية 
ة، لم نأخذه إلى والإنسانية والوطنية والاقتصادية والأمنية ولأنه أيضا ًضلّل التحقيق. وأخذنا الموضوع هذا إلى الحكوم
مكان ثاٍن ولا شّهرنا بالناس فقط، قلنا لهم خذوه إلى المجلس العدلي! حسنا،ً عيب علينا إذا نحن طالبنا بالتصويت 
 ونحن دعاة الديمقراطية التوافقية؟
 
كس هذه الأمور تحتاج إلى توافق لكن نحن الطرف الخاسر في التصويت نقول لهم صوتوا، هذا ليس عيبا ًعلينا بالع
هذه ايجابية منا، نحن نحتكم للمؤسسات وفي أمر نحن من دعاة الديمقراطية التوافقية عليه نقبل بالتصويت على حسابنا 
، وعلى حساب قضية بهذا الحجم فلم يقبلوا بالتصويت ونحن كنا قلنا بأننا نقبل النتيجة وهذا الذي عطل مجلس الوزراء 
  ولسنا نحن من عّطل مجلس الوزراء.
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ما هو البند؟ واحد من البنود الواردة المطلوبة إغلاق ملف شهود الزور. هذا جزء من التسوية التي كانت طيب 
مطروحة، يعني مقابل أن نحيّد لبنان والمحكمة باقية فوق رأسنا والقرار الظني باق فوق رأسنا كان مطلوبا ًبالاتفاق 
شهود الزور؟ يجب أن لا يكون هذا جزءا ًمن أي اتفاق  إغلاق ملف شهود الزور، طيب إذن لماذا أنتم مهتمون بملف
وجزءا ًمن أي تسوية، أنتم يجب أن تكونوا أشد الناس حرصا ًعلى محاسبة شهود الزور ومن فبركهم ومن صنّعهم! 
 مع ذلك هذا يرد في التسوية، هذا من مصلحة الوطن أو من مصلحة فريق سياسي وأمني معين؟
ا كان ممنوعا ًفي مجلس الوزراء التصويت على ملف شهود الزور وأن يتحول الملف على اليوم نعم بدأنا نفهم لماذ
المجلس العدلي. الآن بدأنا نفهم لماذا مسموح أن يتعطل البلد ومجلس الوزراء كل هذه الأسابيع لحماية شهود الزور. 
 لم ألحق مشاهدة الجزء الثاني. مع احترامي لأي تقييم ممكن أن يقال عما عرضته قناة "الجديد" بالأمس، واليوم
طيب، للوهلة الأولى صدر تعميم داخل تيار المستقبل، الكوادر، والمنسقيّات.. أن هذا كلام مفبرك، وحتى صدر كلام 
 عن بعض المسؤولين ان هذا فيلم الفيديو مفبرك وملّزق وموّصل وإلى آخره.
ونقاش.. فنيّا ًممكن، لا أعرف، وعلى كل هناك خبراء  طبعا هذا أمر مضحك، لماذا؟ لأنه جلسة وسجال و"أخذ وعطا"
يقدرون أن يقولوا إن هذا مفبرك أو حقيقي. ولكن المضحك أن هؤلاء الكوادر والمنسقيات وهؤلاء الناس جاهزون أن 
ّكبه، يقبلوا قرارا ًظنيا ًيخرب البلد والمنطقة مبني على داتا اتصالات وتقدر أي شركة اتصالات او شركة خليوي ان تر
هذا الذي يمكن أن يفبرك بكل سهولة ولكن الشريط المسجل الذي عرضته قناة "الجديد" ومباشرة يقولون إن هذا 
الشريط مفبرك، وإن كان على كل حال صدر قبل قليل بيان عن المكتب الاعلامي لرئيس الحكومة، حكومة تصريف 
والمقصود هيك" يعني أنه يناقش بدلالات الكلام الاعمال ويقول فيه إن هذا الحادث صار ولكن "هذا صار هيك 
 وخلفيات الكلام ولكنه لم ينكر اللقاء وما جرى في اللقاء.
أيضا قبل أن آتي لأتكلم معكم "ويمكن من غير المناسب أن أدخل أنا بهكذا تفاصيل" ولكن قيل لي إن تلفزيون المستقبل 
خبار، وانا هنا عندي سؤال: اذا كانت هذه الوثيقة من وثائق المحكمة سينشر الوثيقة الكاملة لوقائع هذا اللقاء بشريط الا
والآن قناة الجديد وغيرها كيف حصلت على  الدولية والتحقيق الدولي والتحقيق سري كيف يكون لديكم هذه الوثائق؟ 
لى هذا التسجيل؟ مع هذا الموضوع هذا شانها، ولكن جنابكم أنتم تريدون أن تعرضوا الوثيقة الكاملة، من أين حصلتم ع
العلم أن الوثائق سرية! وهذا الذي قاله البيان الصادر عن مكتب رئيس الحكومة عندما ينتقد على النشر ويقول هذه 
وثائق سرية، فكيف تم تسريبها ؟ اسمحوا لي أن اتكلم بالعامية: "صح النوم". نحن منذ خمس سنوات نقول إن كل ما 
ود في الصحف وبالمجلات والتلفزيونات وبالمجالس وعند قيادات سياسية وأمنية في يجري في اللجنة الدولية هو موج
  لبنان وعند كل سفارات الدنيا، على كل هذا الموضوع أحببت أن أشير إليه.
هذا الذي صار الى ما قبل الإجهاز على المبادرة العربية واتفهم انها انتهت بعدما جاء الامريكان وبلغنا، طيب نحن ما 
لماذا نذهب الى استقالة لا بل الى اسقاط حكومة ليس فقط استقالة عشرة وزراء؟ وبالمناسبة أنا  تفسير تصرفنا؟ هو 
من واجبي أن أنّوه بالموقف الوطني الشريف والكريم لمعالي الوزير الدكتور عدنان السيد حسين الذي تصرف بما 
بيعي ان الاخرين سوف يلومونه لان لهم رؤيتهم ولهم يمليه ضميره وبما تمليه كرامته في هذا الموقع، ومن الط
 حساباتهم.
ونحن قوى سياسية مشاركة في الحكومة لنا وزراء في الحكومة، جزء من الحكومة، وبعد تجربة سنة وعدة أشهر اذا 
ا ان هذه قبل هذه التطورات كان هناك معاناة مفاده اتينا لنقيّم بعد كل هذه التطورات هل نستطيع ان نستمر فيها؟ 
الحكومة غير منتجة، وهل رئيس الحكومة يكون في البلد ويتابع الوزارات وهل يتابع الملفات ويتابع الخطط ويتابع 
البرامج وهل في جدية؟ ومن اليوم الأول هناك أناس راهنوا أول يوم تشكيل حكومة وحدة وطنية وكانوا ضد تشكيلها 
تفشل ، هذا بالانتاج وبالانجاز واضح، واعتقد الوزراء الليلة وامس وقبل  وعملوا على افشالها، وكانوا يريدون لها أن
امس تكلموا وعالجوا هذا الموضوع، ولكن مع ذلك لم نسرع في إسقاط الحكومة، كنا نراهن انه مع الوقت، مع 
وتفعيل الحكومة المتابعة والجدية فلنعِط الأمور فرصة بهذه الموضوعات التي اسمها اداء الحكومة وانجاز الحكومة 
  ومحاربة الفساد المالي ووو...الخ يمكن أن نصل إلى مكان، ولكن هذا حاضر منذ اليوم الأول. وحل قضايا الناس 
وفي هذا السياق تأتي أهم نقطة. نعم نحن وصلنا إلى محل الآن نعترف فيه أننا عاجزون في هذه الحكومة من أن نواجه 
وتحقيق إصلاح مالي وإصلاح إداري وإصلاح إقتصادي "ليش نكذب على العالم" نعم الفساد المالي والفساد الإداري 
  كنا ما زلنا نراهن على الوقت.
مليار دولار أنفقوا في ظل  11لمدة عدة أشهر، وزراء الحكومة ولجنة المال والموازنة النيابية يطالبون ويتحدثون عن 
مليار أنفقوا أين هذه الأموال؟ من أموال من؟ من أموال  11وأين؟  الحكومات السابقة، فقط قولوا لنا كيف وبقرار ممن
  آبائهم وأمهاتهم أو من أموال الشعب اللبناني؟
وزيرا يطالبون بهذا  21و  11نحن قوى سياسية طويلة عريضة، ويمكن ليس فقط عشر وزراء، ويمكن أكثر من 
مليار دولار مباشرة يشهر عليك موضوع  11ساب الأمر، لم نقدر أن نصل معهم إلى نتيجة، وإذا طالبت بكشف ح




وكبير وحّساس، على المجلس  الحكومة عن تحويل ملف شهود الزور الذي ذكرت، وهو ملف خطير  ثانيا:ً عجز 
  العدلي. حتى بالتصويت عجزنا.
 
ا:ً وهذه الحكومة أيضا ًهي عاجزة عن مواجهة تداعيات القرار الاتهامي، هي أعجز، بالعكس هي حكومة تريد أن ثالث
تواصل تمويل محكمة تتآمر على لبنان وعلى المقاومة ويكون قضاتها اللبنانيون شركاء في هذا التواطؤ وفي هذا 
العام أو المحكمة وتطلب منها أن تعتقل مواطنين  التآمر ولاحقا ًستضع نفسها في موقف صعب عندما يأتي المدعي
  ظلما ًوزورا ًوعدوانا.ً
ه الحكومة غير مؤهلة لمواجهة تداعيات القرار 1هذه الحكومة غير مؤهلة، وإجهاض المسعى العربي أكد بأن هذ
لأمور وانكشف الظني الاتهامي، وعندما يصدر القرار الظني الاتهامي ويتهم عناصر من حزب الله فعندها انتهت ا
أن يخربوا البلد من  البلد، فنحن لا نعرف ماذا يمكن أن يفعل الإسرائيلي أو الأميركي أو غيرهم من الذين يريدون 
الداخل أيضا ًالذين كانت رهاناتهم دائما ًرهانات فتنة وصدام ماذا يفعلون؟! هذه الحكومة تركت البلد ينكشف 
بلمار أبلغ رئيس الجمهورية وأبلغ رئيس الحكومة أنه غدا ًسيصدر القرار  وخصوصا ًإذا كان كما أبلغنا بأن السيد
الظني يوم الاثنين أو أنه الاثنين سوف يسلمه إلى فرانسين وسيعلن عن هذا الأمر يوم الثلاثاء. على كل حال لم يعد 
نان أمام أي تداعيات هناك وقت وهذه الحكومة ورئيس الحكومة تحديدا ًتصرف بما يمنع هذه الحكومة من حماية لب
للقرار الظني. عندما نصبح أمام حكومة عاجزة من هذا النوع نحن نصبح شهود زور وهذا إحساس كل الوزراء 
 ويمكنكم أن تسألوهم واحدا ًواحدا.ً
 
وعندما نصل إلى هذه النتيجة بل أسوأ من هذا، الناس لديهم مطالب وقد يتحركون في الشارع وكانت هناك بدايات 
من هذا النوع، نحن مطلوب منا أن نمنع الناس من التحرك في الشارع وأن ندافع عن الحكومة وعن سياستها  دعوات
وعن أدائها الذي لا يقنع أحدا.ً أمام هذا الواقع كله كان لا بد من الاستقالة ومن إسقاط حكومة عاجزة. إسقاط الحكومة 
هذا أصبح له علاقة بالاستشارات غدا ًـ قد يفتح الباب أمام لبنان العاجزة قد يفتح ـ وهذا ليس أكيدا ًمئة بالمئة لأن 
لتشكيل حكومة قادرة، حكومة مسؤولة، حكومة مخلصة، حكومة تحمل العبء، حكومة حاضرة تتابع وتعالج الأمور 
جبنا الوطني وتتحمل المسؤوليات. إسقاط الحكومة قد يفتح الباب، أما إبقاؤها فسوف يبقي الباب مسدودا،ً ولذلك كان وا
  والأخلاقي أن نذهب إلى إسقاط الحكومة.
برأينا، خلافا ًلبعض التعليقات التي سمعناها، فإن استمرار الواقع الحكومي الحالي كان مستحيلا ًوظلما ًللدولة، نفس 
                    الدولة ومؤسسات الدولة وللناس وهو مقتضى السلامة الوطنية وليس العكس. 
لهذا الواقع الحكومي العاجز المترّهل ـ لا أريد أن أقول أكثر من عاجز ولا أريد أن أذهب  ناًء على تشخيصنا سابعا:ً ب
إلى النوايا ـ بناًء على هذا التشخيص قررنا الاستقالة. نحن قمنا بخطوة دستورية وقانونية وديموقراطية وطبيعية جدا ً
ارع ولم نقطع طرقات ولم نحرق دواليب ولم نتظاهر ـ ولا مثلما يقوم وهذا حقنا الطبيعي، نحن لم نُسقط حكومة في الش
البعض بالترويح بإستخدام السلاح ـ هذا لم يحصل أبدا.ً نحن أتينا، بشكٍل دستوري وقانوني وديموقراطي وحضاري، 
  أننا نحن وزراء وهذه هي أسبابنا وهذه هي استقالتنا.
خذوني هدّت الكعبة)، لم يبَق أمريكا ولم يبَق فرنسا ولم يبَق الغرب ولم يبَق ماذا حدث؟ كأن المعارضة في لبنان (لا تؤا
  بعض الدول العربية، ذاك بدأ يهدد بالتوتر على مستوى المنطقة وذاك.. لهذه الدرجة؟
لماذا قامت الدنيا كلها؟ خيرا ًإن شاء الله؟،فقط لمجرد احتمال، وليس قطع أو يقين، أن الناس إذا ذهبت في ظل 
الأوضاع المستجدة في لبنان إلى استشارات نيابية، احتمال أن المعارضة تُرشح إحدى الشخصيات المحترمة من 
الطائفة السنية الكريمة ويحظى بمسؤولية تكليف الحكومة، وبالتالي لا يأتي الرئيس سعد الحريري، لمجرد هذا 
 صدرت بيانات، هذا ما هو تفسيره أو فهمه؟الإحتمال لم تبَق عاصمة في العالم إلا وقامت واتصلت وضغطت وأ
على كٍل أنا أحب أن أقول في هذه النقطة، نحن في المعارضة اللبنانية نتحمل مسؤولياتنا الوطنية، وما تقتضيه هذه 
المسؤوليات الوطنية سنعمله، نحن لا نخاف من خطب أو من بيانات أومن تهديدات أحد في هذا العالم، نحن لم نخف لا 
بهم ولا طائراتهم ولا أساطيلهم، فكيف تُخيفنا بياناتهم وتهديداتهم الجوفاء؟ نحن نُمارس قناعتنا وتشخيصنا من حرو
لمصلحة بلدنا، ونحن الوسيلة التي اعتمدناها هي وسيلة من حقنا تماما،ً بل يجب أن نُشكر عليها، أن يقال لنا: أنتم 
 المؤسسات.جماعة قد تعاطيتم بشكل دستوري وبشكل قانوني وضمن 
خرجوا من أغلب عواصم العالم كي ينتقدونا ويتهمونا، كيف هذا؟، هذا ماذا يعني؟ أنا أقول للبنانيين هل تعرفون ماذا 
هذا يعني؟، هذا يعني أنه ليس مقبولا ًفي لبنان أن يعترض أحد وأن يمارس حقا ًوأن يرفع صوته، وأن يلجأ أحد إلى 
  .أي عملية إصلاح أو تغيير أو معالجة
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المطلوب من الجميع أن يستسلموا، وإذا فتحت فمك، هذه أميركا وهذا الغرب وهذه إسرائيل وهذا العالم العربي وهذه 
  مباشرة ًنُلّوح لك بالفتنة المذهبية.
هذا أمر معيب جدا ًوهذا يدل ويؤكد أن الفريق الآخر الذي يمشي في هذا المسار وضمن هذه الرؤية هو أين؟، هو أين؟ 
  موقع؟ في أي مشروع؟ ضمن أي رؤية؟ ولأي مصلحة هو يشتغل؟ في أي
 
ثامنا:ً من الواضح أنه حسب معلوماتي في الساعات الأخيرة، والذي أصبح له علاقة بمن نُرشح، لكن واضح لدي أن 
ة لم المعارضة ُمجمعة على عدم تسمية الرئيس سعد الحريري لتكليفه في حكومة جديدة، نحن أصلا ًفي المرة الماضي
نُسّمِ ، لكن قبلنا أن نشترك في حكومة وحدة وطنية. لكن بعد هذه التجربة، أي تجربة سنة وعدد من الأشهر، وتقييمنا 
والمساعي وفهمنا لكل ما جرى خصوصا ًفي الآونة الأخيرة، نحن في هذا الموضوع واضحون في أننا لسنا في صدد 
هذه الليلة بصدد أن أُعلن من هو مرشح المعارضة، هذا الأمر تُعبر  هذه التسمية، ونأخذ اتجاها ًآخرا،ً وأنا لست في
عنه الكتل النيابية المعارضة غدا ًفي الاستشارات، لكن الشيء الذي أُريد أن أسأل عنه في هذا الموضوع والذي هو 
جرت اتصالا ًإلى هنا استحقاق وطني ودستوري داخلي، لماذا كل العالم يتدخل فيه؟، هيلاري كلينتون، السيدة كلينتون أ
واتصالا ًإلى هنا. وليعرف اللبنانيين أن غدا ًيوجد استشارات نيابية ويوجد ظروف معقدة عند بعض الكتل النيابية، هذا 
مفهوم، ولكن يوجد معارضة وطنية لبنانية تخوض معركة الاستشارات بأدوات وطنية ويوجد فريق آخر يخوض 
وإقليمي، وهذا معروف، اليوم حكومات تتدخل ووزارات خارجية تتدخل معركة الاستشارات بتدخل ودعم دولي 
ورؤساء يتدخلون، كله باتجاه أنه لا بد أن يأتي الرئيس سعد الحريري ليعاد تكليفه لرئاسة الحكومة، هكذا توجد دولة 
  الحرية والسيادة والإستقلال؟،
تريد، من الذي يأخذ أغلب الأصوات. هذا مسار اتركوا الناس يأخذون راحتهم، ولتسَم ِ الأغلبية النيابية من 
ديموقراطي ودستوري، لكن عندما توجد جهات هي تستطيع أن تُشخص أين مصلحتها وكيف هي مصلحتها، أو يمكن 
أن لا تعطي لا مرشح المعارضة ولا مرشح الفريق الآخر ولكنها تتعرض للضغوط من قبل دول هنا ودول هناك 
ن نمشي بمسار ديموقراطي وقانوني ودستوري صحيح؟ وهل رئاسة الحكومة التي تلد وتهدد مصالحها، أهكذا نكو
  بمسار من هذا النوع هي دستورية بشكل واضح ونظيف ونقي؟
في الانتخابات النيابية الماضية قمنا بتقطيعها من دون أن نفتعل أي إشكال في البلد بالرغم من كل الشوائب، فعندما 
ية بحجم لبنان يُنفق فيها الطرف الآخر ما يزيد عن مليار ومئتي مليون دولار، وعندما يُصبح تكون هناك انتخابات نياب
حق الصوت في بعض الدوائر صباحا ًألف دولار وظهرا ًألفين دولار وقبيل المغرب خمسة آلاف دولار، هل تكون 
  بتقطيعه.هذه الانتخابات وهذا المجلس النيابي يُعبر عن إرادة الشعب؟ هذا الأمر قمنا 
كما أريد أن أسأل: هل الاستشارات النيابية التي تحصل في ظل تدخل دولي وإقليمي وضغوط لها أول وليس لها آخر، 
  النتيجة التي لها تكون تُعبر عن إرادة النواب الحقيقية وعن تشخيصهم للمصالح الوطنية وبالتالي عن إرادة الشعب؟ 
أن سفيرة الولايات المتحدة الأميركية تذهب اليوم إلى زحلة لتلتقي مع النائب إذا ًلماذا يحدث هذا التدخل؟ تصوروا 
نقولا فتوش، لماذا؟ هل ذهبت لترى ماذا تحتاج زحلة؟، إنماء واقتصاد وفرص عمل، أم أنها ذهبت إلى النائب نقولا 
نراه في الإعلام من خلف الستار  فتوش لأنه يتم العمل على النواب نائب نائب؟، هل الذي نراه في الإعلام، أما الذي لا
  فالله يعلم ما هو؟
الأسوأ من هذا كله، من هذا التدخل الدولي والتدخل الإقليمي والضغط والاتصالات لتسمية الرئيس سعد الحريري 
رئيسا ًللحكومة، مع العلم أنه لا داعي لأن يقلقوا بهذا المقدار، فبحسب الحسبة لا أحد يقول إنه متأكد أن مرشح 
المعارضة سينجح أو أن مرشحهم سوف ينجح، ويمكن أن يكون للوهلة الأولى أن يعتبروا أن حساباتهم هي أريح 
(أفضل) من حسابات المعارضة، ومع ذلك نجد التدخل، كيف لو كان مؤكدا ًأن مسار الاستشارات النيابية غدا ًوبعد 
كريمة شخصيات كبيرة وقيادات كبيرة كفوءة ولائقة غد سيؤدي إلى نجاح شخصية سنية أخرى، وفي الطائفي السنية ال
وذات تاريخ لتحمل هذه المسؤولية، فكيف لو كانت عواصم القرار والعالم متأكدة أن مرشح المعارضة سوف يفوز؟، 
 ماذا كان يمكن أن يحدث؟، ما هو حجم التدخل الذي كنا سنتوقعه؟
يحة جديدة للسيد بلمار، أنا الذي أعرفه أنه عندما أجهضت أرجع وأقول الأسوأ من هذا كله، وهذا برأيي بمثابة فض
العملية (المسعى العربي) في أميركا، أنه بدلا ًمن تأجيل أو استمهال القرار الظني ُطلب من السيد بلمار استعجال 
ين أنا سأسلم إصدار القرار الظني، هذا جزء من المعركة، لكن الفضيحة أن السيد بلمار يبدو له أن يُبلغ أمس أن الإثن
لفرانسين الثلاثاء، ما هو هذا التوقيت؟، القرار الظني والمحكمة الدولية ـ حتى في توقيت إصدار القرار الظني ـ هو 
جزء من المعركة السياسية التي تُخاض في لبنان وتستهدفنا وتستهدف هذا الفريق وتستهدف المقاومة وتستهدف البلد، 
وم الأربعاء؟، حتى تنتهي الإستشارات النيابية ويتكلف رئيس حكومة جديد، أليس أليس كان يستطيع أن ينتظر إلى ي
كان يستطيع أن ينتظر إلى الخميس؟ أنا لا أقول أن القرار الظني سيصدر لكنني أعرف قطعا ًأن هذا الأمر أُبلغ للدولة 
لومات خاصة، أيضا ًأليس كان يستطيع اللبنانية بشكل رسمي، وهذا أُعلن أيضا ًفي وسائل الإعلام، أنا لا أتكلم عن مع
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(بلمار) إصدار القرار شهرين أو شهرا ً أن يؤجل إلى الأربعاء أو الخميس أو الجمعة أو السبت؟، ألسَت أّجلت 
ونصف؟، كنت تستطيع أن تؤجل إلى يومين أو ثلاثة أيام. كلا. المطلوب أن هذا الأمر يُعلن في أيام الاستشارات 
  توظيف السياسي لمصلحة مرشح معين ومحدد.النيابية كجزء من ال
هذا هو واقع الحال، أنا أحب أن أكون واضحا ًوصريحا ًكثيرا،ً يوجد الآن غدا ًوبعد غد وفي الأيام القليلة المقبلة 
  مساران يمشيان في وقت واحد:
السيد بلمار الذي قال أنه يوجد مسار الاستشارات النيابية التي ستوصل إلى تكليف رئيس حكومة جديد، ويوجد مسار 
  سيسلم القرار الظني إلى فرانسين، والإعلان عن ذلك.
  سأتكلم عن المسار الأول ومن ثم سأتكلم عن المسار الثاني.
طبعا ًنحن برأينا أنه تم استخدام التوقيت لمصلحة الاستشارات النيابية، لكن نحن سنتعاطى معه بشكل مفكك، يعني هذا 
ة لنا يوجد مساران: يوجد مسار استشارات نيابية مستقل ويوجد مسار السيد بلمار والقرار الظني توظيف، لكن بالنسب
  كمستقل.
 أيا ًتكن نتائج الاستشارات النيابية هذا شيء، وموضوع القرار الظني وكيفية التعاطي معه هذا شيء آخر.
وني وطبيعي، وأصلا ًنحن طالبنا به، نحن في المسار الأول: نحن نعتبر أن هذا المسار ديموقراطي ودستوري وقان
عندما استقلنا كنا نستطيع أن نظل في الحكومة ونُقاتل داخل الحكومة، والحكومة عاجزة ماشي الحال، وشهود الزور، 
ماشي الحال. كلا نحن استقلنا وطلبنا أن تصبح هذه الحكومة لتصريف الأعمال، وبالتالي يُحدد موعد للاستشارات، 
سار الطبيعي، وسيؤدي إلى نتيجة، وبمعزل عن النتيجة نحن ُمشاركون في هذا المسار وسنصعد إلى القصر هذا هو الم
الجمهوري لنعطي رأينا مثل كل الكتل النيابية، طبعا ًفي هذا المسار القيادات السياسية والزعماء السياسيين والأحزاب 
دهم مسؤولية وطنية كبيرة ومسؤولية تاريخية كبيرة، بعيدا ًعن التي لها نواب والنواب والكتل النيابية غدا ًوبعد غد عن
التعصب والمواقف المسبقة فدعهم يقولون أين يريدون أن يأخذوا هذا البلد، وما هي الحكومة، لأنه من خلال شخص 
  للبناني؟رئيس الحكومة نستطيع أن نفهم شخصية الحكومة المقبلة، ما هي الحكومة التي يريدون أن يُقدموها للشعب ا
ما هو الأداء والممارسة التي يؤدوها أمام الشعب اللبناني، هناك وضع داخلي وهناك وضع إقليمي وفي مرحلة حرجة، 
أتركهم لضميرهم ومسؤوليتهم وإحساسهم وتقييمهم وبالتالي هم الذين سيصوتون ويعطون آرائهم بهذا الموضوع، 
 كلف رئيس حكومة وعلى ضوئها الناس تقرر كيف ستتصرف.ساعتئذ الإستشارات سوف تمشي ونتيجة الأصوات سي
 
لقد عشنا تجربة هذه الحكومة وتجربة حكومة سابقة، بالنسبة لنا وأتكلم عن حزب الله بالتحديد، بالتأكيد هذه التجربة 
 جديدة ولم نكن مشاركين في حكومات على مدى السنوات الماضية، ويمكن أن يكون لدينا تقييم لهذه المشاركة،
وبمعزل عن هذا التقييم، أنا أحب أن يكون واضحا أّن أي حكومة سوف تتشكل ستكون حكومة تحمل مسؤولية، بالنسبة 
لنا ـ وأعتقد أن بقية الأفرقاء في المعارضة يمكن أن يكون جوهم هكذا أو بهذا الوضوح والحسم ـ نحن بالنسبة لنا 
الزور وقد انتهى المسار العربي، هناك ملف اسمه ملف  يستحيل علينا بعد الآن أن نسكت عن حكومة تحمي شهود
شهود الزور متروك، الحكومة المقبلة هي التي ستقرر به هل تحوله إلى المجلس العدلي أو تتنكر له أصلا، كيف 
ستتصرف، هذا أصبح شأن المحكمة المقبلة. أي حكومة تحمي شهود الزور وخصوصا ًإذا كانت ِممَّ ن صنّع شهود 
لا نستطيع أّن نسكت عنها. أي حكومة تحمي الفساد المالي بل تدير الفساد المالي نحن لن نسكت عنها، ولا  الزور نحن
أحد يهددنا لا بالخارج ولا بالداخل وما "حدا" يرفع بوجهنا أي ألوية وأي رايات. أي حكومة لا تتحمل مسؤوليتها 
صعيد أسوأ الظروف الحياتية نحن لن نقدر أن  بشكل جدي ورسمي لمعالجة قضايا الناس الذين يعيشون على كل
  نسكت عنها.
 
أيضا وبطريق أولى ـ وأنا لا أجامل بهذا الموضوع ـ نحن لا نطلب من الحكومة أن تحمي المقاومة ودائما كنت أقول 
عن  هذا الموضوع، أيام حرب تموز نحن لم نطلب من أحد حماية المقاومة، وكل الذين حموها كانوا شرفاء وعبّروا
ضميرهم ومسؤوليتهم وكرامتهم وإنسانيتهم ووطنيتهم وقوميّتهم. نحن دائما نطلب من الحكومة أّن لا تتآمر على 
المقاومة، أن لا تحرض على المقاومة، أن لا تذهب إلى هذه العاصمة وتلك العاصمة لتحرض الحكومات والدول على 
أنا منذ الآن سأكون واضحا ـ نحن لن نسكت عنها، لأّن واجبنا المقاومة في لبنان، أي حكومة تتآمر على المقاومة ـ و
أن نحفظ كل عناصر القوة للبنان أمام التهديد الإسرائيلي والأطماع الإسرائيلية والأخطار الإسرائيلية القائمة والمحدقة، 
لا ننتظر أي أساطيل  وكلنا نعرف في المنطقة أن لا أحد يحمي أحدا، لبنان يحميه أهله وجيشه وشعبه ومقاومته، نحن
من أي مكان من العالم لكي تأتي لتحمي لبنان. إذا كان أحد سوف يتآمر على عناصر القوة الموجودة في لبنان حكومة 




ويات الناس وتحقيق نأمل ونرجو أن يتمكن اللبنانيون أن يشكلوا حكومة قادرة وفاعلة ووطنية وأولوياتها هي فعلا أول
مصالحهم. وأحب أن أقول أّن ما جرى هذه الأيام في تونس يجب أن يكون عبرة، وطبعا بالمناسبة يجب أن أبارك 
للشعب التونسي ثورته وانتفاضته وقيامه التاريخي، العبرة أين، ليست فقط في: "إذا الشعب يوما أراد الحياة"، العبرة 
بقي طول عمره مع فرنسا وطول عمره مع أمريكا وطول عمره مع الغرب، وحتى  في رئيس هذا النظام وفريقه الذي
مع إسرائيل كان فاتحا خطوطا، ومفهوم موقف هذا النظام من كل القضايا الأساسية في المنطقة ماذا كان، هؤلاء الذين 
راتهم، بل قالوا لكل أقاربه أنتم خدمهم طوال هذه السنين لم يستقبلوه ولم يعطوه فيزا ولم يقبلوا أن تنزل طائرته في مطا
غير مرحب بكم "فلّو وحملو وامشو"... العبرة أنه نحن اللبنانيون والشعب اللبناني وأي شعب وأي حكومة وأي سلطة، 
هذا البلد يستمر إذا العالم جلست مع بعضها وفهمت على بعضها وأخذت مع بعضها، عندما قيل أّن الـ سين سين وصل 
قيادات سياسية لبنانية، وهذا الموضوع طرح حتى من الرابية عندما أعلن الوزراء أعلنوا  لطريق مسدود خرجت
استقالتهم، وقالوا نحن نبحث عن حل لبناني لبناني، لكن إذا كنّا نحن اللبنانيون غير جديرين أن نصنع حلا وغير 
 قادرين أن نصل إلى حل فلدينا مشكلة.
 
ضوع اللبناني فهذا سيؤدي إلى تدويل الأزمة في لبنان وسيؤدي إلى تعقيد المشكلة الآن إذا تدخلت أمريكا والغرب بالمو
في لبنان وسيؤدي إلى تشابك مصالح كبيرة وخطيرة في لبنان في الوقت الذي معروف قدر مشكلتنا ونحن كلبنانيين 
ندما جاء المسعى السوري قادرون أن نجلس ونحلها، لكن هناك إصرار من الفريق الآخر أنه لا نريد أن نحل، وحتى ع
 ـ السعودي وكان من الممكن أن نصل إلى حل تّم إجهاض هذا الحل وبمشاركة لبنانية.
 
نحن لا نقفل أبوابا أبدا،ً ونحن نقول أن مستقبل لبنان يتوقف على الحوار وعلى التلاقي وعلى التعاون وعلى الإيجابية 
للبناني بأمريكا وبالغرب وبالعالم فهو مشتبه مشتبه مشتبه وعليه ولكن إذا أراد أحد أن يستقوي على جزء من الشعب ا
 أن يتعظ من كل التجارب التي تحصل في المنطقة.
 
هناك أناس سيقولون: انتظروا لتروا القرار الظني وما الأدلة التي لديه، (لكن) الأدلة التي لديه قرأناها في ديرشبيغل 
ية الكويتية وفي التلفزيون الكندي وموجودة عند كل العالم ومعروف على وقرأناها في اللوموند وقرأناها في السياس
ماذا اعتمد (القرار الظني) وعلى ماذا فُْبِرك وكيف لُِفَق هذا الموضوع من أوله إلى آخره، ولا يوجد هناك لا سرية 
ا القرار وقلنا أّن هذه تحقيق ولا وثائق سرية وما في شي، وكله موجود عند كل العالم. لذلك نحن طلعنا ورفضنا هذ
المحكمة واقعها واحد إثنان ثلاثة أربعة وهذا التحقيق واقعه واحد إثنان ولم نطلع لنشتم ولكن طلعنا وقلنا أّن هذه هي 
  الوقائع وهذه هي المعطيات وهذه هي الحقائق بناء عليه وصفناها بمحكمة أمريكية إسرائيلية.
 
عا نحن سوف نرى ماذا سيجري غدا وبعد غد بموضوع القرار الظني هذا مسار مستقل عن مسار الحكومة، وطب
وعلى ضوئه نحن سنتصرف وسندافع عن كرامتنا وعن وجودنا وعن سمعتنا، كيف سنتصرف هذا له علاقة بقيادة 
حزب الله وبالتشاور والتواصل مع حلفائنا ولكن بالتأكيد نحن مسؤولون أن نتعاطى مع هذا الموضوع وأعود وأقول 
ن نفك المسارين عن بعضهما، وبالتأكيد على كل الذي تحدثنا به في الأشهر الماضية نحن قوم لن نسمح أن تمس نح
سمعتنا وكرامتنا أو أن يُتآمر علينا أو أن يأتي أحد في العالم وفي الكون ِليُلَبَِّسنَا ظلما وعدوانا دم الرئيس الشهيد رفيق 
أناس يقولون لنا "طولو بالكم بعد المحكمة يمكن تبّرئ ويمكن ما تبرئ"، الذي  الحريري ولو ظنّا ولو اتهاما لأّن هناك
وضع القرار الظني سيضع قرار المحكمة، وهذه المحكمة عند الإدارة الأمريكية وعند تل أبيب بالمطلق "وكل واحد 
  ماشي معها هو يخدم هذا المشروع" َعِلَم أم لم يعلم.
لبعد غد على ضوء الذي سيصدر وسنقرأه ونراه وإن شاء الله نحن يمكن أن نقول كيف لذلك هذا الشق أنا أتركه للغد و
  سنتصرف، والتوقيت والمضمون والكيفية لها علاقة بتشخيصنا للمصالح.
واقع الحال هكذا وهذا البلد نتيجة الأطماع به أدخل منذ سنوات في هذه المحنة وبهذه الفتنة، وطبعا أنا قراءتي والقرائن 
قدمتها في المؤتمر الصحفي سابقا أن الإسرائيليين هم الذين قتلوا الرئيس الحريري وهم الذين ارتكبوا الإغتيالات  التي
  في لبنان ليعملوا تغييرا كاملا في الوضع اللبناني.
كان يعني في السنوات الماضية وفي السنة الماضية والتي قبلها عبّروا (الإسرائيليون) عن إحباطهم أّن المشروع الذي 
أّن الفريق الفلاني سيسطر على لبنان للأسف لم ينجح ولم يقدر ولم يتمكن، لكن هم لم ييأسوا وهم يكملون بالإستهداف 
ويكملون بمحاولة المحاصرة والعزل ويكملون بطموح السيطرة على لبنان وتحويل لبنان إلى موقع آخر تماما وإلى 
ف، لكن أحب أن أقول لهم أنّه خلال كل السنين الماضية وفي أصعب واقع داخلي مختلف وإلى موقع إقليمي مختل
الظروف وفي أشد اللحظات عندما كان جورج بوش جالسا في واشنطن (...)، وعندما كانت الجيوش الأمريكية زاحفة 




خلال السنوات الماضية لم يبَق شيء إلا ّواجهناه : حرب سياسية وحرب إعلامية وتضليل وتشويه وأكاذيب وحرب 
وتروننا اليوم نحن أين، وأعود وأؤكد أّن المتابعين بهذا المشروع  6002أمنية واغتيالات وحرب عسكرية عام 
س حسبت لهم حساباتهم الغلط والآن هنا أيضا تحسبون حساباتهم غلط كثيرا وأنا في خطاب سابق وفي محطات خم
غلط... ِمن الممكن أن تعيد الإستشارات الرئيس سعد الحريري، لا نعرف بالنهاية ميول النواب كيف يمكن أن تذهب 
ا لكن هذا بداية لمرحلة جديدة وليس نهاية المرحلة وأنتم تحسبون غلط، وإذا كنتم تعتقدون أنه بإمكانكم أن تستعينو
بالقرار الظني لاستهداف المقاومة فأنتم تحسبون غلط كثيرا وأنا لا أحتاج أّن أفّصل أكثر من ذلك لأنّه على ضوء ما 
  سيقوم به السيد بلمار في هذين اليومين سيكون لي كلام آخر.
والمسؤولية والحرص والقدرة أتمنى أّن يعين الله سبحانه وتعالى الشعب اللبناني ويعطي القيادات اللبنانية كلها الحكمة 
 على تجاوز هذه المحن، لكن هذه طبيعة الحياة.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
